STATE OF IOWA vs. MARK STEVEN LECKINGTON
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 17 / 04-1361
Filed April 28, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
MARK STEVEN LECKINGTON,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Bobbi M.
Alpers, Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions for neglect of a dependent and
child endangerment resulting in serious injury.
DISTRICT
COURT
REVERSED;
CASE
JUDGMENT OF
REMANDED
WITH
DIRECTIONS.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur
Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant
Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Julie A.
Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2
STREIT, Justice.
The defendant, Mark Leckington, was convicted of neglect of a
dependent child and child endangerment resulting in serious injury for
being involved in his wife’s decision that endangered a drunken child.
On appeal, Leckington contends there was insufficient evidence to prove
he had custody or control of the child. After considering the arguments
presented and reviewing the record made below, we conclude the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Mark Leckington had
custody or control of the child. This conclusion requires a reversal of
both the neglect of a dependent child conviction and the child
endangerment resulting in serious injury conviction. Consequently, we
reverse the judgment of the district court.
I.
Facts and Prior Proceedings
The facts in this case are the same as those set forth in State v.
Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 2006), a case we also decide
today. We repeat only those facts necessary to our analysis of this case.
On a December afternoon in 2003, Sandra Leckington received a
phone call from one of her son’s friends, Dominic Major.
Major told
Sandra to come over to his apartment to pick up her son, Shawn Yuille,
and one of his friends, Travis Talbot, because the boys had been drinking
and Travis was “pretty trashed.” Sandra got in her car and went to pick
up the two thirteen-year-old boys.
On the way to Major’s apartment,
Sandra stopped at the local convenience store and picked up her
husband, Mark Leckington. Mark stayed in the car while Sandra went
into Major’s apartment to get the boys. As the two boys emerged from
the apartment, Mark noticed Travis was wobbling, and that Major had to
eventually carry Travis to the car. Once Travis was placed in the back
seat of the car, he immediately slumped over.
One witness thought
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Travis was unconscious by the time he entered the car.
Mark asked
whether Travis had been drinking, and Sandra told him that Travis had
not been drinking. Mark then asked Shawn what was wrong with Travis.
Shawn told him that Travis had hit his head while wrestling around in
the apartment. After a brief discussion, they drove around the block to
the Leckington home.
According to Sandra, Mark, and Shawn, Travis
walked, unaided, out of the car and into the home. Mark and Sandra
watched the boys enter the home and then drove away to run some
errands.
Once inside the Leckington home, Travis collapsed on the kitchen
floor. Shawn went back to Major’s apartment for help, and he was told
to give Travis milk. When this did not work, he went back outside and
found some friends to help carry Travis upstairs to the bathtub.
boys then ran cold water on Travis in hopes of reviving him.
The
Travis’s
eyes remained open, but he began to foam at the mouth.
Approximately an hour after they had left the boys at their home,
Sandra and Mark returned home. Mark went to a room in the back of
the house. One of the children in the house told Sandra that Travis was
“dead” and lying in the bathtub.
After an inexplicable delay, 1 Sandra
told Mark about Travis, and he told her to call Travis’s mother.
Travis was rushed to University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics in
Iowa City via helicopter and placed in pediatric intensive care.
He
regained consciousness after fourteen hours and remained at the
hospital for three days. A doctor testified that his blood-alcohol level was
1When Sandra saw Travis lying in the bathtub, she “freaked out.” She told the
boys they had to get Travis out of the bathtub and out of the house. While moving
Travis out of the tub, Sandra proclaimed “You know how much trouble I’m going to get
into, this little f***er had to drink alcohol, I’m not going to jail for this motherf***ing
bastard.” Sandra helped drag Travis down the stairs, but the boys refused to help her
put Travis outside in the cold December air.
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approximately .3, and that he was at risk of death from the high level of
alcohol in his blood.
The State charged Mark with the offenses of child endangerment
resulting in serious injury and neglect or abandonment of a dependent
person. See Iowa Code §§ 726.3, .6 (2003). The State charged Sandra
with the same crimes, and with the additional charge of providing alcohol
to a minor resulting in serious injury. See id. § 123.47(5).
Mark and Sandra were tried in a joint trial. The jury found Mark
and Sandra each guilty of child endangerment resulting in serious injury
and neglect of a dependent child. The jury also found Sandra guilty of
providing alcohol to a minor. Mark received two, ten-year, consecutive
sentences for his crimes.
On appeal, Mark contends there was insufficient evidence to
support his convictions. He emphasizes he was not present when Travis
consumed the alcohol, he was only a passenger in the car, and he never
did anything to assume responsibility for Travis. He also argues there
was no evidence that he knowingly created a risk endangering Travis, or
knowingly exposed him to a hazard.
Mark also contends his trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to make a motion to sever his trial from
that of his wife. He additionally argues the court abused its discretion in
imposing consecutive ten-year sentences given the circumstances of the
case. Because the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is dispositive, we do
not reach his other arguments on this appeal.
II.
Discussion
A.
Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Claim
Mark made a motion for judgment of acquittal asserting there was
insufficient evidence to support the charges against him. He raises the
same argument on appeal.
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1.
Scope of Review
Review of sufficiency-of-evidence claims is for errors at law. State
v. Petithory, 702 N.W.2d 854, 856 (Iowa 2005).
The verdict must be
supported by substantial evidence which is “such evidence as could
convince a rational trier of fact that [the] defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980);
State v. Query, 594 N.W.2d 438, 445 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (stating the
jury’s findings of guilt are binding if supported by substantial evidence).
In determining whether there is substantial evidence, the record is
viewed in a light most favorable to the State, and this includes all
legitimate inferences that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the
evidence.
State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1999).
We
consider all the evidence presented, not just that of an inculpatory
nature. State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 1996). Evidence
that only raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is not substantial.
State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997).
2.
Neglect or Abandonment of a Dependent Person
The elements of the crime of neglect of a dependent child are set
forth in Iowa Code section 726.3. The relevant portion states:
A person who is the father, mother, or some other person
having custody of a child[ 2 ] . . . who knowingly or recklessly
exposes such person to a hazard or danger against which
such person cannot reasonably be expected to protect such
person’s self or who deserts or abandons such person,
knowing or having reason to believe that the person will be
exposed to such hazard or danger, commits a class “C”
felony.
2A child is defined in Iowa Code section 702.5 as any person under the age of
fourteen.
6
Iowa Code § 726.3 (emphasis added). The term “custody,” as it pertains
to neglect or abandonment of a dependent person, is not defined in the
Iowa Code. Two cases guide our analysis of the term “custody.”
In State v. Sparegrove, 134 Iowa 599, 600, 112 N.W. 83, 84 (1907),
the State charged an individual with “exposing and abandoning a child,”
a predecessor to section 726.3, when he abandoned a baby on a woman’s
doorstep at the direction of the baby’s parents.
The applicable code
provision provided as follows:
If the father or mother of any child under the age of 6
years, or any person to whom such child has been intrusted or
confided, expose such child in any highway, street, field or
outhouse, or in any other place with intent wholly to
abandon it, he or she, upon conviction thereof, shall be
imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding 5 years.
Iowa Code § 4766 (1897) (emphasis added). The defendant argued the
language “intrusted or confided” only referred to situations in which an
individual held legal custody of a child. Sparegrove, 134 Iowa at 601,
112 N.W. at 84.
We held that the statute was not so limited and
concluded that the State properly charged the defendant with the crime
because he “undertook . . . to take charge of [the baby] and care for it.”
Id.
In State v. Johnson, 528 N.W.2d 638 (Iowa 1995), we analyzed the
term “custody” within the current statute. In Johnson, the defendant,
Paula, provided the daily care and maintenance for her husband,
Wallace,
who
suffered
from
Parkinson’s
disease,
hypertension,
depression, and hyperuricemia. 528 N.W.2d at 639. One day, Wallace
fell to the floor and was unable to get back up. He yelled to Paula for
assistance and, after about an hour, Paula came and kicked and
punched him in the face. After Paula left, Wallace called a friend and
told him to call “911.” Paramedics and police arrived at the scene after
7
Paula had returned home. Paula told the paramedics she was the only
person living at the address.
However, Wallace made noises in the
background and the paramedics entered to find Wallace lying on the floor
with a broken nose and lacerations on his ears. The State charged Paula
with, among other things, neglect or abandonment of a dependent
person.
Id.
The district court dismissed the charge of neglect or
abandonment of a dependent person on the ground that custody, an
element of the crime, required the existence of legal custody. Id. at 640.
We disagreed.
We determined the legislature’s use of the phrase
“custody” in section 726.3 did not mean legal custody. Id. at 641. Citing
Sparegrove, we concluded “custody” in the context of chapter 726 meant
“[t]o be in charge of an individual and to hold the responsibility to care
for that individual.” Id. We therefore reversed the trial court’s dismissal
of the charge of neglect or abandonment of a dependent person. Id. at
642.
In the present case, Mark contends the State did not prove he had
custody of Travis for the purposes of this crime. The State argues Mark
had custody because he undertook the supervision of, and responsibility
for, Travis. The State claims Mark had custody of Travis during at least
three points in time. First, when Mark allowed Travis in the car; second,
when he took Travis to the Leckington home and left him there with no
other adults present; and finally, when he did not immediately call for
help when he came back home.
The first and third arguments are without merit.
First, merely
allowing a minor into a car does not establish a custodial relationship.
The third argument—Mark did not immediately call for help—is not
supported by the record. All of the evidence indicates that Mark went to
a different part of the home as soon as he and Sandra returned home
8
from running errands.
A child then approached Sandra and told her
that Travis was “dead” in the bathtub. Mark remained unaware of the
situation until Sandra came and told him about it.
As soon as Mark
found out, he instructed Sandra to call Travis’s mother. There was no
evidence to support a finding that Mark did anything to purposefully
delay medical attention for Travis, and therefore no evidence to conclude
he personally took charge of Travis’s well being.
The State’s second argument—Mark took charge of Travis and had
the responsibility to care for him when he actively participated in the
decision to leave Travis at the Leckington home—requires more analysis.
The State contends Mark’s testimony about what happened during
the brief car ride illustrates Mark was actively involved in the decision to
leave Travis at his unsupervised home. The State points to the following
testimony by Mark:
Well, I said, So what is going on, to Sandi, and she
says, I don’t know. I said, What are you guys planning on
doing?
And they wanted to go to our house to play
PlayStation. Well, with the kids that were at home, and
being Brandon was there, I said, Call Travis’s mom and dad,
see if they’re home, because I really don’t want Travis over at
the house without us being there. Which I did not know that
he had spent the night that night before anyway. And Sandi
had tried calling Travis’s parents, got no answer. I ain’t
going to abandon a child out on the street, you know, saying,
no, you can’t come over to our house. I just said, We got
some things we got to do, me and Sandi got to go and do
some things, will you guys promise me that you’ll behave?
After the boys promised they would behave, Mark told the boys to stay
downstairs away from the other children in the home.
Mark then
testified “Me and Sandi stayed until they got in the porch area. I made
sure they were in the back door of the house.
Once I saw the back
kitchen door close, that’s when we left.” The State argues that once the
9
Leckingtons left Travis at their own home, without adult supervision,
Mark and Sandra both undertook charge of Travis.
The State makes a persuasive argument that Sandra decided to
take charge of the care and responsibility of Travis, but the record does
not support such a finding for Mark.
In fact, the evidence shows Mark had very little involvement in the
decision to pick up Travis and the decision to leave Travis at the
Leckington home. Dominic Major called Sandra and told her to pick up
her son and Travis. On the way to Major’s apartment, Sandra stopped
and picked up Mark at the convenience store. Mark remained in the car
while Sandra went inside to retrieve the boys.
Neither Mark’s inquiry
about Travis’s condition nor his further inquiry about what the boys
planned to do next demonstrate Mark made the conscious choice to
place the boys at the Leckington home. While there was at least some
dispute as to who drove the vehicle, 3 the State presented insufficient
evidence to conclude Mark decided what to do with Travis. At best, Mark
acquiesced in Sandra’s decision to move the children to their home.
Without proof that Mark played a significant role in the decision to move
Travis, there is not enough evidence to find Mark was in charge of Travis,
and therefore insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mark had
custody of Travis.
3.
Child Endangerment Resulting in Serious Injury
The crime of child endangerment resulting in serious injury is set
forth in Iowa Code section 726.6. The relevant portions of this statute
state:
3Sandra,
Mark, Dominic Major, and Major’s roommate all testified that Sandra
was the driver. On the other hand, Kara Lake, a neighbor viewing the incident from the
doorway of her apartment, testified the driver was male.
10
1. A person who is the parent, guardian, or person having
custody or control over a child . . . commits child
endangerment when the person does any of the following:
....
a. Knowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial
risk to a child or minor’s physical, mental or emotional
health or safety.
....
d. Willfully deprives a child or minor of necessary food,
clothing, shelter, health care or supervision appropriate to
the child or minor’s age, when the person is reasonably able
to make the necessary provisions and which deprivation
substantially harms the child or minor’s physical, mental or
emotional health.
Iowa Code § 726.6(1) (emphasis added). In order to sustain a conviction
for child endangerment resulting in serious injury, the State must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, Mark had either control or custody of Travis.
We discuss control and custody separately.
a.
Control
Iowa Code section 726.6(3) states a person has “control” for the
purposes of child endangerment if he or she has: (1) “accepted,
undertaken, or assumed supervision” of a child from the parent or
guardian of the child; (2) “undertaken or assumed temporary supervision
of a child without explicit consent from the parent or guardian of the
child”; or (3) operated a motor vehicle with a child present in the vehicle.
The district court did not instruct the jury on the third definition of
control. Also, there was no evidence to prove Mark accepted, undertook,
or assumed supervision of Travis with the consent of Travis’s parents or
guardians.
Therefore, we must analyze whether Mark undertook or
assumed the temporary supervision of Travis without the explicit consent
of Travis’s parents or guardians.
11
Mark claims his mere presence as an adult in the vehicle does not
mean he had control of Travis for even a brief period of time. We agree.
Mark’s role in this situation was peripheral. He did not decide to pick up
the boys; he did not decide where to leave the boys.
At best he
acquiesced in his wife’s decision to leave the boys at the Leckington
home. His inactivity does not rise to the level of control.
b.
Custody
As noted above, chapter 726, “Protection of the Family and
Dependent Persons,” does not define the term custody. In Johnson, we
equated the term “custody” in section 726.3 (neglect of a dependent
child) with the term custody in section 726.6 (child endangerment
resulting in serious injury).
528 N.W.2d at 641.
Because we have
already concluded Mark did not have custody of Travis for purposes of
neglect or abandonment of a dependent person, we must also find he did
not have custody for the purposes of the crime of child endangerment
resulting in serious injury.
III.
Conclusion
Our decision does not condone Mark Leckington’s behavior. The
level of indifference he displayed towards the health and welfare of a
child was appalling, but his actions (or inaction) did not rise to the level
of criminal liability.
The evidence was not sufficient to establish the
elements of custody or control for either crime.
Therefore, the State
failed, as a matter of law, to tender substantial proof on each of the
essential elements of the offenses.
We reverse the district court’s
judgment of conviction and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
JUDGMENT
OF
DISTRICT
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
COURT
REVERSED;
CASE
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