1. The admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts of the
United Staten does not extend to seizures made on land.
2. The Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863, 12
Stat. 820, did not repeal the Act approved July 17, 1862,
id., 589, entitled "An Act to suppress insurrection, to
punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property
of rebels, and for other purposes."
3. The order of the President for the seizure, under said Act of
July 17, 1862, of the property of persons engaged in armed
rebellion against the United States, or in aiding and abetting the
rebellion, is a prerequisite to the exercise by the district court
of its jurisdiction to adjudge the forfeiture and decree the
condemnation of such property.
4. Cotton found on land in Mississippi was, Feb. 18, 1863,
seized by the naval forces of the United Staten, without the order
of the President, and delivered by an officer of the navy to the
marshal of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois.
A libel was filed in the district court for that district, alleging
as the ground of seizure that the cotton belonged to a person in
armed rebellion against the United States. The cotton was sold and
a decree rendered whereby one half of the proceeds was paid into
the Treasury of the United States and the other half ordered to be
paid to the officer as informer, who declined to accept it, and the
check therefor was deposited with the assistant treasurer at St.
Louis, on whom it had been drawn. At the instance of the admiral,
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting in admiralty
took jurisdiction of the case, and ordered the check to be
deposited with the assistant treasurer at Washington, and the money
to remain in his hands subject to the further order of the court.
The check was so deposited, and the court by its decree distributed
the money to the captors.
Held that the decrees were void,
and that the owner of the cotton was entitled to recover the net
proceeds of the sale of it.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The claimant is the surviving executor of the will of John C.
Jenkins, who died in 1855, leaving four minor children, and
possessed of a plantation in the State of Mississippi, on the
Mississippi River, above Vicksburg. By directions in the will, the
plantation was to be cultivated by the representatives of the
estate for the benefit of the testator's children.
Page 99 U. S. 373
On the 18th of February, 1863, there was on this plantation
belonging to the estate and raised thereon according to the
provisions of the will, a quantity of cotton, one hundred and
sixty-eight bales of which were on that day seized by the naval
forces of the United States, and taken on board of a government
steamer. The cotton was then carried to Johnson's Landing, on the
river, and thence to Milliken's Bend, where, with other cotton,
making in all two hundred and fifty-eight bales, it was shipped on
board of the transport
Rowena, by order of Admiral Porter,
who was in command of the naval forces on the Mississippi.
In March following, the admiral reported the capture of this
cotton to the Secretary of the Navy, and was informed, in reply,
that all property captured as "prize property" must be sent to a
prize court for adjudication, and be disposed of as the court might
decree; and that the disposition of captured "abandoned property"
was provided for by an Act of Congress of March 12, 1863. The
cotton was thereupon sent to Cairo, where it arrived on the 7th of
April, 1863, and was delivered to Captain Pennock, commanding at
the station, and was by him turned over to the United States
marshal of the district. Soon afterwards, upon information given by
Captain Pennock, the United States district attorney filed a libel
in the district court of the United States for the Southern
District of Illinois for the condemnation and sale of the cotton as
forfeited to the United States. The libel stated that the seizure
was made by order of Admiral Porter, on the Mississippi River, that
river "being a public water of the United States, navigable to the
sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden," and that the seizure
was made for violation of the Non-Intercourse Act of July 13, 1861,
and the proclamation of the President of Aug. 16, 1861, and because
the property belonged to a person in armed rebellion against the
government of the United States; and that the case was within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the court. The case then proceeded, in
accordance with the forms of admiralty practice and entitled as in
admiralty, to a decree condemning the property as forfeited to the
United States. The decree was subsequently opened as to part of the
property, and the libel was amended by striking out the first
allegation
Page 99 U. S. 374
as to the Non-Intercourse Act, which was inapplicable to the
cotton belonging to the estate of Jenkins and seized on his
plantation.
Pending the proceedings, the cotton was sold, and by the decree
one half of the proceeds was paid into the Treasury, and the other
half ordered to be paid to Captain Pennock, as informer, to whom a
check for that amount was delivered. Captain Pennock handed the
check to Admiral Porter, his superior officer. The admiral,
unwilling to receive or keep it as informer, sent it to the
Secretary of the Navy, requesting that the money might be
distributed among the officers and crews of the Mississippi
squadron as captors. The secretary refused to distribute the money,
and returned the check to the admiral, and he deposited it with the
assistant treasurer at St. Louis, upon whom it was drawn.
Treating the proceedings in the district court as in admiralty,
they are without validity. The admiralty jurisdiction of the
district court extends only to seizures on navigable waters, not to
seizures on land. The difference is important, as cases in
admiralty are tried without a jury, whilst in cases at law the
parties are entitled to a jury, unless one is waived.
United States v.
Betsey, 4 Cranch 443;
The
Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391.
But it is contended by the Attorney General that the
proceedings, however loose and defective in form, can be sustained
under the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, upon the charge that
the property was seized as belonging to a person in armed rebellion
against the government of the United States. Assuming that upon a
vague allegation of this kind, without designation of the owner,
and with an erroneous statement in the libel of the place of
seizure, a valid decree of condemnation could be rendered under the
act of 1862, previous to the passage of the Captured and Abandoned
Property Act, it is contended on the part of the claimant that by
the passage of this act the provisions for confiscating property,
in the act of 1862, are impliedly repealed, as being repugnant to
those of the latter act. We do not think so. We agree with the
Court of Claims on this point.
The whole scope and purpose of the two acts are different.
Page 99 U. S. 375
The first act provides for the punishment of treason, the
seizure, condemnation, and sale of property of persons engaged in
the rebellion, and the payment of the proceeds into the Treasury,
to be applied to the support of the Army of the United States. It
was directed against persons committing certain overt acts of
treason, and against their property. Its object was to punish the
persons and to confiscate their property, and contemplated in the
latter proceedings equally as in the former the intervention of
judicial authority.
The second act was designed to reach all property, with few
exceptions, in the insurgent states, seized or taken from hostile
possession by the military or naval forces of the United States,
whether belonging to friends or enemies, as well as property taken
while the owner was voluntarily absent and engaged in aiding or
encouraging the rebellion. It provided for a sale of the property
thus captured or abandoned without judicial proceedings, and the
payment of the proceeds into the Treasury, allowing the loyal owner
who had never given aid or comfort to the rebellion the privilege
of pursuing the proceeds in the Court of Claims. There was also a
marked difference in the effect of the proceedings under the two
acts. The Confiscation Act authorized proceedings only against the
interest of the disloyal owner; the Captured and Abandoned Property
Act directed the seizure of the property itself; and its sale
carried the title against all claimants. The former also took the
property wherever it was found; the latter only in the insurgent
States. The former, as respects property, had all the merciless
features inseparable from a war measure, and treated as enemies,
whose property could be confiscated, all residents within the
insurgent States; the latter had this beneficent provision, that it
made a discrimination among those whom the rule of international
law classes as enemies, in favor of those who, though resident
within the hostile territory, maintained in fact a loyal adhesion
to the government. The two acts can stand together, and the
Confiscation Act be enforced as to all property seized under its
provisions. The position of the claimant, as to an implied repeal
from a supposed repugnancy of the provisions of the two acts, is
not, therefore, tenable.
But upon another ground, apparent upon the face of the
Page 99 U. S. 376
record, the proceedings and decree of the district court cannot
be sustained. There was no previous seizure of the property under
any order of the executive, and such seizure was an essential
preliminary to give jurisdiction to the court to adjudge its
forfeiture and decree its condemnation. The executive seizure is
the foundation of all subsequent proceedings under the Confiscation
Act. Such is the plain import of the law, and it was so held by
this court in
Pelham v.
Rose, 9 Wall. 103, and reaffirmed in
The Confiscation
Cases, 20 Wall. 92. Here the property was seized by
the naval forces of the United States upon the notion that being
property in the enemies' country, it was subject to capture as a
prize of war. The Secretary of the Navy, when informed of the
capture, instructed the admiral in command that the disposition of
captured abandoned property was provided for by the Act of March
12, 1863, evidently regarding the property as coming within that
class, if not "prize property." No seizure by executive order is
alleged in the libel, for none such was made. The seizure alleged
is one made by the naval forces, and even that is stated to have
been made at a place other than the plantation of the testator. No
validity can be ascribed to a decree by a court which thus never
had the property rightfully before it for condemnation. For
one-half of the proceeds of the sale paid into the Treasury under
the decree the claimant is, therefore, clearly entitled to
judgment.
As to the remaining half also we have no doubt. The check which
Captain Pennock received under the decree of the court included not
only one-half of the proceeds of the claimant's cotton, but of
cotton libeled in other cases, amounting in the whole to
$59,943.42. The admiral of the squadron to whom Captain Pennock
turned over the check, desired, as already stated, that the money
should be distributed among the officers and crews of the
Mississippi squadron as captors; and when the Secretary of the Navy
declined to make the distribution, the deposited the check with the
assistant treasurer at St. Louis, upon whom it was drawn.
Subsequently, in July 1864, the admiral invoked the aid of the
district court of the District of Columbia to make the
distribution, and placed in the hands of the district attorney a
certificate stating that the amount
Page 99 U. S. 377
decreed to him as informer, namely, $59,943.42, was on deposit
with the assistant treasurer at St. Louis, and expressing his wish
as to the distribution of the money, accompanying the certificate
with a check for the amount. The district court took jurisdiction
in admiralty of the case, and ordered the check to be deposited by
the marshal with the assistant treasurer at Washington, and that
the money should remain in his hands subject to the further order
of the court. The check was accordingly deposited with the
assistant treasurer, and by a subsequent decree the court ordered
the money to be distributed as desired, after the payment of
certain costs and disbursements incurred in the proceedings.
It is not a question upon which contention can arise that these
proceedings of the District Court of the District of Columbia were
extrajurisdictional from beginning to end; and indeed it is
apparent from inspection of the decree that the court, assuming as
valid the action of the Illinois court, proceeded to distribute the
money more upon the request of the admiral than upon any authority
conferred by law. The decree of distribution signed by the Chief
Justice of the district court shows the kind disposition of a
learned magistrate to carry out the generous intentions of a
gallant admiral to distribute among the officers and crew under his
command money awarded to him as informer, but which he refused to
take in that character, without assuming any authority beyond what
the admiral implored him to exercise. But as the Illinois court had
no jurisdiction to award to the admiral or his captain the money
thus generously distributed, we are of opinion that the claimant
must have judgment for the amount as well as for the other moiety
of the proceeds of the cotton belonging to the estate of his
testator.
In the views thus expressed we have merely stated, in brief, the
conclusions of the Court of Claims. In the opinion of that court,
the questions are so fully, clearly, and exhaustively discussed as
to leave nothing to be added.
Judgment affirmed.