STONEY NEWSOME; FORREST HALL; LOIS NEWSOME; S & M LOGGING; AND D & L LOGGING v. EDNA HARRIS; TOM REYNOLDS; AND RAY REYNOLDS
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RENDERED: September 22, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003035-MR
STONEY NEWSOME; FORREST HALL;
LOIS NEWSOME; S & M LOGGING;
AND D & L LOGGING
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00333
v.
EDNA HARRIS; TOM REYNOLDS;
AND RAY REYNOLDS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Stoney Newsome, S & M Logging, Lois Ann
Newsome, and D & L Logging (appellants) appeal from a judgment of
the Floyd Circuit Court entered October 19, 1998, which awarded
Edna Harris (Harris) $12,587.65 in damages for the wrongful
removal of timber from her property.
After reviewing the record,
we affirm.
Harris lives on a tract of land consisting of
approximately 39 acres off of Corn Fork of Brandy Key Creek in
Floyd County, Kentucky.
Harris’ property line runs from the
creek by the road in front of her house to the top of the hill
behind her house.
Immediately upstream from Harris, beginning
near the creek, Harris’ property is bordered by the Collins
family property.
hillside.
The Collins property runs some distance up the
The Collins property line then ends, and above that,
on up the hill, Harris’ property is bordered by the Reynolds
family property.
The Harris and Reynolds property border each
other to the top of the Hill.
In the spring of 1996, the appellants entered into a
contract with Ray Reynolds to remove timber from the Reynolds
property.
At the same time, the appellants approached Harris and
asked her if she was interested in selling some of the timber
located on her land.
Harris told the appellants she was not
interested in selling the timber.
A short time thereafter,
Harris saw trees being cut and falling in an area that she
believed was within her property.
She contacted Ray Reynolds
about her concern; however, he assured her that the appellants
were not cutting on her property.
On May 3, 1996, Harris filed a complaint in circuit
court alleging that the appellants had wrongfully entered upon
her land and removed timber.
In their response, the appellants
asserted that they were advised by Ray Reynolds on three separate
occasions that they were in the correct location and that any
trespass was the result of their reliance on said assurances.
In
addition, the appellants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
join an indispensable party on the grounds that Ray Reynolds had
agreed in a statement signed April 2, 1996, to be responsible for
all timber cut if the appellants accidentally crossed the
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boundary line, Harris was aware of the agreement, and she had not
taken steps to join Ray Reynolds as a party to the action.
The
trial court denied the appellants’ motion to dismiss, and the
appellants thereafter filed a third party complaint against Ray
Reynolds and his son Tom Reynolds.
After a jury trial, the circuit court entered a
judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict which found
appellants liable for damages caused by the removal of timber
from Harris’ property and apportioned the award of $14,809.77
between the appellants and the third party defendants, Ray and
Tom Reynolds, at 85% and 15%, respectively.
The appellants then
filed a motion for new trial, motion to alter, amend or vacate
judgment, motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict, and
motion to set aside judgment.
motions on December 1, 1998.
The circuit court denied the
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the appellants argue that (1) the jury’s
verdict was not supported by substantial evidence, (2) the
instructions given to the jury were improper, (3) statements made
by Harris’ counsel in closing arguments were highly improper, (4)
Harris’ claim should have been dismissed for failure to join an
indispensable party, (5) appellants were entitled to a judgment
against Ray Reynolds as a matter of law, and (6) Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 364.130 is unconstitutional.
In their first argument, the appellants contend that
Harris failed to prove the whereabouts of her boundary line and
the extent of the trespass, and therefore, there was no evidence
of probative value from which the jury could have reasonably
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based its verdict.
In addition, the appellants contend that two
of the witness called by Harris to establish the location of the
boundary line provided inconsistent statements, thereby creating
uncertainty as to its actual location.
It is uncontested that
Harris bears the burden of proving the location of her boundary
line in relation to the trespass.
West v. Keckley, Ky., 474
S.W.2d 87 (1971).
Upon review of the evidence supporting a judgment
entered upon a jury verdict, the role of an appellate court is
limited to determining whether the trial court erred in failing
to grant the motion for directed verdict.
All evidence which
favors the prevailing party must be taken as true and the
reviewing court is not at liberty to determine credibility or the
weight which should be given to the evidence, these being
functions reserved to the trier of fact.
Kentucky & Indiana
Terminal R. Co. v. Cantrell, 298 Ky. 743, 184 S.W.2d 111 (1944);
Cochran v. Downing, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 228 (1952).
The prevailing
party is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn
from the evidence.
Upon completion of such an evidentiary
review, the appellate court must determine whether the verdict
rendered is "'palpably or flagrantly' against the evidence so as
'to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.'"
NCAA v. Hornung, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 855, 860 (1988).
If the reviewing court concludes that such is the case, it is at
liberty to reverse the judgment on the grounds that the trial
court erred in failing to sustain the motion for directed
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verdict.
Otherwise, the judgment must be affirmed.
Lewis v.
Bledsoe Surface Min. Co., Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459, 462 (1990).
The deed to Harris’ property indicates that she shares
a common boundary line, in part, with both the Reynolds property
and the Collins property.
While Harris’ deed does not disclose
where the property lines run together, all three property owners
– Edna Harris, Earl Collins, and Ray Reynolds – unequivocally
identified the boundary as being indicated by a barbwire fence.
Harris testified that her late husband, Charlie Harris, built the
barbwire fence along the boundary line some twenty to twenty-five
years ago.
Earl Collins testified that the boundary between his
family’s land and the Harris property was indicated by a barbwire
fence which ran up the hillside and joined the Reynolds property.
Earl Collins also stated that the fence was still there, and was
there when he took Peter Kovalic, the forestry appraiser who
calculated damages on behalf of Harris, up to the area.
Tom
Reynolds likewise testified that a barbwire fence ran along the
border of the Harris’ property and the Collins and Reynolds
property.
Ray Reynolds, who has lived in the area for over 55
years, stated that he knew where the Harris property line was
located.
He described the existence of the barbwire fence and
stated that he had helped build the portion of the fence that ran
up the hill along his own property.
Kovalic testified that he
saw the fence when he went to the area to do his damage
appraisal, and that he used the fence in determining which trees
had been cut on Harris’ property.
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C.V. Reynolds, Ray Reynolds son, testified that a
barbwire fence ran along the boundary line of his family’s
property.
As to the inconsistent testimony of C.V. Reynolds and
Earl Collins, which the appellants contend causes uncertainty, we
construe the inconsistency as applying to the location of the
Reynolds/Collins line and not the Harris line.
If all evidence which favors Harris is taken as true,
and Harris is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences
which may be drawn from the evidence, we cannot say that the
verdict rendered was palpably or flagrantly against the evidence
so as to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.
The appellants are not entitled to a reversal on the
grounds that the jury’s verdict is not supported by the evidence.
Next, the appellants argue that the trial court gave
erroneous jury instructions in two respects.
First, the
appellants contend that the circuit court erred by not properly
instructing the jury on the law relating to damages for the
conversion of timber as set forth in KRS, Chapter 364.
The
statute which relates specifically to the liability of persons
who enter upon and cut timber growing upon the land of another is
KRS 364.130.
KRS 364.130 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this
section, any person who cuts or saws down, or causes to
be cut or sawed down with intent to convert to his own
use timber growing upon the land of another without
legal right or without color of title in himself to the
timber or to the land upon which the timber was growing
shall pay to the rightful owner of the timber three (3)
times the stumpage value of the timber and shall pay to
the rightful owner of the property three (3) times the
cost of any damages to the property as well as any
legal costs incurred by the owner of the timber.
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(2) (a) If a defendant can certify that prior to
cutting:
1. A signed statement was obtained from the
person whom the defendant believed to be the
owner of all trees scheduled to be cut
that:
a. All of the trees to be cut were on his
property and that none were on the property
of another; and
b. He has given his permission, in writing,
for the trees on his property to be cut; and
2. Either:
a. A written agreement was made with the
owners of the land adjacent to the cut that
the trees to be cut were not on their
property; or
b. Owners of the land adjacent to be cut
were notified in writing, delivered by
certified mail, restricted delivery, and
return receipt requested, of the pending cut
and they raised no objection,
the court may render a judgment for no more
than the reasonable value of the timber, actual
damages caused to the property, and any legal
costs incurred by the owner of the timber.
(b) With respect to subsection (2)(a)2.b. of this
section, if no written objection was received
from the persons notified within seven (7) days
from the date of signed receipt of mail, it
shall be presumed, for the purposes of setting
penalties only, that the notified owner had no
objection to the proposed cut.
After reviewing the court’s instructions to the jury and the
court’s comments in overruling counsel’s objection to instruction
number 3, we find that the court did, contrary to appellants’
contention, instruct the jury as to the law set forth in KRS
364.130(1).
Interrogatory No. 3 of the jury instructions stated,
in relevant part, as follows:
If you have found for Plaintiff under Instruction
Number 1, you will award a sum of money equal to three
(3) times the reasonable market value of said timber on
the stump at the time it was cut and removed from
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Plaintiff’s property, not to exceed three (3) time
(sic) $4,936.59.
This instruction is substantially similar to the one
found in 2 Palmore & Eades, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, sec
32.02 (Supp. 2000).
In fact, in rejecting appellants’ counsel’s
objection to the instruction, the trial court referred to the
comments that followed the instruction in Palmore and Eades’
treatise.
The appellants, however, argue that the jury should
have been additionally instructed on the possibility of
mitigation pursuant to KRS 364.130(2).
argument is two-fold.
The problem with this
First, the appellants presented no
evidence, and in fact admitted, that they did not comply with all
of the terms required to alleviate treble damages under KRS
364.130(2).
Second, even if “substantial compliance” was, as
argued by the appellants, adequate to invoke KRS 364.130(2), the
appellants failed to establish that they substantially complied
with its terms.
There is no dispute that the appellants failed
to either enter into a written agreement with Harris concerning
the timber to be cut, or to give her proper written notice
pursuant to KRS 364.130(2)(a)2.
The trial court did not abuse
its discretion by denying the appellants’ objection to the jury
instructions as concerns KRS 364.130.
The appellants additionally contend that the jury
instructions were erroneous because the damages instruction
failed to make a distinction between “innocent trespassers” and
“willful trespassers.”
We disagree that the instructions were
erroneous in this respect.
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Prior to 1994, two measures of damages for the
conversion of timber which were used, depending upon the intent
of person removing the timber.
Gum v. Coyle, Ky. App., 665
S.W.2d 929 (1984); D.B. Frampton & Co. v. Saulsberry, Ky., 268
S.W.2d 25 (1954).
In Saulsberry, the court adopted the following
rule:
[W]here timber is cut and removed by an
innocent trespasser, the measure of damages
is the reasonable market value of the timber
on the stump. If the trespass is willful, a
different measure of damages is applied. In
that event, the measure of damages is the
gross sale price at the point of delivery.
Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
In 1994, the General Assembly amended KRS 364.130 to
provide for treble damages unless the provisions of KRS
364.130(2) were complied with.
This statutory scheme does not so
much discard the traditional “innocent trespasser”/“willful
trespasser” distinction as it does establish a criteria for
qualification as an “innocent trespasser.”
To qualify as an
“innocent trespasser”, a logger must now comply with KRS
364.130(2)(a).
KRS 364.130 statutorily overrules and supercedes
Saulsberry, and the trial court did not err by refusing the
appellants’ request to include an “innocent trespasser” jury
instruction that would permit it to escape the treble damage
provisions of KRS 364.130.
In summary, even if a logger is
otherwise an innocent trespasser under the old Saulsberry rule,
the legislature has deemed that he must nevertheless comply with
KRS 364.130(2) in order to escape the statute’s triple damages
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provision.1
Next, the appellants contend that statements made by
Harris’ counsel in closing were highly improper and violated
fundamental legal principles by telling the jury his version of
the law, which, the appellants argue, was different from the law
as set forth in the jury instructions.
Appellants specifically
cite to that portion of his closing in which Harris’ counsel
referred to the provisions of KRS 364.130(2)(a), which defines
how a defendant can avoid triple damages for entering upon and
cutting timber growing upon the land of another.
Specifically,
Harris’ counsel stated as follows:
“Let’s say that they had gone to her and they
couldn’t get any kind of written statement
out of her that they were or were not her
trees. Then, all they had to do was send her
a certified letter in the mail and ask if
okay; and, if she doesn’t respond, it’s okay.
And if she doesn’t respond to that, then it’s
okay. That’s all these fellows had to do.
Send her a letter. They didn’t do it. And
that’s where it results in the three (3)
times the value of what was taken. That’s
what she’s entitled to Fourteen Thousand
Eight Hundred and Nine Dollars ($14,809.00).
That’s what we’d ask you to give her today.
Thank you.”
The appellants had requested a jury instruction based
upon KRS 364.130(2)(a), but, as previously explained, the
instruction was denied because the appellants failed to present
1
In addition to the measure of damages recognized in
the Saulsberry case, prior law permitted the owner of the land
to seek punitive damages if the person "unlawfully" entered and
cut the timber without color of title. KRS 364.130 (1980).
Punitive damages, beyond treble damages, were not requested in
this case, and we do not address whether, in addition to treble
damages, KRS 364.130 permits punitive damages under KRS 411.184.
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evidence that they had complied with its provisions.
In his
closing statement, Harris’ counsel correctly stated the law as
set forth in KRS 364.130(2)(a).
The appellants argument,
therefore, rests solely on the point that opposing counsel
referred to a provision of law that was not incorporated into the
jury instructions.
Following opposing counsel’s comment, the appellants
objected.
Thereafter, the trial court admonished the jury as
follows:
I’m going to take your objection under
advisement and admonish the jury that under
the law that they will follow the
instructions and to disregard any comment
about any other law. I’m taking your
objection under advisement.”
At issue is merely one brief utterance during the
course of closing arguments, after which the trial court properly
admonished the jury.
As a general rule, improper argument of
counsel requires reversal only when it is prejudicial and results
in injustice or deprives a party of a fair and impartial trial.
Mason v. Stengell, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 412, 416 (1969).
We are not
persuaded that opposing counsel’s brief reference to a point of
law not incorporated into the jury instructions, followed by an
admonishment, deprived the appellants of a fair and impartial
trial.
Next, the appellants contend that Harris’ claim against
Newsome should have been dismissed for failure to join an
indispensable party, Ray Reynolds.
It was, and remains, Edna
Harris’ position that she had no claim against Ray Reynolds.
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On January 20, 1998, Newsome filed a motion to dismiss
on the basis that Harris had failed to join Ray Reynolds as an
indispensable party.
In her reply, Harris stated that if Newsome
wanted Ray Reynolds in the lawsuit, it was his duty to make him a
party.
On January 30, 1998, the trial court entered an order
“sustaining” Newsome’s motion, and ordering Harris to
“immediately file a Third Party Complaint against Ray Reynolds
and Tom Reynolds to bring them in as Parties Defendant to this
action.”
On that same day, Newsome filed a ”Third Party
Complaint” naming Ray Reynolds and his brother Tom Reynolds as
third party defendants.
The appellants do not provide a citation
to the record directing us to an order denying their January 20
motion, and the record refutes their version of the procedural
history as to this issue.
The decision as to necessary or indispensable parties
rests within the sound authority of the trial judge in order to
effectuate the objectives of CR 19.01.
The exercise of
discretion by the trial judge should be on a case-by-case basis
rather than on arbitrary considerations and such a decision
should not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous or affects
the substantial rights of the parties.
Commonwealth, Dept. of
Fish & Wildlife Resources v. Garner, Ky., 896 S.W.2d 10, 14
(1995).
Though the trial courts order, of January 30, 1998, is
confusing in that it ordered Harris to file a “third party
complaint” against Reynolds, nevertheless, the trial court
“sustained” Newsome’s motion.
It would appear that before Harris
had an opportunity to respond to the order, Newsome brought
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Reynolds into the suit.
In any event, Ray Reynolds, along with
his brother Tom, were joined as parties in this case.
The
appellants’ interest in having Ray Reynolds as a party in the
case was thereby protected.
By our understanding of the trial
court’s order of January 30, 1998, the trial court’s ruling as to
this issue was favorable to the appellants, and, in addition,
the substantial rights of the appellants were not affected.
Next, the appellants contend that Newsome was entitled
to a judgment against Ray Reynolds as a matter of law based upon
a handwritten agreement with Ray Reynolds which stated as
follows:
4/26/96, I Ray Renolds [sic] will be
responsible for all timber cut where Tom
Renolds [sic] showed up the boundary line
upon the FLAT above Tom Lackey’s house to Ms.
Harris. We are about one hundred fifty or to
[sic] hundred ft. From big squire [sic] rock.
Signed, Ray Reynolds.
At this point we will comment upon a problem we have observed
throughout the appellants’ brief - their tendency to overstate
their case.
Here, in regard to the above agreement, the
appellants state that “Ray Reynolds agreed to indemnify Newsome
for any and all damages that may result from the claim against
him.”
Obviously, the agreement does not go that far.
Reynolds was joined into the suit as a third party
defendant, and in the jury instructions, an apportionment
instruction was included which permitted the jury to assign a
portion of the fault to Ray Reynolds to the extent that he bore
responsibility for indemnification to the appellants under the
agreement.
Based upon the testimony at trial and the wording of
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the agreement, we disagree that the agreement entitles Newsome to
a judgment against Reynolds for the full amount of the damages
awarded by the jury.
conditional.
The agreement was ambiguous and
Under the agreement, Ray Reynolds assumed
responsibility only for timber cut “where Tom Renolds [sic]
showed up the boundary line[.]”
The area that Tom Reynolds
“showed” was an issue in dispute, and one to be decided by the
jury.
There was trial testimony to support that the appellants
cut timber outside the area identified by Tom Reynolds, and the
testimony supports the apportionment of fault.
Finally, the appellants contend that KRS 364.130 is
unconstitutional because it “automatically penalizes innocent
trespassers” and fails to provide for a distinction between
innocent trespass and willful trespass.2
See pages 7-8, supra,
for the relevant text of KRS 364.130.
Appellants' contention that KRS 364.130(2)(b) violates
due process constitutional protections is unpersuasive.
When
economic and business rights are involved, rather than
fundamental rights, substantive due process requires only that
the statute be rationally related to a legitimate state
objective.
Stephens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ky., 894
S.W.2d 624, 627 (1995).
A court dealing with a challenge to the
constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly must
"necessarily begin with the strong presumption in favor of
constitutionality and should so hold if possible."
2
Brooks v.
The appellants properly notified the Attorney General
of their constitutional challenge pursuant to KRS 418.075.
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Island Creek Coal Co., Ky. App., 678 S.W.2d 791, 792 (1984).
Due
process or equal protection is violated "'only if the resultant
classifications or deprivations of liberty rest on grounds wholly
irrelevant to a reasonable state objective.’"
Edwards v.
Louisville Ladder, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 290, 295-296 (1997);
Earthgrains v. Cranz, Ky. App., 999 S.W.2d 218, 223 (1999).
KRS 364.130 is rationally related to the legitimate
state objective of discouraging loggers from entering upon the
property of another and cutting timber by providing for treble
damages based upon the stumpage value of the timber.
Section
(2)(a) provides a simple, unburdensome, safe harbor provision
whereby a logger may avoid treble damages in the event he
inadvertently crosses onto another’s property in the course of
his logging activities.
KRS 364.130 is constitutional under both
the United States and Kentucky Constitutions.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Floyd
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas W. Moak
Stumbo, Barber & Moak, PSC
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
James A. Combs
Combs & Isaac
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Ned Pillersdorf
Pillersdorf, Derossett &
Barrett
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
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