People v. Lavariega
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NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are
subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior
to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore,
because the following slip opinion is being made available prior to
the Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the
final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of
Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final
action by the Court.
Docket No. 80560--Agenda 15--September 1996.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ELVIO
LAVARIEGA, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 30, 1997.
CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Elvio Lavariega, was arrested and charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter DUI). 625 ILCS
5/11--501(a)(2) (West 1994). Immediately following his arrest,
defendant refused to consent to or failed to complete a blood-
alcohol test and his driver's license was summarily suspended under
the implied-consent statute. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 et seq. (West
1994). The circuit court of Winnebago County refused to rescind the
suspension in a subsequent rescission hearing. Thereafter,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the DUI prosecution proceeding
against him, arguing that it constituted an attempt to subject him
to an additional punishment for the same offense in violation of
the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Illinois
Constitutions. After defendant's double jeopardy motion was denied,
defendant filed an interlocutory appeal raising the same argument.
145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f). The appellate court held that the summary
suspension of defendant's driver's license did not constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes and therefore that
prosecution for DUI was not barred by the license suspension. No.
2--95--0595 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This
court accepted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill.
2d R. 315) and, for the following reasons, we affirm.
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that by suspending his driver's license and
subsequently prosecuting him for DUI for the same incident, the
State is violating the prohibition against multiple punishments
contained in the Illinois and United States Constitutions. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, 10 ("[n]o person shall *** be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense"); U.S. Const., amend. V ("[n]o
person *** shall *** be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb"). As a threshold matter, then, it
must be determined whether the summary suspension of defendant's
license pursuant to the implied-consent statute constitutes
punishment.
We observe that the Supreme Court has employed different
analyses in determining whether taxes, fines and civil forfeitures
constitute punishment. Considering these, we find that the summary
suspension of a driver's license most resembles the civil
forfeiture of property, though we are cognizant that it is not the
license, per se, that is proceeded against in a summary suspension
proceeding. Accordingly, to determine whether this sanction is
punishment for purposes of the United States Constitution's double
jeopardy clause, we consider whether the General Assembly intended
the proceedings to be civil and, if so, whether the proceedings are
nevertheless so punitive in fact as to persuade the court that the
proceedings may not be legitimately viewed as civil in nature
despite Congress' intent. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S.
___, ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 568, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996),
quoting 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 104 S. Ct. at 1107 (applying the same analysis to congressional forfeiture
statutes); In re P.S., Nos. 78910, 78944 cons. (January 30, 1997).
If not, then the civil sanction does not constitute punishment.
Applying this test we initially observe that the General
Assembly expressly provided that the summary suspension proceeding
under the implied-consent statute is a civil proceeding (625 ILCS
5/2--118.1(b) (West 1994) (a summary suspension "hearing shall
proceed in the court in the same manner as in other civil
proceedings" (emphasis added)). A legislature demonstrates its
intent most directly by the procedural mechanisms it establishes to
impose and enforce the sanction. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 568, 116 S. Ct. at 2147, citing 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
at 363, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 368-69, 104 S. Ct. at 1105. Indeed, this
court has previously determined that the summary suspension is a
civil sanction where it ruled that the driver bears the burden of
proof in a summary suspension hearing. People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326 (1988); see also Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 568-
69, 116 S. Ct. at 2147-48 (finding who bears the burden significant
in determining whether the sanction is civil or criminal).
Accordingly, we find that the legislature intended the sanction to
be civil in nature.
We next consider whether the statutory summary suspension of
a driver's license under the implied-consent statute is so punitive
that it is equivalent to a criminal proceeding, irrespective of the
legislature's intent. In making this determination, the court
requires the "clearest proof" and considers, inter alia: (1)
whether important nonpunitive goals are advanced by the statute;
(2) whether the civil sanction has been traditionally regarded as
punishment; and (3) whether the civil sanction requires scienter.
Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 570, 116 S. Ct. at 2148-
49.
Regarding these factors, we first observe that the summary
suspension of a license for the failure to pass a blood-alcohol
test advances the important policy goal of keeping the roads safe
from intoxicated drivers. People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491
(1988) (the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
public from drunk drivers). As the statute itself declares:
"[T]he driver who is impaired by alcohol or other
drugs is a threat to the public safety and welfare.
Therefore, to provide a deterrent to such practice and to
remove problem drivers from the highway, a statutory
summary driver's license suspension is appropriate." 625
ILCS 5/6--206.1 (West 1994).
Defendant argues that the statement shows that the suspension is
punishment since it purports to provide a "deterrent" to drunk
driving. However, a civil sanction need not be solely remedial in
order to be nonpunitive under the double jeopardy clause. Ursery,
518 U.S. at ___ n.2, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 566 n.2, 116 S. Ct. at 2145
n.2 ("it is hard to imagine a sanction that has no punitive aspect
whatsoever").
Also, Illinois courts have traditionally viewed the purpose of
a driver's license suspension as being remedial and nonpunitive.
People v. Kobylak, 383 Ill. 432, 435 (1943) (revocation of a
driver's license is part of the regulatory measures under the
police power of the state governing traffic upon the highways and
is not part of the punishment administered by the court); People v.
Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491 (1988) (implied-consent concept and the
statutory summary suspension procedure were intended to protect the
public, not to punish the licensee); People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418 (1992) (implied-consent statute remedial in that its
overriding purpose is to make the roads safer).
Finally, we observe that there is no scienter element to the
statutory summary suspension provision, further suggesting that it
is not intended as punishment. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 et seq. (West
1994); Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 570, 116 S. Ct. at
2149. Defendant counters that the suspension is punitive because
the statute provides defenses which allow the suspension to be
rescinded, thus indicating the retributive purpose of the statute.
However, as the Court in Ursery noted, the mere presence of
innocence defenses to a civil sanction is irrelevant to whether the
sanction is punitive under the double jeopardy clause. Ursery, 518
U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 570, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
Accordingly, we hold that the summary suspension of
defendant's driver's license was not punishment for purposes of the
United States Constitution's double jeopardy clause. Insofar as
this court has continuously classified the instant summary
suspension proceeding as primarily nonpunitive, with the remedial
goal of making roads safer by removing drunk drivers, we similarly
conclude that the summary suspension is not punishment for purposes
of the Illinois Constitution's double jeopardy clause. See People
v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 337 (suspension proceeding civil in
nature); Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 503 (suspension intended to
reduce the risks attendant to drunk driving). Thus there exists no
double jeopardy bar to a subsequent DUI prosecution based on the
same driving incident.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the statutory summary
suspension of a driver's license because of a failed blood-alcohol
test is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes and therefore
does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for driving under
the influence of alcohol. We affirm the decisions of the circuit
court and the appellate court.
Affirmed.
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are
subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior
to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore,
because the following slip opinion is being made available prior to
the Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the
final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of
Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final
action by the Court.
Docket No. 80560--Agenda 15--September 1996.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ELVIO
LAVARIEGA, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 30, 1997.
CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Elvio Lavariega, was arrested and charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter DUI). 625 ILCS
5/11--501(a)(2) (West 1994). Immediately following his arrest,
defendant refused to consent to or failed to complete a blood-
alcohol test and his driver's license was summarily suspended under
the implied-consent statute. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 et seq. (West
1994). The circuit court of Winnebago County refused to rescind the
suspension in a subsequent rescission hearing. Thereafter,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the DUI prosecution proceeding
against him, arguing that it constituted an attempt to subject him
to an additional punishment for the same offense in violation of
the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Illinois
Constitutions. After defendant's double jeopardy motion was denied,
defendant filed an interlocutory appeal raising the same argument.
145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f). The appellate court held that the summary
suspension of defendant's driver's license did not constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes and therefore that
prosecution for DUI was not barred by the license suspension. No.
2--95--0595 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This
court accepted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill.
2d R. 315) and, for the following reasons, we affirm.
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that by suspending his driver's license and
subsequently prosecuting him for DUI for the same incident, the
State is violating the prohibition against multiple punishments
contained in the Illinois and United States Constitutions. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, 10 ("[n]o person shall *** be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense"); U.S. Const., amend. V ("[n]o
person *** shall *** be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb"). As a threshold matter, then, it
must be determined whether the summary suspension of defendant's
license pursuant to the implied-consent statute constitutes
punishment.
We observe that the Supreme Court has employed different
analyses in determining whether taxes, fines and civil forfeitures
constitute punishment. Considering these, we find that the summary
suspension of a driver's license most resembles the civil
forfeiture of property, though we are cognizant that it is not the
license, per se, that is proceeded against in a summary suspension
proceeding. Accordingly, to determine whether this sanction is
punishment for purposes of the United States Constitution's double
jeopardy clause, we consider whether the General Assembly intended
the proceedings to be civil and, if so, whether the proceedings are
nevertheless so punitive in fact as to persuade the court that the
proceedings may not be legitimately viewed as civil in nature
despite Congress' intent. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S.
___, ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 568, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996),
quoting 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 104 S. Ct. at 1107 (applying the same analysis to congressional forfeiture
statutes); In re P.S., Nos. 78910, 78944 cons. (January 30, 1997).
If not, then the civil sanction does not constitute punishment.
Applying this test we initially observe that the General
Assembly expressly provided that the summary suspension proceeding
under the implied-consent statute is a civil proceeding (625 ILCS
5/2--118.1(b) (West 1994) (a summary suspension "hearing shall
proceed in the court in the same manner as in other civil
proceedings" (emphasis added)). A legislature demonstrates its
intent most directly by the procedural mechanisms it establishes to
impose and enforce the sanction. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 568, 116 S. Ct. at 2147, citing 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
at 363, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 368-69, 104 S. Ct. at 1105. Indeed, this
court has previously determined that the summary suspension is a
civil sanction where it ruled that the driver bears the burden of
proof in a summary suspension hearing. People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326 (1988); see also Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 568-
69, 116 S. Ct. at 2147-48 (finding who bears the burden significant
in determining whether the sanction is civil or criminal).
Accordingly, we find that the legislature intended the sanction to
be civil in nature.
We next consider whether the statutory summary suspension of
a driver's license under the implied-consent statute is so punitive
that it is equivalent to a criminal proceeding, irrespective of the
legislature's intent. In making this determination, the court
requires the "clearest proof" and considers, inter alia: (1)
whether important nonpunitive goals are advanced by the statute;
(2) whether the civil sanction has been traditionally regarded as
punishment; and (3) whether the civil sanction requires scienter.
Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 570, 116 S. Ct. at 2148-
49.
Regarding these factors, we first observe that the summary
suspension of a license for the failure to pass a blood-alcohol
test advances the important policy goal of keeping the roads safe
from intoxicated drivers. People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491
(1988) (the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
public from drunk drivers). As the statute itself declares:
"[T]he driver who is impaired by alcohol or other
drugs is a threat to the public safety and welfare.
Therefore, to provide a deterrent to such practice and to
remove problem drivers from the highway, a statutory
summary driver's license suspension is appropriate." 625
ILCS 5/6--206.1 (West 1994).
Defendant argues that the statement shows that the suspension is
punishment since it purports to provide a "deterrent" to drunk
driving. However, a civil sanction need not be solely remedial in
order to be nonpunitive under the double jeopardy clause. Ursery,
518 U.S. at ___ n.2, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 566 n.2, 116 S. Ct. at 2145
n.2 ("it is hard to imagine a sanction that has no punitive aspect
whatsoever").
Also, Illinois courts have traditionally viewed the purpose of
a driver's license suspension as being remedial and nonpunitive.
People v. Kobylak, 383 Ill. 432, 435 (1943) (revocation of a
driver's license is part of the regulatory measures under the
police power of the state governing traffic upon the highways and
is not part of the punishment administered by the court); People v.
Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491 (1988) (implied-consent concept and the
statutory summary suspension procedure were intended to protect the
public, not to punish the licensee); People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418 (1992) (implied-consent statute remedial in that its
overriding purpose is to make the roads safer).
Finally, we observe that there is no scienter element to the
statutory summary suspension provision, further suggesting that it
is not intended as punishment. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 et seq. (West
1994); Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 570, 116 S. Ct. at
2149. Defendant counters that the suspension is punitive because
the statute provides defenses which allow the suspension to be
rescinded, thus indicating the retributive purpose of the statute.
However, as the Court in Ursery noted, the mere presence of
innocence defenses to a civil sanction is irrelevant to whether the
sanction is punitive under the double jeopardy clause. Ursery, 518
U.S. at ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 570, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
Accordingly, we hold that the summary suspension of
defendant's driver's license was not punishment for purposes of the
United States Constitution's double jeopardy clause. Insofar as
this court has continuously classified the instant summary
suspension proceeding as primarily nonpunitive, with the remedial
goal of making roads safer by removing drunk drivers, we similarly
conclude that the summary suspension is not punishment for purposes
of the Illinois Constitution's double jeopardy clause. See People
v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 337 (suspension proceeding civil in
nature); Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 503 (suspension intended to
reduce the risks attendant to drunk driving). Thus there exists no
double jeopardy bar to a subsequent DUI prosecution based on the
same driving incident.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the statutory summary
suspension of a driver's license because of a failed blood-alcohol
test is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes and therefore
does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for driving under
the influence of alcohol. We affirm the decisions of the circuit
court and the appellate court.
Affirmed.
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