JOE MCDOUGAL v. JACKSON PURCHASE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE CORPORATION
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RENDERED: AUGUST 11, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001103-MR
JOE MCDOUGAL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES R. DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00932
JACKSON PURCHASE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, McANULTY, and TACKETT, Judges.
McANULTY, JUDGE: Joe McDougal appeals from an order of the
McCracken Circuit Court that granted partial summary judgment to
the Jackson Purchase Electric Cooperative Corporation and
dismissed McDougal’s claim of wrongful termination based on
breach of contract.
After reviewing the record and the arguments
of counsel, we affirm.
Jackson Purchase Electric Cooperative Corporation
(hereinafter Jackson Electric) is a nonprofit electric
distribution cooperative serving six counties in Western
Kentucky.
After having been employed by Jackson Electric for 24
years, McDougal was informed in August 1996 at a meeting with the
interim General Manager and the President of the Board of
Directors that he was being terminated from his job.
At the
time, McDougal was 55 years of age and the manager of the
Department of Finance and Administration overseeing 28 employees.
His responsibilities included overseeing the general accounting
requirements of the company, maintaining financial statements,
and overseeing the billing department.
At the meeting in which
he was notified of his dismissal, the President of the Board of
Directors suggested the action was based on dissatisfaction with
appellant’s management style.
He was replaced by a 30-year-old
female, who had been a supervisor of general accounting in the
Finance Department.
In October 1996, McDougal filed suit against his former
employer alleging wrongful termination, age discrimination in
violation of KRS 344.040, and violation of the company’s
corporate charter based on the action of the Board of Directors.1
He sought compensatory and punitive damages for lost past and
future wages and benefits, emotional distress, attorneys fees,
and incidental expenses.
1
Appellant later filed an amended complaint to include an
additional cause of action for conspiracy to violate civil rights
pursuant to KRS 344.280 and KRS 446.070. Jackson Electric
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on this claim
that was granted by the trial court. McDougal has not appealed
that decision.
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Following some preliminary discovery, Jackson Electric
filed a motion in February 1999, seeking partial summary judgment
under CR 56.03 on McDougal’s claims of breach of contract and
violation of business charter.
It alleged that McDougal was an
“at will” employee and that Kentucky law does not recognize a
cause of action for violation of business charter.
filed a response to the motion.
McDougal
On March 26, 1999, the trial
court entered an order granting Jackson Electric’s motion for
partial summary judgment.2
On April 7, 1999, McDougal filed a
motion asking the court to reconsider and vacate its order
granting Jackson Electric partial summary judgment.
Meanwhile,
between April 12-15, 1999, the circuit court conducted a jury
trial limited to appellant’s age discrimination cause of action.
After the jury informed the court that it was hopelessly
deadlocked, the trial court declared a mistrial on that claim.
Shortly thereafter, McDougal filed a motion pursuant to CR 54.02
requesting the trial court to enter a final and appealable order
on his motion to reconsider/vacate its prior summary judgment
order.
Jackson Electric filed a response opposing appellant’s
motion for a final order.
On May 6, 1999, the trial court
entered an order denying McDougal’s motion to reconsider/vacate
its prior order granting Jackson Electric summary judgment on
appellant’s claim of wrongful termination based on breach of
2
McDougal has not challenged the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment to the appellee on his claim of violation of
business charter. Therefore, we will not address that issue in
this appeal.
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contract.
Consistent with CR 54.02 the order states it is a
final and appealable order.
This appeal followed.
First, we briefly discuss the procedural issue of
whether this case is properly before this Court.
Although the
appellee initially opposed designating the order granting the
partial summary judgment final and appealable, it has not
challenged the trial court’s action on this point in its
appellate brief.
We agree with appellant that the trial court
had the authority to designate its order final and appealable
under CR 54.02.
Although the mere recitation of finality language by
the court in its order is not determinative, Preferred Risk
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., Ky., 872
S.W.2d 469 (1994), the trial court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to certify a judgment as final and appealable on
a claim in an action involving multiple claims.
Christie v.
First American Bank, Ky. App., 908 S.W.2d 679 (1995).
The test
for whether an order is appealable is whether it “‘grants or
denies the ultimate relief sought in the action or requires
further steps to be taken in order that parties’ rights may be
finally determined.’” The Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Beard,
Ky., 690 S.W.2d 374, 376 (1984)(quoting Evans Elkhorn Coal Co. v.
Ousley, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 130, 130-31 (1965)).
An order disposing
of a claim may be appealable even though there are further
proceedings pending between the parties.
See, e.g., Preferred
Risk Mutual, supra; Christie v. First American Bank, supra.
the current case, the circuit court’s summary judgment order
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In
fully adjudicated McDougal’s contract claim.
It is final and
appealable despite the fact that McDougal’s age discrimination
claim is still pending.
McDougal argues on appeal that the trial court acted
prematurely in granting summary judgment and dismissing his claim
of wrongful termination based on breach of contract.
The
standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion
for summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found
that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996);
Palmer v. International Ass’n of Machinists, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117,
120 (1994); CR 56.03.
The trial court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary
judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the
nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial
warranting a judgment in his favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480-82 (1991); Leslie
v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products, Inc., Ky. App., 961 S.W.2d 799,
804 (1998).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and then the
burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present
“at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d
at 482.
See also Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171
(1992).
Because specific factual findings are not involved, an
appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and
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will conduct a de novo review using the same standards as the
trial court.
See Scifres, 916 S.W.2d at 781; Wheeler v. Veal
Realtors and Auctioneers, Inc., Ky., App., 997 S.W.2d 497, 498
(1999); Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir.
1997).
McDougal’s breach of implied contract claim is based on
the company’s employment manual.
He points to several provisions
that he alleges modified the traditional “at will” employment
status and limited Jackson Electric’s discretion in terminating
employees to situations involving good cause.
He further posits
that Jackson Electric had no justifiable reason for terminating
him and this factual issue should be presented to a jury.
On the
other hand, Jackson Electric contends that McDougal was an “at
will” employee that could be dismissed even without
justification.
Therefore, the dispositive issue is whether the
employment manual created an employment contract restricting the
employer’s ability to terminate McDougal only for good cause.
McDougal first points to a provision under Chapter I General Information, Terminations, which states: “Employees hired
for regular work may be discharged without cause or notice during
the first six months’ probationary period.
A notice of discharge
will be filed with the Personnel Department by the affected
department’s manager.”
The Terminations Section also states that
violation of any of 18 listed rules or policies could provide
grounds for immediate dismissal.
Another section entitled
Disciplinary Procedures under Chapter II - Rules and Regulations
states: “An employee may be disciplined for violation of work
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rules, safety rules, Cooperative policy and procedure, or for any
behavior deemed by management not to be in the best interest of
the Cooperative.”
It then sets out a system of progressive
discipline with four separate steps involving a verbal warning, a
written reprimand, suspension, and termination.
McDougal argues that the manual limited the employer’s
authority to discharge or terminate regular employees without
cause to the probationary period and that immediate dismissal was
restricted to the 18 specified grounds in the Termination
Section.
For all other disciplinary actions, the employer was
required to follow the progressive system.
McDougal maintains
that the manual’s policies were not followed because he was not
treated under the progressive system, but rather was immediately
discharged for proffered reasons not within the 18 specified
grounds for immediate dismissal.
He also presents testimony from several former and
current officers of Jackson Electric indicating that the purpose
of the employment manual was to promote retention of qualified
employees by establishing a written policy that treated employees
fairly and consistently.
He asserts that these officers
testified that the manual represented a commitment by the company
to its employees to treat them fairly in accordance with the
procedures in the employment handbook.
Jackson Electric disputes McDougal’s interpretation of
the employment manual.
It relies primarily on a provision in the
Disciplinary Procedures Section which states under the subsection
related to termination: “The Cooperative reserves the right to
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terminate any employee at any time for any reason.”
Jackson
Electric also points to the fact that in 1987, in connection with
the distribution of a prior employment manual, McDougal signed a
Disclaimer that stated, “The language used in this handbook is
not intended to create nor is it to be construed to constitute a
contract of employment between JPECC and any one or all of its
employees.”
The Disclaimer also included an admission that the
signee did “expressly recognize and acknowledge that my
employment and compensation can be terminated ‘at will’ at any
time by either JPECC or myself as provided through Commonwealth
of Kentucky Law.”
Jackson Electric also asserts that the 1996
employment manuals were not generally distributed to employees,
but were kept by management officials who were obligated to
consult with and assist employees regarding the policies embodied
in the handbook.
Generally, employment in Kentucky is considered “at
will” unless the parties otherwise agree.
See generally Grzyb v.
Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399 (1985); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v.
Meadows, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 730 (1983).
In Shah v. American
Synthetic Rubber Corp., Ky., 655 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1983), the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that parties may enter into an
employment contract terminable only for cause “by clearly stating
their intention to do so . . . .”
In Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d
824 (1987), the court reviewed three situations dealing with the
creation of implied employment contracts based on employment
manuals.
In the first situation involving Fetter Printing
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Company, the court held that the company’s handbook contained
policy statements which the employer strove to follow, but it did
not contain contractual language.
In the second situation
involving Cooke Pontiac, the manual contained a disclaimer
provision stating it was not a contract of employment and that
the employee understood that his/her employment was terminable at
will.
The disclaimer also stated that the employer reserved the
right to revise the policies or procedures in the manual at any
time without notice.
The court held that the disclaimer rebutted
any claim that the manual created an implied contract modifying
Cooke Pontiac’s employees’ at will employment status.
In the
third situation involving Wal-Mart Stores, the manual stated that
continued employment was conditioned on following the guidelines
in the handbook and successful performance of all work
assignments.
The court held that the manual did not create an
implied employment contract modifying Wal-Mart’s employees’ at
will employment status.
Although somewhat oblique, the court’s
citation to Shah suggests it did not feel the provisions in the
policy manual were sufficiently clear statements of an intention
to create a for cause employment status.
The court concluded as
follows:
Policy and procedure manuals are to be
commended. They can, when followed, remove
an element of arbitrariness from employment
relationships and thereby improve the entire
atmosphere of the workplace. A contract they
do not necessarily make, and in these three
cases did not make. These were “at will”
employees.
738 S.W.2d at 827.
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In the current case, we agree with the trial court that
Jackson Electric’s employment manual did not create an implied
employment contract.
The disclaimer signed by McDougal in 19873
explicitly states that the then current employment handbook was
not intended to create a contract and that the employee knew that
his employment was terminable “at will”.
It also states that
Jackson Electric reserved the right to modify any of its policies
or procedures at any time without notice.
Although the
disclaimer was associated with an earlier version of the
employment manual, it unambiguously demonstrates the general
purpose of the employment manuals.
Jackson Electric did not
intend its employment manuals to create an implied employment
contract.
It also placed McDougal on notice of this fact and the
fact that his employment at that time was terminable at will.
Although he argues that the disclaimer is irrelevant because it
was executed in connection with a prior handbook, he has not
shown that the revised handbook in existence in 1996 when he was
discharged was substantively different from the earlier handbook
in that it contained different provisions clearly showing an
intent to create an implied employment contract.
In addition, McDougal’s interpretation of the manual is
based on negative inferences.
His conclusion that the provisions
in the Termination Section stating that employees “may be
discharged without cause or notice during the six months’
probationary period” restricts all terminations outside that time
3
The record indicates that McDougal did not return the
disclaimer to the personnel department until 1991. The reason
for this time lapse is not explained.
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period is unconvincing.
Also, his assertion that immediate
dismissal is limited to the 18 specified grounds in the
Termination Section is erroneous because this section also states
that “[i]nfractions of certain basic rules, including but not
necessarily limited to the following, may be grounds for
immediate dismissal.”
As the court indicated in Nork involving
the Baker situation, negative inferences generally are
insufficient to create a contract.
More importantly, the manual contains a reservation
clause in the Disciplinary Procedures Section that states, “The
Cooperative reserves the right to terminate any employee at any
time for any reason.”
Again, McDougal’s attempt to nullify this
provision by arguing it merely represents the final step in a
system of progressive discipline and conflicts with the language
in the Termination Section is unconvincing.
This provision is an
unambiguous expression of the company’s desire to retain an “at
will” employment status.
Furthermore, the testimony of several
Jackson Electric officials that the employment manual represented
a commitment to employees to treat them fairly and was intended
to help attract and retain qualified personnel does not
demonstrate an intent to create an absolute contractual
obligation.
As the court noted in Nork, employment manuals can
be beneficial in eliminating some arbitrariness, but that does
not necessarily create an implied contractual relationship.
In conclusion, Jackson Electric has established that
the employment manual does not contain a sufficiently clear
statement of intention to modify McDougal’s “at will” employment
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status by creating an implied contract to terminate him only for
cause.
Based on the record, we believe that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and Jackson Electric was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law on McDougal’s wrongful
termination breach of contract claim.
Consequently, the trial
court did not err in granting appellee’s motion for partial
summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
McCracken Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jonathan Freed
Bradley and Freed, P.S.C.
Paducah, Kentucky
David L. Kelly
Denton & Keuler
Paducah, Kentucky
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