PONTIKI COAL CORPORATION V. GENE WHITT; HON. DONALD G. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 28, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000427-WC
PONTIKI COAL CORPORATION
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-72452
v.
GENE WHITT;
HON. DONALD G. SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Pontiki Coal Corporation asks us to review an
opinion and award of the Workers' Compensation Board (board)
rendered January 21, 2000.
342.290.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
We affirm.
The board affirmed an opinion and award of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rendered September 8, 1999,
awarding appellee, Gene Whitt, benefits for permanent and total
disability as a result of a work-related injury sustained on July
14, 1997.
On this appeal, Pontiki raises two questions for our
consideration: (1) whether the board appropriately and correctly
interpreted and applied the American Medical Association (AMA)
Guidelines on the issue of the effects of the natural aging
process; and (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial
evidence.
The resolution of these questions requires
interpretation of KRS 342.0011(1) enacted by the legislature
effective December 12, 1996.
That section provides as follows:
“Injury” means any work-related traumatic
event or series of traumatic events,
including cumulative trauma, arising out of
and in the course of employment which is the
proximate cause producing a harmful change in
the human organism evidenced by objective
medical findings. “Injury” does not include
the effects of the natural aging process, and
does not include any communicable disease
unless the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the nature of the employment.
“Injury” when used generally, unless the
context indicates otherwise, shall include an
occupational disease and damage to a
prosthetic appliance, but shall not include a
psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related
change in the human organism, unless it is a
direct result of a physical injury.
(Emphasis added.)
In view of the foregoing, we must look to the evidence to
determine whether it supports the award of total and permanent
disability in contemplation of the statute.
In affirming the
ALJ's award of total permanent disability, the board stated as
follows:
In order to accurately define the
meaning of permanent total disability under
the Workers' Compensation Act, as it was
modified on December 12, 1996, one must
consider the definition of “work” as
contained in KRS 342.0011(34) in addition to
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the definition of permanent total disability
in KRS 342.0011(1)(c). Placing these two
definitions together, one is directed to
consider the following:
The condition of an employee who,
due to an injury, has a permanent
disability rating and has a
complete and permanent inability
to perform any type of work
(providing services to another in
return for remuneration on a
regular and sustained basis in a
competitive economy) as a result
of an injury. . . . KRS
342.0011(11)(c); and KRS
342.0011(34).
The Legislature, by defining “work,” in
part with the use of the phrase “competitive
economy,” establishes that in determining
whether an individual is totally
occupationally disabled, one must not only
consider their performance of a job, but
their ability to “compete” for a job.
The essence of appellant's argument is that the board
should have excluded claimant's natural aging process in arriving
at his disability.
Pontiki contends the worker's disability is
attributable to his fifty years of age, and if the age element is
“carved out,” an award of total disability is unsustainable.
We
agree with the board that the Diagnostic Related Estimate Model
incorporated in the AMA Guidelines automatically excludes the
natural aging process.
This being so, and there being ample
evidence in the record supporting disability based upon AMA
evaluations, we are bound to affirm.
The weight and sufficiency
of the evidence is a matter for the fact finder.
See Square D
Company v. Tipton, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 308 (1993), and Paramount
Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985).
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We are not
at liberty to disturb the ALJ's determination.
See Cal Glo Coal
Company v. Mahan, Ky. App., 729 S.W.2d 455 (1987).
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion and award of the
Workers' Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, GENE
WHITT:
Terri Smith Walters
Pikeville, Kentucky
Robert G. Miller, Jr.
Paintsville, Kentucky
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