TIMOTHY ALLEN MILLER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 7, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003133-MR
TIMOTHY ALLEN MILLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BENJAMIN L. DICKINSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00250
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Timothy Allen Miller appeals from the final
judgment entered by the Barren Circuit Court on December 16,
1998, that followed the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea brought pursuant to RCr1 8.10.
Having concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
In October 1998, the Barren County grand jury indicted
Miller on one felony count of operating a motor vehicle while
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
license revoked or suspended for driving under the influence,
third offense (KRS2 189A.090), one misdemeanor count of operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or other
substance which impairs one’s driving ability, third offense (KRS
189A.010), and one count of being a persistent felony offender in
the second degree (PFO II) (KRS 532.080(2)).
On November 16,
1998, the trial court conducted a hearing at which Miller entered
a guilty plea to the two traffic offenses pursuant to a plea
agreement with the Commonwealth, which recommended a sentence of
five years on count one for operating a motor vehicle while
license revoked or suspended for DUI, third offense, and twelve
months on count two for operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or other substance that impairs one’s
driving ability, third offense, with the two sentences to run
concurrently.3
The Commonwealth also moved the trial court to
dismiss count three involving the PFO II charge.
During the
hearing, the trial court engaged Miller in a colloquy.
The trial
court explained to Miller his constitutional rights, set forth
the facts supporting the charges and asked Miller if he wanted to
waive certain rights as part of the guilty plea.
At the end of
the hearing, the trial court made a finding that Miller
understood the nature of the charges against him, that his plea
was voluntary, and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes
3
The Commonwealth also recommended that Miller pay a fine of
$1,000 and costs on count one and a $750 fine, $200 service fee,
have his license suspended for 24 months and attend alcohol
counseling for one year on count two.
-2-
right to confront any witnesses, his right to trial by jury, and
his right against self-incrimination.
The trial court also found
that there was a factual bases for the plea and adjudged him
guilty of the two traffic offenses.
The trial court then
postponed final sentencing until December 14, 1998, pending
preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report.
On December 9, 1998, Miller filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
At the sentencing hearing on December 14, 1998,
Miller’s attorney raised the issue of the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea.
The trial court denied the motion and sentenced
Miller consistent with the Commonwealth’s recommendation to a
total sentence of five years in prison on the two traffic
offenses.
This appeal followed.
Miller argues that the trial court erred by failing to
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. RCr 8.10 states in part:
“At any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of
guilty or guilty but mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of
not guilty substituted.”4
As the language of RCr 8.10 indicates
and case law clearly establishes, the decision to allow a
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea prior to entry of the final
judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court.5
4
RCr 8.10 further provides that a defendant must be given an
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea if the trial court
rejects the plea agreement. See e.g., Kennedy v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 962 S.W.2d 880 (1997). The trial court did not reject
the plea agreement and sentenced Miller consistent with the
Commonwealth’s recommendation, so the trial court was not
obligated to allow Miller to withdraw his guilty plea.
5
See Couch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 712 (1975);
Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky. 507 S.W.2d 187 (1974).
-3-
Factors relevant to the trial court’s exercise of its discretion
include the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the
motion to withdraw, the presence or absence of a valid reason for
failure to present the grounds for withdrawal at an earlier point
in the proceedings, whether the defendant has asserted his legal
innocence, a defendant’s lack of experience with the criminal
justice system, and the potential prejudice to the state should
the plea be withdrawn.6
During the guilty plea hearing, the trial court
explicitly informed Miller of the importance and binding nature
of his guilty plea.
The trial judge told Miller at the start of
the hearing that he was going to ask him a series of questions in
order to determine his competency and voluntary willingness to
enter the plea and that he would not be able to change his mind
after entering his guilty plea.
At the sentencing hearing,
Miller’s attorney stated that Miller wanted to withdraw his
guilty plea in order to have time to sell some real estate so he
could generate sufficient money to further pursue his desire to
withdraw his guilty plea.
The trial judge stated that he was
denying the motion to withdraw because he had warned Miller at
the guilty plea hearing that he would not be allowed to change
his mind after entering the guilty plea.
Miller argues that the trial court abused its
discretion because it denied the motion based on a “general rule
6
United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir.
1996) (involving Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d) the federal counter part to
RCr 8.10), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848, 117 S.Ct. 136, 136 L.Ed.2d
84 (1996).
-4-
of not allowing pleas to be withdrawn.”
He contends that the
trial court should have inquired further about the reasons for
Miller’s desire to withdraw his plea.
After reviewing the record, we cannot say the trial
court abused its discretion.
Abuse of discretion has been
defined as a decision that is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.”7
We disagree with
Miller that the trial court was obligated to conduct an
independent sua sponte inquiry into the reasons for his desire to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Given the trial court’s prior warning
to Miller at the guilty plea hearing that it generally did not
allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, we believe Miller
was obligated to articulate his specific reasons for moving to
withdraw his plea.
Miller simply failed to provide any reason
for his change of position.
The trial court’s partial reliance
on its general policy of not allowing withdrawals is not
arbitrary and unreasonable since Miller did not offer any
legitimate reason for withdrawal of his guilty plea.
Additionally, Miller has not asserted any claim of innocence, and
he has had prior experience with the criminal justice system.
Thus, we hold that Miller has failed to show that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
The judgment of the Barren Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
7
Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
-5-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Franklin P. Jewell
Louisville, KY
A.B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Kent T. Young
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
