ROY YOUNG STEWART V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: October 23, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1996-CA-003291-MR
ROY YOUNG STEWART
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 88-CR-1726
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
*
BEFORE:
*
*
*
*
*
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; ABRAMSON and COMBS, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The appellant, Roy Young Stewart (Stewart),
appeals from the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his
motion to set aside judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.
This case is
before us a second time following an evidentiary hearing held
pursuant to a previous remand order.
We again remand this matter
for yet another evidentiary hearing because the primary issue for
which we originally remanded this case was not addressed at the hearing.
On January 25, 1990, Stewart was represented by counsel
at a plea hearing.
The videotaped record shows Stewart
expressing serious misgivings about entering a guilty plea before
the court.
The trial court observed Stewart's demeanor at the
podium and then recessed the proceedings to allow Stewart to have
further consultation with his attorney.
Following a short
recess, Stewart expressed his desire to have a jury trial.
The
Commonwealth responded by stating that the sentencing agreement
which it made with Stewart pursuant to his entering an Alford
plea would be valid only until the close of the hearing -- after
which time it would be rescinded.
The proceedings were then
recessed a second time to allow Stewart to further consult with
his attorney in light of this announcement.
When the hearing re-convened, the trial court stressed
to Stewart the importance of making an informed decision,
emphasizing that his entry of an Alford plea should be voluntary
and of his own free will.
The trial court then directly and
meticulously examined Stewart and asked if he felt that he needed
any further consultation with his attorney.
did not.
He replied that he
The court then asked Stewart if he was currently under
the influence of alcohol or drugs.
He replied that he was not.
Finally, the court asked Stewart if he had ever been
institutionalized in a mental hospital.
not.
He replied that he had
Stewart then entered an Alford plea of guilty.
-2-
On November 24, 1992, Stewart filed a motion to set
aside sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 on the grounds that his plea
was not entered voluntarily and that his trial counsel failed to
challenge his underlying convictions due to mental disease or
defect.
The trial court denied this motion, and Stewart appealed
the order to this Court.
Following a review of the record, this Court -- in an
unpublished opinion -- vacated the judgment of trial court and
remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine if Stewart's appointed counsel unreasonably neglected
to raise an issue of Stewart's mental condition in the
proceedings below.
Specifically, this Court held that:
We are constrained, therefore, under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord,
Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37
(1985), to vacate the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court denying appellant's RCr 11.42
motion, and to remand this case to that court
so that appellant may, with assistance of
counsel, elaborate at an evidentiary hearing
the claim that his trial attorney
unreasonably neglected legal issues arising
from his psychological condition.
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 93-CA-0435-MR at 4-5 (March 10, 1995).
The evidentiary hearing mandated by this Court was held
on October 14, 1996.
Our examination of the record indicates
that the circuit court did not address the directives of this
Court's opinion during the hearing.
Additionally, Stewart's
counsel misconstrued this Court's opinion regarding the issue on
remand by stating to the court at the start of the proceeding
-3-
that the primary concern to be addressed at the hearing was
Stewart's mental competency at the time he entered his Alford
plea.
The testimony at the hearing demonstrated that Stewart
was not a novice to the Court system and that he did not suffer
from a mental disturbance that rendered him incompetent to assist
in his own defense or to understand the charges against him.
Stewart testified on his own behalf and claimed that he had
consumed LSD and marijuana in his holding cell prior to the plea
hearing and that he was hallucinating during the proceedings.
The Jefferson Circuit Court weighed the evidence
presented and denied Stewart's RCr 11.42 motion, stating in its
Order that: "this Court finds that Mr. Stewart's guilty plea on
January 25, 1990, was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
Because
of this, his motion must fail." (Jefferson Circuit Court Order
entered October 17, 1996, at 4 (emphasis added)).
Although we agree with the trial court that Stewart was
wholly cognizant of the situation around him and that he actively
participated in his own defense at the evidentiary hearing, the
court's finding is not relevant to the previous performance of
Stewart's trial counsel -- who was neither present nor subpoenaed
to appear at the hearing.
At no point during the evidentiary
hearing was the adequacy of Stewart's counsel's performance
reviewed under the standards enunciated in Strickland and Gall,
supra.
In light of the fact that this issue was the primary
concern of this Court in remanding for an evidentiary hearing, we
-4-
must again remand to the trial court for findings on this
specific issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we again order that this
matter be remanded for a hearing to comply with the directive of
our previous remand order; i.e., whether Stewart's trial counsel
"unreasonably neglected legal issues arising from his
psychological condition."
Stewart v. Commonwealth, supra at 5.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent.
While the trial court did not address the precise question posed
by this Court in its order remanding, the findings of the trial
court and the record support, in my view, the conclusion that a
further remand is unnecessary.
-5-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.