TCI/TKR CABLE OF NORTHERN KENTUCKY, INC., D/B/A TKR CABLE OF NORTHERN KENTUCKY, INC.; TCI/TKR CABLE OF SOUTHERN KENTUCKY, INC., D/B/A TKR CABLE OF SOUTHERN KENTUCKY, INC.; TCI CABLEVISION OF NORTH CENTRAL KENTUCKY, INC.; TCI CABLEVISION OF KENTUCKY, INC.; INTERMEDIA PARTNERS OF KENTUCKY, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V. HON. WILLIAM L. GRAHAM JUDGE, FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT AND CHARLES SHAW; LORETTA SHAW
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 29, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001524-OA
TCI/TKR CABLE OF NORTHERN KENTUCKY,
INC., D/B/A TKR CABLE OF NORTHERN
KENTUCKY, INC.; TCI/TKR CABLE OF SOUTHERN
KENTUCKY, INC., D/B/A TKR CABLE OF
SOUTHERN KENTUCKY, INC.; TCI CABLEVISION OF
NORTH CENTRAL KENTUCKY, INC.;
TCI CABLEVISION OF KENTUCKY, INC.;
INTERMEDIA PARTNERS OF KENTUCKY, A LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP
v.
PETITIONERS
ORIGINAL ACTION
REGARDING FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HON. WILLIAM L. GRAHAM
JUDGE, FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
RESPONDENT
AND
CHARLES SHAW;
LORETTA SHAW
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
AND;
NO.
2000-CA-001621-OA
INTERMEDIA PARTNERS OF KENTUCKY, L.P.;
TCI/TKR OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, INC.;
v.
PETITIONERS
ORIGINAL ACTION
REGARDING JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON. LISABETH H. ABRAMSON
JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT,
DIVISION THREE
RESPONDENT
AND
JAMES F. DOOLEY;
ALFRED P. SYKES JR.;
CHARLES PEARL, AND
LINDA PEARL
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
* * * * * * * * * * * *
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING CR 76.36 RELIEF
BEFORE: DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
These two original actions are being reviewed
together because they raise the same issue and seek the same
relief.
Each was prompted by the denial of petitioners’ motion
to dismiss action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The
controversy in both cases centers around petitioners’ “passthrough” of a pro rata share of the Kentucky Public Service
Corporation Tax (hereinafter KPSC Tax)1 to their customers
through separate line itemization, rather than embedded in the
basic monthly cable rate.
The query addressed below, and now
presented to this Court, relates to whether the pending
complaints challenging the lawfulness of that practice establish
the actions as cable television rate regulation cases, an area
over which the United States Congress has delegated exclusive
jurisdiction to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and
to the local franchising authorities (LFA’s).
Petitioners
contend that they do and, consequently, ask this Court to require
the respondent trial courts to dismiss the actions.
In Franklin County, the litigation pending before the
Honorable William L. Graham was initiated by Charles Shaw and
1
The tax is imposed on cable companies’ tangible and
intangible business property. Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
136.120.
-2-
Loretta Shaw (hereinafter the Shaws). The gravamen of their
complaint is that petitioners are including the KPSC Tax as a
separate charge in their monthly cable service bills under the
line item designation “State/Local Tax” and/or “Prop/Facility
Tax”.
They contend that this billing practice “is calculated to
mislead the defendants’ subscribers into believing that said
charge is “permitted and authorized” and “is a condition
precedent to the customers’ continued receipt of cable television
services.”
The complaint includes counts for violation of the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act;
fraudulent misrepresentation;
concealment and nondisclosure; and breach of contract.
Relief
sought includes monetary damages and injunctive relief.
In denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, Judge Graham rejected their argument
that the Shaws’ fraud claim regarding the cable companies’
treatment of a state property tax relates to regulation for
purposes of federal preemption.
The court found that Congress
did not, expressly or by virtue of its intent spelled out in the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
(hereinafter The Cable Act), 47 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 521
et seq., totally preempt state court action over the treatment of
state taxes by cable companies.
The Franklin Circuit Court
determined that, although said treatment affects the rates as
charged, it does not compromise the intent of Congress to make
rate regulation uniform.
Judge Graham concluded that the Shaws’
claims were properly before him because his review will be
limited to the resolution of state statutory and common law
-3-
questions.
In Jefferson County, the consolidated litigation
pending before the Honorable Lisabeth H. Abramson was initiated
by the real parties in interest, James F. Dooley, et al., and its
substantive content is essentially the same as that set forth in
the Franklin County action.2
An amended complaint added a count
for violation of the Cable Act and 47 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) 76.985 and, further, invoked KRS 446.070 in support of a
private cause of action for violation of the federal statute and
regulation.
Judge Abramson dismissed the claims brought under the
Cable Act and under KRS 446.070 but otherwise denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
refused to label the case as being “rate” or “not rate”.
She
Rather,
she answered in the affirmative the question as to whether the
plaintiffs have made claims not affecting cable rate structure
and that a state court could consider under state consumer
protection, contract and tax laws without invading the FCC’s
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate cable television rates.
Judge
Abramson distinguished Time Warner Cable v. Doyle, 66 F.3d 867
(7th Cir. 1995), a case on which petitioners rely.
She found
that, while Time Warner involved a challenge to a provider’s
2
Petitioners sought to remove the pending actions to federal
court. The United States District Court, Western District of
Kentucky, stated that it did not “find that Congress manifested
the clear intent to completely preempt the area of cable
television billing practices.” It concluded that, in the absence
of complete preemption, it lacked the subject matter jurisdiction
to address the merits of petitioners’ defense. Therefore, the
court remanded the actions to state court “to decide the
preemption issues and other defenses. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).”
-4-
negative option billing practice, thereby putting cable rates at
issue, the case sub judice involves “whether a particular state
property tax can be passed through to the subscriber on a
separate line item” and “is not about the rate for services.”
Petitioners claim entitlement to the extraordinary
remedy of a writ based on the argument that, the state courts
being without jurisdiction, it is desirable to terminate
litigation early to economize resources and to prevent unlawful
assumption of judicial authority.
On the merits, petitioners contend the tax is a charge
that comes within the federal regulatory rate structure and that
allowing individual subscribers to seek redress in state court
regarding previously paid rates would interfere with the uniform
federal scheme of rate regulation and would be a subversion of
the regulatory balance intended by Congress.
They advance the
conclusion that, because the Cable Act expressly preempts state
regulation of cable rates, the pending state law claims, which
are about federally regulated cable rates, are not within state
court jurisdiction.
Having thoroughly reviewed the arguments and the
appended record, the Court determines that these original actions
are not well taken.
Therefore, it is ORDERED that the petitions
for writ of prohibition and the motions for oral argument be
DENIED.
The Court is mindful that the Cable Act includes an
explicit and expansive provision for the federal preemption of
the regulation of cable rates.
The statute provides as follows:
-5-
No Federal agency or State may regulate the
rates for the provision of cable service
except to the extent provided under this
section and section 532 of this title. Any
franchising authority may regulate the rates
for the provision of cable service, or any
other communications service provided over a
cable system to cable subscribers, but only to
the extent provided under this section . . . .
47 U.S.C. §543(a)(1).
As correctly determined by both Judge
Abramson and Judge Graham, this provision is to be read in
conjunction with that set forth in 47 U.S.C. §552 (d)(1) which
provides:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to
prohibit any State or any franchising
authority from enacting or enforcing any
consumer protection law, to the extent not
specifically preempted by this title.
Clearly, this statute recognizes the continued
viability of state consumer protection laws unless “specifically
preempted” and petitioners have failed to advance any federal
authority which would specifically preempt state action over the
state law claims asserted by the plaintiffs below.
Neither do
they point us to any authority that would support an argument
that state action thereon is preempted impliedly or by conflict.
Our review of the case law on which petitioners rely
only bolsters the conclusion that Congress did not intend
complete federal preemption of state regulation connected to
cable television billing practices, and that concurrent
jurisdiction exists with state courts where the state law does
not conflict with the operation of the cable rate structure, and
where the issues raised in the state claims do not jeopardize the
stability of the rate structure and, we might add, do not appear
-6-
to require agency expertise for resolution.
We shall quote the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit:
[The] structure of the Cable Act is wholly
inconsistent with the claim that Congress
intended to pre-empt all state regulations
with an affect on the rates cable companies
charge for the provision of cable services . . . .
. . . .
[W]e think Congress meant to pre-empt
only those state rules that regulate rates
charged by cable companies for providing
services to customers.
Cable Television Ass’n v. Finneran, 954 F.2d 91, 101-02 (2nd Cir.
1992).
We shall also quote the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit:
Each version of the statute, but especially
the new version, applicable in this case,
suggests that Congress envisioned a
regulatory regimen in which cable regulators
would be subject both to the federal
requirements of the 1992 Cable Act with
respect to matters of rate regulation and, at
the same time, to the requirements of certain
state consumer protection laws.
Time Warner Cable v. Doyle, 66 F.3d 867, 878 (7th. Cir. 1994).
The plaintiffs below are not challenging the legality
of a rate for the provision of cable services.
They are not
even challenging the amount of a charge appearing on their
bills.
What they are challenging is the legality of a billing
practice they allege is “calculated to mislead” them into
thinking the charge has been “authorized”3 and is a “condition
3
It must be noted that petitioners sought an opinion from
the FCC. The FCC responded with a letter which is not a final
pronouncement on the matter. In fact, the document concludes
-7-
precedent” to maintaining cable service.
Both trial courts
correctly recognized that the FCC would have exclusive
jurisdiction were the charge the plaintiffs are challenging one
that is embedded in the basic cable rate.
Judge Graham
specifically found that “pass-through fees per se may be subject
to exclusive federal jurisdiction, but that is not what is
before this Court.”
Judge Abramson stated that “clearly, if the
present case required this Court to determine whether the KPSC
Tax should have been embedded in Defendant’s rates and approved
by the franchising authorities in the first instance, the rate
for services would be at issue.”
We agree with the trial courts
that the controlling element is not that the addition of the
state tax to customer bills is affecting the rates as charged.
Rather, we see it as being rooted into petitioners’ chosen
method of passing it to their customers and the nature of the
claims made against it.
In conclusion, this Court is of the opinion that
state court adjudication of the state law claims at issue does
not invade the expressly preempted realm of rate regulation
even though, as noted by Judge Graham, “these state law claims
concern underlying collateral federal issues . . . .”
ALL CONCUR.
with the statement: “[i]f the subject matter in question is
covered by the Commission’s rules, issues relating thereto should
be resolved in accordance with our regulatory procedures.” We
understand that certain administrative proceedings in Northern
Kentucky and in Jefferson County preceded the initiation of the
litigation discussed herein. While they remain pending at this
time in Northern Kentucky, petitioners have settled with the FCC
and the LFA’s in Jefferson County.
-8-
ENTERED: September 29, 2000
/s/ Julia K. Tackett
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS:
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS
Laurence Zielke
Benjamin S. Schecter
Janice M. Theriot
Keith A. Hall
Louisville, Kentucky
No response filed.
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTIES IN
INTEREST:
Dan E. Siebert
Louisville, Kentucky
John L. Tate
Louisville, Kentucky
Vincent E. Johnson
Louisville, Kentucky
Marjorie A. Farris
Louisville, Kentucky
Richard M. Breen
Louisville, Kentucky
Mark Kevin Gray
Louisville, Kentucky
-9-
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