1. Veils manufactured of silk, and commercially known as "crape
veils," and not otherwise, do not fall within the enumerating
clause of the eighth section of the Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat.
210, whereby "silk veils" are dutiable at sixty percent
ad
valorem, but are within its concluding clause touching
manufactures of silk or of which silk is the component material of
chief value, not otherwise provided for, and are therefore subject
to a duty of fifty percent
ad valorem.
2. The designation of an article of commerce by merchants and
importers, when it is clearly established, determines the
construction of the tariff law when that article is mentioned.
3. The intent of Congress to impose, under the act of 1864,
duties upon imported articles according to their commercial
designation and to recognize this rule of construing statutes is
manifest from the first section of the Act of Feb. 8, 1875, 18
Stat. 307, which subjects to a duty of sixty percent
"all goods, wares, and merchandise not herein otherwise provided
for, made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of
chief value, irrespective of the classification thereof for duty by
or under previous laws or of their commercial designation."
4. A well known rule of statutory construction remains in force
until it shall be abolished by Congress.
Morrison and others brought this suit to recover the sum exacted
from them by Arthur, the collector of the port of New York, in
excess of what they protested was the lawful duty upon certain
imported veils.
The portion of the eighth section of the Act of June 30, 1864,
c. 171, 13 Stat. 210, applicable to the case, is as follows:
"That on and after the day and year aforesaid, in lieu of the
duties heretofore imposed by law on the articles hereinafter
mentioned, there shall be levied, collected, and paid, on the
goods, wares, and merchandise enumerated and provided for in this
section, imported from foreign countries, the following duties and
rates of duties, that is to say, . . . on silk vestings, pongees,
shawls, scarfs,
Page 96 U. S. 109
mantillas, pelerines, handkerchiefs, veils, laces, shirts,
drawers, bonnets, hats, caps, turbans, chemisettes, hose, mitts,
aprons, stockings, gloves, suspenders, watch chains, webbing,
braids, fringes, galloons, tassels, cords, and trimmings, sixty
percent
ad valorem. On all manufactures of silk, or of
which silk is the component material of chief value, not otherwise
provided for, fifty percent
ad valorem."
The collector pleaded that the moneys sued for were a part of
the lawful duty of sixty percent
ad valorem for "silk
veils" imported by the plaintiffs. They replied that the veils were
not "silk veils," but a manufacture of silk, and were "crape
veils;" that at the time of the passage of the Act of June 30,
1864, they were commercially known among importers and dealers, and
were bought and sold, as "crape veils," and never otherwise, and
were liable to a duty of fifty percent
ad valorem as a
manufacture of silk. The defendant demurred to the replication. The
demurrer was overruled, and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs.
The defendant sued out this writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the Court.
It was undisputed upon the pleadings that the veils in question
were commercially known among importers and dealers, and were
bought and sold, as "crape veils," and never otherwise.
The question of law thus presented is whether veils which are
not commonly called "silk veils," but are veils manufactured of
silk and are known commercially as "crape veils," and not
otherwise, are liable to a duty of sixty percent.
The argument of the government is that the statute in question
is a comprehensive one, intended to include all articles made of
silk or of which silk is the component material of chief value,
specifically enumerating in its first branch a variety of subjects
on which should be imposed a duty of sixty percent and further
providing that on all manufactures from that material not otherwise
provided for, a duty of fifty percent should be levied and
collected. Silk veils, it is said, are specifically enumerated as
being liable to a duty of sixty percent,
Page 96 U. S. 110
and the articles in question being veils of which the material
is silk, are within the enumerating clause of the statute.
If this were all, the argument would be a strong one. But the
fact that the veils in question are universally known and
recognized among merchants and importers as crape veils, and not
otherwise, and are never called or known as silk veils is to be
taken into the account. Although crape is shown to be a material of
silk to which a certain resinous substance has been applied,
neither the merchant nor the ordinary buyer understands them to be
identical. Neither the merchant who should order a case of crapes
and receive one of silk goods, or who should order silk and receive
crape, nor the individual purchaser who should order a dress of
silk and receive one of crape or should order crape for mourning
and receive silk, would deem that the order had been properly
filled. The general understanding concurs in this respect with that
of the trader and importer, and must determine the construction to
be given to the language of the statute. Especially should this
view prevail as to laws made for the government of the importer.
His business is regulated by them, and it is but reasonable that,
like the language of marine policies and the terms of the law
merchant, supposed to be especially applicable to this class, these
laws should be construed as universally understood by the importer
and trader. Obsolete words or those whose meaning is differently
understood by the writer and the reader produce disorder and
confusion. Importations from foreign countries are necessarily made
with reference to the duties to be paid upon their entry into the
ports of this country. If these are not reasonably uniform and
cannot be ascertained, the transaction of business will be
impossible. No man can determine whether his venture will enrich
him or make him a bankrupt. In
Lattimer v. Smythe it is
said,
"Where general terms are used, the terms are to be taken in
their ordinary and comprehensive meaning unless it is shown that
they have, in their commercial use, acquired a special and
restricted meaning."
17 Int.Rev.Rec. 12. In that case, and in
Jaffray v.
Murphy, 19
id. 143, which is to the same effect, the
question arose under the silk section of the act of 1864.
Page 96 U. S. 111
In the present case, it is admitted by the demurrer that the
goods in question are never understood by merchants and importers
to be silk veils. They cannot, therefore, be said to fall within
the enumerating clause of the statute, but come under the head of
such as are not otherwise provided for, and are subject to the duty
of fifty percent only.
Homer v. The
Collector, 1 Wall. 486;
Reiche v.
Smythe, 13 Wall. 162;
Movius v. Arthur,
95 U. S. 144;
United States v. Two Hundred
Chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 430;
Elliott v.
Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137;
Curtis v.
Martin, 3 How. 106;
Maillard
v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251.
In the last case, Mr. Justice Daniel says:
"The popular or received import of words furnishes the general
rule for the interpretation of public laws, as well as of private
and social transactions; and when the legislature adopts such
language to define and promulgate their action, the just conclusion
must be, that they not only themselves comprehended the meaning of
the language they have selected, but have chosen it with reference
to the known apprehension of those to whom it is delivered, and for
whom it is designed to constitute a rule of conduct -- namely, the
community at large."
In
Curtis v. Martin et al., supra, Chief Justice Taney
says:
"The question brought up by this exception cannot now be
considered an open one. In the case of
United States v. Two
Hundred Chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 430, the Court
decided, that in imposing duties Congress must be understood as
describing the articles upon which the duty is imposed, according
to the commercial understanding of the terms used in the law, in
our own markets. This doctrine was reaffirmed in the case of the
United
States v. One Hundred and Twelve Casks of Sugar, 8
Pet. 277, and again in
35 U. S. 10 Pet. 151, in the
case of
Elliott v. Swartwout. It follows that the duty
upon cotton bagging must be considered as imposed upon those
articles only which are known and understood as such in commerce in
the year 1832, when the law was passed imposing the duty."
That Congress intended duties under the act of 1864 to be
imposed according to their commercial designation, and that it
understood this to be the rule of construing statutes, is also
manifest from the first section of the Act of Feb. 8, 1875, 18
Stat. 307, upon the subject we are considering.
Page 96 U. S. 112
A duty of sixty percent is there imposed
"on all goods, wares, and merchandise, not herein otherwise
provided for, made of silk, or of which silk is the component
material of chief value, irrespective of the classification thereof
for duty by or under previous laws, or of their commercial
designation."
It was, no doubt, within the power of Congress to abolish a well
known rule of construction, as it did in the act of 1875; but until
so abolished, it remained in force.
The case was well decided. The judgment must be affirmed; and it
is
So ordered.
