KENTUCKY STATE POLICE v. ELMER RAY
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RENDERED: MAY 12, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-002097-MR AND
NO. 1998-CA-002162-MR
KENTUCKY STATE POLICE
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT MCGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00036
v.
ELMER RAY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING AND
REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, EMBERTON, AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Elmer Ray filed suit against the Kentucky State
Police (KSP) under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.101-61.103
(the "Whistleblower" statute) alleging that adverse employment
action had been taken against him in retaliation for a letter he
sent to a state senator describing what he claimed was waste and
mismanagement in KSP.
After a jury verdict in Ray's favor, KSP
brings this appeal, and Ray brings a cross-appeal.
For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part and
remand.
Both parties are well-versed in the facts of this case, and
they will be repeated in this opinion only to the extent
necessary to discuss the issues involved.
KSP first claims that
the trial court erred in denying KSP's motion to amend its answer
to include the defense of unconstitutionality of KRS 61.102 and
61.103.
The complaint was filed by Ray on March 24, 1995.
initial answer was filed on April 17, 1995.
KSP's
It filed an amended
answer to an amended complaint on March 22, 1996.
KSP did not
attempt to amend its answer to include the defense of
unconstitutionality until October 7, 1997 - one day after the
first trial of this action had begun.
The first trial ended in a
mistrial, and KSP filed a renewed motion to amend its answer on
December 17, 1997.
The trial court entered an order on January
26, 1998, denying the motion to amend.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure [CR] 15.01 states:
A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may
so amend it at any time within 20 days after
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court issued only one order presumably
denying both of KSP's motions to amend.
The court properly
denied the motion when it was first offered.
To have granted the
motion during the first trial would have resulted in substantial
prejudice to the plaintiff, and the trial court appropriately
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exercised its discretion at that time.
Cheshire v. Barbour, Ky.,
481 S.W.2d 274 (1972).
However, we see no reason why KSP should not have been
permitted to amend its answer after the mistrial.
KSP claims
that it did not become aware of the claimed defect in the
statutes until the parties began preparing jury instructions.
The trial court's discretion in refusing amendments is reviewed
under the "clear error" standard.
Ashland Oil & Refining Co.,
Inc. v. Phillips, Ky., 404 S.W.2d 449 (1966).
Where there is no
showing that the opposing party's position has been worsened by
the delay in offering the amendment, where there is a color of
excuse for the delay, and where there is no suggestion of bad
faith on the part of the party offering the amendment, the trial
court should allow the amendment.
Id. at 450-51.
Here, Ray would not have been prejudiced by allowing
the amendment after the mistrial.
He had ample time to prepare
his case with the knowledge that KSP was challenging the
constitutionality of the statute.
Although the amendment was not
offered for two and one-half years after the answer was filed,
there is a "color of excuse" for the delay given that the alleged
defect was not evident until the parties disagreed about the
shifting burden of proof in the jury instructions.
Finally, we
discern no bad faith on KSP's behalf in offering the amendment.
The trial court erred in denying the motion to amend.
We are remanding this issue to the trial court so that
it can conduct a full hearing into the constitutionality of the
statute.
Since this is solely a question of law, it is not
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necessary to remand for a new trial.
If the trial court
determines that the statute is constitutional, the judgment will
stand.
Although the constitutional challenge was fully briefed
before the trial court and before this Court by KSP, it was not
addressed on its merits by the trial court because the motion to
amend was denied, thus precluding an argument on the substance of
the claim.
This Court lacks authority to review issues not
decided by the trial court.
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett,
Ky., 770 S.W.2d 225 (1989).
As such, we do not reach the
constitutional challenge in this opinion.
KSP also argues that the trial court improperly denied its
motions for JNOV, to vacate, or to grant a new trial.
The
standard of review for motions for JNOV is the same as that for a
directed verdict, and is set out in Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface
Mining Co., Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459 (1990), as follows:
Upon review of the evidence supporting a
judgment entered upon a jury verdict, the
role of an appellate court is limited to
determining whether the trial court erred in
failing to grant the motion for directed
verdict. All evidence which favors the
prevailing party must be taken as true and
the reviewing court is not at liberty to
determine credibility or the weight which
should be given to the evidence, these being
functions reserved to the trier of fact. The
prevailing party is entitled to all
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from
the evidence. Upon completion of such an
evidentiary review, the appellate court must
determine whether the verdict rendered is
"'palpably or flagrantly' against the
evidence so as 'to indicate that it was
reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.'" If the reviewing court
concludes that such is the case, it is at
liberty to reverse the judgment on the
grounds that the trial court erred in failing
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to sustain the motion for directed verdict.
Otherwise, the judgment must be affirmed.
Id. at 461-62 (internal citations omitted).
While we might not have reached the same conclusion had
we been on the jury, we may not weigh the evidence anew.
Upon
review of the evidence presented in this case, we can not say
that the verdict rendered was "palpably or flagrantly" against
the evidence.
Drawing all reasonable inferences from the
evidence in favor of Ray, the trial court did not err in denying
KSP's motions for JNOV, to vacate the judgment, or to grant a new
trial.
KSP first filed its motion for change of venue on May
30, 1997, more than two years after the complaint was filed.
KSP
claims that Ray became a prominent figure in the community due to
his leadership efforts following a devastating flood in Pendleton
County in March, 1997.
Ray's efforts in the assistance project
allegedly allowed him to wield undue influence in the community
and created a climate in which KSP was unable to receive a fair
trial, "tipp[ing] the scales of justice."
We cannot agree.
A motion for change of venue should be timely made.
Miller v. Watts, Ky., 436 S.W.2d 515 (1969).
Although the
request here came more than two years after the filing of the
complaint, it timely followed the flood that triggered the
motion.
The trial court has broad discretion in determining
whether a motion for change of venue should be granted and its
decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion.
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997).
The trial court's decision is afforded great weight because it is
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present in the county and better suited than an appellate court
to assess the environment.
Id.
KSP presented no evidence of
prejudice or bias in favor of Ray, but merely expressed its
opinion that there was a "substantial community feeling in favor
of" Ray.
This falls far short of showing actual prejudice or
prejudice that could have been clearly implied.
Gould v.
Charlton Co., Inc., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734 (1996).
The trial court
correctly denied the motion for change of venue.
KSP also claims that Captain John Barton was "required
to interpret" KRS 61.102 on cross examination, and that the trial
court erred in permitting a non-legal witness to express an
opinion about a legal issue.
After Ray did not get the transfer
he had requested, he sent a letter dated November 9, 1994, to
then state Sen. Joseph Meyer detailing what he felt was an
inefficient use of state resources by KSP because of the time and
distance required for Ray to travel from his home to the region
to which he was assigned.
On January 27, 1995, Barton ordered
Ray not to testify about state police business without first
notifying Barton that Ray was going to testify.
The testimony to
which KSP objected concerned the application of the Whistleblower
statute, and was as follows:
Q:
No. Just tell me what the highlighted
part of that statute says.
A:
". . .No employer shall require any
employee to give notice prior to making such
a report, disclosure, or divulgence. . . ."
That's all that's highlighted. There's quite
a bit more on this page.
Q:
You can read all of it if you want,
Captain, but that's exactly what you did,
isn't it? You required him to give notice
prior to making such a report, disclosure, or
divulgence.
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A:
At the time that I gave him that direct
order, it was in compliance with Kentucky
State Police Policy. I was not aware, I had
not read the statute.
KSP claims that this testimony required Captain Barton
to state a legal opinion about the statute.
record, we disagree.
After reviewing the
Captain Barton was asked to read a portion
of the statute, but then testified that his conduct conformed to
KSP policy.
He did not express a legal opinion about the
statute, and testified that he was not even aware of the statute.
We find no error in this testimony.
KSP's final argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in imposing CR 11 sanctions in response to Ray's motion to
strike certain defenses in KSP's answer.
A trial court should
not impose CR 11 sanctions without a hearing and without
rendering findings of fact.
Clark Equipment Co. v. Bowman, Ky.
App., 762 S.W.2d 417, 421 (1988).
When sanctions are imposed,
appellate review applies a clearly erroneous standard to the
trial court's findings of fact, de novo review of the legal
conclusion that a violation occurred, and an abuse of discretion
standard on the sanctions imposed.
Id.
Ray's motion to strike
defenses was granted by the trial court, which held the motion
for sanctions in abeyance until final judgment had been rendered.
After the trial, Ray renewed his motion for sanctions, which was
granted by the trial court.
However, the record is devoid of any
findings of fact by the trial court in regard to the sanctions.
We must therefore set aside the order awarding sanctions and
remand the issue to the trial court for findings of fact.
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Following the trial, Ray filed a motion to amend the
judgment and order that he be reinstated to his position with
KSP, that he be awarded benefits and back pay, that he be awarded
attorney's fees, and that he be awarded interest on the judgment.
The trial court denied his motion and Ray filed his cross-appeal
addressing these issues.
In denying Ray's motion for reinstatement, benefits,
and back pay, the trial court found that Ray had received some
benefit from KSP's decision to transfer him to the Dry Ridge
post, which was closer to his home than his previous work
station.
Using language associated with claims of constructive
discharge, the court also found that the "transfer would not be
intolerable to a reasonable person" and concluded that Ray's
retirement from KSP was indeed voluntary.
We believe that this
finding is consistent with Ray's deposition and trial testimony.
We further agree that although Ray was not being transferred to
the exact position he had requested, a transfer to a post located
closer to his home did confer some benefit upon him.
We
acknowledge the difficulty in resolving this conclusion with the
jury's verdict, but under the appropriate standards of review,
this finding is not inconsistent with the verdict.
The trial
court correctly denied Ray's motion for reinstatement and for
benefits and back pay.
The trial court denied the motion for attorney's fees
because it had been advised that Ray's attorney's fees had been
paid by a third party.
"The trial judge is generally in the best
position to consider all relevant factors and require proof of
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reasonableness from parties moving for allowance of attorney
fees."
Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts, Ky., 813 S.W.2d
287, 293 (1991).
The underlying public policy for awarding
attorney's fees is to insure effective access to the judicial
process.
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., Ky., 840 S.W.2d
814, 826 (1992).
Ray's access to the judicial process has
apparently not been hindered by legal costs, because those costs
have been borne by a third party which is not a party to this
action.
Allowing him to recover fees which he has not expended
does not serve the purpose behind the policy.
The trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying this motion.
Finally, Ray claims that he should have been awarded
interest on the judgment.
"It is a well-settled principle that
neither a state nor public agency is liable for interest on
public debts unless there is statutory authority or a contractual
provision authorizing the payment of interest."
Powell v. Board
of Education of Harrodsburg, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 940, 941
(1991).
We find that this "well-settled principle" is applicable
when awards of punitive damages, as well as compensatory damages,
are assessed against a state agency.
In sum, we hold that the trial court should have
allowed KSP to amend its answer to include the defense of
unconstitutionality; thus, we remand this case to the trial court
for a hearing and determination on the constitutionality of the
statute.
We affirm the trial court's denial of KSP's motion for
JNOV, to vacate, or for a new trial.
We also affirm the trial
court's denial of a change of venue and its ruling permitting the
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testimony of Captain Barton, but set aside its imposition of CR
11 sanctions and remand for entry of findings of fact.
on cross-appeal in all respects.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT:
Roger N. Braden
Cincinnati, Ohio
Stephen D. Wolnitzek
Covington, Kentucky
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We affirm
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