1. A writ of error lies from this Court to the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia on a judgment confirming an assessment for
damages by the use of the street in front of the church of
defendants in error, although the proceedings before the jury and
the marshal and in the Supreme Court are governed by a statute of
Maryland which, by the construction of the courts of that state,
does not allow an appeal or writ of error.
2. The early decisions of this Court held that the right to the
writ exists in such cases by virtue of the appellate power of this
Court as defined in the Act of 1801, creating the Circuit Court of
the District, and we are governed by the same act.
The trustees of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, in the City of
Washington, instituted proceedings before the marshal and a jury of
the District of Columbia against the Baltimore & Potomac
Railroad Company to recover from it damages which the church had
sustained by reason of the road of the company having been run
through a street in front of their church. The jury assessed the
damages at $11,500, and on the return of this inquest into the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the inquisition was
confirmed and a judgment rendered that the trustees of the church
recover of the railroad company that sum, with costs. The company
having brought the case to this Court on writ of error, a motion
was now made by the trustees of the church to dismiss it for want
of jurisdiction in this Court.
This want of jurisdiction was based on two propositions:
Page 86 U. S. 63
1. That the proceeding is in its nature summary and special, and
is of that character in which the action of the court confirming or
quashing the verdict of the jury is conclusive, and admits of no
appeal.
2. That the proceeding in this case is governed, both before the
jury and in the Supreme Court of the District, by a statute of
Maryland which, by the uniform construction of the courts of that
state, does not allow an appeal or writ of error to any other
court.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is certainly true that the proceeding is of the character
asserted in the propositions on which the want of jurisdiction is
based, and that, as a general rule, no appeal or writ of error lies
in this class of cases.
But the appellate jurisdiction of this Court over the doings of
the Supreme Court of the District is established and regulated by
act of Congress, and a reference to the statutes on this subject is
necessary to the decision of the question before us. The act which
created the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia vested in it
the same powers and jurisdiction that had previously belonged to
the circuit court, which it superseded, and the appellate power of
this Court was declared to be the same as that which it had, by
law, over the circuit court. The Act of February 27, 1801,
organizing the circuit court, declares that any final judgment,
order, or decree in said circuit court, where the matter in
dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the value of one hundred
dollars, may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme
Court of the United States by writ of error or appeal, and though
the sum limiting this jurisdiction has been increased to $1,000,
this statute remains the sole rule governing the right of appeal in
all other respects.
We are of opinion that both the questions raised by the motion
to dismiss have been explicitly decided by this Court.
Page 86 U. S. 64
In the case of
Custiss v. Turnpike Company, [
Footnote 1] an assessment for land
taken for the use of the company was quashed by the circuit court,
and a writ of error was sued out by Custiss from this Court. A
motion was made to dismiss this writ on the same ground taken in
the present case -- namely want of jurisdiction -- to which
Marshall, C.J., replied, that
"at the opening of the case, some doubt was entertained as to
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; but that doubt is removed by
an inspection of the act by which the Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia is constituted. The words of that act, descriptive of
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, are more ample than those
employed in the judicial act."
He then quotes them as we have given them above.
So in the case of
Young v. Bank of Alexandria,
[
Footnote 2] the Court uses
this emphatic language in regard to the same statute: "The words of
the Act of Congress, being as explicit as language can furnish,
must comprehend every case not completely excepted from them."
It is to be observed also that in this latter case, the rights
of the bank and the jurisdiction of the court over it were said in
argument to be controlled by an act of the Legislature of Virginia.
But the court held that whatever might be the extent to which that
statute affected the rights of the parties, the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court depended solely on the act
already quoted.
But perhaps the most conclusive case in this branch of the
discussion, namely, the proposition that the statute of Maryland
governs the right of appeal in the present case, because by the Act
of Congress it is adopted as the mode of proceeding in assessing
damages and in defining the power of the Supreme Court of the
District in the matter, is that of
Carter's Heirs v.
Cutting. [
Footnote 3] That
was a case in which an order of the Orphans' Court of Alexandria
County, being affirmed in the circuit court, an appeal was taken to
this Court, and a motion was made to dismiss that appeal. This
Page 86 U. S. 65
motion was based upon the twelfth section of the same Act of
February 27, 1801, by which it was declared that the circuit court,
in appeals from the Orphans' Court, shall therein have all the
power of the chancellor of the state of Maryland, and by the laws
of Maryland the decree of the chancellor in such case was
final.
It will be observed that the analogy between that case and the
present is perfect. But the court said in that case that the
conclusiveness of the sentence formed no part of the essence of the
powers of the court. Its powers to act are as ample independent of
their final quality as with it. And referring to the language so
often cited already, they say:
"We cannot admit that construction to be a sound one which seeks
by remote inferences to withdraw a case from the general provisions
of a statute which is clearly within its words and perfectly
consistent with its intent."
We do not feel at liberty to disregard these contemporaneous
expositions of an act of Congress which has furnished the criterion
of our jurisdiction ever since the courts of the District were
established, and they are so directly in point that we cannot
dismiss the writ without overruling them. The motion is
therefore
Denied.
[
Footnote 1]
10 U. S. 6 Cranch
233.
[
Footnote 2]
8 U. S. 4 Cranch
384.
[
Footnote 3]
12 U. S. 8 Cranch
251.
