1. Where the owner of land in fee makes a conveyance to a person
in trust to convey to others upon certain conditions, and the
conditions never arise, so that the trust cannot possibly be
executed, a presumption arises in cases where an actual conveyance
would not involve a breach of duty in the trustee or a wrong to
some third person, that the trustee reconveyed to the owner, this
being in ordinary cases his duty.
2. It is not necessary that the presumption should rest upon a
basis of proof or a conviction that the conveyance had been in fact
executed.
3. When a court in a case where at jury is waived under the Act
of March 5, 1865 (
see Revised Statutes of the United
States, § 649), and the case is submitted to it without the
intervention of a jury, finds as a fact that
a conveyance was made to certain persons as trustees, and then
finds as a conclusion of law that the legal title remained in those
trustees, that finding does not bind this Court as a finding of
fact, and if it was the duty of the trustee to have reconveyed to
the grantor as stated in the first paragraph of this syllabus, this
Court will reverse the judgment, founded on that conclusion.
French brought ejectment, on the 30th of November, 1872, in the
court below, against Edwards and twelve others, for a piece of land
in California. The case was submitted to the court without the
intervention of a jury. The court found these facts:
(1) That R. H. Vance, on the 1st of March, 1862, was seized in
fee of the premises in controversy.
(2) That on that day he conveyed the premises to the plaintiff,
who thereupon became seized and the owner in fee, and remained such
owner until the 9th of January, 1863.
(3) That on that day, he and the defendants executed a joint
conveyance of the premises to Edward Martin and F. E. Lynch, their
heirs and assigns forever, upon certain
Page 88 U. S. 148
trusts, which, so far as it is necessary to state them, were as
follows:
To hold and convey the premises in lots of such size and for
such prices as should be directed by a committee of four persons,
or a majority of them, the committee to be appointed by the parties
to the deed and a railroad company then forming, and thereafter to
be incorporated, to construct a railroad leading from Sutteville,
and connecting with the Sacramento Valley Railroad.
This deed provided,
"That no conveyance shall be made by the said party of the
second part until the said railroad shall have been commenced in
good faith as aforesaid, and this conveyance shall be void if such
railroad shall not be built within one year from the date of these
presents, provided however that if the iron for such railroad shall
be lost or detained on its transit from the Atlantic states, from
any accident, then the time for completing said railroad shall be
extended to two years, instead of one year."
(4) That the railroad company was never incorporated and the
railroad was never commenced.
(5) That the defendants were in exclusive possession of the
premises at the commencement of the action, holding adversely to
the plaintiff and all other persons.
The court held that the legal title was vested in Martin and
Lynch by the deed of the 9th of January, 1863, was still vested in
them, and that the plaintiff could not therefore recover.
It accordingly gave judgment for the defendants, and the
plaintiff brought the case here, [
Footnote 1] where it was elaborately argued upon the
doctrine of subsequent conditions.
Page 88 U. S. 149
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have not found it necessary to consider the doctrine of
subsequent conditions broken, upon which the case has been
elaborately argued. Another ground of decision is disclosed which
we think free from difficulty and upon which we are satisfied to
place our judgment.
It appears that the trust deed to Martin and Lynch was executed
on the 9th of January, 1863. By its terms, it was to become void if
the railroad was not completed within one year from its date. This
suit was begun on the 30th of November, 1872, more than eight years
after the time limited when the deed, upon the contingency
mentioned, was to lose its efficacy. The court found that the road
had not been begun and that the company had not been incorporated.
There is nothing in the record indicating that either event will
ever occur. It was found that the plaintiff had a perfect title
when the trust deed was executed. The grantees therefore took their
entire title from him. It is a corollary that the other grantors
had nothing to convey. Their joining in the deed, so far as the
title was concerned, was matter of form, and not of substance.
Without incorporation, the railroad company could not share in the
appointment of the committee under whose direction the lots were to
be sold and the proceeds were to be distributed. Hence there could
be no sale, and the trustees were powerless to do anything but
remain passive and hold the title. The object of the conveyance had
wholly failed, and the trust was impossible to be performed. The
trust thus became barren. One more dry and naked could not exist.
It was the plain duty of the trustees to reconvey to their grantor.
He was the sole
cestui que trust, and had the exclusive
beneficial right to the property. A court of equity, if applied to,
could not have hesitated to compel a reconveyance. Under these
circumstances, such reconveyance will be presumed in equity and at
law as well. In
Lade v. Holford, [
Footnote 2] Lord Mansfield said that when trustees
ought to convey to the beneficial owner, he
Page 88 U. S. 150
would leave it to the jury to presume, where such presumption
might reasonably be made, that they had conveyed accordingly, "in
order to prevent a just title from being defeated by a matter of
form." This case was approved, and the doctrine applied by Lord
Kenyon in
England v. Slade. [
Footnote 3] Three things must concur to warrant the
presumption -- (1) It must have been the duty of the trustee to
convey. (2) There must be sufficient reason for the presumption.
(3) The object of the presumption must be the support of a just
title. [
Footnote 4] The case
must be clearly such that a court of equity, if called upon, would
decree a reconveyance. The present case is within these categories.
The trustees being bound to reconvey, it is to be presumed they
discharged that duty, rather than that they violated it by
continuing to hold on to the title. The trust was executory. When
its execution became impossible, common honesty, their duty, and
the law required that they should at once give back to the donor
the legal title which he had given to them. It is not necessary
that the presumption should rest upon a basis of proof or
conviction that the conveyance had in fact been executed. It is
made because right and justice require it. It never arises where
the actual conveyance would involve a breach of duty by the trustee
or wrong to others. Like the doctrine of relation, it is applied
only to promote the ends of justice, never to defeat them.
[
Footnote 5] The rule is firmly
established in the English law. [
Footnote 6] It is equally well settled in American
jurisprudence. [
Footnote 7]
Properly guarded in its application, the principle is a salutary
one. It prevents circuity of action, with its delays and expense,
quiets possessions, and gives repose and security to titles. Sir
William Grant said:
"Otherwise
Page 88 U. S. 151
titles must forever remain imperfect, and in many respects
unavailable, when, from length of time, it has become impossible to
discover in whom the legal estate, if outstanding, is actually
vested. . . . What ought to have been done, should be presumed to
have been done. When the purpose is answered for which the legal
estate is conveyed, it ought to be reconveyed. [
Footnote 8]"
If it had been one of the facts found by the court below, that
the title was still in the trustees, the case would have presented
a different aspect. [
Footnote
9] It is stated only as a conclusion of law, arising upon the
facts found. Such findings of facts are regarded in this Court in
the light of special verdicts.
"If a special verdict on a mixed question of fact and law, find
facts from which the court can draw clear conclusions, it is no
objection to the verdict that the jury themselves have not drawn
such conclusions, and stated them as facts in the case. [
Footnote 10]"
The presumption of the reconveyance arises here, with the same
effect upon the specific findings, as if it had been expressly set
forth as one of the facts found.
The conclusion of law that the title was still in the trustees,
was, therefore, a manifest error. On the contrary, it should have
been presumed that Martin and Edwards had reconveyed, and that the
title had thus become reinvested in the plaintiff, and the court
should have adjudged accordingly.
Judgment reversed and the case remanded, with directions to
proceed in conformity to this opinion.
[
Footnote 1]
This case was formerly before this Court in another shape.
80 U. S. 13 Wall.
506.
[
Footnote 2]
Buller's Nisi Prius 110.
[
Footnote 3]
4 Term 682.
[
Footnote 4]
Hill on Trustees, by Bispham, 394.
[
Footnote 5]
Hillary v. Waller, 12 Vesey 252; Best on Presumptions
112.
[
Footnote 6]
Langley v. Sneyd, 1 Simon & Stuart 55;
Hillary
v. Waller, supra; Goodson v. Ellisson, 3 Russell 588;
Doe
v. Sybourn, 7 Term 3;
Angier v. Stanard, 3 Mylne
& Keen 571;
Carteret v. Paschal, 3 Peere Williams
198.
[
Footnote 7]
Doe v. Campbell, 10 Johnson 475;
Jackson v.
Moore, 13
id. 513;
Moore v. Jackson, 4
Wendell 62;
Aiken v. Smith, 1 Sneed 304; Washburn on Real
Property 415 and note.
[
Footnote 8]
Hillary v. Waller, 12 Vesey
supra.
[
Footnote 9]
Goodtitle v. Jones, 7 Term 43;
Roe v. Read, 8
id. 122;
Matthews v. Wood's Lessee, 10 Gill &
Johnson 456.
[
Footnote 10]
Monkhouse v. Hay, 8 Price 256.
