COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. LINDA J. FENTON
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RENDERED: June 12, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-1316-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 97-CR-968
V.
LINDA J. FENTON
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
The appellant, Commonwealth of Kentucky
(Commonwealth), appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court order
dismissing the indictment against appellee, Diane J. Fenton
(Fenton), for trafficking in a controlled substance in the second
degree, schedule II, methamphetamine, Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 218A.1412; and possession of drug paraphernalia, KRS
218A.500, on double jeopardy grounds.
We reverse and remand.
In November, 1996, Jefferson County Police Detective
Joseph Collins (Collins) arranged a meeting among an undercover
detective, a confidential informant, and Fenton for a drug buy.
No buy occurred at the time, as Fenton provided the detective and
informant with methamphetamine at no cost.
However, police
maintained an ongoing investigation of Fenton from November,
1996, to March, 1997, on suspicion of drug trafficking.
In March, 1997, Collins arranged another drug buy
between the confidential informant and Fenton at a Jefferson
County bar.
When Fenton arrived at the bar, county police
officers arrested and searched her on an unrelated fugitive
warrant issued as the result of an outstanding charge in
California.
The officers seized approximately two ounces of
methamphetamine.
Following her arrest, Fenton informed Collins that one
pound of methamphetamine was located at a residence in southern
Louisville.
Collins contacted the Louisville City Police and
gave the information to Detective Susan Williams (Williams).
Williams obtained a search warrant for the residence.
Upon
execution of the warrant, Fenton’s housemate admitted to the
officers present that a safe in the house contained
methamphetamine, but that Fenton was the only person with access
to the safe.
Police located the combination among Fenton’s
belongings, opened the safe, and seized approximately one pound
of methamphetamine.
Fenton, was indicted for possession of methamphetamine
from the incident at the bar, pled guilty and was sentenced to
twelve months, conditionally discharged for two years.
The next
day, police charged Fenton with trafficking in methamphetamine
based upon the drug seizure at her residence.
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The trial court
dismissed the indictments on double jeopardy grounds.
This
appeal followed.
Fenton persuaded the trial court that the indictment
should be dismissed because the guilty plea on the possession
charge (the bar seizure) precluded the indictment for trafficking
(the residence seizure).
The Commonwealth contends that the
trial court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss, arguing
that the seizure of methamphetamine at the bar and at Fenton’s
residence constituted different crimes.
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Section 13 of the Kentucky
Constitution provide that an individual shall not twice be put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
165; 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225; 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the clause to protect criminal
defendants from successive prosecutions for the same offense
after an acquittal or conviction and multiple punishments for the
same offense.
Traditionally, the courts have applied the analysis set
forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304; 52
S.Ct. 180, 182; 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), to determine whether an
individuals rights against double jeopardy have been violated.
See Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805 (1997).
This
prohibits closely connected conduct from resulting in multiple
charges under separate statutes.
However, in a case such as the
one at bar, the Blockburger analysis is insufficient.
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In Jordan
v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 653 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1980),
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals enunciated why a different
standard was required:
Successive prosecutions implicate a component
of double jeopardy protection not implicated
in single prosecutions of joined charges such
as those involved in Blockburger and Gore:
the protection against retrial itself. In
this component double jeopardy vindicates
principles of finality and repose of former
judgments and of fundamental fairness that
simply are not involved in a joined charge
prosecution. Basically, it insures that
having once “run the gauntlet” of criminal
trial to judgment either of conviction or
acquittal, a person shall not be required to
run essentially the same gauntlet again. It
protects not only against multiple
punishments but against multiple trials for
the same offense. (Citations omitted).
The Court continued:
It is also a test with more practical
flexibility than the technically precise
Blockburger test, directing a more pragmatic
inquiry to the question whether “the evidence
required to warrant a conviction upon one of
the (prosecutions) would have been sufficient
to support a conviction upon the other,” and
finding the second prosecution barred if the
same evidence would so serve. (Citations
omitted).
Thus, the inquiry in this case becomes whether the same
evidence would be utilized in prosecuting Fenton on both the
possession charge and the trafficking charge.
This Court finds
that the circuit court erred in holding that the possession
charge from the bar and the trafficking charge from the residence
constitute one offense.
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In reaching our decision, we have relied on Rashad v.
Burt, 108 F.3d 677 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
118 S.Ct. 850, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1998).
In this case, the
defendant (Rashad) was convicted in two separate prosecutions
based upon the execution of a single search warrant on a private
residence.
A drug dog alerted officers to the presence of
cocaine in both Rashad’s residence and his automobile.
automobile was impounded.
The
Approximately one week later, an
informant notified police that a secret compartment in the
vehicle contained cocaine.
Upon searching the vehicle again,
police located the cocaine.
Although Rashad was indicted for possession with intent
to deliver, a jury convicted him of possession of a controlled
substance based upon the drug seizure at his residence.
In a
later bench trial, he was convicted of possession with intent to
deliver based upon the drugs seized from his automobile while it
was impounded.
The Sixth Circuit held that the above prosecutions were
successive and violated the double jeopardy clause because the
only distinguishing fact in the second prosecution was the
location of the drugs.
The Court found that this was not a
significant fact which would warrant separate prosecution of the
charged offenses since the search and seizure were a result of
the same confrontation with officers in both prosecutions.
The
Court disagreed with the prosecutor’s contention that the drugs,
though two separate caches, were intended for distribution at two
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separate times and locations and would amount to two separate
transactions when, “[a]t the time of the police action of
September 7, 1988, there was no evidence to support the inference
that the full supply of cocaine could not, and would not, be
employed in a single distribution.”
Id. at 681.
The Court
emphasized that all of the cocaine was possessed at a single
location with the intent to distribute all or part of it in the
future in amounts as requested by buyers.
The Court stated,
“Absent evidence of separate and distinct dedications of the two
caches, his possession was a single, undivided offense.”
The general consensus among courts is that separate
convictions for possession will not violate double jeopardy
principles if the possessions are sufficiently differentiated by
time, location, or intended purpose.
See United States v.
Johnson, 977 F.2d 1360, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom. Behrens v. United States, 506 U.S. 1070, 113 S.Ct. 1024, 122
L.Ed.2d 170 (1993);United States v. Maldonado, 849 F.2d 522, 524
(11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Blakeney, 753 F.2d 152, 154155 (D.C.Cir. 1985); United States v. Palacios, 835 F.2d 230,
233-34 (9th Cir. 1987).
This Court holds that separate
prosecutions may proceed without violating the double jeopardy
clause in the current case because the possessions are
sufficiently differentiated by time, place, and intended purpose.
In the case at bar, the drug seizures occurred at
different times and different locations.
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The first drug seizure
took place at a Louisville bar.
Later that evening, the second
drug seizure took place at Fenton’s residence.
The underlying circumstances surrounding each seizure
also differed significantly from one another.
Jefferson County
Police arrested Fenton at the Louisville bar on the basis of a
fugitive warrant executed in California.
Though the arresting
officers were aware that Fenton likely had methamphetamine in her
possession, since an undercover buy had been previously arranged
at that time, Fenton was not arrested on drug charges.
The
seizure at Fenton’s residence was a result of her statements to
county police officers that more methamphetamine was located at
her residence.
The arresting officers at the bar turned the
information to over Louisville City Police, a separate law
enforcement entity.
It was the Louisville City Police that
executed the search warrant on Fenton’s residence and discovered
the drugs, not the county police who had arrested her earlier
that evening.
Finally, there were different intended purposes for the
separate drug caches.
Fenton had previously arranged to sell two
ounces of methamphetamine to a confidential informant.
that particular amount on her when she was arrested.
She had
Due to the
prior arrangements to sell this amount, the drugs seized from
Fenton at the bar were specifically intended for distribution in
an already arranged drug transaction at a particular time to a
known individual.
However, the methamphetamine located at
Fenton’s residence was not intended for distribution at the
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present time, but rather for future distribution.
Fenton was the
only person with access to the methamphetamine located at her
residence, therefore, the fact that she was present in a location
where a drug transaction had previously been arranged without
possession of the methamphetamine located at her residence shows
that there was no intent to distribute that amount at that time.
The Commonwealth did not violate the double jeopardy
clause when it separately tried Fenton for possession and
trafficking.
Therefore, we find that the circuit court erred in
dismissing the indictment against Fenton on the charge of
trafficking in a controlled substance in the second degree,
schedule II, KRS 218A.1412 for double jeopardy purposes.
foregoing reason, we reverse and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Kim Brooks
Covington, KY
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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For the
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