DARRELL KASSON v. HARSCO CORPORATION/HECKETT MULTISERV; HON. RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: November 3, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000623-WC
DARRELL KASSON
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-76906
v.
HARSCO CORPORATION/HECKETT MULTISERV;
HON. RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Darrell Kasson petitions for review of a
decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board which affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge’s dismissal of a claim for failure to
give timely notice of the injury.
We opine the notice was
timely, vacate the dismissal and remand for further
consideration.
On September 22, 1997, Kasson allegedly injured his
back at work.
He testified that within 10 to 15 minutes of the
incident, he verbally told his supervisor.
The supervisor
disputed the date, contending he was first notified by Kasson on
October 3, 1997, some 11 days after the alleged injury.
After a
claim was filed, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that
notice was not given until October 3, 1997, and that the notice
was untimely, dismissing the case.
The Board affirmed, finding
the question of a timely notice to be a mixed question of law and
fact, and noted that the late notice didn’t cause Harsco any
prejudice.
As to the October 3, 1997 notice being considered “as
soon as practicable,” after the injury, the Workers’ Compensation
Board (“Board”) said it was a factual issue.
We disagree.
There was conflicting evidence as to whether Kasson
verbally gave notice to his supervisor on September 22, 1997.
This is an issue of fact for the ALJ.
When presented with
conflicting evidence, the ALJ decides the competency and
credibility of the evidence as well as the believability of the
evidence, and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment.
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985);
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15 (1977);
KRS 342.285.
The ALJ concluded Kasson did not give notice on the
date of injury, but on October 3, 1997, some 11 days after the
alleged injury.
The next question is whether the notice on October 3,
1997 is “notice of the accident to the employer as soon as
practical . . . .”
KRS 342.185.
Under Harry M. Stevens Co. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Board, Ky. App., 553 S.W.2d 852 (1977),
the date of notice is an issue of fact (here October 3, 1997),
but whether or not it is timely is an issue of law, depending on
the factual findings of the totality of the surrounding
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circumstances.
In the case sub judice, the ALJ discusses the
medical evidence in great detail and infers the September 22,
1997 injury is not the cause of Kasson’s disability.
Then the
ALJ gives two reasons for the timely notice requirement of KRS
342.200:
first, for immediate treatment of the worker to avoid
increased costs and disability - which doesn’t apply here because
Kasson was promptly treated at his own expense.
The Board even
acknowledges the 11-day delay caused no prejudice to the
employer.
The second, and applicable reason for this case, is
that:
some misguided individuals might later
attempt to take advantage of a non-work
injury by remaining silent about the non-work
injury and then give an employer notice of
and make claim of a work related injury on a
date that preceded the date of the non-work
injury. The later or more remotely that
notice is given from the date of injury
increases the difficulty the employer has of
verifying that a work related injury did
occur. Although the great majority of
claimants are honest in the reports and
claims of injury, the acts of the few
dishonest claimants has [sic] created the
notice burden for all claimants.
The ALJ’s reasoning is valid,1 but the application is
incorrect in Kasson’s case.
Harsco stipulated an injury on
September 22, 1997, and the ALJ acknowledged such in paragraph
two of his findings of fact.
The ALJ determined the issues to be
decided were “notice, causation, entitlement to temporary total
disability, and extent and duration of disability.”
The ALJ’s
review of the facts makes it clear to us that he is questioning
1
Harlan Fuel Co. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 296 S.W.2d 722 (1956)
gave a third reason: to enable the employer to promptly
investigate the circumstances.
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causation, but calling it notice.
burden of giving timely notice.
S.W.2d 276 (1979).
Procedurally, Kasson has the
Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576
What is a timely notice is not dependent upon
a specific number of days from the incident to the notice.
Blackburn Brick Co. v. Yates, Ky., 424 S.W.2d 814 (1968).
Marc
But
the ALJ must look at the totality of the surrounding
circumstances to see if notice was timely.
at 852.
Stevens, 553 S.W.2d
Only if the notice is determined to be untimely does
Kasson need to show failure to give timely notice was occasioned
by mistake or other reasonable cause.
KRS 342.200.
In this
case, we opine as a matter of law, that the October 3, 1997
notice of the September 22, 1997 incident at work was timely
based on consideration of the ALJ’s findings on the surrounding
circumstances.
One of the circumstances which leads us to this
conclusion is the short time period (11 days) in light of all of
the medical evidence on causation.
In reviewing the ALJ’s
evaluation, it appears that he doesn’t think the September 22,
1997 incident was the causation of any disability.
may not be true, but that is not a notice issue.
That may or
Also, Kasson
received timely medical treatment as needed, much of it after the
October 3, 1997 notice, and without an increase in disability.
With the stipulation of a work injury on September 11, 1997,
there is not an allegation of fraud, lying, or an increased
difficulty in verifying that a work-related injury did occur.
Also, the incident of September 22, 1997 did not appear to be
serious at the time.
continued working.
It was not disabling in that Kasson
If he left immediately or missed work before
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the notice was given, we would expect a more prompt notice.
Again this overlaps with proof of causation, which was not
decided by the ALJ.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Board’s
conclusion that notice was untimely and remand for the ALJ to
consider causation, entitlement to temporary total disability,
and the extent and duration of disability, if any.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, AND JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCUR IN
RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, HARSCO
CORPORATION/HECKETT
MULTISERVE:
James M. Crawford
Carrollton, Kentucky
George R. Carter
Peter J. Glauber
Louisville, Kentucky
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