1. The court reaffirms the doctrine in
De Treville v.
Smalls, 98 U. S. 517, that
the certificate given by the commissioners to the purchaser of
lands at a sale for a direct tax, under the Act of June 7, 1862, 12
Stat. 422, as amended by the Act of Feb. 6, 1863,
id.,
640, is
prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale
and of all the antecedent facts essential to its validity and to
that of his title thereunder, and that it can only be affected by
establishing that the lands were not subject to the tax, or that it
had been paid previously to the sale, or that they had been
redeemed.
2. The sale may be valid although, when it and the assessment
were made, the lands belonged to a nonresident and were
in
custodia legis, the state court in which the
lis was
pending having enjoined all creditors from interfering with or
selling them, and they were sold as an entirety notwithstanding the
fact that the tax bore but a small proportion to their value.
3. A description of the lands in the notice of sale, which
identifies them so that the owner may have information of the claim
thereon, is all that the law requires.
4. The word "district," where it occurs in the sixth section of
the said act of 1862, signifies a part or portion of a state. The
City of Memphis, Tenn., where the lands in controversy are situate,
was therefore a district within the meaning of that section.
Page 99 U. S. 442
MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the courts of the state this was a bill to quiet title to a
parcel of ground in the City of Memphis, filed against the
appellant, who claims to be the owner by virtue of a sale for
direct taxes made June 24, 1864, and who holds a certificate of tax
sale (No. 1054) given to him in accordance with the seventh section
of the Act of June 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 422, as amended by the Act of
Feb. 6, 1863. The force and effect of that certificate we have had
occasion to consider in
De Treville v. Smalls,
98 U. S. 517. By
the act of Congress, it is made
prima facie evidence of
the regularity and validity of the tax sale and of the title of the
purchaser under it, and it is enacted that it shall only be
affected as evidence of the regularity and validity of the sale by
establishing the fact that the property was not subject to taxes,
or that the taxes had been paid previously to the sale, or that the
property had been redeemed according to the provisions of the act.
The bill assails the title of the appellant, and charges that the
sale made to him was null and void, for ten different reasons,
which it assigns. Most of them are assertions of fact, denied in
the answer and sustained by no proof. Among the charges is one that
at the time of the tax sale, the property was
in custodia
legis, and that under orders of the state court in which the
lis was pending all creditors -- individual, state, and
federal -- were enjoined from selling or interfering with the same.
This, of course, was susceptible of proof only by the record. But
no such record was produced. All that was submitted was the parol
testimony of a witness that the chancery court and the supreme
court had both taken jurisdiction of the property, and ordered
sales of the same, or parts thereof, to pay the debts of the
decedent owner. Waiving, however, objection to this mode of proof,
we do not perceive that the fact charged, if it was a fact, had any
tendency to impair the validity of the tax sale. Such a sale did
not disturb any possession which the state court had
Page 99 U. S. 443
of the property; and no state court could, by injunction or
otherwise, prevent federal officers from collecting federal taxes.
The government of the United States, within its sphere, is
independent of state action, and certainly it would be a strange
thing if a state court by its action could relieve property to
federal taxation from liability to pay the taxes when they are
due.
Secondly, the bill charges that the property was misdescribed in
the publication, orders of sale, and in the sale itself, and that
no legal or proper notice of the sale was ever given by
advertisement or otherwise. There is, however, no proof of any
material misdescription. The lot was described as follows:
"Market Street and Thornton Avenue part of country lot five
hundred and six (506) two acres, assessed to Sanders and Perkins in
1860, fifth civil district, City of Memphis."
That this was a true description, quite sufficient to identify
the property, is not denied. Nor is it denied that it is the same
as that made in the state assessment of 1860. But it is charged
that though the property was part of lot 506, as described, the
part sold was known as portions of lots 19 and 3, allotted to the
heirs and devisees of Sanders. It was not, however, described in
the state assessment by those numbers, and mentioning those numbers
in the description made by the tax commissioners would have added
nothing to its certainty. The purposes in describing lands to be
sold at a tax sale, says Judge Cooley, in his Law of Taxation, p.
284,
"are,
first, that the owner may have information of the
claim made upon him or his property;
second, that the
public, in case the tax is not paid, may be notified what land is
to be offered for sale for the nonpayment; and
third, that
the purchaser may be enabled to obtain a sufficient conveyance. . .
. If the description is sufficient for the first purpose, it will
ordinarily be sufficient for the others also."
There can be no doubt that the description in this case was all
that was needed to identify the land, and to inform the Sanders
heirs or devisees, who are the complainants in the bill, of the
claim made upon their property.
As to the objection that the property was not advertised for
sale legally and properly, it is sufficient to say that the act of
Congress makes the commissioners, certificate of sale
prima
Page 99 U. S. 444
facie evidence of the regularity and validity of the
sale and of the title of the purchaser. Even if it is not
conclusive of the existence of everything antecedent necessary to
such regularity and validity, except liability for taxes and their
nonpayment, it is affirmative evidence, controlling until rebutted.
In this case, so far from there being any evidence to rebut the
prima facies of the certificate, or any evidence to
support the allegation of the bill, there is positive testimony
that the property was advertised for sale in a newspaper then
published in Memphis.
Thus far, we have not considered the effect of the proviso to
the seventh section of the act of 1863. That should not be
overlooked. After having declared that the commissioners'
certificate should be
prima facie evidence both of the
regularity and validity of the sale, as well as of the title of the
purchaser, Congress went further and enacted that it should be
affected as evidence of such regularity, validity, and title only
by establishing one or more of three facts: nonliability of the
property for taxes, or that the taxes had been paid before the
sale, or that the property had been redeemed. Of what possible use
was this proviso unless it was intended to make the certificate
conclusive of the validity of the sale and the title of the
purchaser, unless it should be impeached by establishing one of the
three facts mentioned? If it meant only that proof of the existence
of one of those facts should destroy the
prima facie
effect of the certificate, it was quite superfluous. Without it, if
either of those facts existed, a sale would have been invalid and
the certificate good for nothing, no matter how regularly the sale
might have been conducted, or how fully and correctly it might have
been advertised, or how accurate might have been the assessment.
Congress must have had a purpose in the proviso, and what that was
it is not difficult to discover. It was not to repeat what had been
enacted in the same section. The provisions of the whole act were
designed to enforce the collection of direct taxes in
insurrectionary districts, avowedly so. Governmental disturbance in
such districts must have been anticipated, as well as only a
partial restoration of the ordinary forms of governmental rule,
while the districts were under military control, and consequent
irregularities in the processes
Page 99 U. S. 445
of collecting taxes. Substance, therefore, not form, was to be
required. Hence the proviso. It secured to landowners every
substantial defense against sales for taxes, and made the sale
certificate conclusive of everything else. Such was our opinion
expressed in
De Treville v. Smalls, and we adhere to it
now.
The fourth and fifth objections to the validity of the sale are
that while the taxes due bore but a small proportion to the value
of the property, the commissioners sold it as an entirety without
subdivision. If this was so, it was a mere irregularity, and by no
possibility could it affect the validity of the sale. But it was
not even an irregularity. The seventh section of the act of 1863
required the commissioners to sell the "lot or parcel of land" upon
which the tax was assessed, not such parts of it as on trial might
prove sufficient to pay the tax. It was not made their duty to
subdivide the property.
Another objection urged in the bill against the title acquired
by the appellant at the commissioners' sale is in effect that the
complainant resided in Texas; did not know of the sale until after
it was made; that some other person who was interested could not
get to Memphis in time to redeem before the commissioners had left;
and that there was no safe communication by travel or otherwise
outside the city to Nashville or elsewhere. All this is only
asserted as hearsay, and there is no proof that there was ever any
attempt to redeem, or any purpose to redeem. On the contrary, the
proof is that one of the owners was in the City of Memphis before
the commissioners left, and was told he could redeem the property
if he wished; but he refused, expressing the opinion that "as soon
as the courts got organized it would all be upset." But at best,
the objection is wholly unimportant. The law charged the tax upon
the land. The proceeding to collect it was a proceeding in rem, of
all stages of which the owners had legal notice. It was their duty
to pay the tax when it was due. The commissioners were not bound to
hunt them up.
Turner v.
Smith, 14 Wall. 553. And it is not claimed that
either the commissioners or the purchaser at the sale had any
agency in preventing a redemption, or that there was any obstacle
in the way thereof that could not easily have been overcome. While
it may be admitted that a statutory right of redemption is to be
favorably regarded, it is nevertheless
Page 99 U. S. 446
true that it is a statutory right exclusively, and can only be
claimed in the cases and under the circumstances prescribed. Courts
cannot extend the time, or make any exceptions not made in the
statute. Redemption cannot be had in equity,
Mitchell v.
Green, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 101, except as it may be permitted by
statute, and then only under such conditions as it may attach.
Craig v. Flanagan, 21 Ark. 319. Thus it has been held that
the pendency of the civil war and the fact that the owner resided
in another state then in rebellion cannot enlarge his right to
redeem.
Finley v. Brown, 22 Ia, 538. It is enough,
however, for the present case that there was no attempt or even
offer to redeem.
There are several other matters charged by the bill as
objections to this sale unsustained by evidence, and
immaterial.
One more only requires consideration. It is the averment that
when the tax sale was made the military authority of the United
States was not established in and over the County of Shelby, State
of Tennessee, nor was it established in any one county, as required
by law.
The sixth section of the Act of June 7, 1862, to which the Act
of Feb. 6, 1863, was a supplement, enacted that the board of tax
commissioners should
"enter upon the discharge of the duties of their office whenever
the commanding general of the forces of the United States, entering
into an insurrectionary state or district, should have established
the military authority throughout any parish or district or county
of the same."
Manifestly this was only directory to the commissioners. It was
neither a grant nor a limitation of power. By previous sections the
tax had been charged upon every parcel of land in the state, and
the commissioners had been authorized to fix the amount and receive
payment. The sixth section merely directed when their duties should
commence.
Further than this, whether the military authority had been
established throughout Shelby County before the commissioners
entered upon the discharge of their duties, is a political
question, to be answered by the executive branch of the government
and not by the courts. In its nature it was incapable of being
determined by the latter. Successive juries might give to it
different and contradictory answers.
Page 99 U. S. 447
That before the commissioners undertook to enforce the
collection of the tax upon the lot in controversy, it had been
determined by the executive that military authority had been
established in the district, is plain enough. We know historically
that the President had appointed a military governor of the entire
state, and he was in active service as such. No other and civil
authority existed. The commissioners themselves were executive
officers, and their entering upon the duties of their office was an
assumption that the military authority had been established
throughout the district. The act of Congress required no express
and formal determination that it had been so established, and
therefore, whether it had or not, may be inferred from any
executive action that assumed it had. Hence opening an office for
the collection of the tax and proceeding to enforce collection
raised a presumption of the legality of the commissioners' action.
The law presumes that persons acting in a public office have been
duly appointed, and are acting with authority, until the contrary
is shown. And it has been said that if officers of corporations
openly exercise a power which presupposes a delegated authority for
the purpose, the acts of such officers will be deemed rightful, and
the delegated authority will be presumed.
Bank of
United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64.
This is not all of the case in hand. Not only is the averment of
the bill that the military authority of the United States was not
established in the County of Shelby when the tax sale was made
denied by the answer, but the averment is unsustained by proof. The
City of Memphis, it is conceded, was in full and undisputed
possession of the federal army. All that is proved is that the
military lines were around the city, at a distance of a mile or so
from its corporate limits, and that the remaining part of the
county was not in federal occupation. All that is quite consistent
with the fact that federal military authority was established over
the whole county. No conquering army occupies the entire territory
conquered. Its authority is established when it occupies and holds
securely the most important places, and when there is no opposing
governmental authority within the territory. The inability of any
other power to establish and maintain governmental authority
therein is the test.
Page 99 U. S. 448
But if it should be conceded that federal military authority had
not been established throughout the entire County of Shelby,
undeniably it had been over Memphis, where the sale was made and
where the lot sold is situated. That city had territorial limits
and a municipal organization, with taxing power and assessments
distinct from the county of which it was a part. It was in a very
proper sense a "district," and, we think, a district within the
meaning of the acts of Congress. Those acts manifestly had in view
not merely the larger civil divisions of a state or territory, but
"portions of a state," "sections of country," or "conquered
territory." The title of the act of 1862 is, "An Act for the
collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts within the
United States, and for other purposes," and the first section
enacted that
"when in any state or territory, or in any portion of any state
or territory, by reason of insurrection or rebellion, the civil
authority of the government of the United States is obstructed, . .
. the said direct taxes . . . shall be apportioned and charged in
each state or territory, or part thereof, wherein the civil
authority is thus obstructed, upon all the lands and lots of ground
situate therein,"
&c. The second section required the President to declare by
proclamation in what states or "parts of states" the insurrection
existed. These provisions make no reference to civil divisions of a
state. And when we pass to the sixth section, it is observable that
it speaks of an entry of a commanding general into "any such
insurrectionary state or district." Here it is plain the word
"district" means simply a "part" or "portion" of a state, such as
has been previously mentioned. The section then proceeds to direct
the commissioner to open offices when the military authority shall
have been established throughout any county or parish or district
of the same -- that is, throughout any district of an
insurrectionary district or state. It seems almost an inevitable
conclusion that "taxing districts" was meant, and not alone the
large divisions, such as counties or Louisiana parishes. "Taxing
districts" were in view, as appears also from the thirteenth
section, which contemplated a reference by the commissioners to the
records of assessments and valuations previously made, and such
districts for taxation had a well known meaning when
Page 99 U. S. 449
Congress passed the law. They are portions of a state's
territory, described for the purpose of assessment, not necessarily
political subdivisions for any other purpose. Our conclusion,
therefore, is that the City of Memphis was a district within the
meaning of the sixth section of the act of 1862, and for the
various reasons we have given, we hold that the objection which we
are now considering to the validity of the appellant's title is
without foundation. Upon this mainly, if not alone, the court below
appears to have rested its judgment.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee will be reversed,
and the record remitted with instructions to direct a dismissal of
the bill, and it is
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD dissented.