STEVE LAYNE and VERNA LAYNE v. BOBBY C. JUSTICE and BARBARA JUSTICE
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 27, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001090-MR
STEVE LAYNE and VERNA LAYNE
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES E. LOWE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00842
v.
BOBBY C. JUSTICE and BARBARA JUSTICE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; COMBS and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: The appellants, Steve Layne and Verna Layne (the
Laynes), appeal from the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court which
extinguished an easement across the property of the appellees,
Bobby C. Justice and Barbara Justice (the Justices).
Having
reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
This appeal arises out of an action initiated by the
Laynes to determine their right to an easement across the
Justices’ property.
In 1995, Steve Layne inherited property in
Pike County, Kentucky, adjacent to land owned by the Justices.
The properties of both parties were originally part of a large
tract of land owned by W.A. Thacker (W.A.) lying between Levisa
Fork of the Big Sandy River and Rocky Road.
In 1934, W.A. sold
the portion of his property next to the road to William (Bill)
Thacker.
That deed conveying the property to Bill Thacker
reserved an easement across his property leading to W.A.’s land
near the river.
Ultimately, Bill Thacker’s property was divided
into three tracts and was sold by his predecessor in interest;
Bobby Justice purchased the tract with the easement.
In 1954,
W.A. conveyed the property near the river to Phillip Thacker.
Steve Layne inherited this land in 1995 from his grandmother, Ida
Thacker, who had been married to Phillip Thacker.
After inheriting the property, the Laynes planned to
develop the land.
Phillip Thacker had lived outside Kentucky,
and the property had lain unused for almost three decades.
The
Laynes wanted to divide their property into five lots, which they
could then sell.
Their plan, however, was dependant upon their
ability to access two of the proposed lots by way of the easement
across the Justices’ property.
The Laynes’ property is also
accessible by Walnut Street, a public street which was
established in 1979.
The Laynes contend that the manner in which they can
divide their property will be limited if Walnut Street is the
only means of ingress and egress to their property.
On May 23,
1997, the Laynes filed an action in Pike Circuit Court, alleging
that the Justices had denied them access to the easement and
asking the court to determine their right to the easement.
Justices maintained that the easement had been extinguished.
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The
The case proceeded forward, and on February 22, 1999, the circuit
court conducted a bench trial.
Subsequently, on April 9, 1999,
the court entered judgment extinguishing the easement.
The court
found that Phillip Thacker had intentionally abandoned the
easement across the Justices’ property.
This appeal followed.
The Laynes argue on appeal that the court erred in
finding that Phillip Thacker intentionally abandoned the
easement.
They contend that the court’s finding is not supported
by substantial evidence.
The Laynes assert that the evidence
shows only that the easement was not used and that mere non-use
is not sufficient to establish abandonment of an easement.
We
disagree.
In City of Harrodsburg v. Cunningham, Ky., 184 S.W.2d
357 (1944), the Supreme Court addressed whether an easement by
grant could be lost by abandonment.
The Court held that the
right to the use of an easement by grant could not be
extinguished by mere disuse.
There must be something evidencing
an intention to abandon the right:
a denial of title, an act by
an adverse party, or facts and circumstances that show the
owner’s intention to abandon the easement.
Nonuser of an easement created by grant does
not, of itself, constitute an abandonment
thereof. This rule is based upon the
principle that such an easement is an
interest in land and the only failure to
enjoy it which will operate to extinguish the
easement is that which is due to adverse
occupancy. In order that a nonuser may
constitute an abandonment, there must be an
intention to abandon. However, nonuser may
be continued unexplained for such a length of
time as to be inconsistent with any
hypothesis other than an intention to abandon
the easement.
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Id. at 360, quoting 17 Am.Jur. 1029 § 144.
Furthermore, while
long-continued disuse or suspension of use are not by themselves
conclusive evidence of an intent to abandon, they are factors to
be considered along with other evidence.
Id.
In the case before us, the evidence established that
the easement in question had not been used since the early 1960's
and that Walnut Street was the primary means of accessing the
Laynes’ property.
Additionally, the easement was overgrown with
bushes and undergrowth.
Several witnesses testified that for
approximately thirty-years, a barbed-wire fence had blocked the
easement.
This fence ran along the boundary of the Justices’
property and was removed by Bobby Justice in 1989.
The evidence
also showed that Phillip Thacker knew that Bobby Justice had
built a garage across the easement and that he did not complain
of this structure.
There was testimony from witnesses that the
easement was partially obstructed by a tree which prohibited
vehicles from using it.
Based upon all of this evidence, the
court found that the actions of Phillip Thacker, coupled with his
long disuse of the land, indicated his intention to abandon his
right to the easement.
The trial court as the finder of fact has the best
opportunity to consider and weigh the evidence presented.
We may
not disturb the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly
erroneous.
CR 52.01; Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, Ky. App., 6
S.W.3d 843 (1999).
A trial court’s decision is not clearly
erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Motor Co. V. Green, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 954 (1965).
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Black
Substantial
evidence is evidence sufficient to induce conviction in the mind
of a reasonable person.
Kentucky State Racing Commission v.
Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 304 (1972).
In this case, we find
that the circuit court’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
The Laynes next argue on appeal that the court
improperly relied upon evidence that Phillip Thacker had entered
into an oral agreement with two other property owners to relocate
the easement in question by creating Walnut Street.
They assert
that an easement by grant cannot be extinguished by an oral
agreement and that any evidence of this alleged oral agreement
constituted hearsay.
However, the court specifically stated in
its judgment that this evidence was not the basis of its
decision:
The Court rules that it is not necessary in
reaching a decision herein for the Court to
consider the possible hearsay testimony of
Curtis Thacker regarding the verbal agreement
among Larry Thacker, Curtis Thacker and
Phillip Ferrell Thacker to relocate the
easement. In this instance, it is clear from
the above facts that the owner of the
easement and the servient owner of the land
subject to the easement, in fact relocated
the easement to what is now Walnut Street.
Without addressing the admissibility or propriety of this
evidence, we find that any possible error would have been
harmless.
The court’s decision was clearly supported by evidence
other than the alleged oral agreement.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the Pike Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, KY
Charles J. Baird
Pikeville, KY
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