PASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC. v. HANSFORD YOUNG; HON. DONALD G. SMITH, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 8, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000630-WC
PASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-00773
v.
HANSFORD YOUNG; HON. DONALD G. SMITH,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Paschall Truck Lines, Inc. (Paschall) asks us to
review an opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board (the Board)
rendered February 11, 2000.
342.290.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
We affirm.
The Board affirmed an opinion and award of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rendered March 12, 1999, awarding
appellee, Hansford Young, benefits for permanent, partial
disability as a result of a work-related injury sustained on
April 23, 1997.
On appeal, Paschall presents a single issue for
our review:
whether the Board erred by failing to "carve out" a
portion of Young's award for "the natural aging process."
Resolution of this question requires interpretation of
KRS 342.0011(1), enacted by the legislature effective December
12, 1996.
That section provides as follows:
"Injury" means any work-related traumatic
event or series of traumatic events,
including cumulative trauma, arising out of
and in the course of employment which is the
proximate cause producing a harmful change in
the human organism evidenced by objective
medical findings. "Injury" does not include
the effects of the natural aging process, and
does not include any communicable disease
unless the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the nature of the employment.
"Injury" when used generally, unless the
context indicates otherwise, shall include an
occupational disease and damage to a
prosthetic appliance, but shall not include a
psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related
change in the human organism, unless it is a
direct result of a physical injury.
(Emphasis added).
In view of the foregoing, we must look to the evidence
to determine whether it supports the award.
In reaching his
conclusions, the ALJ observed as follows:
On April 23, 1997, Plaintiff slipped and
twisted his left knee while getting down from
his truck. Plaintiff was first seen by Dr.
Pushkarewicz. Dr. Pushkarewicz eventually
performed surgery on the Plaintiff's knee.
Plaintiff could not return to work as a truck
driver because he has difficulty walking and
climbing into his truck and securing the
loads. Plaintiff continues to treat with Dr.
Pushkarewicz.
* * * *
Dr. Pushkarewicz first examined the Plaintiff
on July 17, 1997. He reported that the
Plaintiff has reached maximum medical
improvement on April 30, 1998. He assigned
-2-
the Plaintiff an 8% impairment rating. He
apportioned 70% of this impairment to arousal
of the natural aging process due to his
diagnosis of degenerative arthritis of the
left knee.
* * * *
Both Dr. Pushkarewicz and Dr. Sharps
indicated Plaintiff's left knee condition was
caused, at least in part, by the work injury
on April 23, 1997.
(Opinion at 3-5).
The essence of the appellant's argument is
that the ALJ should have excluded the effects of "the natural
aging process" in computing Young's award.
Paschall contends
that the majority of Young's disability is attributable to the
effects of degenerative arthritis.
Consequently, it argues that
the ALJ erred by failing to "carve out" a significant portion of
the award.
We do not agree.
The effects of "the natural aging process" are not at
issue in this matter.
While degenerative arthritis may be said
to be a part of the natural aging process in some cases, the
extent to which Young suffered its disabling effects was a direct
result of his work-related injury.
We agree with the Board’s
conclusion that "that which is a dormant, nondisabling condition
has not now become ‘the natural aging process.’" An equating of
these terms would serve to preclude automatically an award for a
work-related injury simply by reference to the worker’s age.
believe that the circumstances of each case must be carefully
reviewed to discern where an injury is the result of working
conditions at its inception — rather than invoking the term
"natural aging process" as a blanket exclusion for recovery.
-3-
We
The medical evidence presented in this case indicates
simply that Young's April 1997 fall caused him to suffer a
disability.
Therefore, the evidence requires a finding that
Young suffered a work-related injury, entitling him to coverage
under the Workers' Compensation Act.
KRS 342.0011(1).
Since
there is ample evidence in the record to support a finding of
work-related disability, we are bound to affirm.
The weight and
sufficiency of the evidence are matters for the fact-finder.
See
Square D Co. v. Tipton, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 308 (1993), and Paramount
Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985).
at liberty to disturb the ALJ's determination.
We are not
See Cal Glo Coal
Co. v. Mahan, Ky. App., 729 S.W.2d 455 (1987).
We affirm the opinion and award of the Workers'
Compensation Board.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
R. Christion Hutson
Paducah, KY
Rodger W. Lofton
Paducah, KY
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