1. In an action at law for the infringement of letters patent,
the rule as to the measure of damages is that the verdict of the
jury must be for the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff,
subject to the right of the court to enter judgment thereon for any
sum above the verdict not exceeding three times that amount,
together with costs.
2. Where the unlawful acts consist in making and selling a
patented improvement or in its extensive and protracted use without
palliation or excuse, evidence of an established royalty will, in
an action at law, undoubtedly furnish the true measure of damages;
but where the use is a limited one, and for a brief period, the
arbitrary and unqualified application of that rule is
erroneous.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Juries, in an action at law for the infringement of a patent,
are required to find the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff
in consequence of the unlawful acts of the defendant. Power is
given to the court in such a case to enter judgment for any sum
above the amount of the verdict, not exceeding three times the
amount of the same, together with costs, but the jury are strictly
limited in their finding to the actual damages which the plaintiff
has sustained by the infringement. 16 Stat. 207; 5
id.
123; Rev.Stat., sec. 4919, p. 960.
Damages are given as a compensation, recompense, or satisfaction
to the plaintiff, for an injury actually received by him from the
defendant. Compensatory damages and actual damages mean the same
thing -- that is, that the damages shall be the result of the
injury alleged and proved, and that the amount awarded shall be
precisely commensurate with the injury suffered, neither more nor
less, whether the injury be to the person or estate of the
complaining party. 2 Greenl.Ev. (10th ed.) sec. 253.
Improvements in machines for amalgamating gold and silver were
made by Zenas Wheeler, then in full life, for which he received
letters patent in due form of law. Sufficient also
Page 93 U. S. 65
appears to show that the patentee subsequently -- to wit, on the
15th of August, 1869 -- departed this life; that, at the time of
his death, he was a resident of San Francisco, in the State of
California, and that he left a last will and testament, duly
executed, as required by the laws of that state; that he gave,
devised, and bequeathed to the plaintiff all and singular his
property, real and personal, wheresoever situated, including all
debts owing to him, and all moneys belonging to him of which he
might die seised and possessed, in trust for certain uses and
purposes therein specifically set forth and described, leaving his
patent rights, machinery, and certain other specified interests in
the hands of his executor, to be managed, controlled, improved,
changed, or disposed of as his executor may in his judgment deem
best for the interests of the estate. Due probate of the will has
since been made, and letters testamentary have been duly granted to
the plaintiff as sole executor of the deceased patentee.
Pursuant to the power vested in the plaintiff as such executor,
he instituted the present suit, in which he alleges that the
deceased testator was the original and first inventor of the
improvement described in the patent, and that the defendants,
though well knowing the premises and in order to deprive the
plaintiff of the gains and profits of the same, have, without
license from the testator in his lifetime or from the plaintiff
since the decease of the testator, used and caused to be used
twenty amalgamating machines, embracing substantially the same
improvement, in violation and infringement of the exclusive right
secured by the said letters patent.
Service was made, and the defendants appeared and pleaded the
general issue and gave notice of certain special defenses, as
follows:
1. That the testator in his lifetime executed a license to J.
Booth & Co., to manufacture the patented machine, and that the
defendants purchased the machines they use of the licensees.
2. That the patented improvement has been openly and universally
used by the public since the patent was granted.
3. That the curved grooves in the face of the muller and in the
bottom of the pan had been previously patented to the respective
parties named in the notice of special matter.
4. That the patentee was not the original and
Page 93 U. S. 66
first inventor of the improvement.
5. That the curved grooves in the face of the muller and bottom
of the pan were in public use more than two years before the
alleged inventor made application for a patent.
6. That the patented improvements were described in the printed
publications mentioned in the notice of special matter.
Reference to the specification will show that the patented
improvement is called a new and improved gold and silver
amalgamator and pulverizer, and that the object of the invention,
as stated by the patentee, is to obtain a device of simple
construction which will cause a thorough incorporation of the
quicksilver with the pulp containing the metal, so as to insure a
perfect amalgamation of the latter. Mechanically considered, the
invention consists in the arrangement of spiral ribs on the
periphery of the rotary muller, and spiral ribs reversed on the
inner side of the pan, to operate in connection with curved grooves
on the face or under side of the muller, and curved grooves
reversed in the bottom of the pan, for the purpose explained.
These explanations are the same as those given in the
specification, and the patentee also states that the invention
consists in the manner of connecting the muller to its shaft by a
universal joint, so as to insure its parallelism with the bottom of
the pan, and in the employment or use of curved plates, which are
placed in the pan just above the muller and arranged in such a
manner as to be capable of being adjusted higher or lower, as set
forth in the specification.
Two of the claims of the patent -- to-wit the first and second
-- are omitted, as the plaintiff admits that those claims have not
been infringed by the defendants. What he charges is that they have
infringed the third claim, which is as follows:
"In combination with the muller and pan, the curved plates
supported at their outer ends on slides, and at their inner ends in
a frame, which is supported on the upper end of the shaft in such a
manner that the plates will follow any adjustment of the muller,
and thus bear the same relation to it, whether in its highest or
lowest working position."
Viewed in the light of these suggestions, it is clear that the
charge of infringement has respect chiefly to the curved plates
Page 93 U. S. 67
supported, as explained, when used in combination with the
muller and pan.
Subsequently the parties went to trial, and the verdict and
judgment were for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,266.66, with costs
of suit. Exceptions were duly filed by the defendants, and they
sued out the present writ of error.
By the bill of exceptions, it appears that the plaintiff
introduced his patent in evidence, together with a model of the
patented machine for amalgamating gold and silver, and gave
testimony tending to show that the defendants purchased twenty
amalgamating pans, which contained wings or curved plates of iron
twelve inches wide and fourteen inches long, fastened at one end to
the inner side of the rim of the pans in a vertical position, in
such a manner that they could be raised or depressed by sliding up
or down in a groove or fastening and could be adjusted at different
heights, and extending lengthways towards the center of the pans,
which were a little more than four feet in diameter.
Wings of the kind, however, were used in only sixteen of the
pans for a few weeks after the defendants commenced to use the pans
for amalgamating purposes, and the defendants testified that the
wings were useless, and even detrimental, for working over old
tailings, which was the work on which they were engaged, for the
reason that such material does not require further grinding or
pulverization; that, finding the wings useless or detrimental, they
took them out of the sixteen pans and sold them for old iron.
They also gave evidence tending to show that when they used the
mill as a quartz mill, they used the wings in sixteen only of the
pans, but that when they commenced to work what are called
"tailings," they took out the wings because they found them to be
detrimental or useless, and the bill of exceptions also states that
the defendants took the wings out of four of the pans before they
used them at all, and only used the wings in some of the other pans
for a short time, and that they did not use any of them more than
six weeks, which is all the evidence introduced to show the extent
of the infringement.
Wide differences of opinion existed between the parties as to
the rule of damages in such case, and to aid in the solution
Page 93 U. S. 68
of that question, the plaintiff introduced testimony tending to
show that the decedent in his lifetime allowed manufacturers to
make and sell the invention for a royalty of $100 for a machine
containing only the same combination as that used by the
defendants, and proved that he, the plaintiff, had sold royalties
to a large amount at the same rate.
Questions of various kinds other than those relating to the
measure of damages are also presented in the bill of exceptions,
but the Court here, in the view taken of the case, do not find it
necessary to decide any other in this investigation.
Instructions as to the measure of damages were given by the
court to the jury in substance and effect as follows: that when a
person, without license, appropriates the patented invention of
another, the measure of damages, if a royalty has been established,
is the regular royalty paid by purchasers and licensees; that if
the jury find for the plaintiff, the damages will be the royalty
which the plaintiff established for that part of the invention used
by the defendants; that if the royalty paid for that part of the
invention is $100, then the jury will allow $100 on each pan used
by the defendants, and interest on that sum, at ten percent per
annum for the time of the appropriation, which is the rate of
interest allowed in that state.
Under those instructions, the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff in the sum of $2,266.66, as appears by the record.
Seasonable exception was taken to the instructions by the
defendants, and that instruction presents the only question which
the Court deems it necessary to decide in disposing of the
case.
Controversies and cases arising under the patent laws are
originally cognizable, as well in equity as at law, by the circuit
courts or by any district court having circuit powers. Prior to the
passage of the act of the 8th of July, 1870, two remedies were open
to the owner of a patent whose rights had been infringed, and he
had his election between the two: he might proceed in equity and
recover the gains and profits which the infringer had made by the
unlawful use of his invention, the infringer in such a suit being
regarded as the trustee of the owner of the patent as respects such
gains and profits, or
Page 93 U. S. 69
the owner of the patent might sue at law, in which case he would
be entitled to recover as damages compensation for the pecuniary
injury he suffered by the infringement, without regard to the
question whether the defendant had gained or lost by his unlawful
acts -- the measure of damages in such case being not what the
defendants had gained, but what the plaintiff had lost. Curtis on
Pat. (4th ed.) 461; 5 Stat. 123.
Where the suit is at law, the measure of damages remains
unchanged to the present time, the rule still being that the
verdict of the jury must be for the actual damages sustained by the
plaintiff, subject to the right of the court to enter judgment
thereon for any sum above the verdict not exceeding three times
that amount, together with costs. 16 Stat. 207.
Damages of a compensatory character may also be allowed to the
complainant suing in equity, in certain cases, where the gains and
profits made by the respondent are clearly not sufficient to
compensate the complainant for the injury sustained by the unlawful
violation of the exclusive right secured to him by the patent.
Gains and profits are still the proper measure of damages in equity
suits, except in cases where the injury sustained by the
infringement is plainly greater than the aggregate of what was made
by the respondent, in which event the provision is that the
complainant "shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the
profits to be accounted for by the respondent, the damages he has
sustained thereby."
Cases occurred under the prior patent act where manifest
injustice was done to the complainant in equity suits by
withholding from him a just compensation for the injury he
sustained by the unlawful invasion of his exclusive rights even
when the final decree gave him all that the law allowed. Examples
of the kind may be mentioned where the business of the infringer
was so improvidently conducted that it did not yield any
substantial profits and cases where the products of the patented
improvements were sold greatly below their just and market value in
order to compel the owner of the patent, his assignees and
licensees, to abandon the manufacture of the patented product.
Courts could not, under that act, augment the allowance made by
the final decree, as in the case of the verdict of a jury,
Page 93 U. S. 70
but the present patent act provides that the court shall have
the same powers to increase the decree, in its discretion, that are
given by the act to increase the damages found by verdicts in
actions at law. Such difficulties could never arise in an action at
law, nor can it now, as both the prior and the present patent act
authorize the court to enter judgment on the verdict of the jury
for any sum above the verdict not exceeding three times that
amount. No discretion is vested in the jury, but they are required
to find the actual damages under proper instructions from the
court.
Still it is obvious that there cannot be any one rule of damages
prescribed which will apply in all cases, even where it is conceded
that the finding must be limited to actual damages. Frequent cases
arise where proof of an established royalty furnishes a pretty safe
guide both for the instructions of the court and the finding of the
jury. Reported cases of undoubted authority may be referred to
which support that proposition; and yet it is believed to be good
law that the rule cannot be applied without qualification where the
patented improvement has been used only to a limited extent and for
a short time, but that in such a case the jury should find less
than the amount of the license fee, and it is admitted in several
cases that the circumstances may be such that the finding should be
larger than the royalty.
Seymour v.
McCormick, 16 How. 490;
Livingston v.
Woodworth, 15 How. 560;
Dean
v. Mason, 20 How. 203; Curtis on Pat. (4th ed.)
459.
Evidence of an established royalty will undoubtedly furnish the
true measure of damages in an action at law where the unlawful acts
consist in making and selling the patented improvement, or in the
extensive and protracted use of the same without palliation or
excuse; but where the use is a limited one and for a brief period,
as in the case before the Court, it is error to apply that rule
arbitrarily and without any qualification.
Packet
Co. v. Sickles, 19 Wall. 617;
Burdell v.
Denig, 92 U. S. 716;
Suffolk Co. v.
Hayden, 3 Wall. 320.
Four of the pans in this case were used throughout without
wings, and wings in most of the others were used only for a short
time, and in none of the pans for more than six weeks.
Page 93 U. S. 71
Under these circumstances, it was error to charge the jury that
if they found any damages, they must find the amount of the royalty
for each pan so used, as that was instructing the jury in effect
that they must find $100 for each pan, which is plainly more than
the actual damages proved by the evidence. Actual damage is the
statute rule, and whenever the royalty plainly exceeds the rule
prescribed by the Patent Act, the finding should be reduced to the
statute rule.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to
issue a venire de novo.