EARL BRYNA PEEL, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-003000-MR
EARL BRYNA PEEL, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00679
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MCANULTY AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This is the second appeal of Earl Bryna Peel,
Jr. (Peel) concerning the Fayette Circuit Court’s denial of his
RCr 11.42 motion to vacate judgment.
In his original appeal,
this Court (in a not-to-be-published opinion rendered February 6,
1999 (1999-CA-001621-MR)) vacated the trial court’s denial and
remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
On remand, the
trial court held an evidentiary hearing and then entered an order
again denying Peel’s RCr 11.42 motion.
Having thoroughly
reviewed the record, including the video-taped evidentiary
hearing, we affirm.
In that this Court’s first opinion succinctly and
thoroughly sets forth the facts and issues relative to Peel’s
guilty plea and arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel,
we adopt the following portions of that opinion:
Earl Bryna Peel, Jr. (Peel) appeals
from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court
entered on June 19, 1997, that denied his RCr
11.42 motion to vacate judgment. Pursuant to
a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, Peel
pled guilty to one count of Kidnapping,
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 509.050, one
count of escape in the second degree, KRS
520.030, and one count of robbery in the
second degree, KRS 515.030. The trial court
sentenced Peel to ten years for the
kidnapping conviction, five years for the
escape conviction to be served concurrently,
and ten years for the robbery conviction to
be served consecutively for a total of twenty
years. Peel argument in his Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion that
he was prejudiced by his counsel’s
ineffective assistance in the entry of his
guilty plea to the kidnapping charge. The
trial court denied the motion without a
hearing. After reviewing the record, the RCr
11.42 motion, the briefs, and the applicable
law, we vacate the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court and remand for an evidentiary
hearing.
On June 23, 1995, Peel was arrested
at his residence pursuant to arrest warrants
and charged with crimes as a result of his
actions the previous day. On June 22, 1995,
while en route to a community service project
during a period of incarceration, Peel forced
the driver of the van out of the vehicle,
took the van, and proceeded to his wife’s
home. At one point, Peel threatened the
driver with a rock. According to Peel, he
had recently learned that his wife had
apparently been involved in an extramarital
affair and that she had begun divorce
proceedings against him seeking custody of
their two children. He said he went to the
residence to discuss saving the marriage.
Once there, Peel attempted to force his wife,
his six-year-old daughter, and her visiting
friend into a vehicle, with little success.
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As he would get one person into the car, the
others would get out. Peel then drove his
wife’s car to this mother-in-law’s residence
and talked to her and to another person on
the telephone. He took a shotgun from his
mother-in-law’s house, and later returned to
his home. He stated that he planned to use
the shotgun to commit suicide. The next
morning, before he was able to accomplish
this, police arrived and arrested him.
The police charged Peel with escape
in the second degree, robbery in the second
degree, two counts of wanton endangerment in
the first degree, assault in the fourth
degree, theft by unlawful taking, three
counts of kidnapping, burglary in the first
degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the
first degree. Peel’s court-appointed counsel
moved the trial court for a competency
evaluation, which was granted. According to
the evaluation report dated October 4, 1995,
Peel was competent to stand trial. The grand
jury returned an indictment on July 32, 1995,
charging Peel with three counts of
kidnapping, one count of escape in the second
degree, and one count of robbery in the first
degree for taking the van. On December 1,
1995, and on advice of counsel, Peel pled
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth to one count of kidnapping, one
count of escape, and one count of the reduced
charge of robbery in the second degree. The
proposed penalties for the charges to which
he pled guilty were ten, five, and ten years,
respectively. The trial judge accepted
Peel’s guilty plea after questioning him as
to the events underlying the charged
offenses, his understanding of the charges
and his plea, and his representation. Peel
then signed a guilty plea form waiving
various constitutional rights. On January 2,
1996, the trial judge sentenced Peel to ten
years on each of the kidnapping and robbery
convictions, to be served consecutively, and
to five years on the escape conviction, to be
served concurrently, for a total of twenty
years.
Peel filed a motion for shock
probation on April 29, 1996, stating that he
intended to remarry his ex-wife. The motion
was denied on May 6, 1996. On March 21,
1997, Peel, through appointed counsel, filed
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an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate judgment
alleging that his counsel had failed to
provide effective assistance in the guilty
plea. In his motion, Peel argued that his
counsel had failed to adequately investigate
his offenses and to consider the defenses
available to him on the kidnapping charges.
More specifically, he contended that the
intent to terrorize element of KRS
590.040(1)(c) was absent, and that a jury
probably would only have convicted him of
unlawful imprisonment in the second degree.
Alternatively, he argued that even if the
element of intent could have been
established, that the charged offense was
never completed.
In its response, the Commonwealth
argued that Peel’s motion should be denied
because he never stated what was wrong with
his counsel’s advice. Additionally, the
Commonwealth argued that Peel acknowledge at
the guilty plea hearing that he had no
complaints about his attorney, that he had
gone over the guilty plea form with his
attorney, and that they had discussed the
elements of the charges and that Peel had
signed the form. In response, Peel argued
that the record did not contain the complete
factual circumstances surrounding the plea,
and that at a minimum an evidentiary hearing
should be held. The trial court denied
Peel’s RCr 11.42 motion without a hearing on
June 19, 1997, finding that the plea had been
entered voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly, and that there was no indication
that counsel was ineffective. This appeal
followed.
After reviewing the record and arguments in the first
appeal, the Court, in a split decision, determined that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary.
The majority believed that
the record demonstrated a “lack of communication between counsel
and Peel as well as Peel’s lack of understanding of his rights
and defenses.
Specifically, Peel never admitted the intent to
terrorize, which is an element necessary for a jury to convict
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him of kidnapping, and furthermore, the record, on its fact, does
not establish this element.”
(Opinion 1997-CA-001621-MR, p. 5).
Thereafter, on November 22, 1999, the circuit court
conducted an evidentiary hearing in this matter.
Peel was
represented by counsel and testified on his behalf and the
Commonwealth called Peel’s ex-wife and victim of the alleged
kidnapping, Diana Jeffries, as a witness.
Having thoroughly
reviewed the testimony of the witnesses, the arguments of counsel
(both at the hearing and in the appellate briefs), and the
statutory and case law applicable thereto, we believe Peel has
failed to establish his ineffective assistance claim.
It is apparent to this Court that Peel was properly
advised by his counsel and that he entered his plea knowingly and
voluntarily.
prison.
Peel was facing a maximum sentence of 85 years in
Considering the seriousness of the allegations, the fact
that he was already serving time for domestic violence against
his wife, that his wife and two young children (ages 6 and 7)
were involved, that he readily admits to the escape and robbery
charges, and the fact that both he and the victim agree that he
forced her into the car, caused her physical injury, and in
essence terrorized her and the children, we believe he could
easily have been convicted of all charges and sentenced to up to
85 years.
The record reflects that counsel consulted with Peel,
explained the elements of each charge and possible lesser
included offenses.
At the evidentiary hearing Ms. Jeffries stated, in
part, the following facts had occurred on the day of the
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kidnapping: that she called the police because (Peel) was
supposed to be in jail; that (Peel) grabbed the phone off the
wall and ripped it off wall; he ranted and raved around the house
for awhile; he decided he was going to take me with him and he
attempted to put me in the car: I resisted...he hit my head
alongside the car door frame and then he punched me in the ribs
to get me to go on in the car; she was afraid he would knock her
out; she hollered to several people to call the police; he
gathered up the girls, they were scared; she asked him not to do
this in front of the kids but he wasn’t listening; he wasn’t
coherent; this went on for 15 to 20 minutes; he pulled the car
keys out of her hand, she didn’t want her hand to get cut; he was
hateful and threatening; that day was very traumatic; he
assaulted me; he had become too scary to be around; he threatened
to break my neck; he insinuated that he intended to shoot me and
then shoot himself; he had expressed that he was going to kill
me; he was running around the house yelling, “where’s the gun?”;
he grabbed me and ripped my nightgown; he grabbed the back of my
neck; he picked me up and carried me to the car and tried to put
me into it; when he left he almost ran over the two girls; he
went to the kitchen and got a knife; she was afraid; she had
bruises and cuts; she and kids had to go to counseling; she is so
afraid a lot of the time, she feels she cannot trust anyone to
keep Peel away from her; she has been depressed and must take
anti-depression drugs and continue counseling; he tore the
drawers up in the dresser; he was pulling drawers out and
throwing clothes around and trying to find the gun.
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She also
responded affirmatively to each of the following questions:
Were you held against your will?; Were you frightened?; (Did) you
receive bodily injury?
Finally, even Peel admitted, during the
evidentiary hearing, that his actions might terrorize someone and
that a jury might believe that based upon the stated facts he
intended to terrorize or to cause bodily harm to his family.
McClellan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464, 466
(1986), held that criminal intent can be inferred from the
circumstances.
The McClellan case cited by Peel stands for the
proposition that a jury should be instructed on all lesser
included offenses.
There is no question that had this case
proceeded to a trial, that the court would have had to instruct
the jury on unlawful imprisonment.
issue before the Court.
However, that is not the
Rather, the question is whether Peel’s
counsel was ineffective by recommending Peel plea guilty to
kidnapping.
We think not.
In order to establish an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a movant must meet the requirements of a two-prong
test.
A movant must establish (1) that counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord, Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702
S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 311, 92
L.Ed.2d 724 (1986).
Pursuant to Strickland, the standard for
attorney performance is reasonable, effective assistance.
A
movant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, or under the prevailing
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professional norms.
The movant bears the burden of proof, and
must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was
adequate.
Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d, 878, 879-880
(1969); McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 874, 878
(1969).
To challenge a guilty plea based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel, the appellant must establish that he was
unable to intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in deciding
to plead guilty.
This test has two parts: (1) that counsel’s
errors were so serious that his performance fell outside the
range of professionally competent service, and (2) that his
deficient performance so seriously affected the guilty plea
process that there is a reasonable probability that the appellant
would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial.
Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed. 203 (1985).
In
order to be valid, a guilty plea must represent a voluntary and
intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to
the movant.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct.
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Kiser v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 892
S.W.2d 432, 434 (1992).
Based upon the admission of Peel that his actions could
be viewed as terrorizing his victims, that a jury might easily
find that he intended to terrorize his victims, the horrendous
facts as detailed by Ms. Jeffries, and statutory and case law
applicable to these facts, we believe counsel for Peel acted
professionally and responsibly in his representation of Peel and
in pursuing a plea agreement that saved Peel up to 65 years of
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imprisonment.
Therefore, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s
denial of Peel’s RCr 11.42 motion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian Thomas Ruff
Assistant Public Advocate
LaGrange, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Kathryn H. Dunnigan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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