JEANNE LYNN STARR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
August 3, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000538-MR
JEANNE LYNN STARR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00142
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Jeanne Lynn Starr appeals from a judgment of the
Jessamine Circuit Court entered on February 29, 2000, sentencing
her to imprisonment for two years for theft by deception over
$300 and forgery in the second degree on a conditional plea of
guilty under CR1 8.09.
Under the conditional plea, Starr
reserved the right to appeal the circuit court’s decision denying
her motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
pursuant to KRS2 500.110.
After reviewing the record and the
arguments of counsel, we find no error and, therefore affirm.
On June 9, 1998, Starr obtained possession of a 1998
Subaru Forester through a lease agreement using a false identity
supported by a fictitious driver’s license and credit card.
On
July 2, 1998, Detective Chris Hinerman filed a criminal complaint
in Jessamine District Court charging Starr with theft by
deception over $3003 and forgery in the second degree4.
The
district court issued an arrest warrant the same day and the
warrants were served on Starr in Lexington, Kentucky, on July 3,
1998.
Starr subsequently was incarcerated at the Kentucky
Correctional Institution for Women (KCIW) at Peewee Valley,
Kentucky, in December 1998.
A detainer for Starr issued by the
Jessamine District Court was lodged with KCIW in either December
1998 or February 1999.5
On April 30, 1999, Starr filed a handwritten pro se
motion entitled “Motion to Include Charges Pursuant to Federal
Rule 40.1; or Dismiss Charges Due to Non-Reply/Response of Fast
and Speedy Trial Request.”
In the motion, she asked the district
2
Kentucky Revised Statute.
3
KRS 514.040.
4
KRS 516.030.
5
The record is unclear on exactly when Starr was received at
KCIW and when the first district court detainer was lodged by the
prison. Starr alleges she was incarcerated at KCIW on December
21, 1998, and a detainer was received by the prison on the same
date. An Acknowledgement of Detainer document in the record
indicates that a district court detainer was lodged at KCIW on
February 24, 1999.
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court to allow the federal court6 to resolve the pending Kentucky
state felony charges or alternatively to dismiss the indictment
based on two speedy trial requests she alleged to have made on
September 21, 1998, and December 23, 1998.
The district court
issued an order of transport to the KCIW for arraignment
scheduled for May 19, 1999, but Starr was not available because
she had been transported to Detroit, Michigan, on federal
criminal charges.
On July 6, 1999, Starr filed a pro se motion to dismiss
the indictment under KRS 500.110 stating she had filed a previous
motion for final disposition more than 180 days earlier and had
received no response.
The certificate of service states a copy
of the July 6 motion was mailed to the Jessamine County
Commonwealth’s Attorney.
On July 13, 1999, Starr appeared before the district
court for a preliminary hearing, which resulted in the court
waiving the case to the grand jury.
The detainer issued by the
Jessamine District Court was released on September 24, 1999.
On August 27, 1999, the Jessamine County grand jury
issued an indictment charging Starr with theft by deception over
$300 and forgery in the second degree.
The Jessamine Circuit
Court issued a bench warrant for her arrest and scheduled
arraignment for September 24, 1999.
On that date, Starr did not
appear and the court was informed she was incarcerated in either
Michigan or KCIW.
On September 27, 1999, KCIW lodged a detainer
6
Starr apparently had fraud charges pending against her in
federal court in Michigan at the time.
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based on the indictment and bench warrant out of Jessamine
Circuit Court.
Starr sent another pro se motion to dismiss the
indictment to the Jessamine Circuit Court dated October 15, 1999
(and filed October 20, 1999) seeking dismissal pursuant to KRS
500.110 for failure to bring her to trial within 180 days under
the time limits in the statute.
In the motion, she alleged that
she had “filed” with the Jessamine County courts a motion for
speedy trial pursuant to KRS 500.110 in December 1998, and a
motion to dismiss the indictment in July 1999, but had received
no response.
She also stated that she had raised the issue of
these motions with the district court judge at the preliminary
hearing but was told she needed to bring the matter before the
circuit court.
The certificate of service on the October 1999
motion indicated a copy of the motion had been sent to the
Jessamine County Commonwealth’s Attorney.
On November 2, 1999,
circuit court Judge Robert Jackson entered an order denying the
motion to dismiss stating that Starr had not complied with the
procedural requirements of KRS 500.110.
The court said Starr
needed to notify the Jessamine County Commonwealth’s Attorney of
her request for a speedy trial under the statute.
On November
29, 1999, Starr was arraigned in Jessamine Circuit Court and an
attorney was appointed to represent her.
On January 24, 2000, Starr’s attorney filed a motion to
dismiss the indictment pursuant to KRS 500.110.
In the
memorandum, counsel alleged that Starr had been incarcerated at
KCIW on December 21, 1998.
Attached to the motion was a document
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from the KCIW records supervisor indicating that the prison had
received a district court detainer on December 21, 1998.
Relying on Huddleston v. Jennings,7 counsel argued that Starr’s
motions for speedy trial in September 1998 and December 1998 were
sufficient to invoke the requirements of KRS 500.110.
In
February 2000, Starr sent a pro se motion for dismissal under KRS
500.110 to the circuit court and the Commonwealth’s Attorney in
which she cited Huddleston, supra, based on her earlier motions
of December 1998 and July 1999.
She attached handwritten copies
of letters she allegedly sent to the Jessamine County
Commonwealth’s Attorney dated April 5, 1999, April 16, 1999, and
April 27, 1999, discussing her attempts to raise the speedy trial
issue in her motions of December 1998 and April 1999.
On February 1, 2000, the circuit court conducted a
hearing on Starr’s motion to dismiss the indictment under KRS
500.110.
The Commonwealth argued that Starr had failed to
establish that she had complied with the filing requirements of
the statute.
Copies of the various motions and correspondence
from Starr to the Commonwealth’s Attorney were entered into the
circuit court record at the hearing.
The court denied the motion
stating Starr had failed to properly notify the County Attorney
of her speedy trial request and that trial had been scheduled
within the 180 day period once the request was properly lodged
with the Commonwealth’s Attorney and circuit court.
Following denial of her motion to dismiss, Starr
entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to CR 8.09 to the
7
Ky. App., 723 S.W.2d 381 (1986).
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two offenses reserving the right to appeal the circuit court’s
denial of the motion to dismiss.
The court sentenced Starr in
accordance with the Commonwealth’s recommendation to two years on
each of the two counts of theft by deception over $300 and
forgery in the second degree to run concurrently for a total
sentence of two years.
This appeal followed.
Starr contends that the circuit court erred in holding
that she was not entitled to dismissal of the indictment because
she had been brought to trial within the 180 day period
prescribed by KRS 500.110, which states as follows:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional
institution of this state, and whenever
during the continuance of the term of
imprisonment there is pending in any
jurisdiction of this state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which a detainer has been lodged
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within one hundred and eighty (180)
days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the
place of his imprisonment and his request for
a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information or complaint;
provided that for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance.
Starr sets forth a time sequence in her appellate brief
for her correspondence and alleged requests for a speedy trial
beginning with December 23, 1998, and including April 5, 1999,
April 16, 1999, April 30, 1999, July 1, 1999, July 6, 1999, and
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October 20, 1999.8
She argues that because a detainer out of
Jessamine District Court was lodged against her on December 21,
1999, any of the above-noted requests, other than the last, would
support dismissal under the statute.
She relies on the leading
case interpreting KRS 500.110, Huddleston v. Jennings, where the
court indicated that a defendant need not make an additional
request for a speedy trial in circuit court following indictment
by a grand jury where a proper request was made in district court
in a felony case that begins in district court.
The court felt
it was not an unreasonable burden to require the county attorney
and district court to forward the request for final disposition
to the Commonwealth’s Attorney and circuit court, respectively,
following transfer of the case to the circuit court for
indictment.9
The court stated:
We believe the intent of the statute is that
the 180 days begin to run once an otherwise
proper request is made to the court in which
the detainer charge was pending when lodged
and to the normal prosecutor in that court.
An indictment on the same charge subsequent
to the lodging of the detainer would not
require that the request be made to the
circuit court and the Commonwealth Attorney
unless the indictment had become the basis
for the detainer. If, however, the
subsequent indictment is known to the
prisoner, there appears no sound reason why
he should not be entitled to make his request
8
Counsel has not included the September 1998 request perhaps
because it would not qualify under the statute because it
preceded the earliest alleged date of the district court
detainer. See note 11.
9
723 S.W.2d at 383 (emphasis added).
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directly to the circuit court and the
Commonwealth’s Attorney.10
In the current case, the circuit court found that the
October 20, 1999, motion was the first request that complied with
the requirements of KRS 500.110.
It refused to acknowledge the
December 23, 1998, motion because Starr failed to prove that it
had been filed with the district court.
Starr did not provide a
copy of the December 1998 motion, and there was no copy in the
record.
In addition, we note that there is a conflict in the
record concerning whether a detainer was actually lodged in
December 1998 as alleged by Starr or in February 1999.
If the
detainer was not lodged with KCIW until February 1999, the
December 1998 request would not qualify under the statute because
it would have preceded the district court detainer.11
Similarly, although the district court received notice
of Starr’s motions and requests in April 1999, the circuit court
found that there was nothing in the record indicating that any of
the motions or letters requesting final disposition had been
served on the county attorney.
Indeed, the documents in the
record and those provided at the February 2000 hearing indicated
that the motions (requests) were sent to the Commonwealth’s
Attorney.
Of course, once the case was transferred to the
circuit court and that court’s detainer was lodged, Starr had to
give notice to the circuit court and the Commonwealth’s Attorney,
10
Id.
11
Id. (The triggering mechanism bringing the statute into
play is the lodging of a detainer against a prisoner); Rushin v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 931 S.W.2d 456 (1996).
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her attempt to notify the district court having failed.
We agree
with the circuit court’s analysis, and a review of the record
supports the finding that Starr failed to comply with KRS 500.110
prior to October 1999.
She did not notify in writing the proper
prosecuting officer (the county attorney) and the appropriate
court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction (the district
court) related to the district court detainer lodged against her.
Starr asserts that the initial November 1999 circuit
court order denying her motion to dismiss, which states that the
proper prosecuting officer for notice was the Commonwealth’s
Attorney, and the second February 2000 circuit court order
denying the motion, which states that she had to notify the
county attorney, are inherently contradictory.
The inconsistency
can perhaps be explained by the lack of information available to
the court when it made the initial ruling.
The first order was
rendered based on Starr’s pro se October 1999 motion without a
hearing.
It appears that the circuit court may have known of the
September 1999 circuit court detainer but was not fully aware of
the February 1999 district court detainer.
In any event, the circuit court subsequently appointed
counsel for Starr and she was allowed to refile the motion to
dismiss.
Starr renewed the motion and the court conducted a
hearing providing her an opportunity to submit further
documentation and evidence to support her position.
As the court
noted, the situation was complicated by the fact that Starr was
transferred from state custody to federal custody on several
occasions throughout the period.
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Despite Starr’s numerous
efforts to accelerate the prosecution of her case, she has failed
to establish that she complied with the requirements of KRS
500.110.
Her notices to the Commonwealth’s Attorney prior to the
indictment and transfer to circuit court, at which time he became
responsible for prosecuting the case, were not sufficient to
invoke the statutory time limitations.
Although pro se
pleadings are generally treated liberally, we cannot say the
circuit court erred in finding that Starr failed to comply with
requirements of KRS 500.110 and in denying her motion to dismiss
the indictment.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Jessamine Circuit Court.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent.
I
believe that the appellant is entitled to rely on Huddleston v.
Jennings, Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 381 (1986), for the proposition
that she made timely efforts to comply with the notification
requirement of KRS 500.110 repeatedly.
At the very least, the
cumulative import of the numerous notices that she sent should be
taken into consideration.
Huddleston essentially holds that the
intent of the statute is that a prisoner give meaningful notice
in timely fashion - not that he or she be held to a hypertechnical standard of compliance requiring repetitious notices to
the same authorities.
It appears to me that the appellant in
this case substantially complied with the statute as construed by
Huddleston, supra.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Pam Clay
Lexington, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
John E. Zak
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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