1. The general pardon and amnesty granted by President Johnson,
by proclamation, on the 25th of December, 1868, do not entitle one
receiving their benefits to the proceeds of his property,
previously condemned and sold under the Confiscation Act of July
17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, after such proceeds have been paid into the
Treasury of the United States.
2. Whilst a full pardon releases the offender from all
disabilities imposed by the offense pardoned and restores to him
all his civil rights, it does not affect any rights which have
vested in others directly by the execution of the judgment for the
offense or which have been acquired by others whilst that judgment
was in force. And if the proceeds of the property of the offender
sold under the judgment have been paid into the Treasury, the right
to them has so far become vested in the United States that they can
only be recovered by him through an act of Congress. Moneys once in
the Treasury can only be withdrawn by an appropriation by law.
3. To constitute an implied contract with the United States for
the payment of money upon which an action will lie in the Court of
Claims, there must have been some consideration moving to the
United States, or they must have received the money charged with a
duty to pay it over, or the claimant must have had a lawful right
to it when it was received, as in the case of money paid by
mistake. No such implied contract with the United States arises
with respect to moneys received into the Treasury as the proceeds
of property forfeited and sold under that act.
The petition of the claimant alleged that he was the owner of
certain described personal property in West Virginia, which was
seized and libeled by the authorities of the United States on the
alleged ground of his treason and rebellion; that by a decree of
the district court for that district, the property was condemned
and forfeited to the United States and sold; and the net proceeds
of the sale, amounting to the sum of $11,000, were paid into the
Treasury of the United States, the proceedings for its condemnation
and sale having been taken under the Confiscation Act of July 17,
1862; that subsequently, by
Page 95 U. S. 150
virtue of the amnesty proclamation of the President, of Dec. 25,
1868, the claimant was pardoned and relieved of all disabilities
and penalties attaching to the offense of treason and rebellion,
for which his property was confiscated, and was restored to all his
rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the
laws made in pursuance thereof, and thus became entitled to receive
the said proceeds of sale; but that the United States, disregarding
his rights in the premises, had refused to pay them over to him,
and therefore he prayed judgment against them. Upon demurrer for
insufficiency of the facts thus alleged to constitute a cause of
action the petition was dismissed, and hence the present
appeal.
The proclamation of President Johnson relied upon is in the
following words:
"Whereas the President of the United States has heretofore set
forth several proclamations offering amnesty and pardon to persons
who had been or were concerned in the late rebellion against the
lawful authority of the government, which proclamations were
severally issued on the eighth day of December, 1863, on the
twenty-sixth day of March, 1864, on the twenty-ninth day of March,
1865, on the seventh day of September, 1867, and on the fourth day
of July, in the present year."
"And whereas the authority of the federal government having been
reestablished in all the states and territories within the
jurisdiction of the United States, it is believed that such
prudential reservations and exceptions, as at the dates of said
several proclamations, were deemed necessary and proper, may now be
wisely and justly relinquished, and that a universal amnesty and
pardon for participation in said rebellion, extended to all who
have borne any part therein, will tend to secure permanent peace,
order, and prosperity throughout the land, and to renew and fully
secure confidence and fraternal feeling among the whole people, and
their respect for and attachment to the national government
designed by its patriotic founders for the general good."
"Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President
of the United States, by virtue of the power and authority in me
vested by the Constitution, and in the name of the sovereign people
of the United States, do hereby proclaim and declare
unconditionally, and without reservation, to all and to every
person who directly or indirectly participated in the late
insurrection or rebellion, a full
Page 95 U. S. 151
pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United
States, or of adhering to their enemies during the late civil war,
with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under
the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance
thereof."
15 Stat. 711.
Page 95 U. S. 152
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented for determination in this case is,
whether the general pardon and amnesty granted by President
Johnson, by proclamation, on the 25th of December, 1868, will
entitle one receiving their benefits to the proceeds of his
property, previously condemned and sold under the Confiscation Act
of 1862, after such proceeds have been paid into the Treasury.
The proclamation of the President extended unconditionally and
without reservation a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of
treason against the United States, or of giving aid and comfort to
their enemies, to all persons who had directly or indirectly
participated in the rebellion, with a restoration of all rights,
privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws made
in pursuance thereof. Some distinction has been made, or attempted
to be made, between pardon and amnesty. It is sometimes said that
the latter operates as an extinction of the offense of which it is
the object, causing it to be forgotten, so far as the public
interests are concerned, whilst the former only operates to remove
the penalties of the offense. This distinction is not, however,
recognized in our law. The Constitution does not use the word
"amnesty," and,
Page 95 U. S. 153
except that the term is generally employed where pardon is
extended to whole classes or communities, instead of individuals,
the distinction between them is one rather of philological interest
than of legal importance. At all events, nothing can be gained in
the consideration of the question before us by showing that there
is any difference in their operation. All the benefits which can
result to the claimant from both pardon and amnesty would equally
have accrued to him if the term "pardon" alone had been used in the
proclamation of the President. In
Klein's Case, this Court
said that pardon included amnesty.
81 U. S. 13
Wall. 128.
The rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution
and laws which the proclamation restored to parties embraced by its
terms, are such as all citizens possess and enjoy. That instrument
does not declare that any subjects of property are restored with
reference to which such rights, privileges, and immunities might be
invoked; nor can its language be thus construed without a manifest
perversion of its sense.
The effect of a pardon upon the condition and rights of its
recipient have been the subject of frequent consideration by this
Court, and principles have been settled which will solve the
question presented for our determination in the case at bar.
Ex Parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333;
Armstrong's
Foundry, 6 Wall. 766;
United
States v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531;
United
States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128;
Armstrong v. United
States,, 13 Wall. 155;
Pargoud v.
United States,, 13 Wall. 156;
Carlisle
v. United States, 16 Wall. 147;
Osborn v.
United States, 91 U. S. 474. A
pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the
consequences of his offense, so far as such release is practicable
and within control of the pardoning power, or of officers under its
direction. It releases the offender from all disabilities imposed
by the offense, and restores to him all his civil rights. In
contemplation of law, it so far blots out the offense, that
afterwards it cannot be imputed to him to prevent the assertion of
his legal rights. It gives to him a new credit and capacity, and
rehabilitates him to that extent in his former position. But it
does not make amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender in his person by imprisonment,
forced labor, or otherwise; it
Page 95 U. S. 154
does not give compensation for what has been done or suffered,
nor does it impose upon the government any obligation to give it.
The offense being established by judicial proceedings, that which
has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction
for it can be required. Neither does the pardon affect any rights
which have vested in others directly by the execution of the
judgment for the offense, or which have been acquired by others
whilst that judgment was in force. If, for example, by the judgment
a sale of the offender's property has been had, the purchaser will
hold the property notwithstanding the subsequent pardon. And if the
proceeds of the sale have been paid to a party to whom the law has
assigned them, they cannot be subsequently reached and recovered by
the offender. The rights of the parties have become vested, and are
as complete as if they were acquired in any other legal way. So,
also, if the proceeds have been paid into the Treasury, the right
to them has so far become vested in the United States that they can
only be secured to the former owner of the property through an act
of Congress. Moneys once in the Treasury can only be withdrawn by
an appropriation by law. However large, therefore, may be the power
of pardon possessed by the President, and however extended may be
its application, there is this limit to it, as there is to all his
powers -- it cannot touch moneys in the Treasury of the United
States, except expressly authorized by act of Congress. The
Constitution places this restriction upon the pardoning power.
Where, however, property condemned, or its proceeds, have not
thus vested, but remain under control of the Executive, or of
officers subject to his orders, or are in the custody of the
judicial tribunals, the property will be restored or its proceeds
delivered to the original owner, upon his full pardon. The property
and the proceeds are not considered as so absolutely vesting in
third parties or in the United States as to be unaffected by the
pardon until they have passed out of the jurisdiction of the
officer or tribunal. The proceeds have thus passed when paid over
to the individual entitled to them, in the one case, or are covered
into the Treasury, in the other.
The views here expressed have been applied in practice, it
Page 95 U. S. 155
is believed, by the executive departments of the government. In
1856, the question was submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury
to the Attorney General, whether, under a pardon of the President
remitting a forfeiture to the United States, imposed by a judgment
of a United States district court, the proceeds of the forfeiture
deposited by the marshal in one of the public depositories to the
credit of the United States, but not brought into the Treasury by a
covering warrant, could be refunded to the marshal, and through him
to the party entitled, in execution of the remission granted by the
President; and the Attorney General replied, that the pardoning
power was completely vested in the President, and did not require
in its exercise any aid from Congress, nor could it be curtailed by
Congress, but that, if the money had actually passed into the
Treasury, it could not be refunded without an act of Congress; for
the Constitution itself, in the provision that "no money shall be
drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made
by law," opposed an insuperable obstacle to such a proceeding, and
that this provision was of equal efficiency with the pardoning
power, and operated as a restriction upon it. But the Attorney
General held, and so advised the Secretary, that, if the money had
only gone into the hands of some officer of the government, and the
right of third parties had not attached, it might be refunded. 8
Op. Att.Gen., p. 281. As an instance where property acquired by a
third party, whilst the judgment against the offender is in force,
cannot be affected by a subsequent pardon, he cited the case of the
disposition of a convict's property during the time of his civil
incapacity. The pardon does not restore the property. And, as an
instance where a right, other than of property, acquired during the
same period, is also unaffected, he cited the case where, by the
law of the country, a conviction of felony operates to dissolve a
marriage, and the innocent party contracts new bonds of matrimony.
The subsequent pardon does not dissolve the new bonds.
Matter
of Deming, 10 Johns. 232.
The same views were, to some extent, applied in the recent case
of
Osborn v. United States, supra, where proceeds of
property, confiscated under the act of July 17, 1862, for the
alleged treason of the claimant, remaining in the registry,
were
Page 95 U. S. 156
ordered by the circuit court to be delivered to the claimant who
had been pardoned, Mr. Justice Miller, presiding in the circuit
court, holding that, until an order of distribution of the proceeds
was made, or the proceeds were actually paid into the hands of the
party entitled, as informer, to receive them, or into the Treasury
of the United States, they were within the control of the court,
and that no vested right to the proceeds had accrued so as to
prevent the pardon from restoring them to the claimant, and
impliedly holding, that, had they been thus paid, either to the
informer or into the Treasury, the right to them would have passed
beyond the control of the court. On appeal, this Court affirmed the
decision, observing, that it was of the essence of a pardon that it
relieved the offender from the consequences of his offense; and as
in that case the forfeiture of his property was one of those
consequences, it restored the property to him, unless the rights of
other parties had vested, and the power of restoration was thus
gone.
An attempt is made by counsel to give some expressions used in
the opinion of the court a wider meaning, so as to support the
claim here presented; but the language will not sustain the
conclusion sought. There was no consideration of the effect of the
pardon upon the proceeds of the forfeited property when paid into
the Treasury, but only of its effect upon those proceeds whilst
under the control of the court in its registry. Any language which
seemingly admits of a broader interpretation must be restricted to
the facts of the case. There was no intention of expressing any
opinion that a pardon could do away with the constitutional
requirement as to money in the Treasury; whilst there, it is the
property of the United States.
There is another view of this case, which must lead to an
affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Claims. The jurisdiction
of that court is limited to claims founded upon a law of Congress
or upon a regulation of an executive department or upon a contract,
express or implied, with the government. The claim here presented
rests upon a supposed implied contract to pay to the claimant the
money received as the proceeds of the forfeited property. To
constitute such a contract, there must have been some consideration
moving to the United States; or they must have received the money,
charged with a duty to
Page 95 U. S. 157
pay it over; or the claimant must have had a lawful right to it
when it was received, as in the case of money paid by mistake. But
here there was no consideration moving to the United States; they
were charged with no duty in respect to the money; there was no
legal claim by any one to it when received into the Treasury; and
no law since has required it to be paid to the claimant. There can
be, therefore, no implied contract in the case.
Judgment affirmed.
