The claim of the heirs and legal representatives of Colonel
Francis Vigo against the United States on account of supplies by
him furnished in 1778 to the regiment under the command of George
Rogers Clarke, who was acting under a commission from the State of
Virginia, was, by an Act of Congress approved June 8, 1872, 17
Stat. 687, referred to the Court of Claims with the direction that
the court, in settling it, should be governed by the rules and
regulations theretofore adopted by the United States in the
settlement of like cases, and without regard to the statute of
limitations.
Held that the act removes the bar of the
lapse of time and that, as the case is like those in which interest
was to be allowed by the fifth section of the Act of Aug. 5, 1790,
1 Stat. 178, the claimants are entitled to recover the principal
sum, with interest thereon.
Page 91 U. S. 443
The court below allowed the claim, with interest thereon from
the time it accrued, and, among other facts, found that
"no rules and regulations have heretofore been adopted by the
United States in the settlement of like cases except such as may be
inferred from the policy of Congress when passing private acts for
the relief of various persons. When passing such private acts,
Congress has allowed interest upon the claim up to the time that
the relief was granted."
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 91 U. S. 448
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The claim of the State of Virginia to dominion over that region
of country called the territory northwest of the Ohio River, which
is now filled with a population of many millions and divided into
five states of the Union, was not undisputed in the days when that
state was a province of Great Britain. The French had numerous
settlements there, and the government of Great Britain claimed,
both by the acquisition of Canada and by settlement, a large part
of that loosely defined country. They had their military posts
there, as well as peaceful villages. The Indians also denied all
right of the Colony of Virginia to rule over them, and some of the
most warlike tribes of that race were known to occupy, with claim
of exclusive right, the largest part of the country.
During the Revolutionary war, General George Rogers Clarke,
acting under a commission from the State of Virginia, fitted out a
warlike expedition and starting from the falls of the Ohio, now
called Louisville, made his appearance suddenly before the military
post of Kaskaskia, then held by the British, and captured it and
several other posts, and, in the course of one of the most romantic
campaigns which the history of that region down to this day
affords, effectually settled the right of Virginia to supremacy in
that quarter.
General Clarke was not very vigorously supported by Virginia in
this enterprise, for it occurred during the war of the Revolution,
and that Commonwealth, as she now called herself, was engaged in
more pressing affairs. It seems, however, that the
Page 91 U. S. 449
state had in New Orleans an agent on whom Clarke drew several
drafts for funds to aid him in the matter, most of which were
paid.
In the year 1778 he drew one of these drafts in favor of Francis
Vigo for $8,616, which was not paid for want of funds. This draft
was given for supplies furnished to Clarke's regiment, and has
never yet been paid. It does not appear that the State of Virginia
ever denied the justice of this debt, but by the finding of the
Court of Claims, from which this record comes to us on appeal, it
does appear that an officer of that state, called the Commissioner
of Revolutionary Claims, examined into this one in the year 1835
and adjusted it, including interest, at $32,654.85.
In the course of the negotiation for the relinquishment of title
by the states to their outlying territories, one of the resolutions
passed by the Continental Congress Oct. 16, 1780 (6 Jour. of Cong.
213), was that when so ceded,
"the necessary and reasonable expenses which any particular
state shall have incurred since the commencement of the present war
in subduing any British post or in maintaining forts or garrisons
within and for the defense or in acquiring any part of the
territory that may be ceded or relinquished to the United States
shall be reimbursed."
The debt represented by this draft comes directly within the
language of this resolution, which was repeated by the Virginia
legislature in the Act of cession.
But by the Act of Aug. 5, 1790, by which Congress constituted a
board of commissioners to adjust all claims of the several states
against the United States, there was a provision that no claim of a
citizen of a state should be admitted as a claim against the United
States which had not been allowed by the state before the
twenty-fourth day of September, 1788. As the claim of Vigo, on
account of this draft, had not then been allowed by the State of
Virginia, this proviso has remained as a perpetual bar to its
payment or allowance by those commissioners, or by any other
officer of the government.
Congress, however, by many private acts, has authorized the
payment of other claims similarly barred. This claim has been
Page 91 U. S. 450
constantly pressed upon the attention of Congress by the heirs
of Vigo, until finally the case was, by the Act of June 8, 1872,
referred to the Court of Claims in the following language:
"The claim of the heirs and legal representatives of Colonel
Francis Vigo, deceased, late of Terre Haute, Ind., for money and
supplies furnished the troops under command of General George
Rogers Clarke in the year 1778 during the Revolutionary war, be,
and the same hereby is, referred, along with all the papers and
official documents belonging thereto, to the Court of Claims, with
full jurisdiction to adjust and settle the same, and in making such
adjustment and settlement, the said court shall be governed by the
rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in
the settlement of like cases, giving proper consideration to
official acts, if any have heretofore been had in connection with
this claim, and without regard to the statutes of limitations."
We entertain no doubt that the claim was a just claim in the
hands of Vigo against the State of Virginia and that, under the
resolutions of the Congress of the United States and the State of
Virginia, it belonged to that class of claims which Congress had
assumed on receiving from that state the cession of the territory
northwest of the Ohio. The wisdom of the Act of Congress of 1790 in
fixing a date after which the states could not make allowances of
claims which should bind the United States is apparent, and nothing
could be more just or honorable than that Congress, when appealed
to for a relaxation of this salutary general rule of exclusion in
favor of the private citizen who had a meritorious case, should
grant relief. It seems clear to us that in the Act of 1872,
Congress did mean to remove this bar of the lapse of time and to
authorize the Court of Claims, if they found the claim to be a just
one, to settle and allow it.
That the allowance of the principal sum was right we think is
beyond question, but the allowance of interest admits of
discussion.
It has been the general rule of the officers of government, in
adjusting and allowing unliquidated and disputed claims against the
United States, to refuse to give interest. That this rule is
sometimes at variance with that which governs the acts of private
citizens in a court of justice would not authorize us to
Page 91 U. S. 451
depart from it in this case. The rule, however, is not uniform,
and especially is it not so in regard to claims allowed by special
acts of Congress or referred by such acts to some department or
officer for settlement.
The counsel for claimant has, in a careful brief, collected with
much labor numerous cases in which interest has been allowed by
Congress in the adjustment of disputed claims. The fifth section of
the Act of Aug. 5, 1790, already referred to, directed the
commissioners, who under that act were to settle the claims of the
states against the General Government, to allow interest, and but
for the bar of time in that act, this case would have come under
that statute. The act under which the Court of Claims took
jurisdiction of this case directed it to be "governed by the rules
and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in
settlement of like cases." This is a like case to those in which
interest was to be allowed by the Act of 1790.
The bill of exchange drawn by Clarke in favor of Vigo is an
instrument which, by the commercial usage of all nations, bears
interest after it becomes due. It also evidences the claim as a
liquidated sum. There had never been any dispute about the amount
due if the claim was legal, and though the United States is not
directly bound by the instrument, yet if they choose to remove the
bar of time, as the Act of 1872 does in express terms, and it is
found that the claim is one which the government has by law agreed
to pay, we see no reason why it should not be paid in full, with
all its legal incidents, as the State of Virginia should and would
have paid it had not the liability been assumed by the United
States when she received the cession of that immense country -- a
consideration ample enough for this and all other obligations she
assumed in that contract.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS did not hear the argument in this case, and
took no part in its decision.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE HUNT,
dissenting.
I dissent from so much of the opinion of the Court as allows
Page 91 U. S. 452
interest to the claimant. Unless where the contract is express
to that effect, the United States are not liable to pay interest.
Interest should never be allowed on old claims where payment has
been deferred because the accounting officers of the Treasury were
of the opinion that further legislation was necessary to authorize
their allowance, unless the new law clearly provides for the
payment of interest as well as principal.