SHEILA FARRELL and RICK FARRELL v. TRI-STATE DIAGNOSTICS, INC.
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RENDERED:
December 30, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-000344-MR
SHEILA FARRELL and RICK FARRELL
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000722
v.
TRI-STATE DIAGNOSTICS, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOX, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order granting
appellee summary judgment in a medical malpractice case.
The
issue raised is whether appellants were required to use the
testimony of an expert witness to prove lack of informed consent.
We agree with appellants that given the facts of this case, they
were not.
Hence, we reverse and remand.
Appellant Sheila Farrell (Farrell) underwent a magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) of the head at Tri-State Diagnostics
Center on July 27, 1995.
In preparation therefor, she was
administered a direct injection of a contrast agent.
Two days
later, she developed swelling, red streaks, and disability in the
arm in which she was injected.
Farrell was diagnosed with
thrombophlebitis and also claims to have developed a staph
infection.
Farrell brought suit on the grounds of medical
negligence and lack of informed consent.
only the latter claim.
This appeal concerns
Appellee moved for summary judgment on
the basis that Farrell had no expert testimony.
The circuit
court granted the motion, finding Keel v. St. Elizabeth Medical
Center, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 860 (1992), which held that expert
testimony is not always needed in an informed consent case,
distinguishable:
Plaintiff Sheila Farrell was presented with a
detailed set of inquiries and questions
concerning her history and the MRI procedure.
She was also presented with a document which
she signed which acknowledged that she had
been informed about the procedure and the
possible complications.
In Keel, 842 S.W.2d 860, the patient underwent a CT
scan, which included the injection of a contrast.
He was given
no information about the risks of the procedure, although he may
have provided answers to routine questions about allergies,
medications, whether he had ever undergone a similar procedure
involving a contrast medium, and if so, whether he had had any
adverse reaction.
Like Farrell, Keel developed thrombophlebitis
at the site of the injection.
In bringing suit, Keel offered no
expert medical testimony on the issue of informed consent.
The
Court held that “expert evidence is not required in all instances
where the claim is lack of informed consent.”
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Id. at 862.
The
Court set forth the special circumstances of the case which
exempted Keel from needing expert testimony:
St. Elizabeth offered Keel no information
whatsoever concerning any possible hazards of
this particular procedure, while at the same
time the hospital admits that it routinely
questions every patient about to undergo a
dye injection as to whether he/she has had
any previous reactions to contrast materials.
If we are to analogize consent actions to
negligence actions, we must also acknowledge
that a failure adequately to inform the
patient need not be established by expert
testimony where the failure is so apparent
that laymen may easily recognize it or infer
it from evidence within the realm of common
knowledge. In the present case, a juror
might reasonably infer from the non-technical
evidence that St. Elizabeth’s utter silence
as to risks amounted to an assurance that
there were none, whereas its own questions to
patients regarding reactions to this specific
procedure demonstrate that St. Elizabeth
itself, as the health care provider
performing the treatment, recognized the
substantial possibility of complications, and
whereas (subject to further proof) a
complication did in fact result.
Id. (citations omitted).
Appellants argue that summary judgment was
inappropriate because, as in the Keel case, a juror might
reasonably infer that she was not specifically informed that she
could suffer thrombophlebitis or a staph infection, and that if
she had been so informed, she would not have consented to the MRI
or the injection.
Prior to the circuit court’s ruling on the motion, the
evidence gathered by appellants included the depositions of the
appellee’s MRI supervisor, the neurologist who treated Farrell
for the thrombophlebitis, and the forms she completed prior to
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the MRI.
Farrell signed a “CONSENT TO CARE AND TREATMENT” form,
which states:
I understand that I am suffering form
[sic] a condition requiring diagnosis and
medical treatment. I hereby consent to
rendering [sic] such care, which includes
MRI/MRA examination and my [sic] include a
[sic] injection of gadolinium contrast agent
(if ordered by referring physician). I
further consent to such medical care to be
necessary or appropriate.
I understand that the practice of
medicine is not a [sic] exact science and
that diagnosis and treatment may involve risk
or [sic] injury, or even death. I
acknowledge that no guarantees have been made
to me as to the result of examination in the
facility.
I understand that I have the right to
refuse consent to any proposed procedures. I
understand that it is my responsibility to
advise my physician if I desire to refuse a
proposed procedure.
This form has been fully explained to
me, I have been given a [sic] opportunity to
ask questions, and I am satisfied that I
understand its contents and significance.
Farrell also answered screening questions, asked by her
physician, to elicit whether she had any condition which would
contraindicate an MRI.
There is no question as to whether the
patient had any history of an adverse reaction to contrast dye.
Farrell herself completed a form entitled, “THE FOLLOWING ITEMS
MAY BE HAZARDOUS OR MAY INTERFERE WITH THE MRI EXAMINATION BY
PRODUCING A [sic] ARTIFACT [sic].”
Again, there was no mention
of a prior reaction to contrast dye.
Finally, Farrell executed a
screening form specifically for undergoing a head procedure.
This form included the question, “Have you ever had a reaction to
a contrast medium used for MRI or CT?”
negative.
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Farrell answered in the
Jana Conn, the MRI supervisor, testified that the
Consent to Care form did not specifically warn about
thrombophlebitis or a staph infection.
She deposed that Farrell
knew she’d be getting an injection and had ample opportunity to
ask questions.
Dr. S. Douglas Deitch is a neurologist who treated
Farrell.
He diagnosed thrombophlebitis secondary to
complications from her IV1.
He testified that this condition is
a known, but not a normal, complication of an IV.
Reluctant to
give any opinion on the informed consent issue, he did state that
it was his experience that the informed consent she signed was
consistent with the way informed consent is procured for similar
diagnostic studies.
When considering a summary judgment, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment.
Dossett v. New York Mining & Mfg. Co., Ky.,
451 S.W.2d 843 (1970).
In comparing the facts of this case to
those of Keel, we note that Keel was offered no information on
the possible hazards of the CT scan.
Farrell was not informed
about the possibility of thrombophlebitis, even though Dr. Deitch
averred that it is a known complication of an injection, and Keel
tells us the same.
Farrell did, however, complete the informed consent
document, which warned her of the possibility of injury or death.
1
Dr. Deitch wrongly assumed Farrell had an IV, when, in
fact, she underwent a direct injection of the contrast dye.
-5-
It cannot be gleaned from Keel whether the patient signed a
boiler-plate informed consent document.
Assuming he did not,
this fact differentiates the present case from Keel.
Thus, we
must ask whether the notice that the MRI could result in injury
or even death was sufficient to have informed Farrell about the
possibility of thrombophlebitis.
“[T]he extent of disclosure relevant to securing the
patient’s consent must be evaluated in terms of what the
physician knew or should have known at the time he recommended
the treatment to the patient.”
S.W.2d 786, 789 (1975).
Holton v. Pfingst, Ky., 534
Moreover, KRS 304.40-320 requires
informed consent to be “in accordance with the accepted standard
of medical . . . practice among members of the profession with
similar training and experience.”
It also dictates that a
reasonable person have a general understanding of the
“substantial risks and hazards inherent in the proposed . . .
procedures which are recognized among other health care providers
who perform similar . . . procedures” based on the information
given by the health care provider.
In addition, our Supreme
Court recently announced:
The very basis of an informed consent is the
discussion between physician and patient
regarding the nature and purpose of the
proposed operation, the risks and possible
complications thereof, and possible
alternative methods of treatment.
Kovacs v. Freeman, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 251, 255-56 (1997).
Appellants have provided proof, through Dr. Deitch’s
deposition, that thrombophlebitis is a known complication of the
procedure.
Since Farrell was not informed of this substantial
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risk, she can establish that the consent form does not meet the
requirements of KRS 304.40-320.
We also find it curious that
although the informed consent form was specific enough to note
that Farrell may receive an injection of gadolinium contrast, it
only generally stated that the procedure might involve risk of
injury or death.
Surely the same can be said of any medical
procedure, but clearly, Farrell was at no point informed of the
risk of thrombophlebitis or any other specific risks.
The burden
is on the health care provider to disclose risks, not on the
patient to ask.
A first-time MRI patient may not even know what
contrast dye is, not to mention have the forethought to inquire
about any complications it may cause.
In Keel, the hospital admitted that it routinely asked
CT patients if they had previous reactions to contrast materials.
The Court reasoned that the hospital’s silence as to risks was an
assurance that there were none, whereas its practice of asking
about reactions to contrast dye evidenced its knowledge of the
possibility of complications due thereto.
Here, one of the
documents completed by Farrell demonstrated the appellee’s
routine of inquiring about reactions to contrast dyes.
We do not
believe it would be a stretch for a juror to conclude that TriState Diagnostics, Inc., like St. Elizabeth Hospital, recognized
the possibility of complications yet remained silent as to them,
and its silence was tantamount to an assurance that the procedure
carried no risk other than the general disclaimer of injury or
even death.
Since the inconsistency would be evident to any
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layman, expert testimony is not necessary.
Snawder v. Cohen, 804
F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Ky. 1992).
Because we believe that appellants “present[ed] at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial,”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (1991), we reverse
the judgment of the trial court, granting summary judgment to
appellee, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeffrey L. Preston
Catlettsburg, Kentucky
Carl D. Edwards, Jr.
Ashland, Kentucky
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