The remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract is
made and is to be performed is a part of its obligation, and any
subsequent law of the state which so affects that remedy as
substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is
forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and therefore
void.
This action was commenced by Leonidas C. Edwards, March 31,
1869, in the Superior Court of Granville County, North Carolina,
against Archibald Kearzey, to recover the possession of certain
lands in that county. They were levied upon and sold by the sheriff
by virtue of executions sued out upon judgments rendered against
Kearzey on contracts which matured before April 24, 1868, when the
Constitution of North Carolina took effect, the tenth article of
which exempts from sale under execution or other final process,
issued for the collection of any debt, the personal property of any
resident of the state, and "every homestead, and the dwelling and
buildings used therewith, not exceeding in value $1,000, to be
selected by the owner thereof." Prior to that date, under statutes
since repealed, certain specified articles of small value, and such
other property as the freeholders appointed for that purpose might
deem necessary for the comfort and support of the debtor's family,
not exceeding in value $50 at cash valuation, and fifty acres of
land in the county and two acres in the town of not greater value
than $500, were exempt from execution. The lands in question were
owned and occupied by Kearzey as a homestead, and as such were set
off to him pursuant to the mode prescribed by the legislation for
carrying the constitutional provision into effect. He had no other
lands, and they did not exceed $1,000 in value.
Page 96 U. S. 596
Edwards was the purchaser at the sheriff's sale of said lands,
and received a deed therefor.
The court found for Kearzey, upon the ground that so much of
said art. 10 as exempts from sale, under execution or other final
process obtained on any debt, land of the debtor of the value of
$1,000, and the statutes enacted in pursuance thereof, embrace
within their operation executions for debts which were contracted
before the adoption of said constitution, and that said article and
said statutes, when so interpreted and enforced, are not repugnant
to Art. I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution of the United States, which
ordains that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation
of contracts.
Judgment having been rendered upon the finding, it was, on
appeal, affirmed by the supreme court of the state. Edwards then
sued out this writ of error.
Page 96 U. S. 598
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Constitution of North Carolina of 1868 took effect on the
24th of April in that year. Secs. 1 and 2 of art. 10 declare that
personal property of any resident of the state, of the value of
$500, to be selected by such resident, shall be exempt from sale
under execution or other final process issued for the collection of
any debt, and that every homestead, and the buildings used
therewith, not exceeding in value $1,000, to be selected by the
owner, or, in lieu thereof, at the option of the owner, any lot in
a city, town, or village, with the buildings used thereon, owned
and occupied by any resident of the state, and not exceeding in
value $1,000, shall be exempt in like manner from sale for the
collection of any debt under final process.
On the 22d of August, 1868, the legislature passed an act which
prescribed the mode of laying off the homestead, and setting off
the personal property so exempted by the constitution. On the 7th
of April, 1869, another act was passed which repealed the prior act
and prescribed a different mode of doing what the prior act
provided for. This latter act has not been repealed or
modified.
Three several judgments were recovered against the defendant in
error, one on the 15th of December, 1868, upon a bond dated the
25th of September, 1865, another on the 10th of October, 1868, upon
a bond dated Feb. 27, 1866, and the third on the 7th of January,
1868, for a debt due prior to that time. Two of these judgments
were docketed and became liens upon the premises in controversy on
the 16th of December, 1868. The other one was docketed and became
such lien on the 18th of January, 1869. When the debts were
contracted for which the judgments were rendered, the exemption
laws in force were the Acts of Jan. 1, 1854, and of Feb. 16, 1859.
The first-named
Page 96 U. S. 599
act exempted certain enumerated articles of inconsiderable
value, and
"such other property as the freeholders appointed for that
purpose might deem necessary for the comfort and support of the
debtor's family, not exceeding in value $50, at cash
valuation."
By the act of 1859, the exemption was extended to fifty acres of
land in the county, or two acres in a town, of not greater value
than $500.
On the 22d of January, 1869, the premises in controversy were
duly set off to the defendant in error as a homestead. He had no
other real estate, and the premises did not exceed $1,000 in value.
On the 6th of March, 1869, the sheriff, under executions issued on
the judgments, sold the premises to the plaintiff in error, and
thereafter executed to him a deed in due form. The regularity of
the sale is not contested.
The Act of Aug. 22, 1868, was then in force. The acts of 1854
and 1859 had been repealed.
Wilson v. Sparks, 72 N.C. 208.
No point is made upon these acts by the counsel upon either side.
We shall therefore pass them by without further remark.
The plaintiff in error brought this action in the Superior Court
of Granville County to recover possession of the premises so sold
and conveyed to him. That court adjudged that the exemption created
by the constitution and the act of 1868 protected the property from
liability under the judgments, and that the sale and conveyance by
the sheriff were therefore void. Judgment was given accordingly.
The supreme court of the state affirmed the judgment. The plaintiff
in error thereupon brought the case here for review. The only
federal question presented by the record is whether the exemption
was valid as regards contracts made before the adoption of the
Constitution of 1868.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists upon the negative
of this proposition. The counsel upon the other side, frankly
conceding several minor points, maintains the affirmative view. Our
remarks will be confined to this subject.
The Constitution of the United States declares that "No state
shall pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of
contracts."
A contract is the agreement of minds, upon a sufficient
consideration,
Page 96 U. S. 600
that something specified shall be done or shall not be done.
The lexical definition of "impair" is "to make worse; to
diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength; to lessen in
power; to weaken; to enfeeble; to deteriorate." Webster's Dict.
"Obligation" is defined to be "the act of obliging or binding;
that which obligates; the binding power of a vow, promise, oath, or
contract," &c.
Id.
"The word is derived from the Latin word
obligatio,
tying up, and that from the verb
obligo, to bind or tie
up; to engage by the ties of a promise or oath, or form of law; and
obligo is compounded of the verb
ligo, to tie or
bind fast and the preposition
ob, which is prefixed to
increase its meaning."
Blair v. Williams and
Lapsley v. Brashears, 4
Litt. (Ky.) 65.
The obligation of a contract includes every thing within its
obligatory scope. Among these elements, nothing is more important
than the means of enforcement. This is the breath of its vital
existence. Without it, the contract, as such, in the view of the
law, ceases to be and falls into the class of those "imperfect
obligations," as they are termed, which depend for their
fulfillment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom they
rest. The ideas of right and remedy are inseparable. "Want of right
and want of remedy are the same thing." 1 Bac.Abr., tit. Actions in
General, letter B.
In
Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, it was said:
"A statute of frauds embracing preexisting parol contracts not
before required to be in writing would affect its validity. A
statute declaring that the word 'ton' should, in prior as well as
subsequent contracts, be held to mean half or double the weight
before prescribed would affect its construction. A statute
providing that a previous contract of indebtment may be
extinguished by a process of bankruptcy would involve its
discharge, and a statute forbidding the sale of any of the debtor's
property under a judgment upon such a contract would relate to the
remedy."
It cannot be doubted either upon principle or authority that
each of such laws would violate the obligation of the contract,
Page 96 U. S. 601
and the last not less than the first. These propositions seem to
us too clear to require discussion. It is also the settled doctrine
of this Court that the laws which subsist at the time and place of
making a contract enter into and form a part of it as if they were
expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This rule
embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction,
discharge, and enforcement.
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy,
supra; 43 U. S.
Hayward, 2 How. 608.
In
Green v. Biddle,
8 Wheat. 1, this Court said, touching the point here under
consideration:
"It is no answer that the acts of Kentucky now in question are
regulations of the remedy, and not of the right to the lands. If
these acts so change the nature and extent of existing remedies as
materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they
are just as much a violation of the compact as if they overturned
his rights and interests."
"One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is, that its
value has by legislation been diminished. It is not by the
Constitution to be impaired at all. This is not a question of
degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its
obligation -- dispensing with any part of its force."
Planters' Bank v.
Sharp, 6 How. 301.
It is to be understood that the encroachment thus denounced must
be material. If it be not material, it will be regarded as of no
account.
These rules are axioms in the jurisprudence of this Court. We
think they rest upon a solid foundation. Do they not cover this
case, and are they not decisive of the question before us?
We will, however, further examine the subject.
It is the established law of North Carolina that stay laws are
void, because they are in conflict with the national Constitution.
Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N.C. 112;
Jones v.
Crittenden, 1 Law Repos. (N.C.) 385;
Barnes v.
Barnes, 8 Jones (N.C.) L. 366. This ruling is clearly correct.
Such laws change a term of the contract by postponing the time of
payment. This impairs its obligation by making it less valuable to
the creditor. But it does this solely by operating on the remedy.
The contract is not otherwise touched by the offending law. Let us
suppose a case. A party recovers two judgments
Page 96 U. S. 602
-- one against A., the other against B. -- each for the sum of
$1,500, upon a promissory note. Each debtor has property worth the
amount of the judgment and no more. The legislature thereafter
passes a law declaring that all past and future judgments shall be
collected "in four equal annual installments." At the same time,
another law is passed which exempts from execution the debtor's
property to the amount of $1,500. The court holds the former law
void and the latter valid. Is not such a result a legal solecism?
Can the two judgments be reconciled? One law postpones the remedy,
the other destroys it, except in the contingency that the debtor
shall acquire more property -- a thing that may not occur and that
cannot occur if he die before the acquisition is made. Both laws
involve the same principle and rest on the same basis. They must
stand or fall together. The concession that the former is invalid
cuts away the foundation from under the latter. If a state may stay
the remedy for one fixed period, however short, it may for another,
however long. And if it may exempt property to the amount here in
question, it may do so to any amount. This, as regards the mode of
impairment we are considering, would annul the inhibition of the
Constitution and set at naught the salutary restriction it was
intended to impose.
The power to tax involves the power to destroy.
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 416. The power to modify at
discretion the remedial part of a contract is the same thing.
But it is said that imprisonment for debt may be abolished in
all cases, and that the time prescribed by a statute of limitations
may be abridged.
Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. Cooper's
Justinian 658; 12 Tables, Tab. 3. It has descended with the stream
of time. It is a punishment, rather than a remedy. It is right for
fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit of the honest
debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and dooms
him, while it lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud,
it is the opposite of a remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice
when such a blot is removed from the statute book.
But upon the power of a state, even in this class of cases,
Page 96 U. S. 603
see the strong dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Washington, in
Mason v.
Haile, 12 Wheat. 370.
Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. They are
necessary to the welfare of society. The lapse of time constantly
carries with it the means of proof. The public as well as
individuals are interested in the principle upon which they
proceed. They do not impair the remedy, but only require its
application within the time specified. If the period limited be
unreasonably short and designed to defeat the remedy upon
preexisting contracts, which was part of their obligation, we
should pronounce the statute void. Otherwise we should abdicate the
performance of one of our most important duties. The obligation of
a contract cannot be substantially impaired in any was by a state
law. This restriction is beneficial to those whom it restrains, as
well as to others. No community can have any higher public interest
than in the faithful performance of contracts and the honest
administration of justice. The inhibition of the Constitution is
wholly prospective. The states may legislate as to contracts
thereafter made as they may see fit. It is only those in existence
when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its
effect.
In
Bronson v.
Kinzie, 1 How. 311, the subject of exemptions was
touched upon but not discussed. There, a mortgage had been executed
in Illinois. Subsequently, the legislature passed a law giving the
mortgagor a year to redeem after sale under a decree and requiring
the land to be appraised, and not to be sold for less than
two-thirds of the appraised value. The law was held to be void in
both particulars as to preexisting contracts. What is said as to
exemptions is entirely
obiter, but, coming from so high a
source, it is entitled to the most respectful consideration. The
Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taney, said a state
"may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements
of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of
necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not
be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this
description have always been considered in every civilized
community as properly belonging to the remedy to be executed or not
by every sovereignty, according to its own views of policy and
humanity."
He quotes with approbation
Page 96 U. S. 604
the passage which we have quoted from
Green v. Biddle.
To guard against possible misconstruction, he is careful to say
further:
"Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according
to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair
the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it
is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy, or
directly on the contract itself. In either case, it is prohibited
by the Constitution."
The learned Chief Justice seems to have had in his mind the
maxim "
de minimis" &c. Upon no other ground can any
exemption be justified. "Policy and humanity" are dangerous guides
in the discussion of a legal proposition. He who follows them far
is apt to bring back the means of error and delusion. The
prohibition contains no qualification, and we have no judicial
authority to interpolate any. Our duty is simply to execute it.
Where the facts are undisputed, it is always the duty of the
court to pronounce the legal result.
Merchants'
Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604. Here there is no
question of legislative discretion involved. With the
constitutional prohibition, even as expounded by the late Chief
Justice, before us on one hand, and on the other the state
constitution of 1868, and the laws passed to carry out its
provisions, we cannot hesitate to hold that both the latter do
seriously impair the obligation of the several contracts here in
question. We say, as was said in
Gunn
v. Barry, 15 Wall. 622, that no one can cast his
eyes upon the new exemptions thus created without being at once
struck with their excessive character and hence their fatal
magnitude. The claim for the retrospective efficacy of the
Constitution or the laws cannot be supported. Their validity as to
contracts subsequently made admits of no doubt.
Bronson v.
Kinzie, supra.
The history of the national Constitution throws a strong light
upon this subject. Between the close of the war of the revolution
and the adoption of that instrument, unprecedented pecuniary
distress existed throughout the country.
"The discontents and uneasiness, arising in a great measure from
the embarrassment in which a great number of individuals were
involved, continued to become more extensive. At length,
Page 96 U. S. 605
two great parties were formed in every state, which were
distinctly marked, and which pursued distinct objects with
systematic arrangement."
5 Marshall's Life of Washington 85. One party sought to maintain
the inviolability of contracts, the other to impair or destroy
them.
"The emission of paper money, the delay of legal proceedings,
and the suspension of the collection of taxes were the fruits of
the rule of the latter, wherever they were completely
dominant."
Id., 86.
"The system called justice was, in some of the states, iniquity
reduced to elementary principles. . . . In some of the states,
creditors were treated as outlaws. Bankrupts were armed with legal
authority to be persecutors, and, by the shock of all confidence,
society was shaken to its foundations."
Fisher Ames's Works (ed. of 1809) 120.
"Evidences of acknowledged claims on the public would not
command in the market more than one-fifth of their nominal value.
The bonds of solvent men, payable at no very distant day, could not
be negotiated but at a discount of thirty, forty, or fifty percent
per annum. Landed property would rarely command any price, and
sales of the most common articles for ready money could only be
made at enormous and ruinous depreciation."
"State legislatures in too many instances yielded to the
necessities of their constituents and passed laws by which
creditors were compelled to wait for the payment of their just
demands on the tender of security or to take property at a
valuation, or paper money falsely purporting to be the
representative of specie."
Ramsey's Hist.U.S. 77.
"The effects of these laws interfering between debtors and
creditors were extensive. They destroyed public credit and
confidence between man and man, injured the morals of the people,
and in many instances ensured and aggravated the ruin of the
unfortunate debtors for whose temporary relief they were brought
forward."
2 Ramsey's Hist.South Carolina 429.
Besides the large issues of continental money, nearly all the
states issued their own bills of credit. In many instances, the
amount was very large. Phillips's Historical Sketches of American
Paper Currency, 2d Series, 29. The depreciation of both became
enormous. Only one percent of the "continental money" was assumed
by the new government. Nothing more
Page 96 U. S. 606
was ever paid upon it.
Id., 194. Act of Aug. 4, 1790,
sec. 4, 1 Stat. 140. It is needless to trace the history of the
emissions by the states.
The treaty of peace with Great Britain declared that
"the creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful
impediment to the recovery of the full amount in sterling money of
all
bona fide debts heretofore contracted."
The British minister complained earnestly to the American
Secretary of State of violations of this guaranty. Twenty-two
instances of laws in conflict with it in different states were
specifically named. 1 Amer.State Papers, pp. 195, 196, 199, and
237. In South Carolina,
"laws were passed in which property of every kind was made a
legal tender in payment of debts, although payable according to
contract in gold and silver. Other laws installed the debt, so that
of sums already due only a third, and afterwards only a fifth, was
securable in law."
2 Ramsey's Hist.S.C. 429. Many other states passed laws of a
similar character. The obligation of the contract was as often
invaded after judgment as before. The attacks were quite as common
and effective in one way as in the other. To meet these evils in
their various phases, the national Constitution declared that
"No state should emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold
and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts, or pass any law
. . . impairing the obligation of contracts."
All these provisions grew out of previous abuses. 2 Curtis's
Hist. of the Const. 366.
See also the Federalist, Nos. 7
and 44. In the number last mentioned, Mr. Madison said that such
laws were not only forbidden by the Constitution, but were
"contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to
every principle of sound legislation."
The treatment of the malady was severe, but the cure was
complete.
"No sooner did the new government begin its auspicious course
than order seemed to arise out of confusion. Commerce and industry
awoke, and were cheerful at their labors, for credit and confidence
awoke with them. Everywhere was the appearance of prosperity, and
the only fear was that its progress was too rapid to consist with
the purity and simplicity of ancient manners."
Fisher Ames' Works (ed. of 1809) 122.
Page 96 U. S. 607
"Public credit was reanimated. The owners of property and
holders of money freely parted with both, well knowing that no
future law could impair the obligation of the contract."
2 Ramsey's History of South Carolina 433.
Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in
Bronson v. Kinzie, supra,
speaking of the protection of the remedy, said: "It is this
protection which the clause of the Constitution now in question
mainly intended to secure."
The point decided in
Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 1 Wheat. 518, had not, it is believed,
when the Constitution was adopted, occurred to anyone. There is no
trace of it in the Federalist, nor in any other contemporaneous
publication. It was first made and judicially decided under the
Constitution in that case. Its novelty was admitted by Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall, but it was met and conclusively answered in his
opinion.
We think the views we have expressed carry out the intent of
contracts and the intent of the Constitution. The obligation of the
former is placed under the safeguard of the latter. No state can
invade it, and Congress is incompetent to authorize such invasion.
Its position is impregnable, and will be so while the organic law
of the nation remains as it is. The trust touching the subject with
which this Court is charged is one of magnitude and delicacy. We
must always be careful to see that there is neither nonfeasance nor
misfeasance on our part.
The importance of the point involved in this controversy induces
us to restate succinctly the conclusions at which we have arrived,
and which will be the ground of our judgment.
The remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract is
made and is to be performed is a part of its obligation, and any
subsequent law of the state which so affects that remedy as
substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is
forbidden by the Constitution, and is therefore void.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina will be
reversed and the cause will be remanded with directions to proceed
in conformity to this opinion, and it is.
So ordered.
Page 96 U. S. 608
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD and MR. JUSTICE HUNT concurred in the
judgment. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD.
I concur in the judgment in this case, upon the ground that the
state law, passed subsequent to the time when the debt in question
was contracted, so changed the nature and extent of the remedy for
enforcing the payment of the same as it existed at the time as
materially to impair the rights and interests which the complaining
party acquired by virtue of the contract merged in the
judgment.
Where an appropriate remedy exists for the enforcement of the
contract at the time it was made, the state legislature cannot
deprive the party of such a remedy, nor can the legislature append
to the right such restrictions or conditions as to render its
exercise ineffectual or unavailing. State legislatures may change
existing remedies and substitute others in their place, and if the
new remedy is not unreasonable and will enable the party to enforce
his rights without new and burden some restrictions, the party is
bound to pursue the new remedy, the rule being that a state
legislature may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in
relation to past contracts as well as those made subsequent to the
new regulation.
Examples where the principle is universally accepted may be
given to confirm the proposition. Statutes for the abolition of
imprisonment for debt are of that character, and so are statutes
requiring instruments to be recorded, and statutes of
limitation.
All admit that imprisonment for debt may be abolished in respect
to past contracts as well as future, and it is equally well settled
that the time within which a claim or entry shall be barred may be
shortened without just complaint from any quarter. Statutes of the
kind have often been passed, and it has never been held that such
an alteration in such a statute impaired the obligation of a prior
contract unless the period allowed in the new law was so short and
unreasonable as to amount to a substantial denial of the remedy to
enforce the right. Angell, Lim. (6th ed.), sec. 22;
Jackson v.
Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280.
Beyond all doubt, a state legislature may regulate all such
Page 96 U. S. 609
proceedings in its courts at pleasure, subject only to the
condition that the new regulation shall not in any material respect
impair the just rights of any party to a preexisting contract.
Authorities to that effect are numerous and decisive, and it is
equally clear that a state legislature may, if it thinks proper,
direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools
of the mechanic, or certain articles of universal necessity in
household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to
attachment and execution for simple contract debts. Regulations of
the description mentioned have always been considered in every
civilized community as properly belonging to the remedy to be
exercised or not by every sovereignty, according to its own views
of policy and humanity.
Creditors as well as debtors know that the power to adopt such
regulations reside in every state, to enable it to secure its
citizens from unjust, merciless, and oppressive litigation, and
protect those without other means in their pursuits of labor, which
are necessary to the wellbeing and the very existence of every
community.
Examples of the kind were well known and universally approved
both before and since the Constitution was adopted, and they are
now to be found in the statutes of every state and territory within
the boundaries of the United States, and it would be monstrous to
hold that every time some small addition was made to such
exemptions that the statute making it impairs the obligation of
every existing contract within the jurisdiction of the state
passing the law.
Mere remedy, it is agreed, may be altered at the will of the
state legislature if the alteration is not of a character to impair
the obligation of the contract, and it is properly conceded that
the alteration, though it be of the remedy, if it materially
impairs the right of the party to enforce the contract, is equally
within the constitutional inhibition. Difficulty would doubtless
attend the effort to draw a line that would be applicable in all
cases between legitimate alteration of the remedy, and provisions
which, in the form of remedy, impair the right; nor is it necessary
to make the attempt in this case, as the courts of all nations
agree, and every civilized community will concede, that laws
exempting necessary wearing apparel,
Page 96 U. S. 610
the implements of agriculture owned by the tiller of the soil,
the tools of the mechanic, and certain articles or utensils of a
household character, universally recognized as articles or utensils
of necessity, are as much within the competency of a state
legislature as laws regulating the limitation of actions or laws
abolishing imprisonment for debt.
Bronson v.
Kinzie, 1 How. 311.
Expressions are contained in the opinion of the Court which may
be construed as forbidding all such humane legislation, and it is
to exclude the conclusion that any such views have my concurrence
that I have found it necessary to state the reasons which induced
me to reverse the judgment of the state court.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT.
I concur in the judgment in this case, for the reasons
following:
By the Constitution of North Carolina of 1868, the personal
property of any resident of the state, to the value of $500, is
exempt from sale under execution; also, a homestead, the dwelling
and buildings thereon, not exceeding in value $1,000.
The debts in question were incurred before the exemptions took
effect. The court now holds that the exemptions are invalid. In
this I concur, not for the reason that any and every exemption made
after entering into a contract is invalid, but that the amount here
exempted is so large, as seriously to impair the creditor's remedy
for the collection of his debt.
I think that the law was correctly announced by Mr. Chief
Justice Taney in
Bronson v.
Kinzie, 1 How. 311, when he said a state
"may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements
of agriculture, or the tools of a mechanic, or articles of
necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, be
not liable to execution on judgments."
The principle was laid down with the like accuracy by Judge
Denio in
Morse v. Goold, 11 N.Y. 281, where he says:
"There is no universal principle of law that every part of the
property of a debtor is liable to be seized for the payment of a
judgment against him. . . . The question is whether the law which
prevailed when the contract was made has been so far changed that
there does not remain a substantial and reasonable mode
Page 96 U. S. 611
of enforcing it in the ordinary and regular course of justice.
Taking the mass of contracts and the situation and circumstances of
debtors as they are ordinarily found to exist, no one could
probably say that exempting the team and household furniture of a
householder to the amount of $150 from levy or execution would
directly affect the efficiency of remedies for the collection of
debts."
Mr. Justice Woodbury lays down the same rule in
Planters'
Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301.
In my judgment, the exemption provided for by the North Carolina
Constitution is so large that, in regard to the mass of contracts
and the situation and circumstances of debtors as they are
ordinarily found to exist, it would seriously affect the efficiency
of remedies for the collection of debts, and that it must therefore
be held to be void.