ADDINGTON, INC. v. REX KILBURN, JR.; HON. RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: May 19, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001467-WC
ADDINGTON, INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-61466
v.
REX KILBURN, JR.;
HON. RONALD W. MAY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This matter comes before us on a petition for
review of an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board)
affirming an opinion and award by the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) awarding total disability benefits to the employee.
The
appellant/employer, Addington, Inc., contests the ALJ’s finding
that the appellee/employee, Rex Kilburn, Jr., is totally
disabled.
Addington argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support such a finding based upon the 1996 amendements to the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
Finding that the ALJ’s findings were
based on substantial evidence of probative value, we affirm the Board.
Since the sufficiency of the ALJ’s findings are in
dispute, we shall set out the Board’s factual summary in its
entirety:
“Kilburn, born March 3, 1959, has an eighth grade
education and testified he is barely literate.
He served in the
U.S. Army as a truck driver and attended vocational school where
he studied auto body; however he has never worked in that field.
He began working in the coal mining industry in 1981 and has
driven a rock truck and primarily been employed as a bulldozer
operator”.
“Kilburn sustained a work injury on November 19, 1997
when he was pushing a load of rock with a bulldozer.
A piece
broke out from under the dozer, causing it to spin around.
Kilburn was thrown around inside of the cab and felt immediate
pain in his lower back and neck.
He continued to work that day
and went to Hazard Appalachian Regional Hospital that night.
He
was x-rayed and remained in the hospital the rest of the night.
He has been seen by his family physician, Dr. James Chaney, who
referred him to Dr. John Gilbert in Lexington.
seen by Dr. Russell Travis.
He has also been
In May or June of 1998, Dr. Gilbert
recommended an epidural, a discogram, and an MRI, but
compensation did not approve these recommendations.”
“At his hearing held on December 10, 1998, Kilburn
testified he believes his condition is worsening.
He testified
that his neck hurts constantly and he cannot turn his head from
side to side.
He has a sharp pain that runs down his arm and
tingling in his hands and fingers.
He testified the pain is
worse when he tries to move his neck and nothing gives him
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relief.
He further testified his low back hurts all the time and
so does his right leg.
He stated sitting or standing too long
increases his back and leg pain.
He further testified that he
possesses a drivers licence and passed the written test for it.
He stated that Dr. Travis did release him to return to work but
he did not feel he was able to do so.”
“The records of Dr. Russell Travis, a neurosurgeon, are
filed into the record.
A letter to Dr. Chaney, dated December
15, 1997, indicates that although Kilburn has been receiving
physical therapy, he has not made significant improvement.
primary problem is back and right leg pain.
His
He advised a lumbar
MRI and renewed a prescription for Loracet Plus.
On January 5,
1998, the lumbar MRI was reviewed and was essentially negative,
as were x-rays of the lumbar and cervical spine.
cervical spine revealed a mild bulge at C5-6.
The MRI of the
Dr. Travis’
records indicate that on February 10, 1998, a myelogram and postmyelogram CT were accomplished.
The post-myelogram CT of the
lumbar area was entirely normal and the cervical area was
essentially normal.
There was a mild bulge at C5-6 but it did
not compress the cord or nerve roots.
Dr. Travis felt there was
no objective reason why Kilburn could not return to normal
activity.”
“Several reports from Dr. John Gilbert, a neurosurgeon
in Lexington, are contained in the record.
Dr. Gilbert first saw
Kilburn on March 6, 1998 on referral from Dr. Chaney for chief
complaints of back, neck, and right shoulder, arm, and leg pain.
Dr Gilbert diagnosed: (1) herniated disc; (2) cervicalgia; (3)
cervical herniated disc; (4) neck strain/sprain; (5) whiplash;
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(6) status post concussion syndrome; (7) degenerative disc
disease lumbar; (8) lumbago; (9) muscle spasm; and (10) anxiety.
Dr. Gilbert thought Kilburn should undergo a functional capacity
evaluation to determine any limitations or restrictions he might
have to return to work and further suggested cervical and lumbar
epidurals and complete cervical and lumbar discogram.
An April
8, 1998 report indicates no changes in Dr. Gilbert’s findings,
other than a review of an MRI on December 12, 1997 showed a
degenerative disc at L3-4 and L4-5.
At Kilburn’s request, he
placed him on light duty with no lifting over 10-25 pounds.
Kilburn was seen again on June 8, 1998.
Dr. Gilbert noted that
as of the last office visit, there was an attempt to preauthorize epidurals, as well as a discogram, but the workers’
compensation insurance denied it.
Furthermore, while Kilburn was
placed on light duty, he informed Dr. Gilbert that there was no
light duty program with his company.
Kilburn expressed that his
symptoms had worsened over the last couple of months.
He now had
a positive Spurling’s test bilaterally, with associated numbness
and tingling in the arms bilaterally.
On September 9, 1998, Dr.
Gilbert noted no changes in his findings, but expressed that Mr.
Kilburn’s symptoms were worsening.”
“Dr. Robert Nickerson, a specialist in physical
medicine and rehabilitation was appointed as a university
evaluator and examined Kilburn on June 23, 1998.
In addition to
his physical examination of Kilburn, he reviewed numerous
diagnostic tests.
Dr. Nickerson diagnosed: (1) lumbosacral
sprain/strain; (2) cervical sprain/strain; and (3) muscle spasms
in the paraspinal region.
Under the DRE model of the AMA
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Guidelines, he assessed a 10% impairment, 5% due to the
lumbosacral spine and 5% due to the cervical spine.
He placed
restrictions on Kilburn’s activity and felt his physical capacity
was extremely limited, not only by his objective findings, but
also by evidence of chronic pain syndrome.
He would restrict
Kilburn to lifting a maximum of 20 pounds and occasionally
lifting no more than 10 pounds.
He further felt he should not
bend, twist, stoop or crawl, and noted he had difficulty walking
without a cane.
He further placed restrictions on walking,
climbing, standing for more than 30 minutes, and sitting for more
than 45 minutes at a time.
Dr. Nickerson opined that Kilburn did
not have the physical capacity to return to any type of work he
had previously performed.
He expressed that it was a non-
surgical case and admitted that Kilburn showed some signs of
symptom magnification.
Dr. Nickerson was questioned concerning a
vocational assessment performed by Dr. Ralph Crystal of the
University of Kentucky, and stated that he respected Dr.
Crystal’s opinion.
By the time of his deposition, Dr. Nickerson
had been supplied with further diagnostic test results.
He
testified it was difficult to say, from these tests, whether or
not the findings were actually capable of producing the symptoms
of which Kilburn complained.
Dr. Nickerson did find muscle spasm
at both the cervical and lumbar levels which he testified were
significant objective signs of pain.”
“Dr. Daniel Primm, an orthopedic surgeon, evaluated
Kilburn on August 20, 1998 and reviewed other treatment reports
and diagnostic studies.
Dr. Primm diagnosed: (1) possible
cervical and lumbar strain superimposed on early degenerative
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changes; and (2) symptom exaggeration.
Dr. Primm did not believe
that Kilburn sustained a serious or permanent injury to the body
as a whole.
Guides.
He assessed a 0% impairment rating under the AMA
Dr. Primm felt Kilburn could return to work with the
first six weeks not lifting over 25 pounds on a frequent basis
and no more than 50-60 pounds occasionally.
After that, he could
perform his regular work without restrictions.
At his
deposition, Dr. Primm explained how Kilburn’s physical findings
indicated symptom magnification and they were not consistent with
the diagnostic studies.”
“Also appearing in the record is a report from Dr.
James Chaney, apparently completed for the consideration of
Social Security disability insurance benefits.
Dr. Chaney
indicated he first saw Kilburn on June 23, 1997 and last examined
him on September 22, 1998.
His report indicates Kilburn is
severely restricted in his physical activities.”
“Dr. Ralph Crystal performed a vocational evaluation of
Kilburn on September 3, 1998.
The evaluation included an
interview, vocational testing, and a review of medical reports.
He reported that Kilburn could read at the 3.5 grade level, spell
at the 2.1 grade level, and do arithmetic at the 3.9 level.
He
was found to be in the borderline range of intellectual
functioning.
He felt, however, that the vocational testing was
not a valid assessment of Kilburn’s actual vocational and
academic abilities since he had been able to work in a semiskilled occupation as a bulldozer operator.
Furthermore, he
noted that passing a written driver’s test requires a reading
level at least the fifth or sixth grade level.
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He was asked to
consider various medical reports and, based on Dr. Nickerson’s
which he found the most detailed, he believed Kilburn would be
limited to light duty and sedentary work.”
“Dr. William Weikel conducted a vocational evaluation
of Kilburn on October 12, 1998.
He found Kilburn scored below
the third grade level for reading and at the end of the fourth
grade level for arithmetic and considered him illiterate.
Weikel felt Kilburn would be unable to return to work.
Dr.
Based on
Nickerson’s assessment, he felt Kilburn had an 80% loss of access
to the labor market.
He expressed that Kilburn’s complaints of
pain were a limiting factor in his ability to work.”
“The ALJ reviewed the lay and medical testimony in the
record in considerable detail.
In the opinion section of his
decision, the ALJ reviewed the evidence from Dr. Nickerson, the
university evaluator.
Magic Coal Co.
He discussed the Board’s decision in
v. Fox, and the term ‘presumptive weight.’
The
ALJ concluded that he did not believe Dr. Nickerson’s clinical
findings and opinions had been overcome and therefore afforded
them presumptive weight.
Thus, the ALJ decided, based on the
report of the university evaluator which is entitled to
presumptive weight that the work injury of November 19, 1997
rendered Kilburn totally and permanently occupationally disabled.
Thereafter, Addington filed a petition for reconsideration which
was overruled by the ALJ.
Addington’s appeal before the Board
ensued.”
After reviewing the evidence and the applicable law,
the Board affirmed the ALJ.
The Board concluded that the ALJ
properly accorded presumptive weight to the university evaluator.
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The Board further found that the ALJ did not err in finding
Kilburn totally disabled.
The Board viewed the ALJ’s finding
that Kilburn is totally disabled as supported by substantial
evidence, after considering both the objective medical evidence
and the evidence of his chronic pain syndrome.
Primarily, Addington raises two issues in this appeal.
First, Addington argues that the ALJ erred in according
presumptive weight to the university evaluator’s diagnosis.
In a
related argument, Addington asserts that the ALJ’s finding that
Kilburn is totally disabled was not supported by evidence meeting
the standard of KRS 342.0011(1) and (11)(c).
Addington contends that the ALJ’s finding of total
permanent disability was not based upon objective medical
evidence.
It points out that the ALJ’s decision and award was
based, in part, upon Kilburn’s subjective complaints of pain and
the limitations this pain would place on his availability in the
labor market.
Addington further notes that the university
evaluator agreed that Kilburn is capable of performing some
sedentary and light duty work on a limited basis.
Consequently,
Addington argues that Kilburn is not totally disabled from
performing any type of work, as set out in KRS 342.0011(11)(c).
Under KRS 342.315(2), “The clinical findings and
opinions of the designated evaluator shall be afforded
presumptive weight by arbitrators and administrative law judges
and the burden to overcome such findings and opinions shall fall
on the opponent of such evidence.”
The particular language used
by the legislature shows that it is clear that the presumption
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applies to the level of credibility to be given to certain
evidence rather than a presumption on an overall issue in the
claim. As the Board correctly pointed out, if the party claiming
benefits cannot produce evidence to rebut the finding of the
university evaluator which is adverse to him or her, then the
party loses.
Since Kilburn’s work-related injury occurred after the
effective date of the statute, it is clear that the provisions of
KRS 342.315(2) apply.
To our knowledge, there have been no
previous court decisions regarding what proof is necessary to
rebut the presumptive weight accorded to the findings of the
university evaluator.
Nonetheless, we consider this
determination to fall within the purview normally assigned to the
fact-finder.
The ALJ, as the finder of fact, has the sole authority
to judge the weight, credibility, substance and inferences to be
drawn from the evidence.
See, Paramount Foods, Inc., v.
Burkhart, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985).
When faced with
conflicting medical evidence, the question of which evidence to
believe remains the exclusive province of the ALJ.
Bugg Brothers, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 123 (1977).
Pruitt v.
Where the party with
the burden of proof was successful before the ALJ, the issue on
appeal is whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's
conclusion.
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
Substantial evidence has been defined as evidence of substance
and relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable men.
Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chemical
Co., Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367 (1971).
Although a party may note
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evidence which would have supported a conclusion contrary to the
ALJ's decision, such evidence alone is not an adequate basis for
reversal on appeal.
McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 514
S.W.2d 46 (1974).
The more significant issue presented in this case is
whether there is substantial evidence of probative value to
support Dr. Nickerson’s assessment of total and permanent
occupational disability.
Addington argues that the objective
findings do not establish that Kilburn is permanently unable to
perform any type of work.
Moreover, Addington asserts that
Kilburn does not meet the standard for total disability because
he remains able to perform some light duty or sedentary jobs.
For the reasons that follow, we find that the ALJ did not abuse
his discretion in finding Kilburn totally disabled.
As amended in 1996, KRS 342.0011(11)(c) defines
“permanent total disability” as: “the condition of an employee
who, due to an injury, has a permanent disability rating and has
a complete and permanent inability to perform any type of work as
a result of an injury . . .”
“Injury” is defined at KRS
342.0011(1) as follows;
“Injury” means any work-related traumatic
event or series of traumatic events,
including cumulative trauma, arising out of
and in the course of employment which is the
proximate cause producing a harmful change in
the human organism evidenced by objective
medical findings. [Emphasis added].
KRS 342.0011(33) further defines “objective medical findings” as
“information gained through direct observation and testing of the
patient applying objective or standardized methods.”
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There has been considerable discussion and a fair
measure of disagreement as to the correct interpretation of
“objective medical findings” that substantiate the diagnosis of
an injury.
Yet while empirical, observable data is highly
indicative of the existence of an injury, we cannot agree that
they should wholly occupy the field diagnostically and supplant
the critical element of judgment, observation and experience of a
skilled professional.
Certainly empirical, observable data are
necessary to the determination that an injury exists.
Nevertheless, we cannot agree that the judgment, observation, and
experience of a skilled profession counts for naught under KRS
342.0011(33).
We conclude that “objective medical findings” may
include a combination of the tangible and intangible components
of medical diagnosis: the use of testing techniques and other
standardized modes of examination where available as well as
recourse to the direct observation and evaluation drawn from the
experience of expertise of the physician.
Addington also argues that Dr. Nickerson’s diagnosis,
even accepted at face value, does not meet the standard for a
finding of permanent total disability.
Addington focuses on the
section of KRS 342.0011(11)(c) which requires that an employee
have a “complete and permanent inability to perform any type of
work as a result of an injury” to support a finding of permanent
total disability.
"Work" is defined in KRS 342.0011(34) as
follows:
"Work" means providing services to another in
return for remuneration on a regular and
sustained basis in a competitive economy.
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These two provisions of the Act mandate two specific
findings by an adjudicator in assessing a total disability award.
First, the adjudicator must conclude that the evidence
establishes that there is a "permanent disability rating."
Here,
Dr. Nickerson assessed a 10% permanent impairment rating which,
based upon the statutory definition, results in a "permanent
disability rating."
The second aspect of the analysis requires
the adjudicator to determine whether there has been a complete
and permanent inability to perform any type of work as a result
of the injury.
This portion of the definition of permanent total
disability gives discretion to an ALJ or arbitrator to interpret
the evidence in light of the definition of "work."
Addington
focuses on the portions of Dr. Nickerson’s testimony in which he
agreed with the majority of the vocational assessment performed
by Dr. Crystal.
Dr. Crystal was of the opinion that Kilburn
could return to a range of sedentary and light-duty jobs.
As a
consequence, Addington contends that there was insufficient
evidence to support Dr. Nickerson’s conclusion that Kilburn is
totally and permanently disabled.
By contrast, the ALJ and the
Board noted that Dr. Nickerson expressed that Kilburn’s physical
capacity was extremely limited, not only by his objective
findings, but also by evidence of chronic pain syndrome and
Kilburn’s limited employment skills.
While permanent partial disability assessments provide
for very little discretion on the part of the fact finder, total
disability assessments are not so strictly limited.
Although the
full impact of Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968),
has been modified, it is not entirely "gone."
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In Osborne, the
court thoroughly analyzed the requirements for finding
disability.
The court emphasized that medical percentages are
not determinative.
While that statement is no longer controlling
for permanent partial disability, it remains applicable to
permanent total disability.
The statute, as it existed at the
time of the decision in Osborne and thereafter until December 12,
1996, also required the fact finder to analyze the worker's
competitive abilities based upon the "local labor market."
However, with the changes in the Kentucky Workers' Compensation
Act as effective December 12, 1996, the local labor market
analysis is no longer appropriate.
The ALJ in the instant action, in concluding Kilburn
was experiencing total occupational disability, did not limit his
assessment to the local labor market and, therefore,
appropriately disregarded that aspect of Osborne.
We believe
that the Legislature's definition of "work" as set out above
follows a great deal of the language used by the court in
Osborne, particularly in its quotations from Larson.1
Larson
noted that if the worker's physical condition is such as to
disqualify him for regular employment in the labor market, then
total disability may be found.
See Osborne at 803.
The court
went on to state at page 803 "if the Board finds the workman is
so physically impaired that he is not capable of performing any
kind of work of regular employment . . . the man will be
1
For current edition discussion, See Larson’s Worker’s
Compensation Law, Vol 3, Ch. 80 (November 1999 update).
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considered to be totally disabled."
In a footnote, the court
further stated at 803:
We are talking about hired employment, not
self-employment. We do not believe the law
contemplates that consideration shall be
given to the workman's ability to sell apples
or pencils on the street.
In defining normal employment conditions, the court
adopted Larson's test of probable dependability to sell services
in a competitive labor market.
This definition considers whether
the individual will be dependable, whether his physiological
restrictions prohibit him from using skills within his individual
vocational capabilities and accepts that one is not required to
be homebound to be determined totally occupationally disabled.
Prior to December 12, 1996, there was a single
definition of disability contained in KRS 342.0011(11).
Effective December 12, 1996, the Legislature created three
specific subsections defining "temporary total disability,"
"permanent partial disability," and "permanent total disability."
While additional sections of the Act severely limit an
adjudicator's ability to assess occupational disability in
permanent partial disability situations, the adjudicator has more
discretion to evaluate the evidence in determining total
occupational disability.
The determination of permanent total
disability continues to be a factual finding.
If, however, the
adjudicator decides that an individual is permanently and totally
disabled, those mathematical factors set out in KRS 342.730(1)(b)
are not applicable.
The evidence presented to the ALJ in this action would
have supported a finding of either total occupational disability
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or partial occupational disability.
In total disability claims,
unlike partial disability claims, medical assessments remain only
one of the many elements to be considered.
The ALJ, as was his
right, considered the individual's own testimony, vocational
testimony, physiological testimony and arrived at a finding of
total disability.
See Caudill v. Maloney's Discount Stores, Ky.,
560 S.W.2d 15 (1977); Eaton Axle Corp. v. Nally, Ky., 688 S.W.2d
334 (1985); and Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chemical Co., Ky., 474
S.W.2d 367 (1971).
Since there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the ALJ’s finding that Kilburn is now totally
disabled, the ALJ was within his authority in reaching the
conclusion that he did.
Accordingly, the opinion and order by the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul E. Jones
Baird, Baird, Baird & Jones
PSC
Pikeville, Kentucky
Donald Wayne Taylor, Jr.
Stumbo, Barber & Moak, PSC
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
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