1.
Carlisle v. United
States, 16 Wall. 147, cited and approved.
2. A foreigner, domiciled during the year 1864 in Texas, who, in
order to obtain permission of the rebel government to export his
cotton, sold at a nominal price, and delivered to its agents or
officers for its use, an equal amount of other cotton, which he
subsequently redeemed by paying a stipulated sum therefor, directly
contributed to the support of the enemy, and gave him aid and
comfort. Out of such a transaction no demand against such agents or
officers can arise which will be enforced in the courts of the
United States.
3. The coercion or duress which will render a payment
involuntary must consist of some actual or threatened exercise of
power possessed, or believed to be possessed, by the party exacting
or receiving the payment over the person or property of another
from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief than
by making payment.
This was an action brought by Radich against Hutchins and Wells.
He alleges in his petition that he is a subject of the Emperor of
Russia, and that he was, in 1864, the owner of four hundred and
fifty bales of cotton of the value of $50,000 which he designed to
export from Texas, where he then resided, to Mexico, and which were
then in transit on their way to Matamoras; that the defendant
Hutchins, claiming to be a lieutenant-colonel in the army of the
Confederate States, and chief of the cotton office at Houston in
that state, combining with the defendant Wells and others, had,
without warrant of law, by a public notice, prohibited the
exportation of cotton from the state except upon written permits
from his office; that such permits would not be issued except upon
condition that the person desiring to export cotton should sell to
them an equal amount, at a nominal and arbitrary price, for the
benefit of the Confederate States; that, being desirous to export
and sell his cotton because of the risk incurred of its destruction
or loss during the war, and knowing that if he should attempt to
send it beyond
Page 95 U. S. 211
the frontier of the state into Mexico, the armed forces of the
Confederate States, provided to carry out the illegal exactions of
the defendants and their confederates, would capture and confiscate
it, he was compelled to submit and did submit to the condition
imposed, and accordingly delivered to the defendants one-half of
his cotton -- namely two hundred and twenty-five bales -- at a
nominal and arbitrary price as a consideration for a permit to
export the other half, but upon a stipulation, however, insisted
upon by himself, that he should have the privilege of redeeming the
bales sold and exporting them upon the payment of such sum as the
defendants might demand; and that afterwards he paid them $13,357
in specie and in goods, wares, and merchandise at specie values in
redemption of the bales and for a permit to export them. He alleges
that the amount thus paid was illegally and oppressively exacted,
and that he submitted to the wrong because of the armed forces to
support and enforce it.
The defendants demurred. The demurrer was sustained and the
petition dismissed. Radich thereupon sued out this writ of
error.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
If at the time the transaction took place which has given rise
to the present action, the plaintiff was a subject of the Emperor
of Russia, as he alleges, that fact cannot affect the decision of
the case or any question presented for our consideration. He was
then a resident of the State of Texas and engaged in business
there. As a foreigner domiciled in the country, he was bound to
obey all the laws of the United States not immediately relating to
citizenship, and was equally amenable with citizens to the
penalties prescribed for their infraction. He owed allegiance to
the government of the country so long as he resided within its
limits, and can claim
Page 95 U. S. 212
no exemption from the statutes passed to punish treason, or the
giving of aid and comfort to the insurgent states. The law on this
subject is well settled and universally recognized.
Carlisle v. United
States, 16 Wall. 147.
The case presented by the petition is without merit.
The substance of the complaint is that the defendants, as
officers of the Confederate government, by a public notice, had
prohibited the exportation of cotton from the State of Texas to
Mexico except upon condition that the exporter should sell to them
an equal amount for the benefit of the Confederate government, and
that the plaintiff, being the owner of cotton which he desired to
export and fearing that if he attempted to export it without such
permit, it would be seized and confiscated by the armed forces of
that government, complied with the condition, and obtained a permit
from the officers to export two hundred and twenty-five bales, and
sold to them an equal amount for the Confederate government,
obtaining at the same time the privilege of redeeming the cotton
sold, and receiving a permit to export it, upon payment of such sum
as they might demand; that he took advantage of this privilege and
redeemed the cotton, paying in money and goods the sum mentioned in
the petition.
There is nothing in these allegations showing that the
defendants subjected the plaintiff to any coercion or duress, which
would justify an action against them, either for the return of the
money paid or for the value of the goods delivered in place of the
money, or for damages of any kind. There is no averment that either
of the defendants ever made, or attempted to make, any seizure of
the cotton, or that either of them was an impressing or other
officer, exercising or claiming to exercise any power for its
seizure, or had any thing to do with the command or operations of
the armed forces of the insurgents in the state of Texas. All that
is directly charged against them is the publication of a notice
that the exportation of cotton was forbidden, except on permits
from the cotton office. The armed force is not stated to have been
under the direction of that office. The whole proceeding set forth
in the petition was a voluntary one by the plaintiff. He applied to
the cotton office, and sold the cotton subsequently redeemed. It is
not
Page 95 U. S. 213
pretended that either of the defendants made any application for
its purchase.
To constitute the coercion or duress which will be regarded as
sufficient to make a payment involuntary -- treating now the
redemption of the cotton as made in money, goods being taken as
equivalent for a part of the amount -- there must be some actual or
threatened exercise of power possessed, or believed to be
possessed, by the party exacting or receiving the payment over the
person or property of another, from which the latter has no other
means of immediate relief than by making the payment. As stated by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the doctrine established by the
authorities is, that
"a payment is not to be regarded as compulsory unless made to
emancipate the person or property from an actual and existing
duress imposed upon it by the party to whom the money is paid."
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4
Gill (Md.) 425;
Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265;
Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268.
Tested by these cases, the allegation of coercion or duress
becomes frivolous. It is plain that the plaintiff entered
voluntarily upon the negotiation with the defendants, and
subsequently paid the redemption money without any constraint which
would in law change the voluntary character of the payment. Such
being the case, the transaction is one which is fatally tainted.
The sale of the cotton was to the Confederate States; the money
paid and goods delivered for its redemption were for the benefit of
those states, to assist them in their war against the government
and authority of the United States. The money paid and the goods
delivered constituted therefore nothing less than a direct
contribution to the support of the insurgents: they gave aid and
comfort to the enemy. No demand arising out of such a transaction
can have any standing in the courts of the Union.
At this time, also, it was the declared policy of the United
States to prevent all intercourse between the insurgent states and
the loyal states, and also between them and foreign countries, and
thus to cut off from the insurgents the means of prolonging the
existing war. In pursuance of this policy, the ports and coasts of
those states were blockaded, commerce
Page 95 U. S. 214
with their inhabitants was prohibited, except as specially
authorized under regulations of the Treasury Department, and
property which eluded the blockade was subject to seizure and
condemnation. The attention of the authorities was specially
directed to prevent the exportation of cotton, upon which the
insurgents chiefly relied to obtain the means for the continuance
of their struggle. The plaintiff alleges that he paid money and
delivered goods to the defendants for the use of the Confederate
government, in order to obtain permission to violate this policy
and legislation, and now he modestly asks that he should be allowed
in the courts of the United States to recover damages from them
because they took what he offered for the permission.
The demurrer was properly sustained.
Judgment affirmed.
