TIMOTHY M. MULLINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and JASON MYKAL FOIT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and ANTHONY GOFF v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 7, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000815-MR
TIMOTHY M. MULLINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00476
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND:
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-000886-MR
JASON MYKAL FOIT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00476
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND:
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-000891-MR
ANTHONY GOFF
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00476
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, and MCANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The appellants, co-defendants Timothy Mullins,
Jason Mykal Foit, and Anthony Goff were convicted of first-degree
robbery, principal or accomplice (KRS 515.020 and/or KRS
502.020).
After reviewing the arguments, the trial record, and
the applicable law, we affirm.
According to the victim, Danny Alton, the facts are as
follows.
On August 19, 1997, at approximately 2:45 a.m., in
downtown Covington, Kentucky, Alton was walking home from a local
At the corner of 8th and Madison, Alton met an
bar.
acquaintance, a man he knew only as “Walter.”
Walter was in the
company of a group of at least four other men.
The group
included Mullins, Foit, Goff, and C.T., a juvenile.
Following a
brief conversation, Alton and Walter began walking north on
Madison.
The group followed them.
Alton became uncomfortable
with being followed, and so he crossed the street and quickened
his pace.
At the corner of Pike and Madison, someone in the group
said, “we know you got it, give it up,” and Alton was struck on
the head.
The blows continued and Alton was ultimately knocked
to the ground.
While Alton was on the ground, he continued to be
struck and kicked and he could feel hands going through his
pockets.
Alton estimates that approximately $80.00 was removed
from his pockets.
Alton’s attackers fled the scene.
The co-defendants wholly contest Alton’s version of the
facts.
As told primarily through the testimony of Goff, the co-
defendants represent the facts to be as follows.
had on a previous occasion engaged in sex.
Alton and Goff
On two occasions
thereafter, Alton approached Goff and asked him if he wanted to
make some money — apparently in exchange for sex.
On the night
of the robbery, Alton again approached Goff and asked him if he
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wanted to go home with him.
This time Goff became upset with
him, telling Alton that he was not gay.
Alton again offered
money — although he mentioned no specific sexual act.
Alton
asked Goff if he had anything against gays and took a swing at
Goff.
Goff moved out of the way, and Alton came forward again.
Goff then took a couple of swings at Alton and hit him in the
face.
Following this incident, Foit and C.T. came running
from across the street to assist Goff.
Mullins was in the alley
“relieving himself” during this time.
According to Goff, no one
attempted to steal anything from Alton, nor was there any
discussion among the four of doing so.
Foit and C.T. pulled Goff
off of Alton, and all of them ran through a nearby alley.
While there are two divergent versions of the events up
to this point, the stories are consistent as to the remaining
facts.
It is undisputed that Alton was beaten up and injured.
Alton waived down a police officer, Officer Haubner, on patrol in
the neighborhood, explained to him what had happened, and gave
him a description of his assailants.
description.
Haubner radioed in the
Shortly thereafter, Police Officers Nader and Allen
observed four men coming onto Madison from behind a building.
The officers took the group into custody and transported them
back to the scene of the altercation, where Alton was waiting,
for identification by Alton.
Alton identified the group of four
men as the ones who had assaulted and robbed him.
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The four men
whom Alton identified that night as his attackers were Mullins,
Foit, Goff, and C.T.1
On October 3, 1997, the Kenton County Grand Jury issued
a joint indictment, indicting Mullins, Foit, and Goff for firstdegree robbery.
The cases were joined for trial.
Following a
two-day trial, on February 4, 1998, Mullins, Foit, and Goff were
each convicted of first-degree robbery, principal or accomplice.
On April 1, 1998, the trial court sentenced each of the
defendants to ten-years’ imprisonment.
TIMOTHY MULLINS’S APPEAL
Mullins’s only argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal.
Specifically, Mullins argues that “[t]here was no
scintilla of evidence shown concerning [Mullins’s] guilt and even
if the Trial Court assumed the Commonwealth’s proof was true,
there was still not enough to allow a jury’s determination as to
guilt or innocence.”
Mullins contends that he “was never put at
the scene; was never identified as a participant; was
specifically excluded by Anthony Goff (co-defendant) as being
involved; and was never identified for record purposes[.]”
(emphasis original).
Mullins lists eleven specific alleged
inconsistencies and short-comings in the evidence, which we will
not reproduce here; however, in summary, Mullins contends that it
1
Walter fled the scene when the attack began and it is not
known with certainty what role, if any, he played in the robbery.
There may also have been one other person who participated in the
robbery but avoided apprehension. C.T., a juvenile, was not
prosecuted as a codefendant in the Mullins, Foit, and Goff trial.
-4-
“was clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt concerning
this Appellant.”
Thus, he argues, he was entitled to a directed
verdict as a matter of law.
On motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
Each of the appellants was convicted under Instruction
No. 7, which stated as follows:
[i]f you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant . . . is
guilty of either Robbery in the First Degree
under Instruction No. 5 or Complicity to
Robbery in the First Degree under Instruction
No. 6, but if you are unable to determine
from the evidence whether the Defendant . . .
committed the crime as Principal under
Instruction No. 5 or Accomplice under
Instruction No. 6, then you will find him
guilty of Robbery in the First Degree,
Principal or Accomplice, under this
Instruction.
A "combination instruction,” which allows the jury to find each
co-defendant guilty as either a principal or an accomplice, has
been upheld as proper if the jury is unable to determine in which
capacity each defendant had actually participated.
Commonwealth, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 921, 925 (1986).
Halvorsen v.
“Where alternate
theories of instruction would support a conviction, both theories
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should be submitted to the jury.”
Campbell v. Commonwealth, 732
S.W.2d 878, 880 (1987).
In this case, because the perpetrators of the robbery
began their attack from behind Alton and because Alton attempted
to ward off their blows by covering his face, Alton was unable to
state with specificity who did what.
Therefore, according to
Alton’s testimony, any one of the appellants could have been a
principal perpetrator of the robbery, or, in the alternative, he
may have been an accomplice.
In summary, in order for the jury
to find Mullins guilty, it need not have believed that he engaged
solo in the conduct set forth in KRS 515.020; rather, it need
only have believed that he aided or assisted in the robbery as
described in KRS 502.020.
The first-degree robbery statute, KRS 515.020,
provides, in part, that:
(1) A person is guilty of robbery in the
first degree when, in the course of
committing theft, he uses or threatens the
immediate use of physical force upon another
person with intent to accomplish the theft
and when he:
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who
is not a participant in the crime;
The accomplice liability statute, KRS 502.020,
provides, in part, that:
(1) A person is guilty of an offense
committed by another person when, with the
intention of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense, he:
(a) Solicits, commands, or engages in a
conspiracy with such other person to commit
the offense; or
-6-
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such
person in planning or committing the offense.
. . . (Emphasis added.)
Alton testified that prior to the attack, he could hear
the group behind him talking in low voices as though they did not
want him to hear, followed by one of them saying, “we know you
got it, give it up.”
At this point Alton was struck, knocked to
the ground, covered his face, and was unable to say exactly “who
did what.”
However, Mullins was identified by Alton as having
been one of the men following him immediately prior to the
attack.
There is no question that Mullins was in the vicinity
that night in the company of Foit, Goff, and the juvenile.
Goff’s testimony places Mullins there; Alton’s testimony does the
same; and Mullins was apprehended in the vicinity of Pike and
Madison on the night of the incident in the company of Goff, who
admitted that he administered the beating to Alton.
He was also
at that time in the company of a juvenile, C.T., who had blood on
his shoes.
Moments after the beating, Alton identified a group of
four suspects, which included Mullins, as the ones who were
following him just before he was attacked.
Similarly, at trial,
Alton identified Mullins as one of the four who were following
him immediately prior to the attack.
Our standard of review has been articulated by Benham,
supra:
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is,
if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal."
-7-
Benham, 816 S.W.2d
at 187;
Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473, 489 (1999).
Goff testified that Alton attacked him first, that no robbery
occurred, and that Mullins was not involved in the incident
because he was in an alley “relieving himself.”
Nevertheless, in
light of Alton’s testimony to the contrary, substantiated by the
arrest of the four in the vicinity shortly after the alleged
attack, a jury question unquestionably was created.
We cannot
agree that it was “clearly unreasonable” for the jury to find
Mullins guilty of at least being an accomplice to the robbery.
See Garrett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 805 (1977)(where a
defendant was positively identified in court by a witness who saw
him near the scene of a crime, the trial court did not err in
submitting the case to the jury).
Hence, we find no error in the
trial court’s refusal to grant Mullins’s motion for a directed
verdict.
JASON MYKAL FOIT’S APPEAL
Foit’s arguments on appeal are that: (1) Alton’s outof-court identification of the defendants the night of the
incident did not meet the due process show-up procedures
prescribed by Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34
L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); and (2) Alton’s in-court identification was
insufficient under United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th
Cir. 1976).
Foit's brief does not include a reference to the record
showing that either of these issues was preserved for review as
required by CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv).
The Commonwealth argues that
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Foit’s arguments are unpreserved for appellate review because he
failed to make a motion to suppress the identifications prior to
trial or to object to the identifications when the evidence was
introduced at trial.
We agree.
“A party must timely inform the court of an error and
request the relief to which he considers himself entitled.”
Renfro v. Commonwealth, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 795, 796 (1995).
When a
trial court has not had the opportunity to rule, the appellate
court is precluded from reviewing the alleged error.
Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 794, 799 (1994).
Sherley v.
“[A] party must timely
inform the court of the error and request the relief to which he
considers himself entitled.
raised on appeal.”
Otherwise, the issue may not be
West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 600,
602 (1989) (cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2569, 518 U.S. 1027, 135
L.Ed.2d (1986).
This Court may review an unpreserved error and grant
appropriate relief provided that it determines that manifest
injustice has resulted from that error.
10.26.
Renfro, supra; RCr
However, in order to grant relief and to regard an
unpreserved error as palpable error, “the reviewing court must
conclude that a substantial possibility exists that the result
would have been different” had the alleged palpable error not
occurred.
(1996).
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224
After examining the weight of the evidence, we conclude
that the alleged errors concerning Alton’s identifications of
Foit —
if errors at all — did not rise to the level of palpable
error.
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Foit and his three co-defendants were apprehended
immediately after the robbery and were returned to the scene of
the crime for identification by the victim, Alton.
Such a ‘show-up’ identification may be
unreliable and suspect, but such show-ups are
nonetheless necessary in some instances
because they occur immediately after the
commission of the crime and aid the police in
either establishing probable cause or
clearing a possible suspect, and the police
do not need to delay the process in order to
allow the suspect to have counsel present.
[Citation omitted]. As the show-up procedure
is suggestive by its nature, the court "must
then assess the possibility that the witness
would make an irreparable misidentification,
based upon the totality of the circumstances
and in light of the five factors enumerated
in [Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93
S.Ct. 375,382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)]."
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 854,
857 (1985).
Savage v. Commonwealth, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 512, 513 (1995).
We have examined the issue of palpable error associated
with Alton’s out-of-court identification of Foit in light of the
five factors set forth in the Biggers standard:
(1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the
accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal; (4)
the level of certainty of the witness demonstrated at the
confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation.
Biggers, supra, at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375.
See
also Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky. App. 556 S.W.2d 918 (1977);
Wilson v. Commonwealth, supra; and Savage, supra.
Alton’s testimony, Alton observed Foit —
According to
along with the rest of
the group — when he first met up with Walter and again when the
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group began following him.
It appears that Alton had a
reasonable opportunity to observe both Foit and the group.
Alton
was attentive or apprehensive enough to notice the group upon his
initial meeting with Walter, to take note that the group began
following him, and to give a description of the group that led
within minutes to the arrest of four members of the group.
a period of initial hesitation,2
After
Alton was able to make a
positive identification of Mullins, Foit, Goff, and the juvenile
as his assailants.
Finally, we note that there was a very short
time-lapse between the crime and the confrontation.
In summary,
Alton’s out-of-court identification of Foit comported with the
due process requirements of Biggers, supra.
Foit likewise did not preserve his United States v.
Russell argument.
Russell, supra, holds that in cases where a
witness identifies a stranger solely upon the basis of a brief
observation at a time of stress or excitement, the trial court
should be especially vigilant to make certain that there is no
distortion of a possibly incomplete or mistaken perception of a
witness by means of suggestive prompting or other unfair
investigatory techniques.
Id. at 1066.
United States v. Russell
applied the five-factor Biggers test to determine if there was an
impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification that would
taint the reliability of an in-court identification.
1067-1068.
Id. at
We have reviewed the facts of this case under the
criteria of both Biggers and Russell, and we have discovered no
2
At trial, Also attributed his initial hesitation in making
an identification to his fear of retaliation.
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palpable error as to the unpreserved issues relating to the
identification process -- either out of court or in court.
ANTHONY GOFF’S APPEAL
Anthony Goff raises two issues on appeal: (1) that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal and (2) that the trial court erred in overruling his
objection to a cross-examination question and to a comment made
during closing argument — both involving Goff’s silence upon his
initial detention by the police.
In our discussion of the appeal of Timothy Mullins, we
identified and discussed the statutes, case authorities, and
appellate standards applicable to the crimes charged and as to a
motion for a directed verdict.
We will not repeat the full
discussion of the applicable authorities here, and we incorporate
that discussion into our consideration of Goff’s appeal.
With regard to Goff’s argument that he should have been
granted a directed verdict of acquittal, he contends that in his
trial testimony, he gave an account of the events that night that
was in complete conflict with Alton’s recollection and that his
version of the events should have been accepted.
According to
Goff, Alton solicited him for sex, Goff refused, Alton attacked
him, and Goff struck Alton in self defense; furthermore, there
was no robbery.
Thus, the two testimonies as to the events of
the August 19, 1997, were wholly contradictory.
"[T]he weight of
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are functions
peculiarly within the province of the jury, and the jury's
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determination will not be disturbed."
Partin v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 221 (1996) (quoting Jillson v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 461 S.W.2d 542, 544 (1970).
While the jury may have chosen to accept Goff’s version
of the events and to disbelieve Alton’s, a review of the evidence
as a whole indicates that the trial court correctly denied Goff’s
motion for a directed verdict and properly submitted to the jury
the issue of which version of the events was the more credible.
As it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to have chosen to
believe Alton’s version of the events over Goff’s, Goff was not
entitled to a directed verdict, and we may not disturb the trial
court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict.
Benham,
supra.
Goff’s second argument is that the trial court erred in
overruling his objection to a question raised during crossexamination and to comment made during closing argument
highlighting his failure to tell police officers immediately on
the night of the robbery the story which he later told in court.
Specifically, Goff cites: (1) the Commonwealth’s questions of
Goff on cross-examination as to whether he told police on the
night of his arrest that Alton had asked him about having sex for
money; and (2) the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument
speculating as to why Goff had not told police from the inception
of the investigation that this homosexual assault was involved.
In the course of the Commonwealth’s cross-examination
of Goff, the following exchange took place:
Q: Of course once you’re caught, you
immediately told these people . . . hey,
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here’s what went down . . . you told the cops
. . . here’s what went down . . . this
homosexual tried to hustle me and I knocked
him out.
A:
No sir.
Q:
Why didn’t you do that?
A:
Cause they didn’t ask me sir.
Q: Nobody asked you and you just stood there
and said . . . well you just told us that
someone said they were picking you up for a
robbery . . .
Unidentified Defense Counsel:
approach please.
May we
At the ensuing bench conference, defense counsel voiced
an objection to the prosecutor’s comment on Goff’s silence.
The
prosecutor commented that this question did not relate to Goff’s
post-Miranda warning silence.
Defense counsel disagreed.
The
trial court overruled the objection on the basis that “the door
had been opened” to the question.
The cross-examination then continued as follows:
Q: Well these officers told you [you] were
being picked up for a robbery, right.
A: I can’t actually recall. I remember them
stopping us saying, you know, I was being
sustained [sic] and taken down here for ID.
They didn’t tell us right then and there what
kind of charge we were being charged with or
nothing.
Q: Well I thought you said earlier on direct
examination that the officer said to you we
we’re going to take you down here cause
there’s a guy saying you [sic] been robbed.
A: They told us that in the cop car on the
way down.
Q: In the cop car on the way down they told
you your going here to see this guy. He’s
claiming that, ah, you robbed him, right?
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A:
Yes sir.
Q: And you knew that as you sat there in the
police cruiser, right?
A:
Yes sir.
Q: And you didn’t say anything to anybody,
right?
A:
No sir.
Q: You didn’t tell the police officer Foit
and Mullins and [C.T.] didn’t have anything
to do with this. I punched the guy because
he approached me for sex.
A:
No sir, I didn’t say nothing.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor described the
events leading up to the moment when the group was picked up by
the police:
Does Goff tell anybody on the way over there
this is a . . . this is a homosexual assault?
I don’t know what this is all about man. I
punched this guy. The guy tried to do this
to me and I punched him. He doesn’t say a
thing about it. He doesn’t tell anybody his
story. He doesn’t give anybody a chance
right then and there to cut themselves loose.
Is Alton making things up? No way.
Defense counsel did not object to these closing
comments.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d
91 (1976), held that when a criminal defendant has received
Miranda warnings following arrest, his subsequent silence cannot
be used to impeach his testimony at trial.
been applied in numerous Kentucky cases.
Since then, Doyle has
See Niemeyer v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 533 S.W.2d 218 (1976); Salisbury v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 556 S.W.2d 922, 926 (1977); Darnell v.
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Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590 (1977); Campbell v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 564 S.W.2d 528 (1978); Wallen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657
S.W.2d 232 (1983); Blake v. Commonwealth, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 718
(1983); Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App. 717 S.W.2d 511 (1986);
Green v. Commonwealth, Ky. 815 S.W.2d 398 (1991); and
Hall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 321 (1993);
However, Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct.
1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), clarified Doyle, explaining that
Doyle only applied in cases where the record disclosed that
Miranda warnings had been given to the defendant.
The Fletcher
court held that:
In the absence of the sort of affirmative
assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings,
we do not believe that it violates due
process of law for a State to permit crossexamination as to postarrest silence when a
defendant chooses to take the stand. A State
is entitled, in such situations, to leave to
the judge and jury under its own rules of
evidence the resolution of the extent to
which postarrest silence may be deemed to
impeach a criminal defendant’s own testimony.
(Emphasis added).
Fletcher at 455 U.S. 607, 102 S.Ct. 1312.
While Fletcher has never been specifically adopted in
this jurisdiction, we can find no holding by our Supreme Court or
by this Court which would indicate that the Commonwealth’s
restrictions on using post-arrest (or in this case postdetention) silence for impeachment purposes should be construed
differently from the standard as explained in Fletcher.3
3
Green v. Commonwealth, supra, does recognize that the right
to remain silent exists whether or not a Miranda warning has been
given; nevertheless, it acknowledges without criticism the
(continued...)
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In summary, Doyle does prohibit commentary on a
defendant’s silence once Miranda warnings have been given in
keeping with the guarantees against self-incrimination embodied
virtually identically at Section 11 of the Constitution of
Kentucky and in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.
However, pursuant to Fletcher, once a criminal
defendant takes the stand and elects to testify, his post-arrest
silence (especially as to contradictions in his own testimony)
may be used for impeachment purposes.
We find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, the convictions of Timothy
Mullins, Jason Mykal Foit, and Anthony Goff are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT TIMOTHY
MULLINS:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Thomas G. Alig, Jr.
Covington, KY
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT JASON
MYKAL FOIT:
Darrell A. Cox
Covington, KY
BRIEF AND REPLY BRIEF FOR
APPELLANT ANTHONY GOFF:
Kim Brooks
Covington, KY
3
(...continued)
decisions (including Fletcher) authorizing the use of post-arrest
silence for the purpose of impeaching a defendant’s trial
testimony.
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