JOSEPH VERNON HOBBS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: September 11, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No. 1996-CA-002729-MR
and
No. 1997-CA-000722-MR
JOSEPH VERNON HOBBS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CR-0022
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GARDNER, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
This is the consolidation of two appeals by
Joseph Hobbs from rulings of McCracken Circuit Court.
Hobbs, an
inmate at the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex in West
Liberty, Kentucky, appeals pro se from a September 19, 1996,
order denying his request to have his pre-sentence investigation
report (PSI) amended.
Hobbs also appeals, with counsel's aid,
from a December 16, 1996, order denying his CR 60.02 motion for
relief from his criminal conviction.
Hobbs was convicted in 1992
of numerous counts of theft and was sentenced to twenty years in
prison.
He maintains that his conviction should be vacated
because the grand jury that indicted him was unlawfully
constituted.
He also seeks relief from what he claims are errors
in his PSI, errors that have resulted in his being assigned to
unfavorable prison housing and in his being denied parole.
In
both cases, the trial court ruled that as a matter of law Hobbs
had failed to state a ground for relief.
court's conclusions of law de novo.
Ky., 821 S.W.2d 488 (1991).
We review the trial
Commonwealth v. Collins,
Agreeing with the trial court that
Hobbs has failed to state a claim, we affirm.
We begin with Hobbs's motion pursuant to CR 60.02.
In
Allen v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 901 S.W.2d 881 (1995), this
Court vacated a McCracken County judgment convicting Allen of a
felony.
Undisputed evidence in that case showed that during the
term of Allen's indictment (he was indicted in June 1992), the
trial court had unlawfully delegated aspects of grand jury
selection to a court administrator.
Allen did not discover the
error until after trial, but prior to sentencing he moved on that
ground to have his conviction vacated and his indictment
dismissed.
The trial court denied relief, but this Court,
relying on Commonwealth v. Nelson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 628 (1992),
and Bartley v. Loyall, Ky. App., 648 S.W.2d 873 (1982), ruled
that, because Allen had raised the issue before the judgment had
become final and as soon as he reasonably could have, he had
preserved the error for review and so was entitled to rely on the
-2-
presumption that a substantial deviation from the grand jury
selection process specified by law is prejudicial.
Hobbs was indicted by the McCracken Grand Jury in
February 1992, just four months before Allen.
He claims that for
the reasons discussed in Allen he should be accorded the same
relief.
Aside from the facts recited in Allen, which are clearly
not dispositive of Hobbs's claim, Hobbs has offered no evidence
that he was in fact indicted by an improperly selected grand
jury.
Even if we assume that he was, however, his reliance on
Allen is misplaced.
Allen was given the benefit of the
presumption of prejudice because his post-trial but pre-judgment
motion was deemed to have adequately preserved the grand jury
error despite his having failed to raise the issue prior to
trial.
On the other hand, Hobbs, whose judgment had been final
for more than two years before he raised the grand jury issue,
makes and could make no claim to having preserved the error.
To
be sure, unpreserved errors may sometimes be reviewed pursuant to
RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02.
However, except where there have been
certain egregious constitutional violations, a movant seeking
relief under these rules must show that he or she has been
prejudiced in fact.
CR 60.02 (a court may grant relief "on such
terms as are just"); Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853
(1983).
In Pierce v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 902 S.W.2d 837
(1995), this Court ruled that a similarly tainted indictment was
not prejudicial because even were the indictment quashed there
was no reason to believe that a properly constituted grand jury
-3-
would not have reindicted the appellant.
Hobbs too has suggested
no reason to doubt that he would have been reindicted had his
indictment been dismissed.
This leads us to conclude, as in
Pierce, that Hobbs suffered no prejudice from the grand jury
error and so is entitled to no relief.
Hobbs also contends that his PSI contains factual
errors which have led the Department of Corrections to treat him
more harshly than it otherwise would have done.
In seeking
relief from this problem, Hobbs claims to have been placed in a
bind.
When he has asked Department of Corrections officials to
amend the report, they have characterized the PSI as a court
record over which they have no authority and have referred Hobbs
to the court.
Now the trial court has told him that it, too, is
barred from altering his PSI because its authority to amend the
judgment has long since lapsed.
As Hobbs notes, his PSI bears on several important
decisions concerning the conditions and the duration of his
confinement.
He thus has a significant interest in the factual
accuracy of that report.
This interest is recognized in KRS
532.050, which requires sentencing courts to apprise the
defendant or his counsel of the PSI’s factual contents and to
afford the defendant a meaningful opportunity to contest them.
Commonwealth v. Bush, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 743 (1987); Doolan v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 566 S.W.2d 413 (1978).
Hobbs acknowledges
that prior to sentencing he was allowed to examine his PSI and
would have been allowed to raise objections.
-4-
However, because
his counsel concluded that none of the errors Hobbs found would
affect the sentence, Hobbs waived his opportunity to contest
them.
Hobbs does not challenge counsel's advice nor does he
contend that the alleged PSI inaccuracies led to an unlawful
sentence.
Because the alleged errors have no bearing on the
validity of Hobbs's judgment, the trial court did not err by
denying Hobbs's request to reopen the sentencing procedure.
Hobbs's real complaint is against the Department of
Corrections.
He maintains that the PSI inaccuracies are relevant
to such agency determinations as his security classification and
his suitability for parole and thus that the agency should afford
him an opportunity to prove the errors and to have his PSI
amended accordingly.
However, because neither the Department of
Corrections nor any of its officials is a party to this action,
the question of Hobbs's right to administrative review of his PSI
is not properly before us.1
We may observe, though, that federal
law has recognized a right to such administrative review in some
instances.
The United States Solicitor General has conceded that
federal PSI's are agency records, not court records, Crooker v.
United States Parole Commission, 760 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985), and
where alleged PSI inaccuracies have been deemed irrelevant to
sentencing, federal courts have declined to review the PSI's
1
To obtain judicial review of adverse Department of
Corrections' decisions, Hobbs is obliged first to exhaust the
administrative grievance procedure. If he remains dissatisfied,
he may then petition for a declaratory judgment against the
agency and the official allegedly violating his rights. Smith v.
O’Dea, Ky. App., 939 S.W.2d 353 (1997).
-5-
under the assumption that the agency could and would do so.
United States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1988); United
States v. LeBlanc, 762 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1985).
Having concluded that the McCracken Circuit Court
decided correctly the matter before it, we affirm its orders of
September 19 and December 16, 1996.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph Vernon Hobbs (pro se)
West Liberty, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Paula Fitzgerald
Louisville, Kentucky
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.