THE ESTATE OF CARL J. MABRY; BILLY JACK MABRY, Individually V. COMMERCIAL BANK OF GRAYSON
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RENDERED: JULY 7, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000258-MR
THE ESTATE OF CARL J. MABRY;
BILLY JACK MABRY, Individually
and as Executor of the Estate
of CARL MABRY; and JOYCE MABRY
V.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00325
COMMERCIAL BANK OF GRAYSON
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; COMBS and MILLER, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a summary judgment
granted by the Carter Circuit Court.
For the reasons stated
hereafter, we affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
The relevant facts, although relatively uncomplicated,
are unique and must be recited in some detail.
Essentially, this
action involves three separate and distinct promissory notes and
a loan agreement, as well as the efforts of appellee Commercial
Bank of Grayson to collect the unpaid balances owed on each of
the four obligations.
Carl Mabry executed promissory notes in favor of
appellee in May 1994 and June 1996, and he entered into a cash
reserve agreement with appellee in November 1995.
Repayment of
all three loan obligations was secured by a perfected security
interest in a motor vehicle.
Carl Mabry and his wife, Gladys Mabry, additionally
executed a 1984 promissory note as evidence of a mortgage loan,
the repayment of which was secured by a first mortgage on their
residence in Olive Hill, Kentucky.
refinanced in 1992.
The mortgage loan was
As part of the mortgage loan refinancing
transaction, a note was executed not only by Carl and Gladys
Mabry, but also by their son and daughter-in-law, appellants
Billy Mabry and Joyce Mabry.
Moreover, the elder Mabrys executed
a mortgage extension agreement whereby they agreed that the
maturity date of the note and the mortgage securing its repayment
would be extended for a sufficient number of years to cover the
repayment period set forth in the new note executed as part of
the refinancing transaction.
Thus, when the widowed Carl Mabry
died in January 1997, he owed appellee four separate and distinct
debts evidenced by four separate and distinct contractual
obligations, i.e., by three promissory notes and a cash reserve
agreement.
Although the record is not sufficiently developed to
establish this fact, it appears that the elder Mabrys’
refinancing of the residential mortgage debt may have been at the
request and for the benefit of their son and daughter-in-law, who
provided no security to appellee regarding the repayment of their
obligations under the 1992 mortgage note.
Because they were not
parties to the 1984 mortgage agreement, the younger Mabrys were
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not bound by any of the covenants and agreements set forth in
that document.
Billy Mabry was appointed executor of his father’s
estate in early 1997.
Several months later, appellee filed a
proof of claim respecting Carl Mabry’s outstanding indebtedness
to it.
In September 1997, after payment of the indebtedness was
not forthcoming, appellee instituted this action against Carl
Mabry’s estate and against Billy Mabry, both individually and as
the estate’s executor.
The initial complaint sought a judgment
for the unpaid amounts owed on all of Carl Mabry’s obligations
other than the amount owed on the 1992 note secured by the 1984
mortgage.
In November 1997, after the vehicle securing repayment
of those three obligations was sold and the net proceeds thereof
were applied in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness due, the
court granted appellee a default judgment against the estate and
its executor for the amount of the deficiency balance due.
Appellee then proceeded to perfect a judgment lien against Carl
Mabry’s residence, which obviously was second and inferior to its
1984 first mortgage against the property.
That judgment lien
secured payment of the default judgment in derogation of the
rights of any other creditors of the estate, and regardless of
whether any such creditors were entitled to priority.
See KRS
396.095.
Next, appellee filed an amended complaint seeking to
recover the balance owed on the 1992 mortgage note, and
requesting that the mortgaged property be sold and that the net
proceeds thereof be applied toward the balance due on the note.
The foreclosure claim was asserted not only against Carl Mabry’s
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estate, but also against Billy Mabry, both individually and as
the estate’s executor, and against Joyce Mabry individually.
Appellants defended against the action on the ground that the
1992 mortgage note was not in default, and that a foreclosure
action therefore was premature.
On December 1, 1998, after limited discovery occurred,
the court granted a summary judgment and order of sale awarding
appellee a personal judgment against Billy Mabry, both
individually and as the estate’s executor, and against Joyce
Mabry individually, in the amount of $19,436.30.
The court
directed that the mortgaged property should be sold, and that the
sale’s net proceeds should be applied in satisfaction of not only
the mortgage indebtedness, but also the judgment lien against the
property stemming from the November 1997 default judgment.
This
appeal followed.
At the outset, it is appropriate to analyze the posture
of this litigation as it has been presented to this court.
First, it is clear that the November 1997 default judgment
against Carl Mabry’s estate and its executor is valid and
enforceable.
Although KRS 396.135 clearly prohibited any levy or
execution on that judgment against Carl Mabry’s property, the
parties have acknowledged that such a levy was effected.
However, the record contains no documentation to establish this
fact.
Moreover, the record neither includes any order regarding
the distribution of the funds, nor otherwise shows whether the
net proceeds derived from the sale of the mortgaged property were
sufficient to satisfy the balance due on the 1992 mortgage note,
the amount of the judgment lien, and/or the claims of creditors.
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Presumably, if the assets were sufficient to pay all outstanding
claims, both of appellee’s judgments would have been fully
satisfied.
On the other hand, if the assets were not sufficient
to pay all outstanding claims, the available funds should have
been distributed to creditors consistent with the dictates of KRS
396.095(1) and (2), except insofar as appellee, as a secured
creditor, was entitled to priority in regard to the net proceeds
from the judicial sale of the residence.
Next, we note that contrary to appellants’ arguments,
the trial court clearly did not err by permitting appellee’s
foreclosure action to proceed to judgment and a judicial sale of
the mortgaged property.
Not only did Carl and Gladys Mabry both
sign the 1992 mortgage note, but they also both executed the
mortgage which secured repayment of the debt evidenced by the
note, agreeing therein that if they died, appellee would be
entitled to accelerate payment of the balance due on the note and
to enforce its mortgage lien if the accelerated debt was not
paid.
Here, the record shows that after the deaths of Carl and
Gladys Mabry, appellee gave Billy Mabry, as the estate’s
executor, written notice that payment of the balance due on the
note was being accelerated consistent with the agreement.
Billy
Mabry was further notified that if the amount due was not paid
within thirty days, appellee would institute collection
procedures.
Thereafter, an amended complaint seeking to enforce
the note and mortgage was filed.
Because Carl Mabry executed
both the note and the mortgage, agreeing therein that in the
event of his death payment of the balance due on the note could
be accelerated, and because appellants filed nothing in
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opposition to appellee’s claim which created a genuine issue of
material fact as to Carl Mabry’s liability on the note and/or
which raised a defense to the note’s enforcement or to the sale
of the mortgaged property, it is clear that appellee was entitled
to seek the judgment and order of sale granted herein.
Thus, we
must affirm the December 1998 order and judgment insofar as it
awards a personal judgment against Carl Mabry’s estate and Billy
Mabry as the executor thereof, and insofar as it directs the
court’s commissioner to sell the mortgaged property and to apply
the proceeds thereof in satisfaction of the unpaid mortgage debt.
The portion of the judgment assessing joint and several
liability on the mortgage note against Billy and Joyce Mabry,
however, is another matter as neither of them was a party to the
mortgage.
Therefore, they were not bound by or subject to the
provisions of the mortgage executed by Carl Mabry, including the
clause regarding acceleration in the event of death.
Thus,
although Carl Mabry’s death allowed appellee to accelerate
payment of the mortgage debt as to him, the note itself afforded
no basis for accelerating payment of the obligation assumed by
Billy and Joyce Mabry.
Rather, their obligations to appellee
must be determined solely according to the provisions of the
mortgage note, which addresses the issue of default in Paragraph
7.
Subparagraph C of Paragraph 7 requires the mortgage holder to
give thirty days written notice of any default to the makers of
the note.
Here, the record contains no written notice of default
and nothing indicates that such notice was given.
Indeed, as far
as the record shows, the only notice given was that which
accelerated Carl Mabry’s payment as a result of his death.
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Thus,
because the record shows that appellee did not attempt to comply
with the 1992 note’s default provisions, appellee was not
entitled either to accelerate the obligations of Billy and Joyce
Mabry under that note, or to obtain a personal judgment against
them for the balance due.
Accordingly, so much of the court’s
December 1, 1998, summary judgment as adjudges Billy and Joyce
Mabry individually liable for the balance due on the mortgage
note must be reversed.
In summary, we affirm the November 1997 and December
1998 judgments as to the liability of Carl Mabry’s estate and
Billy Mabry as executor thereof.
Moreover, we also affirm so
much of the December 1998 judgment as directs a sale of Carl
Mabry’s mortgaged property and orders the net proceeds thereof to
be applied in satisfaction of the balance due thereon.
However,
any additional net proceeds derived from that judicial sale must
be distributed consistent with the dictates of KRS 396.095 and
KRS 396.135.
Finally, the personal judgment against Billy and
Joyce Mabry, respecting their liability on the 1992 mortgage
note, must be reversed since it was not established below that
they were in default with respect to their obligations
thereunder.
On remand, Billy and Joyce Mabry may not be adjudged
personally liable on the 1992 mortgage note for more than any
difference between the balance due on the note on the date of
judgment, and the net proceeds realized from the sale of the
mortgaged property.
For the reasons stated, the court’s judgment is
affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part for further
proceedings consistent with our views.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen G. Wagner
Louisville, KY
W. Jeffrey Scott
Grayson, KY
Christopher G. Stewart
Louisville, KY
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