ZIELINSKI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY V. STEPHEN BURDEN; HON. THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2000; 10:00 a.m
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002070-WC
ZIELINSKI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-01277
v.
STEPHEN BURDEN; HON. THOMAS A. NANNEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Zielinski Construction Company brings this
petition for review from an opinion and order rendered by the
Workers’ Compensation Board on August 6, 1999, which affirmed an
award of retraining incentive benefits (RIB) by the
administrative law judge to Stephen Burden.
Having concluded
that the Board has not misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent in refusing to apply KRS 342.732(1)(a), as amended in
1996, to Burden’s claim, we affirm.1
1
See Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685,
(continued...)
Burden was employed by Zielinski Construction Company
in various capacities from July 1993 until July 5, 1996. After
his employment with Zielinski ended, Burden worked for various
construction companies as a heavy equipment operator.
However,
his last exposure to coal dust occurred during his employment
with Zielinski.
On July 30, 1998, Burden filed an Application
for Resolution of Occupational Disease claim.2
In support of his claim, Burden filed medical reports
from Dr. Judah L. Skolnick and Dr. Ballard D. Wright.
Dr.
Skolnick interpreted Burden’s chest x-ray as category 1/1
pneumoconiosis, while Dr. Wright’s interpretation was category
1/0 pneumoconiosis.
Dr. Wright also had Burden undergo pulmonary
function testing, resulting in an FVC of 88% of predicted value
and an FEV1 of 91% of predicted value.
In addition, Burden was
referred to Dr. Arthur Lieber at the University of Kentucky for a
KRS 342.315 evaluation.
Dr. Lieber interpreted the x-rays as
negative for pneumoconiosis.
Based upon the reports of Dr. Skolnick and Dr. Wright,
the arbitrator and subsequently the ALJ found that Burden
suffered from category 1/1 pneumoconiosis and he received a RIB
award.
The ALJ’s determination was based upon the version of KRS
342.732(1)(a) which became effective on April 4, 1994.
The ALJ
also concluded that since Burden’s last exposure occurred prior
to December 12, 1996, the effective date of the 1996 amendments
1
(...continued)
687 (1992).
2
Form 102.
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to KRS 342.315(2), he was not required to afford presumptive
weight to Dr. Lieber’s report.
In affirming this award, the Board stated that the 1996
amendments to KRS 342.732 were not remedial and could not be
applied retroactively to a claim with a last exposure date prior
to the effective date of the statute.
The Board further noted
that Zielinski did not raise for its review the issue concerning
the presumptive weight to be afforded to university evaluators
pursuant to the 1996 amendments to KRS 342.315(2). Zielinski’s
petition for review followed.
Zielinski first argues that Burden’s RIB claim is
controlled by the version of KRS 342.732(1)(a) that was in effect
on the date his claim was filed rather than the version in effect
on the date of his last exposure. Zielinski claims that “[t]he
prevailing law in Kentucky mandates that a claim for retraining
incentive benefits be evaluated based upon the law in effect on
the date the claim for benefits is filed.”
We disagree.
Instead, we believe the Board was correct that in order to
determine which version of KRS 342.732 is applicable, we must
first decide whether the 1996 amendments to KRS 342.732(1)(a) are
remedial.
Since we conclude the amendments are not remedial, we
hold that the 1996 amendments to KRS 342.732(1)(a) do not apply
to Burden’s claim.3
3
The Board noted the significance of whether the 1996
amendments to KRS 342.732 were applicable to this claim as
follows:
At the time the benefit review
determination (“BRD”) was issued by the
ALJ/Arbitrator, Burden was not employed in a
(continued...)
-3-
We accept Zielinski’s statement that “occupational
disease claims are generally governed by the proposition that the
law in effect on the date of the injury or the date of last
exposure establishes the rights of the claimant.”4
However, we
disagree with its contention that the Supreme Court has
recognized that RIB claims “are distinguishable from awards for
occupational disability,” and that “the Court specifically
declined to adopt this traditional rule of law with regard to RIB
3
(...continued)
job involved in the severance or processing
of coal. This factual determination is
significant if the 1994 amendment to KRS
342.732(1)(a) applies to Burden’s RIB award.
Under that circumstance, benefits may be paid
directly to the employee. However, if the
1996 amendment to KRS 342.732(1)(a) is
applied, the standard and benefit to the
employee is substantially different. To
qualify for a RIB under the 1996 statute,
Burden’s medical evidence must show a
Category 1/1 or ½ on chest x-ray, and
spirometric test values of 55% or more but
less than 80% of the predicted normal values
under the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment. Burden had met the
1994 standard by showing a Category of 1/0,
1/1, or 1/2. The 1994 standard did not
require pulmonary functions test results. On
the other hand, even if Burden could have
qualified under the 1996 standard (which he
could not), any benefits payable would not be
paid directly to Burden unless he was
enrolled and actively and successfully
participating as a full-time student taking
24 or more hours of instruction per week in a
bona fide training or education program
approved under regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner.
4
See Maggard v. International Harvester Co., Ky., 508 S.W.2d
777, 783 (1974).
-4-
claims.”5
Instead, we believe Burden is correct that the cases
relied upon by Zielinski, where the Supreme Court used the date
the claim was filed as the operative date, were RIB cases that
involved the setting of the benefit rate for a “working miner.”
In Thomas, supra, the Supreme Court noted that the case
before it was not “a disability case where the employee has quit
his job so as to mark a time when he was ‘last exposed.’” Rather,
“RIB claims involve workers who do not cease working during the
time they are drawing these benefits.”
Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held “that the compensation rate for a RIB award should be
that rate payable on the date the claim is filed.”
However,
unlike Thomas, the case sub judice does not involve a “working
miner.”
Thus, we do not believe that the exception from Thomas
that uses the date the claim was filed applies to the case sub
judice.
Instead, we must follow the general rule that uses the
date of last exposure as the operative date.
In addition, we believe the 1996 amendments themselves
clearly provide that the changes in KRS 342.732(1)(a) were not to
be applied retroactively.
KRS 342.0015 provides as follows:
The substantive provisions of 1996 (1st
Extra Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1 shall apply to
any claim arising from an injury or last
exposure to the hazards of an occupational
disease occurring on or after December 12,
1996. Procedural provisions of 1996 (1st
Extra Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1 shall apply to
all claims irrespective of the date of injury
of last exposure, including, but not
exclusively, the mechanisms by which claims
are decided and workers are referred for
5
See Breeding v. Colonial Coal Co., Ky., 875 S.W.2d 914
(1998); Arch of Kentucky, Inc. v. Thomas, Ky., 895 S.W.2d 578
(1995).
-5-
medical evaluations. The provisions of KRS
342.120(3), 342.125(8), 342.213(2)(e),
342.265, 342.270(7), 342.320, 342.610(3),
342.760(4), and 342.990(11) are remedial.
The amendments to KRS 342.732(1)(a) at issue herein were clearly
substantive and not procedural.
Thus, to be retroactive, they
would have to be remedial; and they were not designated by KRS
342.0015 as remedial.
KRS 342.0015 limited the designation of
substantive provisions that were remedial to only nine statutory
provisions: KRS 342.120(3); KRS 342.125(8); KRS 342.213(2)(e);
KRS 342.265; KRS 342.270(7); KRS 342.320; KRS 342.610(3); KRS
342.760(4); and KRS 342.990(11).
KRS 446.080(3) provides that “[n]o statute shall be
construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”
Here, the Legislature expressly declared specific sections of the
1996 amendments to be remedial, and thus, retroactive.
When the
Legislature specifies certain items in a statute but omits
certain items, it must be presumed that it did so with a specific
purpose in mind.6
Since the Legislature did not identify the
changes to KRS 342.732(1)(a) as remedial, it would be an abuse of
this Court’s authority to hold them to be so.
We are well aware that the Supreme Court in Thornsbury
v. Aero Energy,7 in addressing the 1994 amendments to KRS
342.732(1)(a), held the amendments to be remedial and thus
retroactive.
However, unlike the 1994 amendments, the
6
Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1984); Inland
Steel Co. v. Hall, Ky., 245 S.W.2d 437, 438 (1952); Rhodes v.
Rhodes, Ky.App., 764 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1988).
7
Ky., 909 S.W.2d 109 (1995).
-6-
Legislature in the 1996 amendments specifically set forth which
sections of the amendments were remedial.
When the Legislature
enacted the 1996 amendments, it was certainly aware of the
Supreme Court’s holding in Thornsbury.
We do not believe the
Legislature could have made its position any more clear than it
did when it took the affirmative step of specifying which
amendments were remedial.
As to the second issue, the Board noted that Zielinski
failed to appeal the ALJ’s finding that KRS 342.315(2) was not
applicable to Burden’s claim.8
Any party who seeks to have a
8
The Supreme Court recently issued an opinion in Magic Coal
Co. v. Fox, Ky., _____ S.W.3d ______ (2000), holding:
It is apparent that KRS 342.316(3)(b)4.b.
relates to the mechanism by which workers are
referred for medical evaluations in
occupational disease claims. It also is
apparent that KRS 342.315(2) relates to the
mechanisms by which claims are decided. We,
therefore, view KRS 342.0015 as expressing a
clear legislative intent for KRS 342.315 and
KRS 342.316(3)(b)4.b., to apply to all claims
pending before an arbitrator or ALJ on or
after December 12, 1996. This appeal turns
upon what we discern the meaning and intent
of KRS 342.315(2) to be. The role of the
Court in construing a legislative act is to
effectuate the intent of the legislature.
Where that intent is not clear, we remain
mindful of the principle embodied in KRS
446.080(3) that, unless the legislature
clearly indicates otherwise, legislation is
not intended to affect the legal consequences
of events which occurred before its
enactment.
. . .
[T]he amendments to KRS 342.315 which became
effective on December 12, 1996, apply to all
claims pending before the fact-finder on or
after that date. KRS 342.315(2) creates a
(continued...)
-7-
decision of the Board reviewed by this Court must have preserved
an assertion of error by having raised it first to the Board.9
Consequently, Zielinski’s argument that the ALJ erred in failing
to accord presumptive weight to the university medical school’s
evaluator’s report is not properly before this Court.
Accordingly, the opinion and order of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, STEPHEN
BURDEN:
John C. Morton
Henderson, KY
8
Ronald K. Bruce
Greenville, KY
(...continued)
rebuttable presumption which is governed by
[Kentucky Rules of Evidence] 301 and,
therefore, does not shift the burden of
persuasion. Pursuant to KRS 342.315(2), the
clinical findings and opinions of the
university evaluator constitute substantial
evidence of the worker’s medical condition
which may not be disregarded by the factfinder unless it is rebutted. Where the
clinical findings and opinions of the
university evaluator are rebutted, KRS
342.315(2) does not restrict the authority of
the fact-finder to weigh the conflicting
medical evidence. In instances where a factfinder chooses to disregard the testimony of
the university evaluator, a reasonable basis
for doing so must be specifically stated.
9
Smith v. Dixie Fuel Co., Ky., 900 S.W.2d 609, 612 (1995);
Eaton Axle Corp. v. Nally, Ky., 688 S.W.2d 334 (1985).
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