The Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the County of Hunterdon,
in the State of New Jersey, in May, 1779, had a general
jurisdiction in all cases of inquisition for treason, and its
judgment, although erroneous, was not void, inasmuch as the court
had jurisdiction of the cause.
Error to the Circuit Court of the District of New Jersey in an
action of ejectment brought by John Den, lessee of Grace Kempe, a
British subject, against R. Kennedy and M. Cowell, citizens of the
State of New Jersey, for land in that state.
Upon the trial of the cause upon the general issue, a bill of
exceptions was taken by the plaintiff which presents the following
case:
Grace Coxe, the lessor of the plaintiff, being seized in fee of
the land in question, before the year 1772 intermarried with John
Tabor Kempe, who died in August, 1792. They resided in New York
before and during the war with Great Britain, and went to Great
Britain when New York was evacuated
Page 9 U. S. 174
by the British army. Grace Kempe, since the death of her
husband, has continued to reside and now resides in Great Britain,
where he died, having been in possession of the land in right of
his wife, on the first of March, 1776, and until the same was
seized by the authority of the State of New Jersey.
The defendants relied upon several acts of the Legislature of
New Jersey; an inquisition taken under the authority of those acts;
a judgment of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the County of
Hunterdon, in May, 1779, upon that inquisition, confiscating the
estate; a judgment of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the
County of Sussex; an execution upon that judgment; and a deed from
Joseph Gaston, an agent for the State of New Jersey, to the
defendant Kennedy, whose tenant the other defendant was, and proved
that he had always been in possession under that deed from the day
of its date to the day of trial.
Upon this case the plaintiff prayed the court to instruct the
jury that it ought to find a verdict for him, which the court
refused and directed the jury that it ought to find a verdict for
the defendants, to which refusal and direction the plaintiff
excepted, and brought his writ of error.
Page 9 U. S. 184
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court as
follows:
In this case two points are made by the plaintiff in error.
1. That the judgment rendered by the court of common pleas which
is supposed to bar the plaintiff's title is clearly erroneous.
2. That it is an absolute nullity, and is to be entirely
disregarded in this suit.
However clear the opinion of the Court may be on the first point
in favor of the plaintiff, it will avail her nothing unless she
succeeds upon the second. Without repeating, therefore, those
arguments which have been so well urged at the bar, to show that
the inquisition in this case did not warrant the judgment which was
rendered on it, the Court will proceed to inquire whether that
judgment, while unreversed, does not bar the plaintiff's title.
The law respecting the proceedings of inferior courts, according
to the sense of that term as employed in the English books, has
been correctly laid down. The only question is was the court in
Page 9 U. S. 185
which this judgment was rendered, "an inferior court," in that
sense of the term?
All courts from which an appeal lies are inferior courts in
relation to the appellate court before which their judgment may be
carried, but they are not therefore inferior courts in the
technical sense of those words. They apply to courts of a special
and limited jurisdiction, which are erected on such principles that
their judgments, taken alone, are entirely disregarded, and the
proceedings must show their jurisdiction. The courts of the United
States are all of limited jurisdiction, and their proceedings are
erroneous, if the jurisdiction be not shown upon them. Judgments
rendered in such cases may certainly be reversed, but this Court is
not prepared to say that they are absolute nullities, which may be
totally disregarded.
In considering this question, therefore, the Constitution and
powers of the court in which this judgment was rendered must be
inspected.
It is understood to be a court of record possessing, in civil
cases, a general jurisdiction to any amount, with the exception of
suits for real property.
In treason, its jurisdiction is over all who can commit the
offense.
The Act of 4 October, 1776, defines the crime, and that of 20
September, 1777, prescribes the punishment. The act of 18 April,
1778, describes the mode of trial, and the tribunal by which final
judgment shall be rendered. That tribunal is the inferior court of
common pleas in each county. Every case of treason which could
arise under the former statutes is to be finally decided in this
Court. With respect to treason, then, it is a court of general
jurisdiction, so far as respects the property of the accused.
Page 9 U. S. 186
The Act of 11 December, 1778, extends the crime of treason to
acts not previously comprehended within the law, but makes no
alteration in the tribunal before which this offense is to be
tried, and by which final judgment is to be rendered.
This act cannot, it is conceived, be fairly construed to convert
the court of common pleas into a court of limited jurisdiction, in
cases of treason. It remains the only court capable of trying the
offenses described by the laws which have been mentioned, and it
has jurisdiction over all offenses committed under them.
In the particular case of Grace Kempe, the inquest is found in
the form prescribed by law and by persons authorized to find it.
The court was constituted according to law, and if an offense
punishable by the law had been in fact committed, the accused was
amenable to its jurisdiction so far as respected her property in
the State of New Jersey. The question whether this offense was or
was not committed, that is whether the inquest which is substituted
for a verdict on an indictment, did or did not show that the
offense had been committed, was a question which the court was
competent to decide. The judgment it gave was erroneous, but it is
a judgment, and until reversed cannot be disregarded.
This case differs from the case from Third Institute in this. In
that case, the court was composed of special commissioners
authorized to proceed not in all cases of treason, but in those
cases only in which an indictment had been taken before fifteen
commissioners. Their error was not in rendering judgment against a
person who was not proved by the indictment to have committed the
crime, but who, if guilty, they had no power to try. The
proceedings there were clearly
coram non judice.
It is unnecessary to notice the eleventh section of
Page 9 U. S. 187
the act, since, without resorting to it, this Court is of
opinion that there is no error in the judgment of the circuit
court. It is
Affirmed with costs.
