PETER C. MacDONALD v. CLARK D. RENNISON
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RENDERED:
December 12, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2247-MR
PETER C. MacDONALD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. HIGGINS, JR., JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-000637
CLARK D. RENNISON
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER VACATING AND DISMISSING
* * * * *
WILHOIT1, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI and JOHNSON, Judges.
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This appeal is from an order entered by the
Christian Circuit Court which granted a writ of prohibition
against Christian District Court Judge, Peter C. MacDonald
(MacDonald, J.), preventing him from proceeding in a domestic
violence action (Paula Renee Gieske Rennison v. Clark D.
Rennison, case number 96-D-00225-001) after the parties of
interest filed a stipulation of dismissal pursuant to CR
41.01(1).
Because the trial court erred in granting said writ,
we vacate the order and dismiss the action.
On July 5, 1996, Paula Rennison (Mrs. Rennison) filed a
domestic violence petition naming Clark Rennison (Mr. Rennison)
as respondent.
1
Judge MacDonald, presiding District Court Judge,
Chief Judge Wilhoit concurred in this opinion prior to his
retirement effective November 15, 1997. Release of the opinion
was delayed by normal administrative handling.
issued an emergency protective order (EPO) pursuant to KRS
403.740.
At a hearing on July 11, 1996, Mrs. Rennison repeatedly
requested that the action be dismissed.
were denied.
Mrs. Rennison's requests
Judge MacDonald continued the EPO for an additional
fourteen (14) days.
On July 12, 1996, the parties filed a stipulation of
dismissal pursuant to CR 41.01(1), whereby the parties stipulated
that the action be dismissed without prejudice.
Later that day,
Mrs. Rennison and Mr. Rennison appeared before Judge MacDonald in
a criminal action involving the same underlying allegations as
the domestic violence action.
Therein, Mr. Rennison entered a
guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91
S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), which disposed of the criminal
matter.
Following disposition of the criminal proceeding, the
court raised the issue of the domestic violence proceeding.
Notwithstanding the filing of the stipulation of dismissal, Judge
MacDonald scheduled a hearing in the Christian District Court for
July 25, 1996, concerning the domestic violence matter.
On July 17, 1996, Mr. Rennison filed a petition for
writ of prohibition requesting that the Christian Circuit Court
enter an order preventing Judge MacDonald from proceeding further
in the domestic violence action.
Judge MacDonald was served with
a copy of the petition and summons on July 24, 1996.
on the petition was conducted on the same day.
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A hearing
Taking the matter
under advisement, the circuit judge entered an order granting the
petition for writ of prohibition on July 31, 1996.
This appeal
followed.
Judge MacDonald contends that it was error for the
circuit court to grant Mr. Rennison's petition for a writ of
prohibition under these circumstances.
Case law is replete with
statements to the effect that a writ of prohibition is an
extraordinary remedy and should never be issued except in
exceptional, very extraordinary and unusual cases.
Appalachian
Regional Health Care, Inc. v. Johnson, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 868
(1993); Avery v. Knopf, Ky., 807 S.W.2d 55 (1991); Wareche v.
Richardson, Ky., 468 S.W.2d 795 (1971); Brown v. Knuckles, Ky.,
413 S.W.2d 899 (1967); Murphy v. Thomas, Ky., 296 S.W.2d 469
(1956).
The standard to be applied in a petition for writ of
prohibition is set out in Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 770
S.W.2d 239 (1989):
To obtain relief in the nature of a writ of
prohibition, a petitioner must show that:
(1) the lower court is proceeding or is about
to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and
there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or (2)
the lower court is about to act incorrectly,
although within its jurisdiction, and there
exits no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise and great injustice and irreparable
injury would result.
Tipton v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d at 241.
Also see, Shumaker v.
Paxton, Ky., 613 S.W.2d 130 (1981); Bender v. Eaton, Ky., 343
S.W.2d 799 (1961).
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In the case sub judice, Mr. Rennison alleges that Judge
MacDonald was acting or was about to act without jurisdiction.
Consequently, the applicable standard to be applied in this case
is did Judge MacDonald have jurisdiction in the underlying
domestic violence proceeding and whether or not Mr. Rennison had
an adequate remedy by appeal.
It cannot be disputed that
district courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over domestic
violence cases pursuant to Chapter 403 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS).
However, the trial court places great emphasis
on the fact that the voluntary dismissal entered by the parties
stripped the district court of any authority or jurisdiction to
act with regard to the domestic violence matter filed on July 5,
1996.
We do not agree.
A voluntary dismissal by stipulation
pursuant to CR 41.01(1) is effective upon filing and does not
require judicial approval, as does CR 41.01(2), Louisville Label,
Inc. v. Hildesheim, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 321 (1992), and it renders
the proceedings a nullity and leaves the parties as if the action
had never been brought.
(1995).
Smith v. Dowden, 8th Cir., 47 F.3d 940
See also, 7 Kentucky Practice Rules of Civil Procedure
Ann., ยง 41, 36-38 (5th Ed. West (1995).
However, this theory
cannot defeat the basic fact that district courts have statutory
jurisdiction over domestic violence cases.
Although Judge
MacDonald may have been acting erroneously by continuing to
proceed with this particular case, he was still acting within his
jurisdiction.
See Duncan v. O'Nan, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 626 (1970).
-4-
Besides not being able to show that Judge MacDonald had
acted outside his jurisdiction, Mr. Rennison has also failed to
show that he had no adequate remedy of appeal.
Although the
circuit court held that "there is no adequate remedy by appeal as
an appeal cannot be based on a [sic] action which is a nullity
and further...before a decision on an appeal could be rendered",
we decline to engage in this circular reasoning.
The lower court
seemed to be saying that since the case had been dismissed by
operation of law then no appeal could follow had Judge MacDonald
taken further action.
This is simply not so.
Instead, we
believe that Mr. Rennison would have had a right to appeal any
action or decision taken by Judge MacDonald in the underlying
domestic violence proceeding, even if that proceeding had been
properly deemed to have been a "nullity" because the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.
It is clear that Mr. Rennison could
properly appeal any such action, including an appeal based upon
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
As stated previously, a writ of prohibition is an
extraordinary remedy and is not to be issued unless circumstances
exist that are so exceptional that no other remedy is adequate to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.
at 899.
Brown v. Knuckles, 413 S.W.2d
In this case, we do not believe that Mr. Rennison has
met his burden for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
The
trial court erred in its findings that the district court judge
lacked jurisdiction and that Mr. Rennison had no adequate remedy
of relief by appeal.
Therefore, the Christian Circuit Court's
-5-
order granting a writ of prohibition is vacated and the action
dismissed.
ALL CONCUR.
/s/ Daniel T. Guidugli
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
ENTERED: December 12, 1997
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Jack N. Lackey, Jr.
Deatherage, Myers & Self
Hopkinsville, KY
Bill Pettus
Assistant Attorney General
Scott White
Assistant Deputy Attorney
General
Frankfort, KY
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