JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. SHEILA GOODPASTER-TROYER
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RENDERED: AUGUST 4, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001627-MR
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O’MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-001439
v.
SHEILA GOODPASTER-TROYER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
The Jefferson County Board of Education appeals
from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting appellee's
motion for summary judgment which remanded the case back to the
Board to resolve an issue of fact.
The Board contends the
appellee requested a voluntary demotion and that the procedures
under KRS 161.765(2) for demoting an administrator with three
years of service do not apply to voluntary demotions, so that the
Board in appellee’s case lacked jurisdiction.
We agree with the
circuit court that the voluntariness of the demotion is an issue
of fact which determines jurisdiction, and must be resolved first
by the Board.
However, we disagree with the circuit court’s
conclusion that if the demotion was voluntary, no hearing is
needed.
Sheila Goodpaster-Troyer was the principal of
Coleridge-Taylor Elementary School, in Jefferson County,
Kentucky, from approximately 1993 to 1997.
Sheila asserts that
her troubles began in June 1996, when she experienced problems
with a teacher at the school.
In May 1997, the teacher filed a
complaint against Sheila, who was found to be in compliance with
school policy.
The teacher appealed, and a small demonstration,
organized by a community activist, was held in support of the
teacher on the first day of school.
On August 27, 1997, Sheila
was called to the office of her supervisor, Dr. Frieda
Merriweather, where Sheila alleges she was directed, under
duress, to write a letter requesting that, in light of the recent
happenings, that she be reassigned to an instructional position
for the 1997-98 school year.
Sheila alleges that, later that
same day, she was called back into Dr. Merriweather's office,
where she was presented with a second letter that had been typed.
The second letter revised the terms of the first letter, stating
that, in addition to requesting reassignment for the 1997-98
school year, she would "voluntarily accept reassignment for the
1998-99 school year" to a resource teacher position with the
applicable salary adjustment.
Sheila claims that she asked to
take the letter home and have the letter reviewed by her lawyer
before signing it, but that Dr. Merriweather insisted that she
sign it immediately.
Sheila signed the letter, but contends she
did so under duress.
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On September 15, 1997, Sheila wrote to the
Superintendent of the Jefferson County Schools, stating that she
did not write the letter which she signed, and had not
voluntarily requested reassignment as she had been intimidated
into signing the letter by Dr. Merriweather.
The Superintendent
replied on October 20, 1997, stating that it was clear to him
that it was Sheila's decision to take the demotion.
Sheila was
reassigned to a resource teacher position, but retained her
principal's salary and benefits for the duration of the 1997-98
school year.
In a letter dated April 28, 1998, the
Superintendent notified Sheila that her responsibilities as
principal would be eliminated at the end of the 1997-98 school
year, with a corresponding reduction in salary for the 1998-99
school year.
In a letter dated May 7, 1998, Sheila notified the
Superintendent that she wished to contest the demotion through
her appeal rights in KRS 161.765.
The Superintendent responded
in a letter dated May 14, 1998, stating that her transfer was a
voluntary move to which KRS 161.765 did not apply.
Sheila's original complaint, which included statutory,
tort, and contract claims, was filed on March 13, 1998.
These
claims were later dismissed and a claim pursuant to KRS Chapter
344 was stayed.
Sheila filed an amended complaint, requesting a
declaration of rights pursuant to KRS 161.765 and an order
directing the Board to process her appeal in compliance with the
statute.
On December 23, 1998, the Board filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that KRS 161.765 does not apply to
voluntary demotions.
On December 28, 1998, Sheila filed a cross-
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motion for summary judgment, stating that the transfer was not
voluntary, and requesting the court to place the controversy back
within the authority of KRS 161.765.
On April 26, 1999, the court granted summary judgment
to Sheila.
The court stated that it agreed with the Board that
Sheila "would have waived her rights under KRS 161.765, if [she]
had voluntarily requested the demotion".
However, the court
found that because the parties were in dispute as to whether the
demotion was voluntary or involuntary, the issue must be
addressed at an administrative hearing and resolved by an
administrative fact finder.
On May 7, 1999, the Board filed a
motion to alter, amend or vacate the court's April 26, 1999
order.
On June 9, 1999, the court denied this motion.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the Board argues that the circuit court
erred in granting summary judgment to Sheila, as her demotion was
clearly voluntary in light of her two signed requests for a
transfer.
The Board contends that KRS 161.765 does not apply to
such voluntary transfers, and therefore Sheila was not entitled
to a demotion hearing.
Alternatively, the Board argues that,
because the court found an issue of fact existed regarding the
voluntariness issue, summary judgment was improper.
The Board
contends that it is without authority to decide the issue of
voluntariness per KRS 161.765, since KRS 161.765 will not apply
if the demotion was voluntary.
Therefore, the Board asserts that
this issue must be resolved by the court, not the Board.
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KRS 161.765, "Procedures for demotion of administrative
personnel - Appeal" states, in pertinent part:
(2) An administrator who has completed three
years of administrative service . . . cannot
be demoted unless the following procedures
have been complied with:
(a) The superintendent shall give written
notice of the demotion to the board of
education and to the administrator. If the
administrator wishes to contest the demotion,
he shall, within ten (10) days of receipt of
the notice, file a written statement of his
intent to contest with the superintendent.
If the administrator does not make timely
filing of his statement of intent to contest,
the action shall be final.
(b) Upon receipt of the notice of intent to
contest the demotion, a written statement of
grounds for demotion, signed by the
superintendent, shall be served on the
administrator. The statement shall contain:
1. A specific and complete statement of
grounds upon which the proposed demotion is
based, including, where appropriate, dates,
times, names, places, and circumstances;
2. The date, time, and place for a
the date to be not less than twenty
more than thirty (30) days from the
service of the statement of grounds
demotion upon the administrator.
hearing,
(20) nor
date of
for
(c) Upon receipt of the statement of grounds
for demotion the administrator shall, within
ten (10) days, file a written answer.
Failure to file such answer, within the
stated period, will relieve the board of any
further obligation to hold a hearing and the
action shall be final. . .
(d) The hearing on the demotion shall be
public or private, at the discretion of the
administrator and shall be limited to the
matters set forth in the written statement of
grounds for demotion . . .
. . . .
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(f) Appeal from final board action may be
taken in the same manner . . . as an appeal
from tribunal action under KRS 161.790.
KRS 161.790(6) and (8) provide that a teacher has the
right to appeal the final order of a tribunal to the circuit
court having jurisdiction in the county where the school district
is located.
The right to appeal an administrative action calls
for a review of the record, or a de novo hearing if the statute
so provides,1 but after the administrative hearing.
The right to
appeal is not a substitute for the Board hearing required by KRS
161.765.
See KRS 161.790 and Bowlin v. Thomas, Ky. App., 548
S.W.2d 515, 518 (1977).
Even if we agreed that the administrator
who resigns has no right to appeal, allegations of duress call
into question the voluntariness of the demotion or resignation.
Whether the demotion/transfer was voluntary is an issue of fact
and must be resolved first by the Board.
The Board contends that its longstanding interpretation
of KRS 161.765, that a principal who requests a transfer is not
entitled to a hearing, must be given controlling weight.
Hagan
v. Farris, Ky., 807 S.W.2d 488, 490 (1991); Barnes v. Department
of Revenue, Ky. App., 575 S.W.2d 169 (1978).
However, an
agency's interpretation of a regulation is valid, only if the
interpretation complies with the actual language of the
1
KRS 161.790 has been interpreted to give a teacher the
right to a hearing before the Board and if requested, a de novo
hearing before circuit court. Bowlin v. Thomas, Ky. App., 548
S.W.2d 515, 518 (1977); Osborne v. Bullitt County Board of
Education, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 607 (1967); Story v. Simpson County
Board of Education, Ky., 420 S.W.2d 578 (1967); and Kelly v.
Board of Education of Monticello Independent School Dist., Ky.
App., 556 S.W.2d 165 (1977).
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regulation.
Hagan, 807 S.W.2d at 490.
We believe that the
Board's interpretation of KRS 161.765(2) conflicts with the plain
language of the statute that "an administrator . . . cannot be
demoted" unless its procedures have been complied with.
We find
no language in the statute which excuses the Board from complying
with procedures because the contested grounds for demotion is
"voluntariness".
Furthermore, unlike the circuit court, we believe that
voluntariness can be contested under the statute, and may be the
subject of a demotion hearing when asserted by the Board as the
"grounds for demotion" per KRS 161.765(2)(b).
The interpretation
of a statute is a matter of law, and a reviewing court is not
required to adopt the decisions of the trial court as to a matter
of law, but must interpret the statute according to the plain
meaning of the act and in accordance with the legislative intent.
Floyd County Board of Education v. Ratliff, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 921,
925 (1997).
The intent of KRS 161.765(2) is to provide
administrators with three years of service with heightened
procedural protections.
Estreicher v. Board of Education of
Kenton County, Kentucky, Ky., 950 S.W.2d 839 (1997).
Upon receipt of notice that an administrator is
contesting a demotion, KRS 161.765(2)(b)(1) requires the
superintendent to provide a statement of grounds upon which the
proposed demotion is based.
In the instant case, the
superintendent's letter to Sheila, dated May 14, 1998, stated
that the grounds for the demotion was her voluntary request for
reassignment.
KRS 161.765(2)(b) and (d) entitles an
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administrator to a hearing on the grounds for demotion.
As
"voluntariness" is the ground the Board is asserting, per the
statute, the Board was required to hold a hearing on this ground
and then take official action, from which Sheila could then
appeal to circuit court.
KRS 161.765(2)(d),(e), and (f); KRS
161.790.
We reject the Board’s argument that this interpretation
of KRS 161.765 would lead to an unreasonable and absurd result that principals would be permitted to "change their minds" at any
time and rescind transfers which they themselves sought, forcing
the Board to deny all requests by school principals for
transfers, or to leave the vacated positions open, or to staff
them for an unspecified period with temporary replacements.
After receiving notice of a demotion, the principal has 10 days
to contest it, after which it becomes final.
KRS 161.765(2)(a).
It is logical to assume that principals whose demotions were
truly voluntary will not contest them, and as such, these
demotions would be final in 10 days.
The Board is further
mistaken that this interpretation of KRS 161.765 will allow
principals who simply "change their minds" to rescind their
transfers.
A voluntary request for a transfer is a legitimate
reason for a demotion, and, as such, if the request is truly
voluntary, the Board will prevail in the demotion hearing, and
the principal will be unsuccessful on appeal.
For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Cynthia Blevins Doll
C. Tyson Gorman
Louisville, Kentucky
Don Meade
Louisville, Kentucky
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