ALBERT BLACKMON v. HALL CONTRACTING; SHEILA LOWTHER, Chief Administrative Law Judge; RONALD JOHNSON, Arbitrator; SPECIAL FUND; ALBERT CHANDLER III, Attorney General; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: June 30, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001808-WC
ALBERT BLACKMON
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-01169
HALL CONTRACTING; SHEILA LOWTHER, Chief
Administrative Law Judge; RONALD JOHNSON,
Arbitrator; SPECIAL FUND; ALBERT
CHANDLER III, Attorney General; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, JOHNSON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, JUDGE: Two issues are presented in this appeal from the
denial of appellant’s motion to reopen his workers’ compensation
claim: (1) whether the December 12, 1996, amendments to Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.125, prohibiting the reopening of an
award within two years of its entry, apply to awards entered
after the effective date of the amendments for injuries which
were incurred prior to that date; and (2) whether the December
12, 1996, amendments to KRS 342.125 are unconstitutional.
In
Meade v. Reedy Coal Company,1 the Kentucky Supreme Court resolved
the first of appellant’s contentions, concluding that the twoyear waiting period contained in KRS 342.125(3), governs the
reopening of claims entered on or after that date.
Although the
opinion does not directly address the question of the
constitutionality of the amendments, the court’s analysis of the
application of the amendments is helpful in resolving that issue
as well.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board.
Appellant Blackmon sustained a work-related back injury
on October 14, 1996, resulting in a February 23, 1998, award of
permanent partial disability benefits.
He subsequently attempted
to reopen his claim by filing the motion which is the subject of
this appeal on October 3, 1998.
In denying his motion, the Chief
Administrative Law Judge concluded that the amendment was
remedial in nature and that the two-year waiting period did not
impair any vested right as it relates solely to the timing of
reopening.
The Board agreed and affirmed the denial of
appellant’s motion to reopen his claim.
In this appeal, as he did before the Board, appellant
argues that because his injury predated the amendments to the
reopening statute, the law in effect at the time of injury
controls, thus giving him a vested right in the ability to reopen
his claim at any time.
A reading of the analysis offered by the
Supreme Court in Meade, however, clearly dispels that contention:
1
Ky., 13 S.W.3d 619 (rendered March 23, 2000, and not yet
final).
-2-
Under the law in effect on the date of injury
and on the date of claimant’s award, a
reopening was permitted “at any time” upon
proof of one of the permissible grounds. As
noted by the Board, parties who settled
claims prior to December 12, 1996, the ALJ’s
who decided claims before that date, had no
opportunity to anticipate that a two-year
waiting period might be imposed on the
ability to reopen the resulting award and to
provide accordingly. Keeping in mind that
even remedial statutes should be given
retroactive effect only to the extent that
the intent of the legislature in that regard
is clear, we are convinced that only the
four-year limitation which is explicitly
stated in KRS 342.125(8) [setting a four-year
cap on reopening] should be applied
retroactively to claims which arose and were
decided prior to December 12, 1996.
We conclude, therefore, that the
exceptions to reopening established in KRS
342.125(1) and (3) permit the reopening of
any claim, at any time, upon proof of the
requisite facts. The two-year waiting
periods and the four-year limitation
contained in KRS 342.125(e) govern the
reopening of claims in which an award is
entered on or after December 12, 1996.2
(Emphasis added).
Thus, in order to escape application of the two-year
waiting period, the award must have been entered prior to the
effective date of the statute.
Since appellant’s award was
entered after that date, the Board correctly denied his claim as
violative of the two-year waiting period set out in KRS
342.125(3).
Turning our attention to appellant’s second argument,
we find no constitutional impediment created by the amendments.
As a preliminary matter, appellees contend that the question of
the constitutionality of KRS 342.125 has not been preserved for
2
13 S.W.3d at 620-21.
-3-
our review because it was not presented to the Board for
consideration.
Although we are cognizant of the general rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, we are
nevertheless of the opinion that because the Board has no
authority to declare statutes unconstitutional, appellant’s
failure to afford that body an opportunity to pass on the
question cannot be considered fatal to review in the court
system.3
Furthermore, the court in Swatzell v. Commonwealth,
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet,4
recognized that there are limited exceptions to rules requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to invoking judicial
relief.
We are convinced that this is one of the exceptions to
that rule, because requesting a ruling by the Board as to the
constitutionality of a statute would have been a futile gesture.
However, we find no merit in appellant’s contentions
that the amendments somehow impair a claimant’s right to opt out
of coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act or that they
constitute special legislation by treating employers and
employees differently for purposes of reopening.
First, by
merely prescribing a time frame for reopening, the amendments to
the statutes do not deprive appellant of any vested right
because, as noted in Meade, he had an opportunity to anticipate
the two-year waiting period and provide accordingly as his claim
was resolved after the amendment became effective.
3
See Blue Diamond Coal Company v. Cornett, 300 Ky. 647.
189 S.W.2d 963 (1945).
4
Ky., 962 S.W.2d 666 (1988).
-4-
Second, there is no evidence that disparate treatment
of employers and claimants in terms of reopening constitutes
special legislation or poses a equal protection problem.
In
Earthgrains v. Cranz,5 the court rejected an equal protection
challenge to KRS 342.320(2)(c) which imposes attorney’s fees upon
an employer who does not prevail on appeal.
The Cranz court
noted that in the area of workers’ compensation, “the General
Assembly may properly classify in its legislation, provided the
‘objective is legitimate and the classification is rationally
related to that objective.’”6
KRS 342.125(3) provides:
Except for reopening solely for determination
of the compensability of medical expenses,
fraud, or conforming the award as set forth
in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2, or for reducing a
permanent disability award when am employee
returns to work, no claim shall be reopened
more than four (4) years following the date
of the original award or order granting or
denying benefits, or within two (2) years of
any previous motion to reopen by the same
party. (Emphasis added).
We find absolutely nothing in this enactment that could
be labeled special legislation.
The statutory exceptions to the
waiting period and cap on filing motions for reopening are
carefully limited in scope and are rationally related to the
remedial purpose of the legislation.7
The statute appears to
recognize the difference in the situation of a claimant who must
wait two years before seeking increased benefits because his
5
Ky. App., 999 S.W.2d 218 (1999).
6
999 S.W.2d at 222.
7
See KRS 342.0015.
-5-
condition has worsened and an employer having to wait two years
to reopen when an employee returns to work.
The two situations
are significantly different in terms of proof required and the
demands each would have upon the system.
These differences alone
would justify disparate treatment in terms of the timing on the
motion.
Thus, we perceive no constitutional impediment because a
legitimate objective and a rational basis justifies the
legislation.
The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE HALL
CONTRACTING CORPORATION:
Wayne C. Daub
Louisville, Kentucky
David M. Andrew
Robert A. Winter, Jr.
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SPECIAL
FUND:
John Burrell
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
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