A., residing in New Orleans and B. in Mobile during the whole
rebellion, consigned cotton which they owned to C., a supervising
special agent of the Treasury Department. It arrived at Mobile on
the last of July or the first of August, 1866, when it was claimed
by them. It was consigned to him to facilitate its arrival, as the
government had at that time charge of the railroads. C. having
received orders from the Treasury Department to ship all cotton
received by him, shipped in the latter month that of A. and B. to
New York, where it was sold. The net proceeds were paid into the
Treasury. A. and B. brought suit for them against the United States
in the Court of Claims March 27, 1872.
Held that the suit
was barred by the statute of limitations.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the Court of Claims. The facts of the
case cannot be more clearly or compactly stated than they are
presented in the findings of the court.
The findings are as follows:
"In July and August, 1865, the petitioners, James S. Clark and
Edward Fulton, were merchants and copartners doing business at New
Orleans under the firm name and style of J. S. Clark & Co., and
Joseph C. Palmer was a merchant at Mobile."
"In said July and August, the petitioners were the owners
jointly of nine hundred bales of cotton, which arrived at Mobile in
the last part of said July or the first part of said August,
consigned by them to T. C. A. Dexter, supervising special agent of
the Treasury Department for the Department of Alabama."
"At the times above stated, the government had charge of the
railroads, and the cotton was consigned to Mr. Dexter to facilitate
its arrival at Mobile, and on its arrival there it was claimed of
him by the petitioners. "
Page 99 U. S. 494
"In August, 1865, Mr. Dexter having received orders from the
Treasury Department to ship all the cotton received by him, shipped
the said nine hundred bales to New York, where it arrived and was
sold by the United States, and the net proceeds thereof, amounting
to $127,350, were paid into the Treasury."
"The said Clark and Fulton resided in New Orleans, and said
Palmer in Mobile, during the whole rebellion, and this petition was
filed March 27, 1872."
The United States rely upon two defenses:
1. That the petitioners did not, within two years after the
suppression of the rebellion, prefer their claim in the Court of
Claims.
This limitation is prescribed by the "Act for the collection of
abandoned property, and for the prevention of frauds in the
insurrectionary districts of the United States," passed March 3,
1863. 12 Stat. 863. It is confined to cases arising under that
act.
2. That the petition was not filed in the Court of Claims within
six years after the cause of action accrued.
This limitation is found in the tenth section of the act
relating to the Court of Claims, also of March 3, 1863. 12 Stat.
765. That section enacts:
"That every claim against the United States cognizable by the
Court of Claims shall be forever barred unless the petition setting
forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court or transmitted
to it under the provisions of this act within six years after the
claim first accrues,
provided that claims which have
accrued six years before the passage of this act shall not be
barred if the petition be filed in the court or transmitted as
aforesaid within three years after the passage of this act,
and
provided further that the claims of married women first
accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one
years, first accruing during minority, and of idiots, lunatics,
insane persons, and persons beyond seas at the time the claim
accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the petition
be filed in the court or transmitted as aforesaid within three
years after the disability had ceased; but no other disability than
those enumerated shall prevent any claim from being barred, not
shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively. "
Page 99 U. S. 495
In the Revised Statutes of 1874, sec. 1009, the first proviso
was dropped. It was then needless, the time of the saving thereby
created with respect to the claims to which it related having
before expired.
The counsel of the appellants have contended, in an argument of
unusual research and ability, that the cotton in question was not
captured or abandoned property within the meaning of the act upon
that subject, and that hence the limitation in that act has no
application to this case. Our view renders it unnecessary to
consider this point. We therefore pass from it without further
remark. The only question to be considered is whether the action is
barred by the limitation of six years in the Court of Claims act
before referred to.
Nothing can be clearer than the terms of the limiting
section.
It begins by declaring that every claim cognizable by the court
"shall be forever barred" unless the petition "shall be filed
within six years after the claim first accrued." Then follows the
proviso naming the disabilities which shall arrest the running of
the statute, and either of which shall give three years for the
filing of the petition "after the disability has ceased." Finally,
it is enacted that "no other disability shall prevent any claim
from being barred, nor shall any of said disabilities operate
cumulatively."
It is not claimed that any of the disabilities named affected
either of the appellants.
In the early part of April, 1862, New Orleans was captured by
the naval forces of the United States under the command of Admiral
Farragut. On the 1st of May following, the national military forces
under the command of General Butler took possession of the city. It
was never afterwards in possession of the insurgents.
Desmare
v. United States, 93 U. S. 605. The
appellants resided there. It is a part of the public history of the
country, of which we are bound to take judicial notice, that from
the time last mentioned communication between that place and the
seat of the national government was constant and uninterrupted.
In the case just referred to, this Court said:
"Upon the issuing of General Butler's proclamation, the legal
status of New
Page 99 U. S. 496
Orleans and its inhabitants with respect to the United States
became changed. Before that time, the former was enemy territory
and the latter were enemies. . . . General Butler's proclamation
was proof of the subjugation of the city and the reestablishment of
the national authority. The hostile character of the territory
thereupon ceased and the process of rehabilitation began. The
inhabitants were at once permitted to resume, under the regulations
prescribed, their wonted commerce with other places, as if the
state had not belonged to the rebel organization.
The
Venice, 2 Wall. 258. But they were clothed with new
duties, as well as new rights."
The cotton was shipped to New York in August, 1865, and there
sold, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury of the United States.
The claim then first accrued. The petition was filed on the 27th of
March, 1872. This was at least six months in excess of the six
years limited by the statute.
During all this period, the appellants could easily have put the
proper machinery of the law in motion. The delay is unaccounted
for.
The supplementary briefs filed by the parties since the argument
at the bar do not, we think, call for any special remarks.
The case is clearly within the bar of the statute, and we are
constrained to hold accordingly.
Judgment affirmed.