STEVEN BRIGGS V. VALERIE CLEMONS WILLHITE
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RENDERED:
December 24, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-0662-MR
STEVEN BRIGGS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOAN L. BYER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-FD-1805
V.
VALERIE CLEMONS WILLHITE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE.
Steven Briggs brings this appeal from an order
of the Family Court Division of Jefferson Circuit Court granting
Valerie Clemons Willhite’s motion to remove the parties' minor
son to Georgia.
After reviewing the arguments and applicable
authorities, we affirm.
Steven and Valerie were never married.
Their child,
Alec Matthew Clemons, was born on October 15, 1993.
Blood tests
performed in May 1994 revealed that Steven was, indeed, the
child's father.
After paternity was established, the parties
litigated visitation and child support.
On December 4, 1995, the
trial court entered an order (1) awarding joint custody and (2)
providing an equal division of time with the child.
In March 1996, Valerie remarried her former husband,
Gerald Willhite, a resident of Georgia.
Thereafter, she filed a
motion seeking to remove Alec to Georgia.
restraining order to prevent the move.
Steven sought a
On February 13, 1997, the
trial court entered an order granting Valerie's motion to remove
Alec to Georgia.
This appeal followed.
Steven first argues that, in light of the evidence, the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing Alec to be removed
to Georgia.
Since the circumstances involved modification of a
joint custody decree (as to equal division of time), the trial
court was obligated to (1) determine whether there had been
inability or bad faith refusal by one or both parties to
cooperate, (2) conduct a de novo hearing regarding the
nonconsensual modification of joint custody, and (3) justify any
modification based upon the child's best interest by utilizing
the factors enumerated in KRS 403.270.
See Mennemeyer v.
Mennemeyer, Ky. App. 887 S.W.2d 555 (1994).
Steven does not
contest either the trial court's finding that the parties had
been unable to cooperate or that a de novo hearing on
modification held.
Thus, the sole issue on this appeal is the
best interest of the child.
Steven alleges that the trial court failed to take into
account the statutory best interest factors enumerated in KRS
403.270.
Specifically, he alleges that the court (1) allowed
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Alec to leave a stable home environment with all of his
significant relatives; (2) ignored Alec's minimal contact with
his new stepfather; (3) erred when it relied solely upon the
testimony of the court’s psychologist; (4) "erred and abused its
discretion in analyzing the child's siblings and any other person
who may significantly affect the child's best interests;" and (5)
did not adequately consider the mental and physical health of all
relevant individuals.
In support of its best interest determination, the
trial court made the following findings:
(1) that the court
psychologist had determined that Alec has some preferential
feelings regarding his mother; (2) that Valerie appears to be
more sensitive to Alec’s needs; (3) that Valerie tends to be more
attentive to Alec and to take the lead with regard to his daycare participation; and (4) that Valerie generally takes the lead
with regard to Alec’s medical care.
As to Steven, the court noted concern that he suffered
“unacknowledged and untreated anger,” that he “is especially very
bitter and vengeful toward Valerie and that this anger interferes
with parenting Alec to the best of his capability.”
The court
also noted that on one occasion when Alec was injured, Steven had
acted irresponsibly merely to avoid communication with Valerie.
The trial court has broad discretion in determining
what is in the best interest of the child.
See Reichle v.
Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442 (1986), and Cherry v. Cherry, Ky.,
634 S.W.2d 423 (1982).
We will not substitute findings of fact
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for those of the trial court where they are not clearly
erroneous.
See Reichle v. Reichle, supra, and Bennett v. Horton,
Ky., 592 S.W.2d 460 (1979).
Not infrequently, a trial judge may
draw upon common sense and personal life experiences, as well as
those of mankind, to determine that certain conduct or
environment will adversely affect children.
647 S.W.2d 790, 793 (1983).
Krug v. Krug, Ky.,
Great weight must be given to the
court's findings concerning child custody; its conclusions will
not be disturbed except where there exists an abuse of
discretion.
Watson v. Watson, Ky., 434 S.W.2d 33 (1968).
We do not find Steven's enumerated complaints
persuasive.
We are of the opinion that the court did, in fact,
consider elements of which he complains.
Steven alleges that the court failed to consider the
psychological factors of the move upon the child.
He cites
various law review articles and out-of-state authorities.
This
is not a specifically enumerated factor under 403.270.
Nevertheless, we think it a valid consideration.
We find no
reversible error, however, inasmuch as this was a consideration
underlying the entire proceeding.
Finally, Steven argues that the trial court erred in
failing to fully consider Valerie's psychiatric records.
Specifically, he alleges that the court failed to consider those
aspects of the records relating to Valerie's sexual abuse as a
child and her use of marijuana and cocaine during her first
marriage to Gerald Willhite.
Steven fails, however, to identify
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how these events, which occurred prior to Alec's birth, would
affect Valerie and Alec's relationship.
KRS 403.270(2) provides that “[t]he court shall not
consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child.”
While the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law do not specifically address these
issues, absent a showing that Valerie's past experience of child
abuse and/or drug use between 1984 and 1987 affects her
relationship with Alec, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
court to omit this issue from its discussion in reaching its
judgment.
Upon the whole of the record herein, we cannot say that
the court abused its discretion when it concluded that it was in
Alec's best interest to remain with his mother and that she be
permitted to remove him to Georgia.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Armand I. Judah
Louisville, Kentucky
Steven J. Kriegshaber
Louisville, Kentucky
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