1. The Confederate States was an illegal organization, within
the provision of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting
any treaty, alliance, or confederation of one state with another,
whatever efficacy, therefore, its enactments possessed in any state
entering into that organization must be attributed to the sanction
given to them by that state.
2. Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a
state gives the force of law is a statute of the state within the
meaning of the act regulating the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court over the judgments and decrees of the state courts.
3. An enactment of the Confederate States, enforced as a law of
one of the states composing that confederation, sequestrating a
debt owing by one of its citizens to a citizen of a loyal state as
an alien enemy is void because it impairs the obligation of the
contract and discriminates against citizens of another state. The
constitutional provision prohibiting a state from passing a law
impairing the obligation of contracts equally prohibits a state
from enforcing as a law an enactment of that character, from
whatever source originating.
Page 96 U. S. 177
4. When a rebellion becomes organized and attains such
proportions as to be able to put a formidable military force in the
field, it is usual for the established government to concede to it
some belligerent rights, but to what extent they shall be accorded
to the insurgents depends upon the considerations of justice,
humanity, and policy controlling the government.
5. The concession of belligerent rights to the Confederate
government sanctioned no hostile legislation against the citizens
of the loyal states.
6. Where property held by parties in the insurgent states as
trustees or bailees of loyal citizens was forcibly taken from them,
they may in some instances be released from liability, their
release in such cases depending upon the same principles which
control in ordinary cases of violence by an unlawful combination
too powerful to be successfully resisted, but debts due such
citizens, not being tangible things subject to seizure and removal,
are not extinguished, by reason of the debtor's coerced payment of
equivalent sums to an unlawful combination. They can only be
satisfied when paid to the creditors to whom they are due or to
others by direction of lawful authority.
7.
De facto governments of two kinds considered: 1.
Such as exists after it has expelled the regularly constituted
authorities from the seats of power and the public offices and
established its own functionaries in their places so as to
represent in fact the sovereignty of the nation. As far as other
nations are concerned, such a government is treated as in most
respects possessing rightful authority; its contracts and treaties
are usually enforced; its acquisitions are retained; its
legislation is in general recognized; and the rights acquired under
it are, with few exceptions, respected after the restoration of the
authorities which were expelled. 2. Such as exists where a portion
of the inhabitants of a country have separated themselves from the
parent state and established an independent government. The
validity of its acts, both against the parent state and the
citizens or subjects thereof, depends entirely upon its ultimate
success; if it fail to establish itself permanently, all such acts
perish with it; if it succeed and become recognized, its acts from
the commencement of its existence are upheld as those of an
independent nation.
8. The Confederate government was distinguished from each kind
of such
de facto governments. Whatever
de facto
character may be ascribed to it consists solely in the fact that
for nearly four years it maintained a contest with the United
States and exercised dominion over a large extent of territory.
Whilst it existed, it was simply the military representative of the
insurrection against the authority of the United States; when its
military forces were overthrown, it utterly perished, and with it
all its enactments.
9. The legislative acts of the several states stand on different
grounds, and so far as they did not impair or tend to impair the
supremacy of the national authority or the just rights of citizens
under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid
and binding.
This was an action of assumpsit for certain goods sold by the
plaintiffs in March, 1861, to George Bruffy, since deceased,
Page 96 U. S. 178
brought against the administrator of his estate in the Circuit
Court of Rockingham County, Virginia. The plaintiffs at the time of
the sale were and still are residents of the State of Pennsylvania,
and the deceased was then, and until his death, which occurred
during the war, continued to be a resident of the State of
Virginia.
The defendant pleaded the general issue and two special pleas,
in one of which he averred in substance that Pennsylvania was one
of the United States, and that Virginia was one of the states which
had formed a confederation known as the Confederate States; that
from sometime in 1861 until sometime in 1865, the government of the
United States was at war with the government of the Confederate
States; that on the 30th of August, 1861, the Confederate States
enacted a law sequestrating the lands, tenements, goods, chattels,
rights, and credits within the Confederate States and every right
and interest therein held by or for any alien enemy since the 21st
of May, 1861, excepting such debts as may have been paid into the
treasury of one of the Confederate States prior to the passage of
the law, and making it the duty of every attorney, agent, former
partner, trustee, or other person holding or controlling any such
property or interest to inform the receiver of the Confederate
States of the fact and to render an account thereof, and, so far as
practicable, to place the same in the hands of the receiver, and
declaring that thereafter such person should be acquitted of all
responsibility for the property thus turned over, and that any
person failing to give the information mentioned should be deemed
guilty of a high misdemeanor; that on the 1st of January, 1862,
this law being in force, the defendant's intestate paid over to the
receiver of the Confederate States the amount claimed by the
plaintiffs, and that by virtue of such payment he is discharged
from the debt. The second special plea is substantially like the
first, with the further averment that the debt due to the
plaintiffs was sequestrated by the decree of a Confederate district
court in Virginia, upon the petition of the receiver, who
afterwards collected it with interest.
The plaintiffs demurred to these pleas, but the demurrers were
overruled. The case was then submitted to the court
Page 96 U. S. 179
upon certain depositions and an agreed statement of facts. They
established the sale and delivery of the goods, the residence of
the plaintiffs and of the deceased during the war, and the payment
by the latter of the debt in suit to the sequestrator of the
Confederate government under a judgment of a Confederate district
court. The court below gave judgment for the defendant, and the
subsequent application of the plaintiffs to the Supreme Court of
Appeals for a supersedeas was denied, that court being of opinion
that the judgment was plainly right. Such a denial is deemed
equivalent to an affirmance of the judgment so far as to authorize
a writ of error from this Court to the Court of Appeals.
Page 96 U. S. 182
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for our determination arises upon the special
pleas, and relates to the sufficiency of the facts therein set
forth as a defense -- that is, to the effect of the sequestration
of the debt by the Confederate government as a bar to the
action.
There is, however, a preliminary question to be considered. It
is contended by the defendant that the record presents no ground
for the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. The second section
of the amendatory judiciary act of 1867, as given in the Revised
Statutes, provides for a review by this Court of the final judgment
or decree of the highest court of a state in which a decision could
be had, in three classes of cases.
1st, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or
statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and
the decision is against their validity.
2d, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or
an authority exercised under, any state, on the ground of their
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity;
and,
3d, where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed
under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission
held or authority exercised under, the United States and the
decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity
specially set up or claimed by either party under such
Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority.
It is upon the last two clauses that the jurisdiction of the
Court is asserted by the plaintiffs, and we are of opinion that it
can be maintained upon both of them. The pleas aver that a
confederation was formed by Virginia and other states, called the
Confederate States of America, and that under a law of this
confederation, enforced in Virginia, the debt due to the plaintiffs
was sequestrated. Now the Constitution of the United States
prohibits any treaty, alliance, or confederation by one state with
another. The organization whose enactment is pleaded cannot,
therefore, be regarded in this Court as having any legal existence.
It follows that whatever efficacy the enactment possessed in
Virginia must be attributed to the sanction
Page 96 U. S. 183
given to it by that state. Any enactment, from whatever source
originating, to which a state gives the force of law is a statute
of the state within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the
jurisdiction of this Court. It would be a narrow construction to
limit the term to such enactments as have gone through various
stages of consideration by the legislature. There may be many acts
authorized by the constitution of a state, or by the convention
that framed it, which have not been submitted to the consideration
of its legislature, yet have all the efficacy of laws. By the only
authority which can be recognized as having any legal existence --
that is, the State of Virginia, this act of the unauthorized
confederation was enforced as a law of the commonwealth. Its
validity was drawn in question on the ground that it was repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision of the
court below was in favor of its validity. Its repugnancy was
asserted in this, that it impaired the obligation of the contract
between the plaintiffs and the deceased and undertook to release
the latter from liability, contrary to the express prohibition of
that instrument, and also in this, that it discriminated against
the plaintiffs as citizens of a loyal state and refused to them the
same privileges accorded to the citizens of Virginia, contrary to
the provision declaring that "the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states." This provision has been held in repeated
adjudications of this Court to prohibit discriminating legislation
by one state against the citizens of another state and to secure to
them the equal protection of its laws, and the same freedom
possessed by its own citizens in the acquisition and enjoyment of
property.
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.C.C. 371;
Ward v.
Maryland, 12 Wall. 418;
Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. The enactment of the
confederation which by the assent of Virginia was enforced as a law
in that commonwealth, and which is now invoked by the defendant,
not only impaired, but attempted to destroy, the obligation of the
contract of the deceased with the plaintiffs, and it discriminated
against them as citizens of a state that maintained its allegiance
to the Union. The demurrers to the special pleas raised these
objections. The decision made involved the upholding of the
Confederate enactment and
Page 96 U. S. 184
the denial of the immunity claimed by the plaintiffs. It could
not have been made without passing upon both of these points. It is
sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction that, though not in
terms specially stated in the pleadings, they were necessarily
involved in the decision, and that without their consideration, the
judgment would not have been rendered. We have no doubt of our
jurisdiction, and we proceed therefore to the merits of the
case.
Treating the Confederate enactment as a law of the state which
we can consider, there can be no doubt of its invalidity. The
constitutional provision prohibiting a state from passing a law
impairing the obligation of contracts equally prohibits a state
from enforcing as a law an enactment of that character, from
whatever source originating. And the constitutional provision
securing to the citizens of each state the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states could not have a more
fitting application than in condemning as utterly void the act
under consideration here, which Virginia enforced as a law of that
commonwealth, treating the plaintiffs as alien enemies because of
their loyalty to the Union and decreeing for that reason a
sequestration of debts due to them by its citizens.
The defendant, however, takes the ground that the enactment of
the Confederate States is that of an independent nation, and must
be so treated in this case. His contention is substantially this:
that the Confederate government, from April, 1861, until it was
overthrown in 1865, was a government
de facto, complete in
all its parts, exercising jurisdiction over a well defined
territory, which included that portion of Virginia where the
deceased resided, and as such
de facto government it
engaged in war with the United States and possessed, and was
justified in exercising within its territorial limits, all the
rights of war which belonged to an independent nation, and, among
them, that of confiscating debts due by its citizens to its
enemies.
In support of this position, reference is made to numerous
instances of
de facto governments which have existed in
England and in other parts of Europe and in America; to the
doctrines of jurists and writers on public law respecting the
powers of such governments, and the validity accorded to their
acts; to the opinion of this Court in
Thorington v. Smith
and in
Page 96 U. S. 185
the
Prize Cases; to the concession of belligerent
rights to the Confederate government; and to the action of the
states during our own revolutionary war and the period immediately
following it.
We do not question the doctrines of public law which have been
invoked, nor their application in proper cases, but it will be
found upon examination that there is an essential difference
between the government of the Confederate States and those
de
facto governments. The latter are of two kinds. One of them is
such as exists after it has expelled the regularly constituted
authorities from the seats of power and the public offices, and
established its own functionaries in their places, so as to
represent in fact the sovereignty of the nation. Such was the
government of England under the commonwealth established upon the
execution of the King and the overthrow of the loyalists. As far as
other nations are concerned, such a government is treated as in
most respects possessing rightful authority; its contracts and
treaties are usually enforced; its acquisitions are retained; its
legislation is in general recognized; and the rights acquired under
it are, with few exceptions, respected after the restoration of the
authorities which were expelled. All that counsel say of
de
facto governments is justly said of a government of this kind.
But the Confederate government was not of this kind. It never
represented the nation, it never expelled the public authorities
from the country, it never entered into any treaties, nor was it
ever recognized as that of an independent power. It collected an
immense military force and temporarily expelled the authorities of
the United States from the territory over which it exercised an
usurped dominion, but in that expulsion the United States never
acquiesced; on the contrary, they immediately resorted to similar
force to regain possession of that territory and reestablish their
authority, and they continued to use such force until they
succeeded. It would be useless to comment upon the striking
contrast between a government of this nature, which, with all its
military strength, never had undisputed possession of power for a
single day, and a government like that of the Commonwealth of
England under Parliament or Cromwell.
The other kind of
de facto governments to which the
doctrines
Page 96 U. S. 186
cited relate is such as exists where a portion of the
inhabitants of a country have separated themselves from the parent
state and established an independent government. The validity of
its acts, both against the parent state and its citizens or
subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate success. If it fail to
establish itself permanently, all such acts perish with it. If it
succeed and becomes recognized, its acts from the commencement of
its existence are upheld as those of an independent nation. Such
was the case of the state governments under the old confederation
on their separation from the British Crown. Having made good their
declaration of independence, everything they did from that date was
as valid as if their independence had been at once acknowledged.
Confiscations, therefore, of enemy's property made by them were
sustained as if made by an independent nation. But if they had
failed in securing their independence, and the authority of the
King had been reestablished in this country, no one would contend
that their acts against him, or his loyal subjects, could have been
upheld as resting upon any legal foundation.
No case has been cited in argument, and we think none can be
found, in which the acts of a portion of a state unsuccessfully
attempting to establish a separate revolutionary government have
been sustained as a matter of legal right. As justly observed by
the late Chief Justice in
Shortridge & Co. v. Macon,
decided at the circuit, and, in all material respects, like the one
at bar,
"Those who engage in rebellion must consider the consequences.
If they succeed, rebellion becomes revolution, and the new
government will justify its founders. If they fail, all their acts
hostile to the rightful government are violations of law, and
originate no rights which can be recognized by the courts of the
nation whose authority and existence have been alike assailed."
Chase's Decisions 136.
When a rebellion becomes organized and attains such proportions
as to be able to put a formidable military force in the field, it
is usual for the established government to concede to it some
belligerent rights. This concession is made in the interests of
humanity, to prevent the cruelties which would inevitably follow
mutual reprisals and retaliations. But belligerent rights, as the
terms import, are rights which exist only during
Page 96 U. S. 187
war, and to what extent they shall be accorded to insurgents
depends upon the considerations of justice, humanity, and policy
controlling the government. The rule stated by Vattel that the
justice of the cause between two enemies being by the law of
nations reputed to be equal, whatsoever is permitted to the one in
virtue of war is also permitted to the other, applies only to cases
of regular war between independent nations. It has no application
to the case of a war between an established government and
insurgents seeking to withdraw themselves from its jurisdiction or
to overthrow its authority. Halleck's Inter.Law, c. 14, sec. 9. The
concession made to the Confederate government in its military
character was shown in the treatment of captives as prisoners of
war, the exchange of prisoners, the recognition of flags of truce,
the release of officers on parole, and other arrangements having a
tendency to mitigate the evils of the contest. The concession
placed its soldiers and military officers in its service on the
footing of those engaged in lawful war, and exempted them from
liability for acts of legitimate warfare. But it conferred no
further immunity or any other rights. It in no respect condoned
acts against the government not committed by armed force in the
military service of the rebellious organization; it sanctioned no
hostile legislation; it gave validity to no contracts for military
stores; and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal citizens
as they had existed at the commencement of hostilities. Parties
residing in the insurrectionary territory, having property in their
possession as trustees or bailees of loyal citizens, may in some
instances have had such property taken from them by force, and in
that event they may perhaps be released from liability. Their
release will depend upon the same principles which control in
ordinary cases of violence by an unlawful combination too powerful
to be successfully resisted.
But, debts not being tangible things subject to physical seizure
and removal, the debtors cannot claim release from liability to
their creditors by reason of the coerced payment of equivalent sums
to an unlawful combination. The debts can only be satisfied when
paid to the creditors to whom they are due, or to others by
direction of lawful authority. Any sum which
Page 96 U. S. 188
the unlawful combination may have compelled the debtors to pay
to its agents on account of debts to loyal citizens cannot have any
effect upon their obligations -- they remain subsisting and
unimpaired. The concession of belligerent rights to the rebellious
organization yielded nothing to its pretensions of legality. If it
had succeeded in its contest, it would have protected the debtor
from further claim for the debt; but, as it failed, the creditor
may have recourse to the courts of the country as prior to the
rebellion. It would be a strange thing if the nation, after
succeeding in suppressing the rebellion and reestablishing its
authority over the insurrectionary district, should by any of its
tribunals recognize as valid the attempt of the rebellious
organization to confiscate a debt due to a loyal citizen as a
penalty for his loyalty. Such a thing would be unprecedented in the
history of unsuccessful rebellions, and would rest upon no just
principle.
The immense power exercised by the government of the Confederate
States for nearly four years, the territory over which it extended,
the vast resources it wielded, and the millions who acknowledged
its authority present an imposing spectacle well fitted to mislead
the mind in considering the legal character of that organization.
It claimed to represent an independent nation and to possess
sovereign powers, and as such to displace the jurisdiction and
authority of the United States from nearly half of their territory,
and, instead of their laws, to substitute and enforce those of its
own enactment. Its pretensions being resisted, they were submitted
to the arbitrament of war. In that contest the Confederacy failed,
and in its failure its pretensions were dissipated, its armies
scattered, and the whole fabric of its government broken in pieces.
The very property it had amassed passed to the nation. The United
States, during the whole contest, never for one moment renounced
their claim to supreme jurisdiction over the whole country and to
the allegiance of every citizen of the republic. They never
acknowledged in any form or through any of their departments the
lawfulness of the rebellious organization or the validity of any of
its acts except so far as such acknowledgment may have arisen from
conceding to its armed forces in the conduct of the war the
standing and rights of those
Page 96 U. S. 189
engaged in lawful warfare. They never recognized its asserted
power of rightful legislation.
There is nothing in the language used in
Thorington
v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1, which conflicts with these
views. In that case, the Confederate government is characterized as
one of paramount force, and classed among the governments of which
the one maintained by Great Britain in Castine from September,
1814, to the treaty of peace in 1815, and the one maintained by the
United States in Tampico during our war with Mexico, are examples.
Whilst the British retained possession of Castine, the inhabitants
were held to be subject to such laws as the British government
chose to recognize and impose. Whilst the United States retained
possession of Tampico, it was held that it must be regarded and
respected as their territory. The Confederate government, the Court
observed, differed from these temporary governments in the
circumstance that its authority did not originate in lawful acts of
regular war; but it was not on that account less actual or less
supreme, and its supremacy, while not justifying acts of hostility
to the United States, "made obedience to its authority in civil and
local matters not only a necessity, but a duty." All that was meant
by this language was that as the actual supremacy of the
Confederate government existed over certain territory, individual
resistance to its authority then would have been futile, and
therefore unjustifiable. In the face of an overwhelming force,
obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and, in the
interests of order, a duty. No concession is thus made to the
rightfulness of the authority exercised.
Nor is there anything in the decision of this Court in the
Prize Cases which militates against the views expressed.
It was there simply held that when parties in rebellion had
occupied and held in a hostile manner a portion of the territory of
the country, declared their independence, cast off their
allegiance, organized armies, and commenced hostilities against the
government of the United States, war existed; that the President
was bound to recognize the fact, and meet it without waiting for
the action of Congress; that it was for him to determine what
degree of force the crisis demanded and whether the hostile forces
were of such magnitude as to require him to
Page 96 U. S. 190
accord to them the character of belligerents, and that he had
the right to institute a blockade of ports in their possession
which neutrals were bound to recognize. It was also held that as
the rebellious parties had formed a confederacy, and thus become an
organized body, and the territory dominated by them was defined,
and the President had conceded to this organization in its military
character belligerent rights, all the territory must be regarded as
enemy's territory, and its inhabitants as enemies whose property on
the high seas would be lawful subjects of capture. There is nothing
in these doctrines which justified the Confederate States in
claiming the status of foreign states during the war or in treating
the inhabitants of the loyal states as alien enemies.
Nor is there anything in the citations so often made from
Wheaton and Vattel as to the rights of contending parties in a
civil war which, if properly applied, militates against these
views. After stating that according to Grotius, a civil war is
public on the side of the established government, and private on
the part of the people resisting its authority, Wheaton says:
"But the general usage of nations regards such a war as
entitling both the contending parties to all the rights of war as
against each other, and even as respects neutral nations."
Wheaton, Int.Law, sec. 296. The writer is here referring to the
consideration with which foreign nations treat a civil war in
another country. So far as they are concerned, the contending
parties to such a war, once recognized as belligerents, are
regarded as entitled to all the rights of war. As between the
belligerent parties, foreign nations, from general usage, are
expected to observe a strict neutrality. The language used has no
reference to the rights which a sovereign must concede or is
expected to concede to insurgents in armed rebellion against his
authority. Upon the doctrine stated in the citation the United
States acted towards the contending parties in the civil war in
South America. In speaking on this subject in the case of
The Santissima
Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, this Court said:
"The government of the United States has recognized the
existence of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, and has
avowed a determination to remain neutral between the parties and to
allow to each the same rights of
Page 96 U. S. 191
asylum and hospitality and intercourse. Each party is therefore
deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far as concerns us,
the sovereign rights of war and entitled to be respected in the
exercise of those rights. We cannot interfere to the prejudice of
either belligerent without making ourselves a party to the contest
and departing from the position of neutrality."
Vattel says:
"A civil war breaks the bands of society and government, or at
least suspends their force and effect; it produces in the nation
two independent parties who consider each other as enemies and
acknowledge no common judge. Those two parties therefore must
necessarily be considered as thenceforward constituting, at least
for a time, two separate bodies, two distinct societies. . . . On
earth they have no common superior. They stand, therefore, in
precisely the same predicament as two nations who engage in a
contest and, being unable to come to an agreement, have recourse to
arms. This being the case, it is very evident that the common laws
of war -- those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honor which we
have already detailed in the course of this work -- ought to be
observed by both parties in every civil war. For the same reasons
which render the observance of those maxims a matter of obligation
between state and state, it becomes equally and even more necessary
in the unhappy circumstance of two incensed parties lacerating
their common country."
Vattel, Law of Nations, p. 425. All that Vattel means by this
language is that in a civil war, the contending parties have a
right to claim the enforcement of the same rules which govern the
conduct of armies in wars between independent nations -- rules
intended to mitigate the cruelties which would attend mutual
reprisals and retaliations. He has no reference to the exercise of
legislative power by either belligerent in furtherance of its
cause. The validity of such legislation depends not upon the
existence of hostilities, but upon the ultimate success of the
party by which it is adopted.
It is unnecessary to pursue the subject further. Whatever
de
facto character may be ascribed to the Confederate government
consists solely in the fact that it maintained a contest with the
United States for nearly four years, and dominated for that period
over a large extent of territory. When its military
Page 96 U. S. 192
forces were overthrown, it utterly perished, and with it all its
enactments. Whilst it existed, it was regarded, as said in
Thorington v. Smith, "as simply the military
representative of the insurrection against the authority of the
United States."
75 U. S. 8 Wall. 1;
Keppel's Adm'rs v. Petersburg Railroad Co., Chase's
Decisions, 167.
Whilst thus holding that there was no validity in any
legislation of the Confederate States which this Court can
recognize, it is proper to observe that the legislation of the
states stands on very different grounds. The same general form of
governments, the same general laws for the administration of
justice and the protection of private rights, which had existed in
the state prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance
and afterwards. As far as the acts of the states did not impair or
tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just
rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are in general to
be treated as valid and binding. As we said in
Horn v.
Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570:
"The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen
the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved,
police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property
protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates
settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated,
precisely as in time of peace. No one that we are aware of
seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative acts in
the insurrectionary states touching these and kindred subjects
where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement
to the authority of the national government, and did not impair the
rights of citizens under the Constitution."
The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases.
It follows from the views expressed that the state court erred
in overruling the demurrers to the special pleas. Those demurrers
should have been sustained, and the plaintiffs should have had
judgment upon the agreed statement of facts for the amount of their
claim, with interest from its maturity, deducting in the
computation of time the period between the 27th of April, 1861, at
which date the war is considered to have commenced in Virginia, and
the 2d of April, 1866, when it is
Page 96 U. S. 193
deemed to have closed in that state.
The
Protector, 12 Wall. 700;
Brown v.
Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177.
The action of the Court of Appeals of Virginia in refusing a
supersedeas of the judgment of the circuit court must, therefore,
be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion, and it is
So ordered.