1. The joint resolution of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 571,
repealing that portion of the fifth section of the Act approved
June 30, 1804, 13
id. 208, which subjected to a duty of
ten percent
ad valorem
"lastings, mohair cloth, silk, twist, or other manufacture of
cloth, woven or made in patterns of such size, shape, and form, or
cut in such manner, as to be fit for shoes, slippers, boots,
bootees, gaiters, and buttons exclusively, not combined with india
rubber,"
did not revive the provision in the twenty-third section of the
Act of March 2, 1861, 12
id. 195, which placed such
articles on the free list.
2. Patterns imported in 1870, made of cotton canvas cut into
strips of the size and shape for slippers, more or less embroidered
with worsted and silk, were dutiable under the last paragraph of
the sixth section of the Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 209, which
imposes a duty of thirty-five percent
ad valorem on
"manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for."
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 96 U. S. 154
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Repeal by implication of revenue and collection laws, except
when the prior laws have been subjected to a general statutory
revision, are not favored in legal decision unless it appear that
the prior provision has been reenacted in the new regulation or
that the later act is repugnant to the former, and the Revised
Statutes provide in express terms that, whenever an act is repealed
which repealed a former act, such former act shall not thereby be
revived unless it shall be expressly so provided. Rev.Stat., sec.
12, p. 2.
Six invoices of merchandise were imported into the port of New
York, designated as embroidered slipper patterns, being the
ordinary slipper patterns made of cotton canvas cut into strips of
the size and shape for slippers, more or less embroidered with
worsted and silk. Due entry of the goods described in the invoice
was made at the custom house of the port; and enough appears to
show that the collector liquidated the duties at thirty-five
percent
ad valorem, holding that the importations were
subject to duty under the last clause of sec. 6 of the Act of June
30, 1864, as other manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided
for, certain articles of cotton manufacture therein previously
named being declared subject to the same rate of duty. Appeal to
the Secretary of the Treasury and due protest by the importers are
admitted.
Payment was made by the importer under protest, and his
executors instituted the present action of assumpsit in the state
court, subsequently removed into the circuit court, and there
prosecuted, to recover the excess of duty which, as they allege,
the collector unlawfully exacted, and which the importer was
compelled to pay to get possession of his goods. Protest was made
upon two grounds: 1, that the goods were duty free under the Act of
March 2, 1861, 12 Stat. 195; or, 2, that the goods were subject to
a duty of ten percent
ad valorem only, under the Act of
July 14, 1862, entitled an act increasing temporarily the duties on
imports.
Id., 650.
Instead of that, the United states contended in the court below,
and still contend, that the decision of the collector, as approved
by the Secretary of the Treasury, is correct, and that the goods
imported were subject to an
ad valorem duty of thirty-five
percent.
Page 96 U. S. 155
Appropriate issues being joined, the parties went to trial, and
the verdict and judgment were for the defendant. Exceptions were
taken by the plaintiffs, and they sued out the present writ of
error.
Questions of fact were determined by the jury, and the questions
of law presented for decision are the same as those raised in the
protest -- or in other words, the plaintiffs still maintain the two
theories there set up:
1. That the goods imported were duty free.
2. That, if they were not duty free, they were subject only to
an
ad valorem duty of ten percent.
Import duties of ten percent
ad valorem were imposed by
the Act of June 30, 1864, on lastings, mohair cloth, silk, twist,
or other manufactures of cloth, woven or made in patterns of such
size, shape, and form, or cut in such manner, as to be fit for
shoes, slippers, boots, bootees, gaiters, and buttons exclusively,
not combined with india-rubber, which duty, it will be observed, is
imposed upon the enumerated articles by name.
Extensive lists of enumerated goods made of silk or wool, as
well as of cotton, are also given in the fifth, sixth, and eighth
sections of the act, which are made subject to the duty or rate of
duty there provided. Manufactures of silk, or of which silk is the
component material of chief value, not otherwise provided for, are
there made subject to a duty of fifty percent ad valorem. Provision
is also made that all manufactures of wool of every description,
made wholly or in part of wool, not otherwise provided for,
twenty-four cents per pound, and, in addition thereto, forty
percent
ad valorem. Cotton goods, to a large extent, are
placed in the enumerated list; but the further provision is, that
all other manufactures of cotton, not otherwise provided for, shall
be subject to a duty of thirty-five percent
ad
valorem.
Goods of the kind imported, if made of cotton, were, beyond all
doubt, when that act went into operation, subject to a duty of ten
percent
ad valorem, under the clause enumerating that
class of goods and imposing that rate of duty. 13
id.
208.
Rates of duty on these articles remained unchanged from that
time until the passage of the joint resolution of the 2d of March,
1867, which repealed the paragraph in sec. 5 of the Act of June 30,
1864, enumerating the articles, and imposing a duty of ten percent
ad valorem on the same. Wool is also
Page 96 U. S. 156
included in the repealing clause; but that circumstance does not
diminish the effect of the argument, as every article enumerated in
the paragraph in question is specifically named in the repealing
joint resolution. 14
id. 511.
Customs duties from that date were levied and collected on all
the articles enumerated in that paragraph, if manufactured of
cotton, at the rate of thirty-five percent
ad valorem; the
ruling of the department being that the repeal of the clause
enumerating the articles left the same dutiable under the clause
imposing a duty of thirty-five percent on all manufactures of
cotton not otherwise provided for in the same act.
Manufacturers of buttons complained that their business could
not bear so high a rate of duty, and Congress, at their request,
amended the joint resolution referred to, and took buttons out of
its operation, the effect of which was that lastings, mohair cloth,
silk, twist, or other manufactures of cloth, woven or made in such
manner as to be fit for buttons exclusively, became dutiable under
the clause repealed by the before-mentioned joint resolution, and
only at the rate of ten percent
ad valorem.
Collated in this manner, these statutory regulations are as
plain in their construction as anything which depends upon a
revenue act of Congress well can be. Cloth of the kind intended for
buttons is dutiable at ten percent
ad valorem, but all the
other articles of manufactured cloth, woven or made of cotton, in
patterns of such size, shape, and form, or cut in such manner, as
to be fit for shoes, slippers, bootees, or gaiters, are dutiable
under the clause embracing manufactures of cotton not otherwise
provided for, at the rate of thirty-five percent
ad
valorem.
Attempt at one time was made, as indicated in the second ground
of the protest, to maintain the proposition that the repeal by the
joint resolution referred to, of the enumerating paragraph in the
Act of June 30, 1864, revived the same provision in the Act of July
14, 1862, which imposed the same duty as the repealed paragraph. 12
id. 550;
Butler v. Russell, 11 Int.Rev.Rec.
30.
Eminent counsel urged the proposition; but the court held
otherwise, for reasons which are entirely satisfactory. Nor is it
necessary to examine that question, as the plaintiffs in this
Page 96 U. S. 157
case abandon that theory, and rest their case entirely upon the
first ground assumed in the protest -- that the goods imported are
exempt from duty, or, in other words, that the effect of the joint
resolution under consideration was to repeal the paragraph in the
two prior acts, to-wit, the act of 1864 and the act of 1862, and to
revive the corresponding provision in the Act of the 2d of March,
1861, which included such goods in the free list.
Cases arise undoubtedly where it is properly held that the
repeal of a repealing statute revives the old law, but the Court is
of the opinion that the rule in that regard is inapplicable to the
case before the Court for several reasons, which will more fully
appear from a review of the acts of Congress immediately preceding
the act under which the duties in this case were levied and
collected.
Temporary increase of import duties, to the extent of fifty
percent on the rates authorized by law, was imposed on the 29th of
April next preceding the passage of that act by the joint
resolution of that date. 13 Stat. 405. But the events of that
period required stable regulations, and it was the evident
intention of Congress, in passing the act in question, to effect a
permanent increase of duties to meet the public exigency, and they
accomplished it in part by diminishing the free list and by
changing the basis of computation in ascertaining the dutiable
value of imported merchandise, and by including the costs and
charges in the appraisement. All prior acts upon the subject, in
force at the time, to the extent therein specified, were revised,
and it is safe to affirm that the articles enumerated in that act
were subject to no other duty than that which the act imposed.
Evidence to support that proposition is found in almost every
section of the act. No reference to any other act is made for that
purpose, but the twenty-second section of the act provides that the
existing laws shall extend to, and be in force for, the collection
of the duties imposed by this act, for the prosecution and
punishment of all offenses, and for the recovery, collection,
distribution, and remission of all fines, penalties, and
forfeitures, as fully and effectually as if every regulation,
penalty, forfeiture, provision, clause, matter, and thing to that
effect in
Page 96 U. S. 158
the existing laws contained had been inserted in and re-enacted
in this act. Plain provision is also made that
"the duties upon all goods, wares, and merchandise imported from
foreign countries, not provided for in this act, shall be and
remain as they were according to existing laws"
at the time the joint resolution was passed which temporarily
increased the rates of duties fifty percent. 13
id.
405.
These provisions must be taken in connection with the repealing
clause of the act, and, when so considered, it is clear that
Congress intended to make a comprehensive and complete revision to
the extent specified, of all the antecedent acts imposing import
duties. When a revising statute covers the whole subject matter of
antecedent statutes, the revising statute virtually repeals the
antecedent enactment, unless there is something in the nature of
the subject matter or the revising statute to indicate a contrary
intention.
Davies v.
Fairbairn, 3 How. 636;
School District v.
Whitehead, 2 Beas. 290.
None of these principles are controverted by the plaintiffs, but
still they insist that the joint resolution which repealed the
paragraph in the act of the 30th of June, 1864, imposing the duty
of ten percent
ad valorem on the goods, had the effect to
revive the provision in the act of 1861, which placed such goods in
the free list.
Nothing is contained in the joint resolution expressing any such
intention, or to indicate that Congress did not intend exactly what
followed, in case the antecedent provision is held not to be
revived. Congress has now provided that whenever an act is repealed
which repealed a former act, such former act shall not thereby be
revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided; but that
provision was not in force when the cause of action in this case
arose, nor is it referred to for any other purpose than to show
that such a conclusion ought not to be adopted in a case where it
is unreasonable to suppose that Congress intended such a
result.
Had it been supposed that such was the effect of the joint
resolution, the manufacturers of buttons would never have applied
for the relief which was granted to them by the second joint
resolution. Beyond all doubt, they applied for that relief
Page 96 U. S. 159
upon the ground that their importations were dutiable at
thirty-five percent
ad valorem, and it is equally certain
that Congress granted the relief upon the ground that the second
joint resolution left the cloth which the manufacturers of buttons
imported subject to the duty of ten percent
ad valorem, as
imposed prior to the passage of the first joint resolution.
Public necessity demanded increased rates of import duties when
the joint resolution of the 29th of April, 1864, was passed, and
every one having any knowledge upon the subject knows that the Act
of the 30th of June of that year was enacted for the express
purpose of increasing the rates of duty on foreign importations;
nor is it any less certain that the repeal of the paragraph in that
act rendering the goods of the character in question dutiable at
the rate of ten percent ad valorem was regarded by Congress and the
Treasury Department, and everybody else interested in the
legislation, as a measure having the effect to augment the rate of
duty from ten percent
ad valorem to thirty-five percent,
as the duties were liquidated in this case.
Customs duties on such importations, except where the article
was woven or cut in patterns, so as to be fit for buttons
exclusively, were levied and collected pursuant to that view of the
law from the date of the repeal of that paragraph, March 2, 1867,
to Nov. 15, 1870, when the present controversy arose. In the
meantime, the manufacturers of cotton cloth intended for buttons
complained that they were oppressed, and Congress passed the joint
resolution to relieve their grievance. 15
id. 24.
By that resolution, it was provided that the prior joint
resolution shall not be considered to apply to lasting, mohair
cloth, silk, twist, or other manufactures of cloth, woven or made
in patterns of such size, shape, and form, or cut in such a manner,
as to be fit for buttons exclusively.
Viewed in the light of these provisions, it seems almost past
belief that the attentive reader should have any doubt as to the
intent of Congress or the legal effect of the joint resolution
which repealed the enumerating paragraph in the act passed to
increase duties on imports. 13
id. 208.
In the exposition of statutes, the established rule is that
the
Page 96 U. S. 160
intention of the lawmaker is to be deduced from a view of the
whole statute, and every material part of the same, and where there
are several statutes relating to the same subject, they are all to
be taken together, and one part compared with another in the
construction of any one of the material provisions, because, in the
absence of contradictory or inconsistent provisions, they are
supposed to have the same object and as pertaining to the same
system. Resort may be had to every part of a statute, or, where
there is more than one
in pari materia, to the whole
system, for the purpose of collecting the legislative intention,
which is the important inquiry in all cases where provisions are
ambiguous or inconsistent.
Rules and maxims of interpretation are ordained as aids in
discovering the true intent and meaning of any particular
enactment; but the controlling rule of decision in applying the
statute in any particular case is that whenever the intention of
the legislature can be discovered from the words employed, in view
of the subject matter and the surrounding circumstances, it ought
to prevail, unless it lead to absurd and irrational conclusions,
which should never be imputed to the legislature, except when the
language employed will admit of no other signification.
Apply these rules to the case before the Court, and it is clear
that the goods imported in this case were subject to an
ad
valorem duty of thirty-five percent, as appears from the
following considerations:
1. Importations of the kind were duty free under the Act of
March 2, 1861, which placed
"lastings, mohair cloth, silk, twist, or other manufactures of
cloth cut in strips or patterns of the usual size and shape for
shoes, slippers, bootees, gaiters, and buttons exclusively, not
combined with india-rubber, in the free list."
12
id. 195.
2. Goods of the kind were subject to a duty, under the Act of
July 14, 1862, of ten percent
ad valorem, the goods being
described as follows: lasting, mohair cloth, silk, twist, or other
manufacture of cloth, woven or made in patterns of such size,
shape, and form, or cut in such manner, as to be fit for shoes,
slippers, boots, bootees, gaiters, and buttons exclusively, not
combined with india-rubber.
Page 96 U. S. 161
3. All of the provisions of those two tariff acts imposing
import duties, or prescribing the rates of such duties, were, to
the extent therein specified, revised by the Act of June 30, 1864;
and the provision there made in respect to the kind of goods in
question was as follows:
"Lastings, mohair cloth, silk, twist, or other manufacture of
cloth, woven or made in patterns of such size, shape, and form, or
cut in such manner, as to be fit for shoes, slippers, boots,
bootees, gaiters, and buttons exclusively, not combined with
india-rubber, ten percent
ad valorem."
4. Congress, March 2, 1867, repealed that paragraph, as set
forth in the last-named act, reciting the paragraph
in haec
verba, adding therein the word "wool," showing conclusively
that Congress intended to repeal the entire paragraph, which had
been three times before incorporated into the tariff acts.
5. Manufacturers of buttons complained that the effect of the
repeal was to impose an
ad valorem duty of thirty-five
percent on fabrics designed and used for their manufacture, and
insisted that it was greater than their business could bear. They
were heard, and Congress, having become satisfied that their
complaint was reasonable, passed the joint resolution of the 29th
of March, 1867, which provided that the prior joint resolution
repealing that paragraph
"shall not be construed to apply to lastings, mohair cloth,
silk, twist, or other manufactures of cloth, woven or made in
patterns of such size, shape, and form, or cut in such manner, as
to be fit for buttons exclusively,"
leaving it in full operation as to every other article in the
paragraph. 15
id. 24;
Butler v. Russell,
supra.
Weighed in the light of these suggestions, which are deduced
entirely from a comparison of the different provisions in the acts
of Congress upon the same subject, it seems impossible to deny that
the ruling of the circuit judge is correct.
Other questions were discussed at the bar, but they are not
material to the decision of the present case.
Judgment affirmed.