WILLIAM BRADFORD ALTES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
OCTOBER 27, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000817-MR
WILLIAM BRADFORD ALTES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00005
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE: The appellant, William Bradford Altes, entered a
conditional plea of guilty to one count of sexual abuse in the
first degree and one count of second degree sexual abuse.
Altes
reserved his right to appeal several adverse evidentiary rulings
by the trial court.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On October 27, 1999, the appellant William Bradford
Altes was arrested on two counts of sexual abuse.
In January
1998, the Oldham County Grand Jury returned a two count
indictment against Altes, charging that on October 13, 1997 he
had committed first degree sexual abuse against K.E.N.; and that
during July 1997 he committed second degree sexual abuse against
B.M.F.
Both victims were under the age of 14 at the time of the
commission of the offenses.
On November 25, 1997, while he was being held in the
Oldham County Jail, Altes attempted to commit suicide.
During
the course of his treatment, he made a number of potentially
incriminating statements to the emergency room staff.
Shortly
thereafter, Altes was transferred to an inpatient psychiatric
facility where he was further evaluated and received additional
counseling and treatment.
Prior to trial, Altes moved to sever the counts of the
indictment.
sever.
The Commonwealth did not object to the motion to
Rather, the Commonwealth filed written notice pursuant to
KRE 404(c) of its intention to present evidence of sexual abuse
by Altes against K.E.N. and B.M.F., as well as allegations
involving uncharged sexual abuse against B.M.F. and another
child, B.E.B., in each trial.
Altes filed a motion in limine to
exclude evidence of other allegations of sexual abuse during the
trial of either count of the indictment.
In January 1999, the Commonwealth moved the trial court
to order production of Altes’s medical records, including those
pertaining to psychiatric or psychological treatment or
counseling.
Altes objected to the production order.
Altes also
filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to his suicide
attempt.
The trial court granted the order for production of the
medical records, but it ordered that the records be placed under
seal and it reserved a ruling on the matter.
-2-
Shortly before jury selection was to begin, the trial
court ruled that the testimony of the other victims was
sufficiently similar to the charged offenses, and allowed the
Commonwealth to introduce the evidence.
The trial court also
allowed the Commonwealth to introduce statements which Altes made
during his psychiatric evaluation and counseling following his
suicide attempt.
Lastly, the trial court denied Altes’s motion
to exclude any reference to his suicide attempt, provided that
the Commonwealth present proof prior to the introduction of such
evidence to establish a link between the suicide attempt and the
charged offense.
Rather than proceed to trial, Altes entered a
conditional guilty plea to one count of sexual abuse in the first
degree and one count of sexual abuse in the second degree.
The
trial court accepted the plea, and sentenced Altes to two years
on the first degree sexual abuse charge, and to twelve months on
the second degree sexual abuse charge, to be served concurrently
with the felony sentence.
The court probated Altes’s sentence
for a period of five years, provided that Altes first serve six
months in jail.
The trial court also ordered Altes to complete a
sex offender treatment program, to make reparation or restitution
for the victims’ counseling expenses, and to abide by all other
conditions of his probation.
This appeal followed.
Altes first argues that the accusations of sexual abuse
made by other victims were not sufficiently similar to establish
a common scheme or plan.
Rather, he contends that the evidence
only tends to show that he is pre-disposed to commit sexual abuse
crimes against children, and that the evidence is not admissible
-3-
for this reason.
KRE 404(b).
The Commonwealth stated that it
intended to present the testimony of K.E.N. and B.M.F. against
Altes in each separate trial.
K.E.N. would have testified that
in October 1997, when she was 11 years old, Altes persuaded her
to “play dead” on her bed while he was alone with her.
When the
game began, Altes allegedly got on top of her, he blew into her
mouth, stuck his tongue into her mouth, rolled up her shirt, and
kissed her stomach and between her breasts.
Thereafter, he put
his hand down her pants and touched her vagina, placed her hand
on his penis and finally exposed himself to her.
Later, Altes
allegedly told K.E.N. that he would “come back” if she told
anyone about what happened.
B.M.F. would have testified
concerning an incident which occurred in July of 1997.
B.M.F.,
who was 12 at the time, alleged that on three occasions when she
was spending the night with K.E.N., Altes crawled into her bed
and put his hand in or on her vagina.
B.M.F. also intended to
testify concerning other acts of sexual abuse against her by
Altes which occurred between April and October 1997.
acts were not charged in the indictment.
These other
In addition, the
Commonwealth stated that it intended to present evidence of
additional acts of sexual abuse which Altes committed against
B.E.B.
B.E.B. would have testified that in 1995, when she was
approximately 14 years old, she and Altes were “play wrestling”
at her mother’s house.
She alleged that Altes pinned her down on
the bed with his knees on her shoulders, and exposed himself to
her.
This incident was not charged in the indictment.
-4-
Admissibility of evidence of prior crimes or bad acts
is governed by KRE 404(b), which provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with
other evidence essential to the case that
separation of the two (2) could not be
accomplished without serious adverse effect
on the offering party.
Even prior to the adoption of the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence, our courts had always recognized the general
prohibition against proving character or criminal predisposition
by evidence of prior wrongful acts.
See, e .g., Jones v.
Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 666, 198 S.W.2d 969 (1947).
However,
Kentucky courts also recognized that evidence of prior conduct is
admissible, if it is "probative of an element of the crime
charged . . . even though it may tend to prove the commission of
other crimes."
Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 674
(1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 831, 112 S. Ct. 107, 116 L. Ed. 2d
76 (1991).
Specifically, evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts was held to be admissible if it tended to show "motive,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, intent, or knowledge,
or common scheme or plan."
S.W.2d 549, 552 (1985).
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685
"Common scheme" is not included in the
"other purpose" exceptions listed in KRE 404(b)(1), though "plan"
is specifically included.
Nonetheless, this omission or variance
in terminology does not constitute an alteration of this
-5-
long-standing legal concept, for "the specifically listed
purposes are illustrative rather than exhaustive."
Tamme v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 29 (1998), (quoting R. Lawson,
The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.25, at 87 (3d ed.
Michie
1993)).
In order to prove the elements of a subsequent offense
by evidence of a common scheme or plan, the facts surrounding the
misconduct must be so strikingly similar to the charged offense
as to create a reasonable probability that (1) the acts were
committed by the same person, or (2) the acts were accompanied by
the same mens rea.
945 (1999).
Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941,
Temporal remoteness generally is held to go to the
weight of the evidence, but not to render it inadmissible per se.
However, temporal remoteness tends to lessen the probative value
of the evidence.
When "pattern of conduct" is the purpose for
which evidence is sought to be introduced, the more significant
question is whether the method of the commission of the other
crime or crimes is so similar as to indicate a reasonable
probability that the crimes were committed by the same person.
Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (1994) (citing Adcock
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 440, 443 (1986)).
The balancing
of the probative value of such evidence against the danger of
undue prejudice is a task properly reserved for the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
English 993 S.W.2d at 944-45.
The facts related by K.E.N., B.M.F., and B.E.B. are
sufficiently similar to establish a common scheme or plan.
In
the cases of K.E.N. and B.M.F., the charged instances involved
-6-
young girls of approximately the same age, both instances
occurred in the same bed, both instances involved Altes exposing
himself to the girls and then touching or rubbing their genitals,
and the instances occurred within a short period of time.
The
uncharged allegations by B.M.F. follow a similar pattern.
The
allegations made by B.E.B. are more temporally remote from those
made by K.E.N., B.M.F., and B.E.B. was slightly older than the
other girls.
However, the circumstances are otherwise
sufficiently similar to the incidents involving K.E.N. and B.M.F.
so that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
admission of the evidence.1
Altes next argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to exclude statements which he made during his
psychological evaluation at the emergency room and during his
subsequent psychiatric counseling.
The trial court concluded
that KRS 620.050(2) abrogates any claim of privilege which Altes
might have for these statements.
1
KRS 620.050(2) provides:
See also Commonwealth v. English, supra, (probative value
of prior acts of sexual abuse against children was heightened by
the multiplicity of victims, the multiplicity of occurrences, and
the fact that the abuse was perpetrated against members of
several generations of the same family); Violett v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 907 S.W.2d 773 (1995) (prior acts separated in time by four
years held admissible); Lear v. Commonwealth, Ky., 884 S.W.2d 657
(1994) (prior acts of sexual misconduct against children
admissible to show pattern of conduct which was ongoing over a
period of years); Anastasi v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 860
(1988) (prior acts of sexual abuse against children eight years
earlier were sufficiently similar to the charged act);. and
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, supra, (prior acts of sexual
misconduct against older daughter were sufficiently similar and
not too remote in time to be admissible as showing a method of
operation of sexual activity with young daughters and to indicate
a common and continuing pattern of conduct on the part of the
accused).
-7-
Neither the husband-wife nor any
professional-client/patient privilege, except
the attorney-client and clergy-penitent
privilege, shall be a ground for refusing to
report under this section or for excluding
evidence regarding a dependent, neglected, or
abused child or the cause thereof, in any
judicial proceedings resulting from a report
pursuant to this section. This subsection
shall also apply in any criminal proceeding
regarding in District or Circuit Court
regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused
child.
Altes contends that KRS 620.050(2) eliminates the
psychiatrist/psychotherapist-patient privilege in judicial
proceedings only when the statements were made pursuant to a
report under KRS Chapter 620.
Although he is technically
correct, Altes construes the purpose of KRS 620.050(2) too
narrowly.
In construing a statute, the general rule is that we
are to give effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed
in the statutory language and context and revealed by the evil
the law was intended to remedy.
Sisters of Charity v. Raikes,
Ky., 984 S.W.2d 464 (1998); Democratic Party of Kentucky v.
Graham, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 423 (1998).
Thus, the context of KRS
620.050(2) is significant.
KRS 620.030(1) requires any person who knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that a child is dependent, neglected,
or abused to report it to the authorities.
KRS 620.030(2) places
special reporting obligations on, among other persons, teachers
and medical personnel.
KRS 620.040 and KRS 620.050(3)-(8) deal
with how reports of abuse, neglect, or dependency shall be
investigated and prosecuted.
In addition, KRS 620.050(1) grants
immunity to any person who makes a good faith report of abuse,
neglect, or dependency involving a child.
-8-
When considered in
this context, the purpose of KRS 620.050(2) is to allow
allegations of child abuse to be reported, investigated and
prosecuted without interference from the evidentiary rules which
privilege communications with a spouse or with a medical
professional.
Thus, in Mullins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 210
(1997), the defendant attempted to claim a marital privilege for
statements made by his wife reporting to the police his sexual
misdeeds with a child.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that
KRS 620.050(2) “abrogates the professional-client/patient
privilege, as well as the marital privilege, if it is used in the
case of dependent, neglected or abused children.”
Id. at 211.
The statute improves the truth finding function of the judicial
process “by refusing to allow a shield to a child abuser in the
form of the husband-wife privilege.”
Id.
at 212.
By the same
token, the statute also furthers the reporting requirements set
out in other provisions of KRS Chapter 620 by refusing to allow
an alleged child abuser to thwart reporting of or testimony about
child abuse by assertion of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In this case, the Commonwealth sought to introduce
inculpatory statements which Altes made during the course of his
psychological evaluation at the emergency room, and during his
psychiatric counseling thereafter.
We conclude that KRS
620.050(2) expressly abrogates the privilege for such evidence.2
Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Altes’s motion
to exclude the evidence.
2
However, see footnote 4.
-9-
Lastly, Altes contends that the trial court erred by
permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence regarding his
suicide attempt.
The Commonwealth concedes that the
admissibility of such evidence is a matter of first impression.
However, the Commonwealth asserts that a defendant’s attempt to
commit suicide shortly after being charged with a crime
constitutes circumstantial evidence showing consciousness of
guilt.
The Commonwealth argues that a suicide attempt is
analogous to an attempt to flee or evade arrest.
The
Commonwealth contends that attempted suicide, like flight, is a
circumstance to be considered with the other circumstances of the
case in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
We realize that the prevailing rule in other
jurisdictions is that evidence that the accused attempted to
commit suicide is relevant as a circumstance tending to show
consciousness of guilt or as showing an attempt to flee and
escape forever from the temporal consequences of one's misdeeds.
The courts of other states in almost every instance have allowed
evidence of attempted suicide to go to the jury for whatever
weight it chooses to place upon it.3
3
See Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Related to
Accused’s Attempt to Commit Suicide, 22 A.L.R. 3d 840 (1968 &
2000 Supp.). See also Aldridge v. State, 229 Ga. App. 544, 494
S.E.2d 368 (1997) (suicide attempt while in custody is relevant
as possibly indicating a consciousness of guilt); Commonwealth
v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 680 N.E.2d 75, 83 (Mass. 1997)
(instruction that attempted suicide is evidence of consciousness
of guilt not error); Harper v. State, 930 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.
App. 1996) (evidence of flight and attempted suicide was properly
admitted); State v. Mitchell, 450 N.W.2d 828, 831-832 (Iowa 1990)
(admission of evidence of suicide attempt after arrest not abuse
of discretion); and State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818,
(continued...)
-10-
Nevertheless, we find several problems with this
position.
First, the rule in Kentucky is that the flight of a
person or concealment (of himself or evidence) after the
commission of a crime and before his arrest is a circumstance to
be considered with the other circumstances of the case in
determining his guilt or innocence.
445 S.W.2d 675, 681 (1969).
Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Altes’s suicide attempt occurred
while he was in custody, so the analogy to flight is somewhat
more attenuated in this case.
Moreover, flight or concealment (of self or evidence of
a crime) is relatively unambiguous conduct.
Such conduct is more
likely to be consistent with consciousness of guilt than it is
not.
At least, it is conduct which, in the average experience of
most jurors, could be equated with consciousness of guilt.
Consequently, evidence of flight or concealment is admissible as
a circumstance to be considered by the finder of fact, along with
all other evidence.
Of course, if a defendant chooses to
testify, he or she may attempt to explain such conduct.
The inferences to be drawn from a suicide attempt are
not as clear.
While a suicide attempt may, as the Commonwealth
argues, be evidence of consciousness of guilt, it could just as
likely be caused by depression, by mental illness, or by stress
or fear caused by the confinement.
The inferences to be drawn
from a suicide attempt while in custody are arguably are as
consistent with innocence as with guilt.
3
Furthermore, evidence
(...continued)
823 (N.C. 1982) (flight and attempted suicide in jail are implied
admissions of guilt).
-11-
of a post-confinement suicide attempt would open the trial to
collateral matters such as the state of mind and the mental
health of the defendant at a time which is not relevant to the
offense charged.
Thus, there is a significant danger that such
evidence would result in a confusion of the issues.
KRE 403.
In addition, we believe that allowing the Commonwealth
to present an unsupported inference to the jury and then require
a defendant to refute it is simply unfair.
Unless there is
evidence to link the suicide attempt to the charged offenses, any
correlation between the suicide attempt and the charged offense
is entirely speculative.
The bare fact that a defendant
attempted to commit suicide after being charged may or may not
indicate a consciousness of guilt.
The prevailing rule, which
allows such evidence to be presented to the jury and then leaves
the jury to decide what weight to give to it, shifts the burden
of refuting the inference of consciousness of guilt to a
defendant.
This approach excuses the prosecution from first
establishing that the evidence is relevant and probative to the
charged offense.
See KRE 401.
Thus, we decline to establish a
firm rule that such evidence should be admissible as a matter of
law.
Conversely however, we cannot agree with Altes that
such evidence is irrelevant as a matter of law.
Instead, the
approach taken by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v.
Mann, 132 N.J. 410, 625 A.2d 1102 (1992), seems most reasonable
to this Court:
The possible ambiguity of an accused's
suicide attempt requires a careful
-12-
consideration of the probative value such
evidence offers. A suicide attempted to
"flee" arrest or prosecution may, in some
circumstances, reveal a defendant's
consciousness of guilt. However, a
defendant's psychological, social or
financial situation may underlie a suicide
attempt. In addition, introduction of
evidence of that attempt may be unduly
prejudicial under certain circumstances.
To ensure a proper balancing of the
interests at stake, a trial court ordinarily
should hold an [evidentiary] hearing to
determine whether evidence of a defendant's
suicide attempt is sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that the suicide attempt
was prompted by a desire to avoid the ordeal
of prosecution and punishment or was
otherwise evidence of consciousness of guilt.
As with evidence of flight, the chain of
inferences leading from an attempted suicide
to the inference of consciousness of guilt
must be soundly supported. [citation
omitted]. The court should consider
alternative explanations of the suicide
attempt offered by a defendant, as well as
the possible prejudice to a defendant from
the introduction of the attempted suicide
evidence or from a defendant's effort to
offer a different explanation of that
evidence. The trial court also should ensure
that a defendant has been given adequate
notice of the State's intention to offer
proof of the attempted suicide.
If evidence of a defendant's suicide
attempt is admitted, the trial court should
charge the jury on its proper use. The jury
should be instructed that it first must find
that an actual suicide attempt had occurred.
It should then consider whether that attempt
was made to avoid the burdens of prosecution
and punishment. The jury should also
determine whether defendant's attempted
suicide demonstrated consciousness of guilt.
The trial court should instruct the jury that
if it credits any alternative explanation
offered by the defendant, it may not infer
consciousness of guilt from the evidence of a
suicide attempt.
Id. at 423-24, 625 A.2d at 1108-09.
Therefore, we hold that evidence that a defendant
attempted to commit suicide while in custody may not be
-13-
introduced by itself as circumstantial evidence demonstrating
consciousness of guilt.
Rather, such evidence may only be
introduced if the prosecution presents additional evidence to
establish a link between the crimes charged and the suicide
attempt.
The trial court’s handling of this matter implicitly
followed this approach.
The court held that evidence of Altes’s
suicide attempt would be admissible if the Commonwealth could
establish a link between the charged crimes and the suicide
attempt.
The Commonwealth sought to introduce the medical
records to establish that connection.4
Since Altes pleaded
guilty prior to trial, no question ever arose concerning jury
instructions and we need not reach that issue.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Oldham Circuit Court
is affirmed.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
4
We recognize that in most cases, the psychotherapistpatient privilege will remain in force, and it will be more
difficult for the prosecution to establish the link. However,
there may be unprivileged testimony or evidence which is
sufficient to establish the link in those cases. Furthermore, we
question whether KRS 620.050(2) abrogates the psychotherapistpatient privilege to this extent. As noted above, there is no
privilege for direct evidence in prosecutions for child abuse
(i.e.: eyewitness testimony; admission to a third party).
Mullins, 956 S.W.2d at 211-12. However, there is no indication
that KRS 620.050(2) intended to eliminate the privilege for all
purposes. The Commonwealth is attempting to use Altes’s medical
records to establish a link between his suicide attempt and the
charged offense. The use of otherwise privileged records to
raise a circumstantial inference of guilt from a collateral act
appears to be outside of the scope of KRS 620.050(2).
Nevertheless, Altes did not reserve this issue in his conditional
guilty plea, so the matter is not properly presented on appeal.
-14-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jerry D. Crosby, II
LaGrange, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-15-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.