1. An appeal in admiralty from the District to the circuit court
in effect vacates the decree of the district court, and a new trial
in all respects, and a new decree, are to be had in the circuit
court. The latter must execute its own decree, and the district
court has nothing more to do with the case.
2. An order of the circuit court merely affirming the decree of
the district court, and nothing more, is not such a decree as the
circuit court should render and is not a final decree from which an
appeal lies to this Court.
The Act of March 3, 1803,
* amendatory of the
Judiciary Act, enacts that "from all
final decrees"
rendered in any circuit court in any cases of admiralty, "where
the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed
the sum or value of $2,000," an appeal shall be allowed to this
Court.
This statute being in force, Nancy Repass libeled the schooner
Lucille, in the district court for Maryland, for damages,
alleging a collision by the
Lucille whereby she had been
"damaged to the extent of $2,000,
for which she claims
reparation in this suit."
The libel concluded with a prayer, that
"the court will pronounce for the libellant's aforesaid demand,
and for such other and further relief and redress as to right and
justice appertain, and as the court is competent to give in the
premises."
The court decreed in favor of the libellant for $2,100. The
libellant, objecting to a decree for a sum larger than that
claimed, remitted, of record, $100, parcel of the said sum, and the
other side appealed to the circuit court, where an order was
entered affirming the decree below. The order thus made, and from
which the present appeal was taken, was in the following words:
Page 86 U. S. 74
"It is, this 27th day of May, A.D. 1872, adjudged and ordered
that the decree of the district court be, and the same is hereby,
affirmed, with costs."
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Whatever may be the merit of the objection on which the motion
is founded, namely that the above decree is not for an amount
exceeding $2,000, we are of opinion that there is not a final
decree from which an appeal can be taken to this Court, and that
this appeal must for that reason be dismissed.
An appeal in admiralty has the effect to supersede and vacate
the decree from which it is taken. A new trial, completely and
entirely new, with other testimony and other pleadings, if
necessary, or, if asked for, is contemplated -- a trial in which
the judgment of the court below is regarded as though it had never
been rendered. A new decree is to be made in the circuit court.
This decree is to be enforced by the order of that court, and the
record remains there. The case is not sent back to the district
court for executing the decree, or for any other proceeding
whatever, and that court has nothing further to do with it. The
decree should
Page 86 U. S. 75
therefore be complete within itself. In the case before us, the
decree fixes no sum which the successful party is to recover. If
any process is to be issued to enforce it, the clerk must from the
record of the district court ascertain the amount, or he can issue
no such process. But this is the duty of the court, and not the
clerk. It may be said that it is, in such case as this, a mere
matter of computation, and in some cases it may be. But the one
before us shows that it is not always so, for the only question
argued by counsel on this motion is whether the judgment affirmed
is for $2,000 or $2,100 -- for the amount after the remittitur or
before. No final decree of a court which enforces its own judgments
ought to be left in such condition that the record of another court
is the only evidence of the amount recovered by the successful
party. An order affirming a decree in another court is neither in
express terms nor by necessary implication a judgment or decree for
the amount of the judgment or decree in that court. The costs of
the lower court, and the interest on its judgment to the date of
the decree or judgment on appeal, are to be added to it, and,
though they may be computed by the clerk, they should have the
judicial consideration of the court. According to these views,
there is no final decree such as the law intends in the circuit
court in this case, and the appeal is
Dismissed.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD dissented.
* 2 Stat. at Large 244.
