1. Although, by the common law, the money which the wife has at
the time of her marriage, not secured to her by a settlement or
contract, and that which she subsequently earns, belong to the
husband, it is competent and lawful for him to allow its investment
in the purchase and improvement of real property for her separate
use if the rights of existing creditors are not thereby
impaired.
2. The doctrine of resulting trusts has no application to an
investment of this kind; it constitutes a voluntary settlement upon
the wife, whether made through the husband or directly by the wife
with his consent.
3. A divorce granted to the wife for cruel treatment by the
husband is not of itself sufficient reason for awarding to him any
portion of the property thus settled upon her.
This is a case of divorce. The parties were married on the 25th
of November, 1856, in the District of Columbia, where they then and
ever since have resided. Each prayed for a dissolution of the
marriage contract for the alleged misconduct of the other. The
appellee, in his cross-bill, set up that the appellant held in her
individual name the title to certain real estate in said District
which had been acquired and paid for since their marriage with his
money and earnings, and prayed that she be decreed to convey the
same to him.
The appellant's answer to the cross-bill alleged that the land
had been purchased with money received from her father's estate,
and from the proceeds of her own industry and savings.
The cause being set down for hearing, the court found as a
matter of fact that the appellee was guilty of cruel treatment, as
charged in the appellant's bill; that the cause of divorce in the
cross-bill mentioned was not made out; and that the property was in
part acquired and paid for with money belonging to the appellant at
the time of her marriage, and for the rest with moneys earned by
the joint efforts of said parties.
The court thereupon decreed that the married relations between
the parties be dissolved; that the title to the property be held by
the appellee in trust for both parties; and that, from the date of
the decree, the appellant should hold, as of her own absolute
right, a specifically described portion thereof, and convey in fee
simple the remainder to the appellee.
Page 91 U. S. 123
From so much of the decree as relates to the property, the
plaintiff below appealed to the general term of said supreme court.
The decree being affirmed, an appeal was taken to this Court.
There is no conflict in the proofs as to the purchase of the
real estate by the appellant with the money which she possessed at
the time of her marriage. The rent of the house which was then
standing on the property, and her earnings, were used in the
erection of the additional buildings; but the evidence adduced by
the appellee tended to show that a part of his earnings was applied
to the same purpose.
The appellant took the deed in her own name, paid taxes on the
property, caused it to be insured, and managed and controlled it as
her own separate estate, with the full knowledge and consent of the
appellee.
The common law as to the rights of a married woman to real or
personal property belonging to her at the time of her marriage, or
thereafter acquired, prevailed in said District until April 20,
1869, when an act was passed to regulate such rights. 16 Stat.
45.
The ninth section of the "Act to authorize divorces in the
District of Columbia, and for other purposes," approved June 19,
1860, 12 Stat. 59, provides
"That in all cases where a divorce is granted, the court
allowing the same shall have power, if it see fit, to award alimony
to the wife and to retain her right of dower, and to award to the
wife such property, or the value thereof, as she had when she was
married, or such part, or the value thereof, as the court may deem
reasonable, having a regard to the circumstances of the husband at
the time of the divorce."
The above provisions, except insofar as they relate to alimony
and the right of dower, appear not to have been reenacted in the
Revised Statutes.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The land in controversy in this case was purchased by the wife
with money which she had previous to her marriage, given to her by
her father. The buildings erected thereon were constructed
Page 91 U. S. 124
partly with such money, and partly with her subsequent earnings.
The deed of the land was taken in her name; the contract for the
houses was made by her alone with the builder; the policy of
insurance upon the buildings was executed to her; and she paid the
taxes upon the property. It is true that at the date of the
marriage, and when the land was purchased and the improvements were
made, the common law governed in the District of Columbia as to the
rights of married women to the personal property possessed by them
previous to their marriage, and not secured by a settlement or
contract to their separate use, and as to their subsequent
earnings. By that law, the money which the wife then possessed and
her subsequent earnings belonged exclusively to her husband. They
vested as absolutely in him as though the money had been originally
his, and the earnings were the proceeds of his own labor and
industry. This harsh rule of the common law was founded upon the
idea that as the husband was bound by the marriage to support the
wife and the rest of the family, he was entitled to whatever she
possessed or subsequently acquired which was available for that
purpose -- a rule which would have had some good ground for its
existence had it only applied when the money or earnings of the
wife were necessary for that purpose. But, becoming absolutely the
property of the husband, they were subject to his disposal without
regard to the necessities of the family, and might be taken from
them at the suit of his creditors. They partook of the condition,
and were subject to the fate, of his separate property.
But though the money which the wife in the present case had at
her marriage, and her subsequent earnings, must be regarded as the
property of the husband, it was competent and lawful for him to
allow her to invest them for her own use, so as to be beyond his
reach and control. Being at the time free from debt, he could have
taken whatever money she had, whether given to her or earned by her
own labor, and purchased with it the land in controversy, and
received the deed in her name. The investment would then have been
an advancement for her benefit -- a voluntary settlement upon her,
and the subsequent application of her earnings to the construction
of improvements would have equally been a legal disposition of
them. The improvement of property settled upon the wife
Page 91 U. S. 125
is not forbidden to the husband, if not made with a fraudulent
intent, and the moneys used for that purpose do not interfere with
any rights of existing creditors.
The law on the subject of post-nuptial settlements of this
character is well settled, and will be found stated in numerous
adjudications of the American courts.
Picquet v. Swan, 4
Mas. 444;
Haskell v. Bakewell, 10 B.Mon. 206. The doctrine
of resulting trusts, arising where a conveyance is taken in the
name of one person and the consideration is advanced by another,
has no application to investments of this kind. Such trusts are
raised by the law from the presumed intention of the parties, and
the natural equity that he who furnishes the means for the
acquisition of property should enjoy its benefits. But no
presumption that a personal benefit was intended to the party
advancing the funds for a purchase in the name of another can arise
where an obligation exists on his part, legal or moral, to provide
for the grantee, as in the case of a husband for his wife, or a
father for his child. The circumstance that the grantee stands in
one of these relations to the party is of itself sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust and to
create a contrary presumption of an advancement for the grantee's
benefit.
Murless v. Franklin, 1 Swans. 17;
Grey v.
Grey, 2
id. 597;
Finch v. Finch, 15 Ves. 50;
Guthrie v. Gardner, 19 Wend. 414; Perry on Trusts, secs.
143, 144.
The case of
Sexton v.
Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229, which arose in the District
of Columbia, is a determination of this Court upon the points here
presented. There the husband had purchased a house and lot within
the District, and taken the conveyance in the name of his wife, and
afterwards improvements were made upon the property. Subsequent
creditors, having obtained judgment against him, filed a bill to
subject the property to its payment, contending that the conveyance
to the wife was fraudulent and void as to them, and praying that,
if the conveyance was sustained, the wife might be compelled to
account for the value of the improvements. But the Court held, Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall delivering its opinion, that, the husband at
the time being free from debt, the conveyance to the wife was to be
deemed a voluntary settlement upon her which, not being made with
any fraudulent intent, was operative and binding against subsequent
creditors, and that the
Page 91 U. S. 126
improvements upon the property stood upon the same footing as
the conveyance itself, they being made before the debts were
contracted. The Chief Justice observed that it would seem to be a
consequence of that absolute power which a man possesses over his
own property, that he might make any disposition of it which did
not interfere with the existing rights of others; that such
disposition, if it were fair and real, would be valid; and that the
limitations upon this power were those only which were prescribed
by law. The Chief Justice then proceeded to show that the law only
limited this power when its exercise impaired the rights of
existing creditors, and that a voluntary settlement by a husband in
favor of his wife could not be impeached by subsequent creditors
unless it was made to defraud them.
The present case is one much stronger than the case cited, for
here there are no creditors complaining. It differs from the one
cited in this, that the investment was made directly by the wife,
instead of being made through the husband; but we do not perceive
in this fact any valid objection to the legality of the
transaction. There can be no doubt that she acted with his
approval. Fifteen years of acquiescence in her holding the land in
her name, and in making improvements thereon with her earnings,
ought to be deemed satisfactory evidence of his original
authorization of the investments. The amount paid for the land was
only $300 (less than one-sixth of the sum received from her
father), and the whole cost of the improvements for the fifteen
years was only about $2,000; and it does not appear that any third
parties have been in any respect prejudiced by the investments or
have ever questioned their validity.
The divorce decreed was not of itself a sufficient reason for
restoring to the husband any rights to the property thus settled
upon the wife. That was granted for cruel treatment, and whatever
may be the power of the court over the property of parties upon the
dissolution of the marriage relation, there was no call for its
exercise in a case like the present.
The decree of the Supreme Court of the District, so far as
it awards any portion of the property in controversy to the
husband, and directs a conveyance by the wife to him, must be
reversed, and it is so ordered.
Page 91 U. S. 127
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS dissenting.
I agree to the legal propositions advanced by the court, but in
my opinion the evidence in this case does not warrant the
application that has been made of them.
It would serve no useful purpose to discuss the evidence, in
order to show that it is so, and I shall therefore content myself
with saying that it justified the conclusion reached by the court
below, that the property should be divided between the parties. As
the appeal only brought up the question of property rights, I am
not at liberty to consider the merits of the decree for
divorce.
