JOANN CREMEANS v. KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION AND KOKOKU RUBBER, INC.
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RENDERED: May 26, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001207-MR
JOANN CREMEANS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM JENNINGS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00635
v.
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
COMMISSION AND KOKOKU RUBBER, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, SCHRODER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
JoAnn Cremeans appeals from an Order of Madison
Circuit Court affirming the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission’s denial of benefits for misconduct.
facts are not in dispute.
The essential
On appeal, the standard of review is
whether the law was correctly applied to those facts.
Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Cardwell, Ky., 409 S.W.2d
304 (1966).
We affirm.
Cremeans worked for Kokoku Rubber, Inc. as a press
operator for approximately six and a half years.
In February
1998, she was placed on a period of light duty for a back problem
which was apparently work-related.
and continued having back problems.
to the emergency room.
Cremeans continued to work
On March 8, 1998, she went
Cremeans requested vacation leave from
March 9 through March 13, 1998, due to her back problem.
While
on vacation leave, Cremeans was contacted by Sherri Cornelison,
Human Resources Superintendent, who advised her to see one of the
“workers’ compensation” physicians.
Cremeans saw a physician at Instant Care in Richmond on
March 13, 1998.
At that time, she was given a referral to see an
orthopedic specialist in Lexington on March 20, 1998, and a form
stating she could return to work on March 13, 1998, with no
lifting over ten pounds.
On March 16, 1998
-- a Monday –
Cremeans called Kokoku, spoke to a supervisor, and said, “I won’t
be in to work today.”
Cremeans admitted that “for the rest of
the week I didn’t call in because I started thinking, well, this
is work – I’m on workman’s comp anyway, so why should I have to
call in every day.
I didn’t think you had to call in when you’re
on workman’s comp.
That’s what I was thinking.”
When asked why
she had called in that Monday, if she did not think she had to
call in while she was “on workman’s comp,” Cremeans responded,
“Well, I don’t know.
I just called in Monday, I guess, it’s uh,
I don’t know why I called in on Monday.”
Cremeans admitted her familiarity with company policy.
She knew she was required to call in when absent.
Cornelison
testified that they did not hear from Cremeans on March 17, 18,
or 19, 1998.
Cremeans showed up on the afternoon of March 20,
1998 to get her paycheck.
Cornelison explained that she had
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attempted to contact Cremeans several times by phone, but was
unable to reach her.
Cornelison testified about Kokoku’s policy
– if absent, an employee is required to call in no later than one
hour after the start of the shift. The policy is uniformly
enforced.
Kokoku had no documentation from a physician that
Cremeans had been taken off work while she was absent, but had
not called in on March 17, 18, 19 or 20, 1998.
Cremeans was
terminated for having been absent three days without notice in
violation of company policy.
Cremeans filed for unemployment benefits.
The initial
determination reflects that Cremeans’ absence was either
unnecessary or not properly reported, and that her actions showed
a willful disregard of the employer’s interests.
was for misconduct in connection with work.
and a hearing was held on May 6, 1998.
decision dated May 13, 1998.
Her discharge
Cremeans appealed
The referee affirmed in a
The referee found that the evidence
established Cremeans was aware of the employer’s attendance
policy, that the policy of reporting all absences prior to the
start of the working shift was reasonable, and that Cremeans’
failure to follow the policy was misconduct under KRS 341.370(6).
Cremeans appealed to the Commission which affirmed the
referee decision.
The Commission reviewed the record, and
determined that the referee had correctly applied the law:
Although claimant contends that she did not
think it was necessary to call and report her
absences from March 17 through 20 because she
thought she was to be off on Worker’s
Compensation, the evidence clearly shows
otherwise. She was not told to be off by any
doctor – including her family doctor – and
she was released to return to work as of
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March 13. Also, although she filled out some
Workers’ Compensation forms, she was never
advised by anyone that she was to be off for
that reason. She was, therefore, absent
without good cause and failed to properly
report her absences as required by the
reasonable rule of the employer. Such
actions constitute misconduct under the law.
Cremeans filed a verified Petition for Review of the
Commission’s order in the Madison Circuit Court.
The circuit
court affirmed by order entered April 23, 1999.
On appeal to
this Court, Cremeans contends that her acts did not constitute
misconduct “within the meaning of unemployment insurance law.”
The statute provides, in pertinent part:
341.370
Disqualifications -- Length of time.
(1) A worker shall be disqualified from
receiving benefits for the duration of any
period of unemployment with respect to which:
. . . .
(b) He has been discharged for misconduct or
dishonesty connected with his most recent
work, . . . .
. . . .
(6) "Discharge for misconduct" as used in
this section shall include, but not be
limited to, separation initiated by an
employer for falsification of an employment
application to obtain employment through
subterfuge; knowing violation of a reasonable
and uniformly enforced rule of an employer;
unsatisfactory attendance if the worker
cannot show good cause for absences or
tardiness; damaging the employer's property
through gross negligence; refusing to obey
reasonable instructions; reporting to work
under the influence of alcohol or drugs or
consuming alcohol or drugs on employer's
premises during working hours; conduct
endangering safety of self or co- workers;
and incarceration in jail following
conviction of a misdemeanor or felony by a
court of competent jurisdiction, which
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results in missing at least five (5) days
work.
Cremeans contends that in order to deny unemployment on
the basis of misconduct, “her actions must rise to the level of
‘intentional’ as required by law” in reliance upon City of
Lancaster v. Trumbo, Ky. App., 600 S.W.2d 954 (1983).
reliance is misplaced.
That
Trumbo, id. involved sanitation
department employees who were asked to take over picking up
refuse in the public square – a task that formerly had been
performed by a 73 year old part-time employee in about an hour.
The sanitation workers repeatedly refused and were ultimately
discharged.
The issue on appeal was whether the Commission’s
determination --
that the employees were disqualified on ground
of discharge for misconduct
evidence.
--
was supported by substantial
We held that:
An employee is obligated to render, loyal,
diligent, faithful and obedient service to
his employer and failure to do so is a
disregard of the standards of behavior which
the employer can expect of his employee.
Brown Hotel Company v. White, Ky., 365 S.W.2d
306 (1963). There is no right to reject the
tasks of employment on the basis that work
methods have changed and the employee
suspects (without trying it) that he will be
unable to satisfactorily do the new
assignment. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission v. Day, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 656
(1970). Where an employee manifests an
intent to disobey the reasonable instructions
of his employer, the denial of unemployment
compensation benefits on the basis of
misconduct is proper. Brown Hotel Company,
supra; 76 Am.Jur.2d Unemployment
Compensation S 55. There was substantial
evidence in the record which indicates that
the order to clean the public square in this
case was within the appellees' ability to
perform and would not result in any undue
hardship and was, in essence, a reasonable
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request. It is undisputed that when the
subject was first brought up, they refused to
do so, and they have continued in that
refusal. We hold that there was substantial
evidence in the record to support the action
of the Unemployment Insurance Commission in
holding that the appellees were disqualified
under the provisions of KRS 341.370 on the
grounds of discharge for misconduct.
Trumbo, id. at 956.
KRS 341.370(6) speaks for itself.
A knowing violation
of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule is ground for
disqualification for misconduct.
Cremeans admitted knowing of
the employer’s policy about calling in within one hour of the
start of the shift when absent.
Cremeans submits that her
failure to call in was, at most, an isolated error in judgment,
rather than an act of misconduct sufficient to disqualify her
from benefits, in reliance upon Shamrock Coal Co. v. Taylor, Ky.,
697 S.W.2d 952 (1985).
facts.
Shamrock, id.,
is distinguishable on its
There, a dozer operator had permitted his dozer to slip
and overturn.
This Court noted that the dozer operator had some
discretion in the performance of the work and that no job –
especially one as rigorous as coal mining – can be performed free
of misadventure.
Cremeans did not make an isolated error in
judgment while performing her job.
in to work, if absent.
Cremeans knew she had to call
Cremeans failed to show up for work,
without notifying her employer, not once but four times, after
she had been released to return to work.
The Commission
correctly applied the law to the facts of this case.
of the Madison Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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The order
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan Dabney Luxon
Richmond, Kentucky
Thomas J. Birchfield
Louisville, Kentucky
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