JODY PEREZ ROJAS, Alleged Spouse, SAMUEL DAVID PEREZ, Minor Child, YOLANDA CARRERAS NARVAEZ, Alleged Spouse, and RAUL PEREZ CARRERAS, JUAN CARLOS PEREZ CARRERAS, VINICIO PEREZ CARRERAS, YOLANDA PEREZ CARRERAS, and MERCEDES PEREZ CARRERAS, Alleged Minor Children of RAUL PEREZ ROJAS, Deceased vs. PINE RIDGE FARMS, L.L.C., Employer and COMMERCE & INDUSTRY INS. CO., Insurance Carrier,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–0554
Filed March 5, 2010
JODY PEREZ ROJAS, Alleged Spouse,
SAMUEL DAVID PEREZ, Minor Child,
YOLANDA CARRERAS NARVAEZ, Alleged
Spouse, and RAUL PEREZ CARRERAS,
JUAN CARLOS PEREZ CARRERAS,
VINICIO PEREZ CARRERAS,
YOLANDA PEREZ CARRERAS, and
MERCEDES PEREZ CARRERAS, Alleged Minor
Children of RAUL PEREZ ROJAS, Deceased,
Appellants,
vs.
PINE RIDGE FARMS, L.L.C., Employer and
COMMERCE & INDUSTRY INS. CO.,
Insurance Carrier,
Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F.
Staskal, Judge.
Dependents of a deceased employee appeal a district court decision
affirming the allocation of workers’ compensation death benefits.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED.
DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Thomas J. Reilly of Thomas J. Reilly Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines,
for appellants Jody Perez Rojas and her dependent.
2
Randall P. Schueller of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for
appellants Yolanda Carreras Narvaez and her dependents.
Jean Z. Dickson of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, P.L.C., Davenport,
for appellees.
3
WIGGINS, Justice.
The workers’ compensation commissioner awarded benefits to the
dependents of a deceased employee.
The dependents included the
spouse, a child residing in the United States, five children born in
Mexico, and the mother of those children who resides in Mexico.
The
commissioner equitably, rather than equally, allocated the benefits
between all the dependents.
In allocating the benefits between the
dependents, the commissioner also considered a statute requiring
benefits payable to nonresident aliens be reduced by fifty percent, with
the remaining fifty percent payable to the Second Injury Fund. See Iowa
Code § 85.31(5) (2003). All of the dependents filed petitions for judicial
review.
The district court affirmed the decision of the workers’
compensation commissioner.
All of the dependents filed notices of
appeal.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals.
The court of
appeals affirmed the commissioner’s decision. All of the dependents then
requested further review, which we granted. On further review, we find
that the statute requiring a reduction in benefits for nonresident aliens is
neither unconstitutional nor does it conflict with other statutory
provisions. We also conclude the commissioner erred when he allocated
a portion of the benefits to the mother of the children residing in Mexico.
We further conclude that the allocation of the benefits should be
equitable rather than equal. Finally, we conclude that the commissioner
should not have considered the reduction in benefits for nonresident
aliens
when
it
allocated
the
benefits
between
the
dependents.
Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the
judgment of the district court, and remand the case to the district court
to enter an order reversing the decision of the workers’ compensation
4
commissioner and remanding the case to the commissioner to reallocate
the benefits between the dependents entitled to receive compensation in
a manner consistent with our decision.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Raul Perez Rojas died in a work-related accident on February 15,
2004, while working for Pine Ridge Farms, L.L.C. (“Pine Ridge”). In the
summer of 1987, Raul married Yolanda Carreras Narvaez in a religious
ceremony in Mexico.
Although religious ceremonies are common in
Mexico, they have no legal effect under Mexican law. In Mexico only a
civil marriage is legally recognized. The commissioner determined that
because Mexico does not recognize Raul and Yolanda as legally married,
Iowa’s workers’ compensation laws do not recognize their marriage. 1
Yolanda claims she and Raul had five children: Raul Perez
Carreras born June 18, 1987, Juan Carlos Perez Carreras born May 19,
1989, Vinicio Perez Carreras born February 1, 1995, Yolanda Perez
Carreras born October 16, 1996, and Mercedes Perez Carreras born
February 12, 1998. The parties disagree on whether Mercedes is Raul’s
child. Raul is not listed on Mercedes’ birth registry in Mexico; however,
he is listed on her baptism announcement.
The commissioner
determined Mercedes is Raul’s child. Jody Perez Rojas, Raul’s spouse,
does not argue paternity in her application for further review, and we
believe substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s finding that
Mercedes is Raul’s child.
After his marriage to Yolanda, Raul worked and lived in the United
States and returned to Mexico periodically.
During his stays in the
United States, he sent money to Yolanda to support her and the children.
While living in Polk County, Raul met Jody Prock, and in May 1999, they
1The
legality of Raul’s marriage to Yolanda is not at issue in this appeal.
5
married.
Jody and Raul have one son, Samuel David Perez, born
February 4, 2002.
Raul initiated proceedings with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to become a documented worker. He returned to Mexico during
this time and was living with Yolanda and the children. Neither Jody nor
Yolanda knew about Raul’s other marriage or family. After his marriage
to Jody, Raul continued to regularly send money to Yolanda and the
children. Jody believed this money was for his ailing mother. Raul sent
Yolanda an average of $91.54 per week when he was working in the
United States.
Yolanda relies on her oldest sons for her current source of income.
They contribute roughly $40 to $60 per week.
Yolanda’s oldest sons
were living with her sister in Juan Leon, Mexico, but her seventeen-yearold son, Juan Carlos, is currently working in Texas. Yolanda’s monthly
expenses for herself and the children are approximately $325 to $425.
Yolanda has never worked outside the home and stopped attending
school at age eleven.
The children own the family home.
Yolanda’s
economic position is meager, and most families in her town receive
economic remittances from people working in the United States.
Jody’s monthly living expenditure for herself and her son is
approximately $2064. She has received some death benefits from Pine
Ridge. Jody has received money from a life insurance policy, retirement
benefits, and social security, all due to her husband’s death. The social
security amount she receives will end once she has completed school and
starts working full-time, but her son will continue to receive these
benefits. However, Jody still has debts stemming from a car accident,
medical bills, and a school loan.
Jody worked outside the home
6
throughout the marriage except when she was pregnant and for a short
period after the birth of her son.
Due to the misunderstanding concerning Raul’s dependents, Jody
received some death benefits from Pine Ridge.
those payments on August 26, 2004.
Pine Ridge terminated
Pine Ridge’s insurance carrier
hired investigators to determine the validity of Yolanda’s claim.
Pine
Ridge filed a petition with the workers’ compensation commissioner to
determine the equitable apportionment of the death benefits.
months later, Pine Ridge dismissed its petition.
Jody
and
Yolanda
both
filed
separate
Nine
Then, in spring 2005
petitions
for
equitable
apportionment of the death benefits with the workers’ compensation
commissioner on behalf of themselves and their children.
The
deputy
decision.
commissioner
filed
an
equitable
apportionment
The deputy determined that Jody, Samuel, Yolanda, and
Yolanda’s five children were all dependents to be included in the
equitable apportionment of benefits. The decision found Yolanda was an
actual dependent under Iowa Code section 85.44 and the children were
presumed dependents. The deputy found, at the time of Raul’s death,
his weekly rate of compensation was $360.79.
Of that amount, the
deputy determined Jody would receive fifty percent as the surviving
spouse, Samuel would receive twenty percent during his dependency,
and Yolanda and the five children would receive the remaining thirty
percent.
The decision also stated that fifty percent of the share of
benefits that Yolanda and the five children were apportioned must be
paid to the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.31(5).
Jody
and
Yolanda
separately
appealed
commissioner’s equitable apportionment decision.
from
the
deputy
Another deputy
commissioner, sitting pursuant to an order of delegation under Iowa
7
Code section 86.3, affirmed the equitable apportionment decision and
adopted it as the commissioner’s final decision. In doing so, the second
deputy
added
some
additional
analysis
to
the
prior
equitable
apportionment decision. The final decision stated Yolanda and the five
children were actual dependents pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.44
because they depended on Raul’s income. It also stated Yolanda and the
five children received roughly fifteen percent of Raul’s gross wages;
therefore, they should receive fifteen percent of the death benefits.
However, the final decision goes on to state because fifty percent of the
benefits Yolanda and the five children receive must be paid into the
Second Injury Fund, the deputy correctly considered this factor when he
apportioned thirty percent of the death benefits to them. Thus, the final
decision upheld the deputy’s equitable apportionment award.
In summer 2007 Jody and Yolanda separately filed petitions for
judicial review. The district court consolidated these cases. The district
court affirmed the workers’ compensation commissioner in all respects.
The court affirmed the allocation of benefits and stated the commissioner
could consider the Second Injury Fund deduction when apportioning
benefits. The court also found Iowa Code section 85.31(5), imposing the
Second Injury Fund deduction, was constitutional under both the
Federal and Iowa Constitutions.
The court further concluded that if
section 85.31(5) conflicted with Iowa Code section 85.51, which the court
questioned, section 85.31(5) would still govern because the Second
Injury Fund statute was the more specific of the two statutes.
Jody and Yolanda separately appealed this decision.
transferred the case to the court of appeals.
affirmed the commissioner.
We
The court of appeals
8
Both Yolanda and Jody filed applications for further review, which
we granted.
II. Issues.
In this appeal, we must first decide whether Iowa Code section
85.31(5) violates equal protection of the law under the Federal and Iowa
Constitutions by discriminating against nonresident aliens.
Next, we
must decide the applicability of Iowa Code section 85.51 to this appeal.
Finally, we must decide if the commissioner correctly decided the
apportionment of weekly death benefits.
III. Constitutional Claims.
All but nine states have workers’ compensation laws concerning
benefits payable to nonresident aliens. 5 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson,
Larson’s Workers’
[hereinafter
Compensation
Larson’s
Workers’
Law §
97.07,
Compensation].
at
Five
97–25
(2009)
states
treat
nonresident aliens on equal terms with other dependents, while five
states exclude nonresident aliens from benefits entirely. Id. A majority
of the remaining states provide for a reduction of benefits or the
commutation of benefits to a lump sum on a reduced basis. Id. Iowa’s
workers’ compensation statute follows the majority of the states and
reduces the amount of benefits a nonresident alien can receive.
Accordingly, Iowa Code section 85.31(5) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by treaty, whenever, under the
provisions of this and chapters 86 and 87, compensation is
payable to a dependent who is an alien not residing in the
United States at the time of the injury, the employer shall
pay fifty percent of the compensation herein otherwise
provided to such dependent, and the other fifty percent shall
be paid into the second injury fund in the custody of the
treasurer of state. But if the nonresident alien dependent is
a citizen of a government having a compensation law which
excludes citizens of the United States, either resident or
nonresident, from partaking of the benefits of such law in as
favorable degree as herein extended to the nonresident alien,
9
then said compensation which would otherwise be payable to
such dependent shall be paid into the second injury fund in
the custody of the treasurer of state.
Iowa Code § 85.31(5).
In their application for further review, Yolanda and her five
children claim the provisions of section 85.31(5) violate due process and
equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the United States and Iowa
Constitutions.
However, the district court only addressed their equal
protection claims. Yolanda and her five children did not file a motion
under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) asking the court to enlarge
or amend its findings to rule on their due process claims. Thus, Yolanda
and her five children did not preserve error on their due process claims;
accordingly, we will not address those claims in this appeal.
Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537–39 (Iowa 2002).
In the past, we have said the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Federal Equal Protection Clause, while not binding, is persuasive on how
we will evaluate a claim made under the Iowa Constitution’s equal
protection clause. Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d
255, 258–59 (Iowa 2007). We have always reserved, however, the right to
differ our approach in applying an equal protection analysis under the
Iowa Constitution in the appropriate case.
N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980).
Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293
In making their equal protection
argument, Yolanda and her five children did not argue that our equal
protection analysis under the Iowa Constitution should differ in any way
from our analysis under the Federal Constitution.
Consequently, we
decline to apply a different analysis under the Iowa Constitution and only
apply a federal analysis to Yolanda and her five children’s equal
protection claim under the Iowa Constitution.
N.W.2d 264, 277 (Iowa 2006).
State v. Simmons, 714
10
We review a constitutional issue raised in an appeal of an agency
action de novo. Drake Univ. v. Davis, 769 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Iowa 2009).
Before applying an equal protection analysis, we must first determine
whether Yolanda and her five children can assert a claim of equal
protection.
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court stated that
although the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
extends beyond mere citizenship, it does not extend beyond the territorial
boundaries of the country.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6
S. Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L. Ed. 220, 226 (1886).
Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have adhered to this decision.
See, e.g., Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 1851, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534,
541 (1971) (recognizing citizens and aliens are entitled to equal
protection of the laws of the state in which they reside).
In 1982 the
Supreme Court reiterated that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all
those within the jurisdiction of the United States even if the person is in
the territory illegally, but it does not apply outside of the territory. Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214–15, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2393–94, 72 L. Ed. 2d
786, 797–98 (1982).
Accordingly, at the time Raul died, the Equal
Protection Clause did not apply to Yolanda or her five children because
they were outside of the country.
Yolanda and her five children do not argue that they are entitled to
equal protection of the law as nonresident aliens.
Rather, they argue
that their claims are derivative of Raul’s claim; therefore, Raul’s claim
and all claims derived from his claim are entitled to equal protection of
the law. In support of their position, Yolanda and her five children cite
cases from other jurisdictions holding that a dependent’s right to death
benefits in a workers’ compensation case is a derivative right of the
employee; consequently, the employee’s rights are at stake when
11
challenging the constitutionality of the receipt of those benefits.
De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla.
1989); Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669, 675 (Kan. 1993).
The
rationale
for
holding
death
benefits
in
a
workers’
compensation case are a derivative right of the employee can be found in
Jurado v. Popejoy Construction Co., 853 P.2d 669, 672–75 (Kan. 1993).
There, the court stated the right to death benefits arises out of the
employment relationship and is part of the employee’s benefits package;
therefore, the disparate treatment of nonresident alien dependents
occurs before the death of the employee. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 673–74.
The court found the Kansas workers’ compensation statute “separates
the two causes of action and creates a separate right of action in the
dependents, that right of action is derived from the deceased employee,
and everything must relate back to the time of the accident.” Id. at 674.
Because the dependents’ action was truly derivative of the employee, the
constitutional rights of the now-deceased employee were at stake, not the
rights of the nonresident alien dependents. Id. at 675. Thus, the court
held the nonresident alien dependents were entitled to equal protection
of the law under the Constitution. Id. at 675.
Yolanda
and
her
five
children
also
recognize
that
other
jurisdictions have decided nonresident alien dependents were not
entitled to equal protection of the law under the Constitution.
Barge-
Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671, 672–73 (Ga. 1993);
Jarabe v. Indus. Comm’n, 666 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1996); Pedrazza v. Sid
Fleming Contractor, Inc., 607 P.2d 597, 600–01 (N.M. 1980), abrogated on
other grounds by Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. Gutierrez, 658 P.2d 1116,
1117–18 (N.M. 1982); Alvarez Martinez v. Indus. Comm’n, 720 P.2d 416,
417–18 (Utah 1986).
These jurisdictions based their decisions on the
12
proposition that under state law, a nonresident alien dependent’s right to
benefits
is
not
derived
from
the
employee,
but
constituted
an
independent and distinct claim. Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 429 S.E.2d
at 672–73; Jarabe, 666 N.E.2d at 4; Pedrazza, 607 P.2d at 600–01;
Alvarez Martinez, 720 P.2d at 417–18.
Thus, as nonresident alien
dependents and in accordance with Supreme Court jurisprudence, they
were not entitled to equal protection of the law under the Constitution.
Barge-Wagener Constr. Co., 429 S.E.2d at 672–73; Jarabe, 666 N.E.2d at
4; Pedrazza, 607 P.2d at 600–01; Alvarez Martinez, 720 P.2d at 417–18.
In Iowa, we have decided, “[a] dependent’s right to workmen’s
compensation is a distinct claim.” McClure v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co.,
238 N.W.2d 321, 329 (Iowa 1976). In McClure, we found a deceased’s
widow had an independent claim as a dependent under our workers’
compensation laws, separate and distinct from her entitlement to
uninsured motorist insurance as the administrator of her husband’s
estate. Id. We see no reason to revisit our holding in McClure. We also
believe it would be unprincipled to hold a dependent’s right to workers’
compensation is an independent claim for purposes of an uninsured
motorist claim, but derivative for purposes of the allocation of workers’
compensation death benefits.
Therefore, Yolanda and her five children are not entitled to equal
protection of the law under the United States and Iowa Constitutions
because
they
have
a
separate
and
distinct
claim
for
workers’
compensation benefits and they are nonresident aliens.
IV. Claim under Iowa Code Section 85.51.
Yolanda and her five children claim Iowa Code section 85.31(5),
which mandates that an employer pay fifty percent of a nonresident alien
13
dependents’ awarded benefits to the Second Injury Fund, conflicts with
Iowa Code section 85.51. Section 85.51 reads:
In case a deceased employee for whose injury or death
compensation is payable leaves surviving an alien dependent
or dependents residing outside the United States, the consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the nation
of which the said dependent or dependents are citizens, or
the duly appointed representative of such consular official
resident in the state of Iowa, shall be regarded as the
exclusive representative of such dependent or dependents,
and said consular officials or their representatives shall have
the same rights and powers in all matters of compensation
which said nonresident aliens would have if resident in the
state of Iowa.
Iowa Code § 85.51. Yolanda claims the last phrase in section 85.51 gives
nonresident aliens the same rights as residents and is contradictory to
the fifty percent reduction in benefits mandated by section 85.31(5).
It is well-settled law that the legislature did not clearly vest the
workers’ compensation commissioner with the power to interpret the
workers’ compensation statutes.
Schadendorf v. Snap-On Tools Corp.,
757 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa 2008).
Thus, we do not give the
commissioner’s interpretation of law deference and can substitute our
own judgment as to the interpretation of a statute. Id. Our primary goal
in statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. In re Estate of
Thomann, 649 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2002). When interpreting a statute, we
assess the entire statute, not just isolated words or phrases.
Young, 686 N.W.2d 182, 184–85 (Iowa 2004).
State v.
We also presume the
legislature included all parts of the statute for a purpose, so we will avoid
reading the statute in a way that would make any portion of it redundant
or irrelevant. In re Estate of Thomann, 649 N.W.2d at 4. Where a general
statute and a special statute are relevant, we will attempt to construe the
14
statutes to give effect to both. Id. If we are unable to give effect to both,
the provisions of the more specific statute control. Id.
We disagree with Yolanda and her five children’s claim that the
statutes conflict.
First, section 85.31(5) is more specific than section
85.51 as to the benefits payable to nonresident alien dependents.
Second, section 85.51 appears to relate to administrative problems that
could arise in the course of a proceeding, not the actual amount of
compensation due to nonresident alien dependents.
If we hold the
statutes conflict, the general language of section 85.51 cannot trump the
specific language contained in section 85.31(5) because it would render
section 85.31(5) mere surplusage.
We
can
avoid
construing
these
statutes
as
conflicting
by
determining section 85.51 applies to the administrative process of the
workers’ compensation statutes and not to the substantive provisions
regarding benefits and compensation. That way, we give effect to both
statutes.
Consequently, we do not see a conflict between sections
85.31(5) and 85.51 and hold section 85.31(5) controls the amount of the
benefits payable to nonresident alien dependents.
V.
Whether the Commissioner Correctly Apportioned the
Death Benefits.
To determine if the commissioner properly apportioned the death
benefits, we must construe Iowa Code sections 85.31, 85.42, 85.43, and
85.44.
We apply the same scope of review and rules of statutory
construction we applied to the interplay between sections 85.31(5) and
85.51 in division IV of this opinion.
The first determination made by the commissioner was that
Yolanda and her five children were actual dependents who were wholly
dependent upon Raul’s income under sections 85.31(1)(d) and 85.44.
15
The commissioner then adopted the apportionment of benefits made by
the deputy commissioner. The first question we must decide is whether
the commissioner’s decision applied the proper analysis to determine
who is eligible to receive death benefits under the workers’ compensation
statutes.
Iowa Code sections 85.31 and 85.42 are relevant as to who is
eligible to receive death benefits as a dependent of Raul.
Section
85.31(1) provides in relevant part:
When death results from the injury, the employer shall pay
the dependents who were wholly dependent on the earnings
of the employee for support at the time of the injury, during
their lifetime, compensation upon the basis of eighty percent
per week of the employee’s average weekly spendable
earnings, commencing from the date of death as follows:
a.
To the surviving spouse for life or until
remarriage, provided that upon remarriage two years’
benefits shall be paid to the surviving spouse in a lump sum,
if there are no children entitled to benefits.
b.
To any child of the deceased until the child shall
reach the age of eighteen, provided that a child beyond
eighteen years of age shall receive benefits to the age of
twenty-five if actually dependent, and the fact that a child is
under twenty-five years of age and is enrolled as a full-time
student in any accredited educational institution shall be a
prima facie showing of actual dependency.
....
d.
To all other dependents as defined in section
85.44 for the duration of the incapacity from earning.
Iowa Code § 85.31(1).
Iowa Code section 85.42 provides in relevant part:
The following shall be conclusively presumed to be
wholly dependent upon the deceased employee:
1.
The
exceptions:
surviving
spouse,
with
the
following
16
a.
When it is shown that at the time of the injury
the surviving spouse had willfully deserted deceased without
fault of the deceased, then such survivor shall not be
considered as dependent in any degree.
b.
When the surviving spouse was not married to
the deceased at the time of the injury.
2.
A child or children under eighteen years of age,
and over said age if physically or mentally incapacitated from
earning, whether actually dependent for support or not upon
the parent at the time of the parent’s death.
Id. § 85.42.
We agree with the commissioner that Yolanda is eligible to receive
benefits under section 85.31(1), because she was wholly dependent
under section 85.31(1) and a dependent under section 85.31(1)(d). We
disagree with the commissioner’s decision finding that Raul’s five
children with Yolanda were eligible to receive benefits for the same
reasons that Yolanda was eligible to receive benefits.
Raul’s five children with Yolanda are eligible to receive benefits
under sections 85.31(1)(b) and 85.42(2).
Section 85.31(1)(b) makes
children who are wholly dependent on the earnings of the deceased
employee eligible to receive benefits.
Id. § 85.31(1)(b).
Under section
85.42(2), Raul’s five children with Yolanda are conclusively presumed to
be wholly dependent upon Raul when they are under the age of eighteen.
Id. § 85.42(2). Accordingly, Yolanda’s five children are eligible to receive
benefits under section 85.31(1)(b), not section 85.31(1)(d).
Raul’s present spouse, Jody, and his child with Jody, Samuel, are
eligible to receive benefits under section 85.31(1). Jody, as the surviving
spouse, is eligible to receive benefits under section 85.31(1)(a), because
under section 85.42(1) she is conclusively presumed to be wholly
dependent. Id. §§ 85.31(1)(a), .42(1). Samuel, as Raul’s child, is eligible
to receive benefits under section 85.31(1)(b), because section 85.42(2)
17
conclusively presumes him to be wholly dependent. Id. §§ 85.31(1)(b),
.42(2).
Consequently, Jody Perez Rojas, Samuel David Perez, Raul Perez
Carreras, Juan Carlos Perez Carreras, Vinicio Perez Carreras, Yolanda
Perez Carreras, Mercedes Perez Carreras, and Yolanda Carreras Narvaez
are all eligible to receive a portion of the death benefits under section
85.31(1).
The aggregate amount of benefits payable to the eligible
beneficiaries is eighty percent per week of the employee’s average weekly
spendable earnings, subject to a maximum benefit limitation contained
in the statute.
Id. § 85.31(1).
To determine the amount of
compensation, if any, each eligible person may receive, it is necessary to
review the apportionment statutes concerning the distribution of benefits
to the eligible beneficiaries.
Thus, the second question we must decide is how to apportion the
compensation
payable
between
the
eligible
beneficiaries.
The
commissioner apportioned fifty percent of the benefits to Jody, twenty
percent to Samuel, and thirty percent to Yolanda and her five children.
In making this apportionment, the commissioner found that during his
lifetime, Raul sent approximately fifteen percent of his gross pay to
Yolanda for the support of her and the five children. The commissioner’s
decision noted Iowa Code section 85.31(5) required the employer to pay
fifty percent of any benefits payable to nonresident alien dependents to
the Second Injury Fund.
Therefore, because the commissioner
concluded Yolanda and her five children’s net benefit should be fifteen
percent, the commissioner doubled the amount of their gross benefits to
thirty percent, so that after the fifty percent reduction required by section
85.31(5) Yolanda and her five children would still receive a net benefit of
fifteen percent.
18
On appeal, Yolanda and her five children claim the benefits should
be divided equally among all dependents. Jody and Samuel claim the
commissioner’s decision correctly determined that fifteen percent of the
benefits should have been apportioned to Yolanda and her five children,
but argue that the commissioner should not have considered the Second
Injury Fund reduction, thereby doubling Yolanda and her five children’s
allocation of benefits to thirty percent.
We find that the commissioner erred in two respects when he
apportioned the compensation among the eligible beneficiaries. First, the
worker’s compensation statutes do not allow Yolanda, the parent of
Raul’s
Mexican
children,
to
receive
any
compensation
in
an
apportionment. Second, the commissioner should not have considered
the amount of the benefits payable to the Second Injury Fund when it
apportioned
the
compensation
to
the
nonresident
aliens.
An
examination of the applicable statues supports our conclusions.
The statutes bearing on the apportionment of benefits are found in
sections 85.43 and 85.44.
Section 85.43 contains the following
language:
If the deceased employee leaves a surviving spouse
qualified under the provisions of section 85.42, the full
compensation shall be paid to the surviving spouse, as
provided in section 85.31; provided that where a deceased
employee leave a surviving spouse and a dependent child or
children the workers’ compensation commissioner may make
an order of record for an equitable apportionment of the
compensation payments.
Id. § 85.43 (emphasis added). Section 85.44 reads:
In all other cases, a dependent shall be one actually
dependent or mentally or physically incapacitated from
earning. Such status shall be determined in accordance
with the facts as of the date of the injury. In such cases if
there is more than one person, the compensation benefit
19
shall be equally divided among them. If there is no one
wholly dependent and more than one person partially
dependent, the compensation benefit shall be divided among
them in the proportion each dependency bears to their
aggregate dependency.
Id. § 85.44 (emphasis added).
Section 85.43 controls the apportionment of the compensation
payable because Raul left a surviving spouse, Jody.
Section 85.43
requires that “the full compensation shall be paid to the surviving
spouse” unless the commissioner equitably apportions the compensation
between the surviving spouse and any dependent children. Id. § 85.43.
Section 85.43 does not provide for any apportionment to an actual
dependent, such as Yolanda.
Section 85.44 provides for the payment and apportionment of
compensation to an actual dependent. However, section 85.44 has no
application to the facts of this case.
Section 85.44 begins with the
phrase “[i]n all other cases.” Id. § 85.44. This phrase means that section
85.44 is only applicable when section 85.43 does not apply. Raul left a
surviving spouse. Therefore, even though Yolanda is eligible as an actual
dependent to receive compensation, she is not entitled to receive any of
the compensation awarded for Raul’s death because section 85.43
controls who is to receive the compensation, not section 85.44.
On first blush, this result appears to be harsh and inconsistent
with section 85.31(1). On closer examination, this result is consistent
with the scheme envisioned by the legislature when determining who
shall receive a worker’s death benefits. Section 85.31(1) determines who
is eligible to receive a worker’s death benefits. Once the class of persons
eligible to receive those benefits is determined, sections 85.43 and 85.44
determine who is entitled to receive those benefits. The default provision
is the surviving spouse receives the full compensation. Id. § 85.43. The
20
default provision assumes if the deceased worker left a surviving spouse,
any eligible children would be living in the same household, and the
surviving spouse would use the full compensation to support the family
unit.
If, for example, the deceased worker’s children lived in separate
households, the legislature gave the commissioner the authority to
apportion the compensation equitably between the surviving spouse and
the children.
This way all of the deceased worker’s children would
receive a fair share of the compensation.
The legislature also made the decision that actual dependents
should not receive any compensation if the worker left a surviving
spouse. Id. § 85.44. Actual dependents could include individuals like
Yolanda, parents, relatives, and even paramours.
By this statutory
scheme, it is apparent the legislature made a conscious choice that
actual dependants should not receive any compensation if the deceased
worker left a surviving spouse.
It is not our job to second-guess the
legislature in its choices. Accordingly, even though Yolanda is eligible to
receive death benefits under section 85.31(1), she is not entitled to
receive any compensation under section 85.43.
Therefore, this case
should be remanded to the commissioner to apportion the benefits
equitably between Jody Perez Rojas, as Raul’s spouse, and Raul’s
children, Samuel David Perez, Raul Perez Carreras, Juan Carlos Perez
Carreras, Vinicio Perez Carreras, Yolanda Perez Carreras, and Mercedes
Perez Carreras. Yolanda, the mother of Raul’s Mexican-born children, is
not entitled to receive any compensation by reason of Raul’s death.
Section 85.43 requires an equitable apportionment. Id. § 85.43.
“Equitable” is an undefined term.
When the legislature fails to give a
definition to a term, we consider the context in which the legislature
used the term and give the term its ordinary and common meaning. City
21
of Des Moines v. Employment Appeal Bd., 722 N.W.2d 183, 196 (Iowa
2006).
The dictionary defines “equitable” as “fair to all concerned.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 769 (unabr. ed. 2002).
Black’s law dictionary defines “equitable” as “consistent with principles of
justice and right.” Black’s Law Dictionary 578 (8th ed. 2004).
Like
most
distribution”
other
jurisdiction
states,
for
Iowa
purposes
dissolution of marriage proceeding.
N.W.2d 205, 207 (Iowa 1987).
is
known
of
as
dividing
an
“equitable
property
in
a
In re Marriage of McNerney, 417
An equitable distribution is not
necessarily an equal distribution. In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d
535, 542 (Iowa 2005).
An equitable distribution depends upon the
circumstances of each case. In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493,
496 (Iowa 2005).
Two sister states appear to apportion death benefits equitably. In
Tennessee, a statute allowed the court to allocate death benefits between
a spouse and children appropriately. Farmer v. Farmer, 562 S.W.2d 205,
207 (Tenn. 1978).
In Colorado, a statute allowed the commission to
apportion the benefits in a manner it deemed just and equitable. Spoo v.
Spoo, 358 P.2d 870, 871 (Colo. 1961). In both cases, the courts found
equitable did not mean equal. Spoo, 358 P.2d at 871–72; Farmer, 562
S.W.2d at 206–07.
The equitable division of the benefits required
considering all the facts and needs of the dependents. Spoo, 358 P.2d at
871–72.
We agree that the ordinary meaning of the term “equitable” does
not mean an equal distribution of benefits.
In equitably apportioning
death benefits between entitled dependents, the commissioner must
consider the facts and circumstances of the dependents. This includes
22
consideration of the needs of the dependents.
The commissioner’s
decision appears to allocate the benefits equitably rather than equally.
Our inquiry into the allocation is not finished because Jody claims
the commissioner’s decision should not have considered the fifty percent
reduction in benefits required under section 85.31(5) when it allocated
the benefits.
In enacting our workers’ compensation statutes, the
legislature made a conscious choice that certain nonresident aliens
should receive reduced benefits.
Iowa Code § 85.31(5).
One noted
treatise attributes this reduction on the problems of proof and
administration of these claims, rather than on the desire of a state to
discriminate
against
nonresident
Compensation § 97.07, at 97–26.
aliens.
Larson’s
Workers’
The legislature defined how the
commissioner allocates benefits in section 85.43.
Iowa Code § 85.43.
The amount of benefits payable, including the reduction in benefits for
nonresident aliens, is found in section 85.31.
Id. § 85.31.
By not
incorporating the allocation of benefits with the amount of benefits
payable, the legislature intended to keep the determination of the
allocation of benefits separate from the determination of the amount of
benefits payable to a dependent.
The commissioner’s decision circumvented this intent by first
determining an equitable allocation of benefits and then doubling the
allocation of benefits to Yolanda and her five children to take into
consideration section 85.31(5)’s reduction of benefits to nonresident alien
dependents.
If we were to allow the commissioner to consider this
reduction when making an equitable allocation, we would be giving the
commissioner the power to circumvent the clear intent of the legislature,
that the allocation of benefits is a separate and distinct issue from the
amount of benefits payable to a dependent and the benefits payable to
23
nonresident alien dependents are to be reduced by fifty percent.
Therefore,
the
commissioner
erred
by
considering
the
reduction
contained in section 85.31(5) for nonresident aliens when it equitably
allocated the death benefits awarded in this case.
VI. Disposition.
On further review, we find that section 85.31(5), requiring a
reduction in benefits for nonresident aliens, is neither unconstitutional
nor does it conflict with section 85.51. We further find the commissioner
erred when he allocated a portion of the benefits to Yolanda, the mother
of Raul’s Mexican children.
Although the commissioner was correct
when he allocated the death benefits equitably rather than equally, he
also erred by considering the effects of the reduction contained in section
85.31(5)
for
nonresident
aliens
when
he
allocated
the
benefits.
Consequently, we must vacate the decision of the court of appeals,
reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case to the
district court to reverse the judgment of the workers’ compensation
commissioner and remand the case to the commissioner to reallocate the
benefits in a manner consistent with this decision.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED.
COURT
JUDGMENT
DIRECTIONS.
REVERSED
AND
CASE
DISTRICT
REMANDED
WITH
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