DEMETRIOUS MACK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2000; 10:00 a.m
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000224-MR
DEMETRIOUS MACK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELLEN B. EWING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-0140
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, MCANULTY AND MILLER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Demetrious Mack appeals from a judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court entered on January 14, 1998, following
his conditional guilty plea.1
Mack attempted to preserve two
issues for appellate review: (1) whether the trial court erred in
refusing to grant Mack a separate trial from his co-defendants;
and (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to sanction the
Commonwealth for an alleged discovery violation.
1
Having
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
concluded that Mack has failed to show that he would have been
unduly prejudiced by a joint trial and that the discovery ruling
was proper, we affirm.
Mack was indicted along with co-defendants Demetrius
Stephenson and Sherwin Harrison for robbery in the first degree2
and the attempted murder3 of Jerimaine Williams.4
Williams
claimed that late in the evening of October 9, 1996, Mack and
Harrison robbed him and shot him eight times.
He claimed that
Stephenson was driving the car that the co-defendants alighted
from just prior to robbing him.
A joint trial of the three defendants began on January
6, 1998.
On the second day of trial, all three defendants
accepted the Commonwealth’s offer and entered conditional guilty
pleas.
Mack entered a conditionally guilty plea to two counts of
robbery in the first degree5 and one count of attempted murder.6
2
In violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.020.
3
In violation of KRS 506.010 and 507.020.
4
Mack and
offenses which
defendant also
98-CA-0674-MR,
5
Harrison were indicted on additional unrelated
were severed for separate trial. Each cohas an appeal pending in this Court: Stephenson,
and Harrison, 98-CA-0368-MR.
Mack also pled guilty to robbing Deante Smith on July 4,
1996.
6
Mack also pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon and received a five-year sentence; operating a
motor vehicle without an operator’s license, with a 6-month
sentence; giving a peace officer a false name or address, with a
90-day sentence; and operating a motor vehicle without insurance,
with a 30-day sentence. The trial court also dismissed a charge
of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree.
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He was sentenced to prison for a term of fifteen years on each
conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently with each
other and the other current sentences, but consecutively with a
sentence he was then serving.
This appeal followed.
Mack argues that the trial court erred by not severing
his case for a separate trial from his co-defendants.
He claims
this issue was preserved for appellate review by the written
motions for separate trials by each defendant and by the entry of
a conditional guilty plea.
The Commonwealth has conceded that at
trial it intended to call as a witness Stephenson’s former
girlfriend, Alicia Lynette Sanders.
The Commonwealth intended to
elicit from Sanders testimony that she had seen the three codefendants together in a car the night of the robbery.
Co-
defendants, Mack and Harrison, each stated that it was his
intention to impeach Sanders by asking her about her alleged bias
against Stephenson.7
7
It was Sanders who had filed a petition for an Emergency
Protective Order (EPO) against Stephenson that had led to his
arrest in the case sub judice. In the petition seeking the EPO,
Sanders accused Stephenson of violent behavior toward her and
serious violations of the law. She claimed that Stephenson also
went to a her house with a gun and forced her to go to his mobile
home where he beat her with the gun, disrobed her, locked her in
a closet and had his friends come over to look at her. The EPO
petition further alleged that on that same day Stephenson also
beat a 14-year-old girl and threw her out of his home. The EPO
petition also claimed that Stephenson had been violent with
Sanders in the past, including one instance where he broke her
arm, and that she was afraid of him. Separate criminal charges
were filed against Stephenson in regard to the allegations made
in the EPO petition.
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Mack also contended that it was his intention at trial
to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
He
argued that if his co-defendants testified against him at a joint
trial, he would be forced to waive his right to remain silent in
order to defend himself.
He claimed that he would be prejudiced
by these circumstances and that this prejudice could only be
eliminated by a separate trial.
Kentucky RCr 9.16 provides in pertinent part:
If it appears that a defendant or the
Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by
a joinder of offenses or of defendants in
an indictment, information, complaint or
uniform citation or by joinder for trial,
the court shall order separate trials of
counts, grant separate trials of defendants
or provide whatever other relief justice
requires.
The determination of whether a separate trial should be granted
to jointly indicted persons is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and a conviction will be reversed
only if the refusal of the trial court to grant the relief is a
clear abuse of discretion and undue prejudice to the defendant is
positively shown prior to trial.8
A defendant must show that
antagonism between his and his co-defendant’s case would prevent
a jury from being able to separate and treat distinctively
evidence that is relevant to each defendant and that such
8
Rachel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 523 S.W.2d 395 (1975);
Humphrey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 865, 868 (1992).
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antagonism could mislead or confuse the jury.9
However, the fact
that the defenses of the co-defendants are antagonistic is only a
factor for the trial court to consider in determining whether a
defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial.10
There are only a few cases in Kentucky where sufficient
prejudice to the defendant was found so as to require the
reversal of a conviction.
Compton v. Commonwealth11 embraces
the proposition that severance is proper when evidence presented
against one defendant would not have been admissible in a second
trial of that single defendant.12
Kentucky courts have also
recognized that severance is proper when one defendant is on
trial with co-defendants who are also charged with additional,
separate crimes.13
The problem that we encounter in the case sub judice is
that we must decide whether the trial court erred in making its
determination that Mack was not unduly prejudiced by the joint
trial when no trial actually took place.
Mack is asking this
Court to predict what would have happened had the case gone to
trial.
Since Mack has failed in his burden
to demonstrate that
9
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872 (1992) cert.
denied 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S.Ct. 1857, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993).
10
Id.; Rachel, supra at 400.
11
Ky., 602 S.W.2d 150, 153 (1980).
12
See also Commonwealth v. Rogers, Ky., 698 S.W.2d 839
(1985).
13
See Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 869 S.W.2d 32 (1993);
Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 828 (1984).
-5-
the trial court’s denial of a severance was a clear abuse of
discretion due to a positive showing of prejudice, we affirm.
The relief sought by Mack would require us to speculate
as to what evidence would have been presented at trial and as to
the significance of the prejudice caused by the co-defendants’
testimony.
This need for speculation highlights one of the
policy reasons for the adoption of a rule of law that requires
that any issue reserved for appeal through a conditional guilty
plea be “case dispositive and [] capable of being reviewed by an
appellate court without a full trial.”14
It has been held that, before accepting a
conditional plea, the trial court and the
prosecutor15 must determine that the pretrial
issues reserved for appeal are case
dispositive and are capable of being reviewed
by an appellate court without a full trial,
which requires the trial court to make
specific findings on the record of the issues
to be resolved upon appeal,16 and a further
specific finding that those issues would
effectively dispose of the indictment or
suppress essential evidence which would
substantially affect the prosecution’s
ability to prosecute the defendant as charged
in the indictment . . . . However, it has
also been held that the dispositiveness of
14
21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law §712 (1998).
15
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) makes specific reference to “the
consent of the government” to the entry of a conditional plea of
guilty, while RCr 8.09 makes no reference to the prosecutor.
16
The judgment in the case sub judice merely stated: “This
is a conditional plea pursuant to RCr 8.09 reserving the right to
appeal all pre-trial motions.” Mack’s motion to enter guilty plea
made no reference to a conditional plea. The Commonwealth’s
offer on a plea of guilty merely noted: “This is [a] conditional
plea pursuant to RCr 8.09 reserving right to appeal all pre-trial
motions.”
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the issue preserved for appeal is not a
prerequisite to the acceptance of a
conditional plea of no contest to a criminal
charge [citations omitted].17
Two foreign cases that illustrate this dichotomy are
cited in the above discussion.
The first, State v. Hosea18, is a
West Virginia case involving West Virginia Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(a)(2)19.
There, the defendant, a juvenile charged
with first-degree murder, entered a Rule 11(a)(2) conditional
guilty plea; but the State argued that the issues were not
properly preserved for appellate review because they were not
dispositive of the case.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia noted that several federal courts have consistently held
that guilty pleas entered pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) are proper
only when the appellate court’s decision will completely dispose
of the case,20
and ruled that the issue presented on appeal must
17
21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law §712 (1998).
18
199 W.Va. 62, 483 S.E.2d 62 (1996).
19
Both foreign rules discussed infra are practically
identical to Kentucky RCr 8.09 which reads: “With the approval of
the court a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty,
reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to
review of the adverse determinations of any specified trial or
pretrial motion. A defendant shall be allowed to withdraw such
plea upon prevailing on appeal.”
20
See United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056, 1058 (7th
Cir.1994); United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 914, 915-16 (5th
Cir.1992); United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996, 999 (7th
Cir.1989); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1313 (7th
Cir.1993)(holding that when a guilty plea is appealed, the issues
to be resolved must “dispose of the case”)(quoting United States
v. Wong Ching Hing, 867 F.2d 754, 758 (2nd Cir.1989))(quoting
Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Amendment to Fed.R.Crim.P 11)).
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be case dispositive.
Conversely, in State v. Montoya,21 the Supreme Court of
Utah reversed the intermediate appellate court’s ruling that the
issue on appeal from a conditional guilty plea must be case
dispositive.22
The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea
to incest, and attempted to reserve for appellate review the
narrow legal issue of whether the State had correctly charged
him. The Supreme Court disagreed with the State’s argument that
since the issue on appeal was not case dispositive, it was not
subject to a conditional guilty plea.
The Court noted that in
State v. Sery,23 the Court had not found a case dispositive
requirement; that the conditional guilty plea rule itself was
clear and unambiguous; and that the conditional plea itself
reserved the right to appeal “the adverse determination of any
specified pre-trial motion,” not just dispositive ones.24
Thus, this Court could follow the reasoning of the West
Virginia Court and hold that in order for an issue preserved by a
conditional guilty plea to be subject to review that it must be
dispositive.
Using this approach, Mack’s argument for severance
would fail, since if this Court found prejudice from the denial
of the severance, it would necessitate a full trial.
21
However,
887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994).
22
The Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(i)mirrors the
language of West Virginia Rule 11(a)(2) and Kentucky RCr 8.09.
23
758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
24
Montoya, supra at 860.
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since the Commonwealth has not argued for the “case-dispositive”
approach and since there is no Kentucky precedent for us to
follow, we will refrain from going beyond the arguments in the
briefs.
Instead, we affirm because Mack has failed to show
prejudice.
This Court considered a somewhat similar issue in
Rushin v. Commonwealth.25
There the defendant, in accordance
with KRS 440.450 and 500.110, requested a speedy trial in
writing.
Six days before the 180-day time limit was up, the
court set the trial for November 28, 1994.
On November 22, after
the defendant’s newly-appointed counsel’s motion to dismiss was
denied, counsel claimed that he did not have adequate time to
prepare for trial because the Commonwealth was “trying to race to
trial” to avoid violation of KRS 440.450.26
The Commonwealth
responded, claiming that if defense counsel could not be ready by
the trial date, then Rushin should be required to move for a
continuance, thereby waiving the prescribed time restraints.
Rushin then entered a RCr 8.09 conditional guilty plea, reserving
the issue for appeal.
Rushin argued that the Commonwealth’s insistence on the
November 28 trial date forced him to choose between his right to
a speedy trial and his right to effective assistance of counsel.
This Court noted that to prove ineffective assistance of counsel
25
Ky.App., 931 S.W.2d 456 (1996).
26
Id. at 458.
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prejudice must be shown:
[I]t is well-established that a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel must
be based upon a showing of prejudice. . .
Since Rushin entered a conditional guilty
plea without proceeding to trial, we are
unable to determine whether he would have
been prejudiced by the allegedly short amount
of preparation time [citations omitted].27
Since no trial was held, Rushin’s conditional guilty plea
precluded a determination of whether prejudice had occurred.
Likewise, prejudice must be shown in a claim of
improper denial of severance.28
prejudice cannot be shown.
Since a trial was never held,
Mack based his conditional guilty
plea on the mere possibility of prejudice.
Since he cannot show
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to
sever the cases for trial, we affirm.
Mack also claims that the trial court erred in refusing
to sanction the Commonwealth for an alleged discovery violation.
In his brief, Mack stated the issue as follows: “The failure of
the court to enforce the discovery order to include the nursing
notes of the alleged victim in the robbery was so prejudicial to
appellant so as to deny him due process of law as guaranteed by
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section
11 of the Kentucky Constitution.”29
27
Id at 460 (citations omitted).
28
See RCr 9.16, supra.
29
Mack attempted to preserve this issue by two rather
innocuous written motions. The first, a motion for continuance,
(continued...)
-10-
During a pre-trial hearing on November 4, 1997, Mack’s
counsel mentioned to the trial court that the hospital records of
the victim did not contain so-called “nurse’s notes”.
He
informed the trial court that these notes were potentially
exculpatory in nature, in that they could possibly include data
on the victim’s intoxication level, thus evidencing an impairment
of his ability to clearly identify two of the defendants, Mack
and Harrison, as his assailants.30
The trial court found that
the Commonwealth had complied with its discovery obligations by
turning over to the defendants the records sent by the hospital.
The trial court offered to enter an order allowing Mack’s counsel
to visit the hospital and examine any of William’s records,
including the nurse’s notes.
Mack’s counsel agreed to this
arrangement, stating that he would examine those records the
following morning.
However, the following morning the trial was
continued for a month and counsel made no effort to examine the
notes.
The trial finally commenced on January 6, 1998, almost
seven weeks after the November 17, 1997, order.
RCr 7.24(1)(b), provides in pertinent part:
Upon written request by the defense, the
attorney for the Commonwealth shall . . .
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph any relevant . . . results or
(...continued)
states: “The basis for the motion is that vital evidence
contained in the hospital records of the victim have not been
released to the Commonwealth.”
30
Williams identified Stephenson about one month later from
a photo-pak presentation at his home.
-11-
reports of physical or mental examinations,
and of scientific tests or experiments made
in connection with the particular case . . .
that are known by the attorney for the
Commonwealth to be in the possession, custody
or control of the Commonwealth.
The general rule is that the prosecutor’s obligation to
disclose information in the possession of the state is not
limited to only materials that are in the prosecutor’s office,
but also includes information held by the various police agencies
and officers involved in the case.31
In Moore v. Commonwealth,32
our Supreme Court approved this general rule as it relates to
Kentucky police being “an arm of the prosecution for this
purpose.”
In Wagner v. Commonwealth,33 the Supreme Court held
that the only materials discoverable under the rule are those
within the possession, custody and control of the Commonwealth,
and found that the records of a private, charitable hospital were
not encompassed within this obligation.
The situation in the case sub judice is very similar to
Wagner, supra;
and the action taken by the trial court in this
situation was proper.
The trial court compelled the discovery of
the hospital records, which the Commonwealth provided to Mack.
When the issue concerning the nurses’ notes was raised, the trial
court found that the Commonwealth could not control what records
31
23 Am.Jur.2d Depositions and Discovery §421 (1983).
32
Ky., 569 S.W.2d 150, 154 (1978).
33
Ky., 581 S.W.2d 352 (1979), overruled on other grounds to
the extent of conflict, Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 663 S.W.2d
213 (1984).
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the hospital relinquished, and that it had complied with the
discovery order in good faith.
Nevertheless, the trial court
issued an order allowing counsel to go to the hospital to examine
any and all records concerning Williams, including any nurse’s
notes.
Seven weeks later, when the trial commenced, none of the
three defendant’s counsel complained that these nurse’s notes
were still not available to them.
In summary, the Commonwealth is required by the
discovery rule to provide only those items within its control,
custody and possession; and the hospital was not an agent of the
Commonwealth.
The trial court entered a proper discovery order,
and the Commonwealth properly complied with the order.
Furthermore, the trial court provided the defendant with a clear
opportunity to examine the records at the hospital.
Defense
counsel, who had seven weeks to examine those records, did not
advise the trial court on the day of trial that the notes were
still an issue.
Thus, Mack cannot now claim that he was
improperly denied access to those records.
If it is Mack’s
position that this Court should require the Commonwealth to
assist in conducting an investigation to support his defense,
such an argument is not supported by the law.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, KY
A.B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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