GLOSTER HAYES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 9, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002268-MR
GLOSTER HAYES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00324
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON, and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Gloster Hayes (Hayes) appeals the order of the
Fayette Circuit Court sentencing him to a total of ten-years’
imprisonment following a jury trial in which he was convicted of
second-degree escape, first-degree perjury, and being a seconddegree persistent felony offender (PFO II).
Having reviewed the
record and applicable law, we affirm.
In January 1998, as a result of violating the terms of
his participation in the drug court program, Hayes was interned
in the Fayette County Detention Center under a work release
program.
Hayes’s term of commitment was to run from January 7,
1998, to January 21, 1998.
Under the terms and conditions of the
program, Hayes was released from the detention center at 6:00
a.m. and was required to return at 6:00 p.m. on Mondays through
Saturdays.
On January 17, 1998, Hayes failed to return to the
facility, and a warrant for his arrest was issued that same
evening.
On January 19, 1998, Hayes was identified in the
vicinity of Sixth Street and North Limestone Avenue by patrol
Officer Wright of the Lexington-Fayette County Metro Police
Department.
Following their initial eye contact, Officer Wright
lost sight of Hayes, and it was not until some minutes later that
Hayes was located and arrested at North Limestone Avenue and
Bryan Station Road.
On March 17, 1998, Hayes testified on his own behalf
before the grand jury, stating that: (1) he was unaware that his
departure from the detention center was unlawful as he believed
that he had been released; (2) he was en route to turn himself in
to law enforcement officials when arrested by Officer Wright; (3)
he was “doing alright” under the drug court program; (4) he had
spent the two days away from the detention center with his
sobriety sponsor, Darnell Edwards, in Cincinnati, Ohio; and (5)
he was unfamiliar with the release procedure as he had never been
released from the detention center annex.
The grand jury indicted Hayes for the offenses of
second-degree escape and first-degree perjury as a result of his
testimony — as well as for being a PFO II.
A jury trial was held
on July 21, 1998, resulting in guilty verdicts on all the
charges.
The jury recommended a sentence of one (1) year on the
escape offense and two and one-half (2½) years on the perjury
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count. Because of his PFO II status, the jury recommended that
each sentence be enhanced to five (5) years — to run
consecutively.
The court entered its judgment adopting the
jury’s recommendations on August 27, 1998.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Hayes argues that the trial court erred in:
(1) failing to direct a verdict on his behalf; (2) permitting the
Commonwealth to admit evidence through a rebuttal witness; and
(3) denying the defense’s request for a jury instruction on false
swearing.
We shall address his arguments in the order in which
they were presented.
The appellate standard of review as to a directed
verdict is that “[i]f under the evidence as a whole it would not
be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty,
he is not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.”
Trowel
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 530, 533 (1977).
The trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the party opposing the motion, and a
directed verdict should not be given unless
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction. The evidence presented must be
accepted as true. The credibility and the
weight to be given the testimony are
questions for the jury exclusively.
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (1983).
Hayes moved for a directed verdict based on the
insufficiency of the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth’s
case, again at the end of his own case, and a third time
following the rebuttal testimony provided by Corporal Hughes.
Each time, the motion was denied, and the case then went to the
jury.
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The Commonwealth presented eight witnesses during its
case-in-chief.
A portion of the testimony revealed that while
participating in the drug court program, Hayes had been on work
release three previous times:
December 1996.
in June 1994, June 1995, and
Darnell Edwards, Hayes’s longtime friend and
sponsor in a sobriety program, testified that Hayes was not with
him from January 17 through January 19 but rather that he had
phoned after the grand jury hearing and asked Edwards to lie
about his whereabouts during this time period.
Additionally,
Hayes’s drug court case specialist testified that following his
arrest, Hayes had called him and stated that he had suffered a
“relapse” and had not turned himself in.
Testimony was also presented establishing that Hayes
was serving time in the detention center for his third and fourth
dirty urine samples — in addition to having previously served
time for missing urine drops and for a pattern of behavior that
violated the terms of the drug court program.
Officer Wright
testified that Hayes fled on foot when first approached and was
found travelling outbound on North Limestone Avenue and New
Circle Road — in a direction more distant and opposite from the
detention center.
Officer Wright stated Hayes acted shocked and
surprised that he was being arrested.
Testimony was presented as to the fact that Hayes was
fully and adequately informed about requirements and rules of the
work release policies and procedures.
Susan Torrey-Preston was
the adult probation officer aide who allegedly gave Hayes
permission not to return to the detention center; contrary to his
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allegation, she testified that she neither authorized his release
nor was she empowered to do so.
The defense called two witnesses: Hayes’s grandmother
and Gloster Hayes himself.
His grandmother contradicted his
account of how he learned of the warrant for his arrest.
According to Hayes, upon his return from Cincinnati, his
grandmother informed that him she had seen him reported on
television as an escapee and that a warrant had been issued.
However, according to her direct testimony, she knew nothing of
the warrant — nor had she informed Hayes of its existence.
On
the contrary, she stated that she recalled hearing Hayes say that
he was going to “turn himself in.”
Hayes testified that he had relied on Torrey-Preston’s
statement to him that he was not required to “come see them
anymore.”
When asked about the conflicting evidence produced by
the other witnesses — including that of his grandmother, Hayes
stated that either they held different "perceptions" about
issues, or that they were simply lying.
Our review of the record convinces us that the
Commonwealth presented ample testimony to prove Hayes’s guilt.
Thus, the issue was properly submitted to the jury so that it
might sift through the evidence and determine its credibility and
weight. The trial court did not err in finding the evidence
sufficient to sustain convictions on both counts of the
indictment.
The motions for directed verdict were properly
denied.
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Hayes next argues that the trial court committed
reversible error by allowing the Commonwealth to recall Corporal
Hughes as a rebuttal witness following the close of the case for
the defense.
He contends that the Commonwealth recalled this
witness at this time deliberately and calculatedly in order to
prejudice the defense.
He also claims that the Commonwealth’s
contention that it was rebuttal testimony was merely a
subterfuge.
Absent arbitrariness or an abuse of discretion, an
appellate court must defer to the prerogative of the trial court
to determine whether rebuttal evidence will be allowed.
Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 228 (1976); RCr 9.42.
Pilon v.
Only where
it clearly appears the evidence at issue was purposefully
withheld and prejudicially interjected at the close of the trial
under the guise of "rebuttal evidence" will the trial court’s
decision be disturbed.
Gilbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 633 S.W.2d
69 (1982).
Hayes testified that he failed to return to the
detention facility solely in reliance on Ms. Torrey-Preston’s
comment that he did not have to "come see them anymore,"
believing that her statement meant that he had been released.
That conversation took place on Friday, January 16, 1998.
The
adult probation center was closed on Saturday and Sunday (the
17th and 18th, respectively); the following Monday, January 19,
was a legal holiday.
Ms. Torrey-Preston apparently miscalculated
days and dates and believed that Hayes’s last day, January 21,
would fall on that Monday and that she likely would not be seeing
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him again.
Hayes, however, was insistent that he believed that
she had authorized his early release by virtue of this verbal
exchange.
The Commonwealth moved to recall Corporal Hughes to
rebut Hayes’s testimony.
Corporal Hughes stated that following
Hayes’s failure to return, an inventory taken of his quarters at
the detention facility revealed that he had left behind most of
his personal property; i.e., a black bag, a pair of Nike shoes,
assorted clothing, hair brush, hair dressing, assorted
toiletries, underwear, etc.
Corporal Hughes testified that when
inmates are released from custody, they generally take all of
their personal property along.
However, in Hayes’s case, his
personal possessions were placed in the facility’s property
locker until March 6, 1998 — at which time Hayes signed for the
release of some of the items.
Hayes relies on Wager v. Commonwealth, Ky., 751 S.W.2d
28 (1988), as to the rebuttal issue.
Wager involved a situation
in which the Commonwealth called a surprise witness on rebuttal
for the purpose of introducing an out-of-court statement that had
been made by the defendant.
That statement constituted an
admission of guilt or amounted to a confession.
The Wager court
held that the evidence was highly prejudicial and that it had
been improperly introduced under the facts of that case.
We find
that case highly distinguishable from the facts before us.
Corporal Hughes was not a surprise witness; he had
already testified in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief.
Similarly, the nature of the evidence presented was neither
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inflammatory nor pivotal as to guilt or innocence per se.
It
merely raised a legitimate question as to evidence already at
issue:
if Hayes truly believed he had been released, why did he
not take his personal property with him?
Furthermore, Hayes was
allowed to take the stand again in order to explain his conduct
as to the abandoned property.
We find no error in the trial
court’s exercise of discretion in permitting the Commonwealth’s
rebuttal testimony.
Hayes’s last argument is that the court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury on false swearing.
An alternative instruction is required only
if, considering the totality of the evidence,
the jury might reasonably conclude that the
defendant was not guilty of the charged
offense, but was guilty of a lesser included
offense.
Bills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 851 S.W.2d 466, 469 (1993).
KRS 523.020(1) provides that a person is guilty of perjury in the
first degree if he “makes a material false statement, which he
does not believe, in any official proceeding under an oath
required or authorized by law[.]”
False swearing is defined at
KRS 523.040 as the making under oath of a “false” statement which
one knows not to be true.
The distinction between the offenses
turns on the materiality or gravity of the contents of the
statement.
A statement is deemed to be sufficiently material if
it has the potential to influence the tribunal or the jury.
Commonwealth v. Thurman, Ky., 691 S.W.2d 213, 215 (1985).
In this case, Hayes testified before both the grand
jury and the petit jury at trial regarding:
the reason for his
failure to return to the detention center; his whereabouts during
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his time of absence; the means by which he discovered his status
as an “escapee”; and his alleged effort to turn himself into the
appropriate authorities prior to being arrested on the street.
Furthermore, the jury did not believe Hayes’s testimony regarding
his record and performance within the drug court program,
believing instead the contradictory facts set forth by the
record.
There can be no question that Hayes’s testimony was
offered as a defense for his unlawful departure from the
detention facility’s work release program.
Not only did his
statements have the potential of influencing the outcome of the
proceedings; they were carefully crafted and designed to achieve
that very outcome.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in refusing to instruct on false swearing as Hayes’s
statements were wholly material to the proceedings.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Karen Mead
Lexington, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Shawn C. Goodpaster
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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