1. The similitude clause of the Act of Aug. 30, 1842, 6 Stat.
565, applies only to nonenumerated articles.
2. In 1872 and 1873, a quantity of spectacles made of glass and
steel were imported at New York, upon which the collector of the
port, under the third section of the Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat.
205, exacted a duty of forty-five percent
ad valorem.
Held that they were dutiable under the ninth section of
that act, which imposes "on pebbles for spectacles and all
manufactures of glass, or of which glass shall be a component
material, not otherwise provided for," a duty of forty percent
ad valorem.
In 1872 and 1873, the plaintiffs, Sussfield, Lorsch, & Co.,
imported, at New York a quantity of spectacles made of glass and
steel.
Arthur, the collector, held them to be subject to a duty of
forty-five percent under the third section of the Act of June 30,
1864, which reads, "On all manufactures of steel, or of which steel
shall be a component part, not otherwise provided for, forty-five
percent," 13 Stat. 205, and exacted the duty at that rate.
The importers insisted that the duties were to be chargeable
under the ninth section of the same act, which reads, "On pebbles
for spectacles and all manufactures of glass, or of which glass
shall be a component material, not otherwise provided for, forty
percent."
Id., 211.
Having paid the duty under protest, they brought suit to
Page 96 U. S. 129
recover the alleged excess. The court below held the goods to be
dutiable under the ninth section of the Act of 1864. There was a
verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs. The collector then brought
the case here.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is as to the proper duty to be
imposed.
On the part of the government, it is now insisted that the third
and the ninth sections of the Act of June 30, 1864, give a partial
description of the articles taxed, but that neither is so complete
as to exclude the other, and therefore neither description can be
applicable; hence it is argued that spectacles must be treated as a
nonenumerated article, and that, equally resembling two enumerated
articles -- to wit, those of which steel is a component and those
of which glass is a component -- they must, under the similitude
clause of the Act of Aug. 30, 1842, 5 Stat. 565, pay the highest
rate of duty chargeable on either of the articles they
resemble.
We are not able to assent to this course of reasoning. The
similitude act applies only to nonenumerated articles. These goods
are enumerated. They fall under the description or enumeration of
both sections, and if either were absent, the description under the
other would be sufficient. Thus, if it were not for that provision
of the act describing "manufactures of which steel is a component
part," there could be no difficulty in classifying them under that
clause which describes "manufactures of which glass shall be a
component material," and if it were not for the provision
describing "manufactures of which glass shall be a component
material," there could be no difficulty in classifying them under
that clause which describes "manufactures of which steel is a
component part."
The difficulty, it is said, may be solved in this way: 1st, that
in the case of repugnant statutes, the later statute, or, in the
case of repugnant provisions of the same statute, the later portion
of the act, is deemed to be the last expression of the
Page 96 U. S. 130
legislative will, and 2d, that when the same article is twice
enumerated, the lower rate of duty must prevail. To these points
many authorities are cited. Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, pp. 170,
744;
Powers v. Barney, 5 Blatchf. 202; 2 Taunt. 109; 2 B.
& Ad. 818;
United States v.
Johnson, 17 Wall. 504;
United States v.
Ulman, 5 Ben. 553.
Without passing upon this point, we prefer to place our opinion
upon the connection in which the different articles are found in
the statute. Neither in the general use of language nor in
commercial designation would it be understood that the unconnected
expression, "of which steel is a component part," was intended to
embrace spectacles. Steel may or may not form a part of the
spectacles. The article will be as perfect without steel as with
it. On the other hand, the terms "pebbles for spectacles and all
manufactures of which glass shall be a component material"
naturally connects the glass manufacture with the spectacles. There
could be no spectacles without them. The colorless crystals in
spectacles, termed pebbles, and the manufactures of glass used in
spectacles embrace the same idea, to-wit, of pebbles or glass for
spectacles. The section, we think, was intended to impose a duty of
forty percent on those substances used in the manufacture of
spectacles to aid the sight, and which are therein described as
pebbles or as glass. The use of spectacles is to aid the sight. The
pebbles and the glass are the materials which effect that purpose.
The steel is incidental or auxiliary merely, and Congress intended
to embrace spectacles under this appropriate designation.
Judgment affirmed.
