The United States, whether named in a state statute of
limitations or not, is not bound thereby, and when it sues in one
of its own courts, such a statute is not within the provisions of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 which declare that the laws of the
states, in trials at common law, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply.
The United States sued, Dec. 6, 1875, Clark W. Thompson, and his
sureties on his official bond, as superintendent of Indian affairs
in Minnesota. The breach alleged was that he, as such officer, had,
prior to March 30, 1865, received $10,562.27 of the moneys of the
United States, which he had neglected and refused to account for,
and had converted to his own use.
The defendants pleaded that the cause of action did not accrue
within ten years next preceding the commencement of the suit. The
United States demurred. The demurrer was overruled and judgment
rendered for the defendants. The United States has brought the
judgment here for review.
The statutes of Minnesota, c. 66, tit. 11, set. 6, provide that
an action upon a contract, express or implied, unless it be founded
upon some judgment or decree of a court, shall be barred if not
commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues. 2
Minn.Stat. at Large 782.
The twelfth section of that title further provides that
"The limitations prescribed in this chapter for the commencement
of actions shall apply to the same actions when brought in the name
of the state, or in the name of any officer, or otherwise, for the
benefit of the state, in the same manner as to actions brought by
citizens."
Id., 783.
While a territory, the following statute was in force in
Minnesota: "The limitations prescribed in this chapter apply to
actions brought in the name of the United States, in the same
manner as to actions by private parties." Rev.Stats. of 1851, c.
70, sec. 13, p. 331; Revision of 1858, p. 533, sec. 13.
This statute was first passed by the Territorial Legislature of
Wisconsin, and was continued in force over that portion of it
Page 98 U. S. 487
which, in 1848, became the Territory of Minnesota. It was
modified, several years after Minnesota became a state, to read as
it now does. When Wisconsin became a state, its legislation
underwent the same change.
Page 98 U. S. 488
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE, after stating the facts, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
This case turns upon a statute of the State of Minnesota which
bars actions
ex contractu like this within a specified
time, and the same limitation is applied by the statute to the
state. The United States are not named in it. The court below held
that the statute applied to the United States and rendered judgment
against them.
There is no opinion in the record, and we are at a loss to
imagine the reasoning by which the result announced was reached.
The federal courts have been in existence nearly a century. The
reports of their decisions are numerous. They involve a great
variety of questions and the fruit of much learned research. We
have been able to find but two cases in the lower federal courts in
which it appears the question was raised. They are
United
States v. Hoar, 2 Mas. 311, and
United States v.
Williams, 5 McLean 133. In both it was held without the
intimation of a doubt that a state statute cannot bar the United
States. The same doctrine has been several times laid down by this
Court, but it seems always to have been taken for granted, and in
no instance to have been discussed either by counsel or the court.
United States v.
Buford, 3 Pet. 12;
Lindsey v.
Miller's Lessee, 6 Pet. 666;
Gibson v.
Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92.
This state of things indicates a general conviction throughout
the country that there is no foundation for a different
proposition. There are also adjudications in the state reports upon
the subject, but they concur with those to which we have referred.
Among the earliest of them is
Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass.
521. In that case, Chief Justice Parsons said: "No laches can be
imputed to the government, and against it no time runs so as to bar
its rights." The examination of the subject by Judge Story in
United States v. Hoar, supra, is a fuller one than we have
found anywhere else.
Page 98 U. S. 489
He and Parsons are in accord. So far as we are advised, the case
before us stands alone in American jurisprudence. It certainly has
no precedent in the reported adjudications of the federal
courts.
The United States possess other attributes of sovereignty
resting also upon the basis of universal consent and recognition.
They cannot be sued without their consent.
United
States v. Clark, 8 Pet. 436. If they sue, and a
balance is found in favor of the defendant, no judgment can be
rendered against them, either for such balance or in any case for
costs.
United States v.
Boyd, 5 How. 29;
Reeside v.
Walker, 11 How. 272. A judgment in their favor
cannot be enjoined.
Hill v. United
States, 9 How. 386. Laches, however gross, cannot
be imputed to them.
United States v.
Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720. There is no presumption
of payment against them arising from lapse of time.
United
States v. Williams, supra. They can maintain a suit in their
own name upon a nonnegotiable claim assigned to them.
United
States v. White, 2 Hill (N.Y.), 59.
The rule of
nullum tempus occurit regi has existed as
an element of the English law from a very early period. It is
discussed in Bracton, and has come down to the present time. It is
not necessary to advert to the qualifications which successive
parliaments have applied to it.
The common law fixed no time as to the bringing of actions.
Limitations derive their authority from statutes. The King was held
never to be included, unless expressly named. No laches was
imputable to him. These exemptions were founded upon considerations
of public policy. It was deemed important that, while the sovereign
was engrossed by the cares and duties of his office, the public
should not suffer by the negligence of his servants.
"In a representative government, where the people do not and
cannot act in a body, where their power is delegated to others, and
must of necessity be exercised by them, if exercised at all, the
reason for applying these principles is equally cogent."
When the colonies achieved their independence, each one took
these prerogatives, which had belonged to the crown, and when the
national Constitution was adopted, they were imparted to the new
government as incidents of the sovereignty thus
Page 98 U. S. 490
created. It is an exception equally applicable to all
governments.
United States v. Hoar, supra; People v.
Gilbert, 18 Johns. (N.Y.) 227; Bac.Abr., tit. Limitation of
Actions;
id., tit. Prerog. E. 5, 6, 7; 5 Com.Dig.
Parliament, R. 8; Chitty, Law of Prerogatives, 379.
Congress, like the British Parliament, has made a number of
specific limitations both in civil and criminal cases. They will be
found in the Revised Statutes, and need not be here repeated.
The only argument suggested by the learned counsel for the
defendants in error is that the Judiciary Act of 1789, reenacted in
the late revision of the statutes, declares
"That the laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution and treaties of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply."
It is insisted that the case in hand is within this statute. To
this there are several answers.
The United States, not being named in the statute of Minnesota,
are not within its provisions. It does not and cannot "apply" to
them. If it did, it would be beyond the power of the state to pass
it, a gross usurpation, and void. It is not to be presumed that
such was the intention of the state legislature in passing the act,
as it certainly was not of Congress in enacting the law of 1789.
United States v. Hoar, supra; 34 U. S. United
States, 9 Pet. 182.
The federal courts are instruments competently created by the
nation for national purposes. The states can exercise no power over
them or their proceedings except so far as Congress shall allow.
This subject was considered in
Farmers' & Mechanics'
National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, and we
need not pursue it further upon this occasion.
The exemption of the United States from suits except as they
themselves may provide rests upon the same foundation as the rule
of
nullum tempus with respect to them. If the states can
pass statutes of limitation binding upon the federal government,
they can by like means make it suable within their respective
jurisdictions. The evils of such a state of things are too obvious
to require remark.
Page 98 U. S. 491
But, viewing the subject in the light of considerations
ab
inconvenienti, we need not look beyond the consequences of the
ruling, if sustained, of the court below. The doctrine is alike
applicable to civil and criminal actions. There are thirty-eight
states in the Union. The limitations in like cases may be different
in each state, and they may be changed at pleasure from time to
time. The government of the Union would in this respect be at the
mercy of the states. How that mercy would in many cases be
exercised it is not difficult to foresee. The constitutional
relations of the head and the members would be reversed, and
confusion and other serious evils would not fail to ensue.
The judgment of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause
remanded with directions to proceed in conformity with this
opinion, and it is
So ordered.