1. A. having recovered a judgment against B. and C. in the
District Court for the Parish of New Orleans, B., on the ground,
among others, that the judgment, having been obtained by default
and without lawful service upon him, was void, filed a petition in
that court praying for a decree of nullity and for an injunction.
An injunction and citation were issued and served upon A., who
thereupon, alleging that he was a citizen of Missouri and B. a
citizen of Louisiana, prayed that the action of nullity be removed
to the circuit court of the United States. It having been so
removed, and B.'s petition amended by converting it into a bill so
as to conform to the practice in equity, that court, on a final
hearing upon the pleadings and proofs, the latter including an
exemplification of the record and proceedings in the original suit,
dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill.
Held that
the causes relied on for the nullity of the judgment being, under
the Code of Louisiana, vices of form, the proceeding by petition
was substantially a continuation of the original suit, and that the
circuit court could not take cognizance thereof.
2. The character of cases sought to be removed to the courts of
the United States is always open to examination to determine
whether,
ratione materiae, they are competent to take
jurisdiction thereof. State rules on the subject cannot deprive
them of it.
On the 19th of January, 1874, Logan Hunton recovered in the
Fourth District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, against
F. M. Goodrich and one Pilcher, a judgment for $2,500, and interest
at eight percent per annum from May 1, 1861. On the 28th of that
month, Goodrich filed a petition in said court praying for a decree
of nullity of the said judgment and for an injunction in the
meantime, setting forth as grounds for such relief that the
judgment complained of was void because it was founded on a default
taken, and no lawful service of the petition and citation in the
suit had ever been made on him, Goodrich, and because the
partnership of Pilcher & Goodrich had been dissolved before
1866, and because he, Goodrich, had been discharged as a bankrupt
in 1868. An injunction and citation were thereupon issued and
served.
On Feb. 3, 1874, Hunton, the defendant in this proceeding, filed
a petition for the removal of the action of nullity to the circuit
court of the United States alleging that he was a citizen of
Missouri and that Goodrich, the plaintiff, was a citizen
Page 99 U. S. 81
of Louisiana, and after a hearing on the subject, an order of
removal was made by the district court. The plaintiff moved the
circuit court of the United States to remand the cause, but this
motion was denied and the suit proceeded in the latter court. After
various proceedings had, the plaintiff, by leave of the court,
amended his petition to conform to the equity practice of the
United States court, converting it into a bill in equity containing
substantially the same averments and praying the same relief as
before. The defendant answered, and the parties went to proofs.
Amongst the proofs adduced was an exemplification of the record and
proceedings in the original suit in which the judgment was
rendered, which the plaintiff in this suit sought to have declared
null and void. On the 14th of February, 1876, the circuit court
made a final decree, as follows:
"This cause came on to be heard upon the bill, answer,
replication, and proofs, and was argued by counsel. On
consideration whereof, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that
the injunction herein issued by the state court was wrongfully
obtained, and is therefore dissolved. And it is further ordered and
decreed that the plaintiff's bill be dismissed at his costs. "
A rehearing having been refused, the decree was confirmed on the
28th of February, 1876.
From this decree the present appeal was taken, and it is sought
to be reversed on two grounds, upon which errors are assigned,
namely:
1st, that the transfer was illegally made, and the circuit court
was without jurisdiction.
2d, that it appears that the Fourth District Court, which
rendered the judgment against F. M. Goodrich, was without
jurisdiction, and therefore the judgment is null and void.
Goodrich having died
pendente lite, Barrow, his
administrator, was substituted in his stead.
Page 99 U. S. 82
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, after stating the facts, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The question presented with regard to the jurisdiction of the
circuit court is whether the proceeding to procure nullity of the
former judgment in such a case as the present is or is not in its
nature a separate suit, or whether it is a supplementary proceeding
so connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it
and substantially a continuation of it. If the
Page 99 U. S. 83
proceeding is merely tantamount to the common law practice of
moving to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of
error, or to a bill of review or an appeal, it would belong to the
latter category, and the United States court could not properly
entertain jurisdiction of the case. Otherwise, the circuit courts
of the United States would become invested with power to control
the proceedings in the state courts, or would have appellate
jurisdiction over them in all cases where the parties are citizens
of different states. Such a result would be totally
inadmissible.
On the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill
in equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof,
then they constitute an original and independent proceeding, and
according to the doctrine laid down in
Gaines v. Fuentes,
92 U. S. 10, the
case might be within the cognizance of the federal courts. The
distinction between the two classes of cases may be somewhat nice,
but it may be affirmed to exist. In the one class, there would be a
mere revision of errors and irregularities, or of the legality and
correctness of the judgments and decrees of the state courts, and
in the other class, the investigation of a new case arising upon
new facts, although having relation to the validity of an actual
judgment or decree, or of the party's right to claim any benefit by
reason thereof.
It would seem apparent that the proceeding in the present case
was one that affected the mere regularity of the original judgment.
In the common law practice, it would have been a motion to set
aside the judgment for irregularity or a writ of error
coram
vobis.
It will be more satisfactory, however, to take a brief view of
the practice of Louisiana on this subject.
The process for procuring nullity of a judgment in that state is
prescribed by the Code of Practice, in which we find the following
provisions:
"ART. 556. Definitive judgments may be revised, set aside, or
reversed 1, by a new trial; 2, by appeal; 3, by action of nullity;
4, by rescission. The last mode can only be exercised by minors, or
persons who were absent when judgment was rendered against them.
"
Page 99 U. S. 84
"ART. 605. The causes for which the nullity of a definitive
judgment may be demanded are twofold: those that are relative to
the form of proceeding and those that appertain to the merits of
the question to be tried."
Art. 606 specifies the vices of form for which a judgment can be
annulled, as, when against a minor appearing without a curator, or
against a married woman appearing without the authority of her
husband; where the defendant is condemned by default without being
cited; where the judge was incompetent to try the suit; and where
defendant has not been legally cited, and has not entered
appearance, and judgment is by default.
Art. 607 specifies the grounds of nullity relating to the merits
-- namely where the judgment has been obtained through fraud,
bribery, forgery of documents, &c.
"ART. 608. The nullity of judgment may be demanded from the same
court which has rendered the same, or from the court of appeal
before which the appeal from such judgment was taken, pursuant to
the provisions hereafter expressed."
"ART. 609. The nullity can be demanded on the appeal only while
the appeal is still pending and when the nullity is apparent on the
face of the records."
"ART. 610. The party praying for the nullity of a judgment
before the court which has rendered the same must bring his action
by means of a petition, and the adverse party must be cited to
appear, as in ordinary suits."
From these extracts it is to be inferred that the action of
nullity must be brought in the same court which rendered the
judgment or in the court of appeal when an appeal is pending. And
so the Supreme Court of Louisiana has decided. Hennen's Digest,
art. Judgment, XI(c), and cases there cited. In
David v.
Calouret, 1 La.Ann. 171, the court says:
"The settlement made before the notary, under the order of the
judge, . . . sought to be annulled in this suit, was made the
judgment of the court by a decree, . . . and before that court
alone ought the action to annul the act to have been brought."
The action of rescission, which is nearly identical with that of
nullity, is expressly required by art. 616 of the
Page 99 U. S. 85
Code of Practice to be brought in the court that rendered the
judgment.
The fact that an action of nullity can only be brought in the
court which rendered the judgment or in the court to which such
judgment is appealed is entitled to some weight in determining the
question now under consideration. It shows that in the estimation
of the Legislature of Louisiana, there is a manifest propriety in
submitting the question of the validity of a judgment to the court
which rendered it, or to the court which has the right to revise
the judgment by way of appeal. We are not disposed, however, to
allow this consideration to operate so far as to make it an
invariable criterion of the want of jurisdiction in the courts of
the United States. If the state legislatures could, by investing
certain courts with exclusive jurisdiction over certain subjects,
deprive the federal courts of all jurisdiction, they might
seriously interfere with the right of the citizen to resort to
those courts. The character of the cases themselves is always open
to examination for the purpose of determining whether,
ratione
materiae, the courts of the United States are incompetent to
take jurisdiction thereof. State rules on the subject cannot
deprive them of it.
The classification of the causes of nullity in the Louisiana
Code into causes relative to form and those relative to the merits
is nearly coincident with the classification above suggested, of
cases which are, and cases which are not, cognizable in the courts
of the United States. Causes of nullity relating to form would fall
in that class of cases which could not be brought in these courts
or be removed thereto. The present case is one of that character.
It is precisely described in the fourth division of art. 606 of the
Code.
In our judgment, therefore, the case was one of which the
circuit court could not take cognizance, and therefore the judgment
must be reversed and the record remitted with directions to remand
the cause to the state court from which it was removed.
So ordered.
