1. Where two persons were driving sulkies in competition
alongside of each other at a horse race for money -- which sort of
race was made illegal by statute -- and on a collision ensuing, one
jumped to the ground from his sulky, and was clear from the sulky,
harness, and reins, on his feet and uninjured, and instantly spoke
to his horse to stop, and then started forward to get hold of the
reins, which were hanging across the axletree, and when ahold of,
or attempting to get hold of them, was killed by getting tangled in
them, falling down and being dragged against a
Page 86 U. S. 532
stone,
held, on a suit upon a policy of insurance on
the life of the person killed which made it a condition of paying
the sum assured that the contract should not extend to a case of
death caused by "dueling, fighting, or other
breach of the law
on the part of the assured, or by his willfully exposing himself to
any unnecessary danger or peril" -- that this death was within
the condition, and that the leap from the sulky and securing the
reins, and the subsequent fall and injury, were so close and
immediate in their relation to the racing, and all so manifestly
part of one continuous transaction, that it could not be said that
there was a new and controlling influence to which the disaster
should be attributed.
2. On a suit for the insurance money on such a policy as the one
above mentioned, and where the language of the condition was the
matter referred to by the court, it was error to tell the jury that
they were to consider
"how ordinary people in the part of the country where the
insured reside, in view of the state of things then existing -- the
frequency of such races, and the way in which such matches are
usually regulated -- would naturally understand such language,
whether as precluding such driving or not."
Mrs. Elizabeth Seaver sued the Travelers' Insurance Company of
Hartford on a policy of insurance, which insured her against loss
of life of her husband -- described in the policy as a livery
stable keeper -- caused by any accident within the meaning of the
policy and conditions thereto annexed. Among these conditions was
one that the insurance should
"not extend to death or injury caused by dueling or fighting,
or other breach of the law on the part of the assured, . . . or
by his willfully exposing himself to any unnecessary danger or
peril."
Seaver, the husband, was killed suddenly at Morrisville,
Vermont, immediately after jumping from a sulky, in which he was
driving in a match race, on the event of which a considerable sum
of money was wagered. The defense of the company, as the case was
submitted to the jury, was that his death was caused by a breach of
the law and by his willfully exposing himself to unnecessary
danger.
The plaintiff's evidence, as the bill of exceptions showed,
tended to prove that at the race, Seaver was driving a mare and
sulky; that one Gilmore was driving a horse and sulky in
competition alongside; that the track was "in form like the link of
a chain," in other words was an oval track; and
Page 86 U. S. 533
that soon after leaving the judge's stand, Seaver having the
inside track, and his mare and Gilmore's horse being nearly
abreast, Seaver's mare broke and fell back, and that Gilmore's
horse got a little ahead; that Gilmore thereupon reined in towards
the inside track, apparently to get the inside track -- his team
being then about half its length ahead of Seaver's mare -- that
Seaver's mare at that moment regained her speed and, gaining on the
other horse, the sulkies came into collision. That the wheel of
Seaver passed over the near wheel of Gilmore, and that Seaver
instantly jumped from his sulky, and struck upon the grass ground
off the track, upon his feet, uninjured, some two or three feet
from his sulky, and entirely free from it; that if he had remained
standing where he struck, he would have received no injury; that he
instantly spoke to his mare, and that the mare slackened her speed,
and that Seaver started to catch her, and with that purpose ran a
distance of some twenty feet by her side, trying to get hold of the
reins to stop her; that the reins were hanging loosely across the
axletree of the carriage; that when Seaver ran the distance as
aforesaid, and while thus running with one hand either ahold of or
grasping for the reins, the mare turned in upon the grass ground
and towards Seaver, throwing him down, when in some way he became
entangled in the reins, and was dragged along a few feet until his
head struck a stone with great force; that Seaver was immediately
taken up insensible and carried into the house, and that he died
the next morning from the injury.
The plaintiff's evidence further tended to show that by the
rules of the trotting course, Gilmore had not the right to attempt
to take the inside track until he had passed Seaver a distance
equal to the whole length of Seaver's team.
The defendant gave in evidence section nine of chapter cxix of
the General Statutes of Vermont, which was as follows:
"All racing, running, trotting, or pacing of any horse or horse
kind for any bet or wager of money or other valuable
Page 86 U. S. 534
thing, or for any purse or stake made, is hereby declared a
misdemeanor, and the parties, contrivers, aiders and abettors
thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding $500."
The court charged as follows:
"That for the purposes of this trial, the jury were to regard
the trotting race in which the insured was engaged when he jumped
from his sulky and was killed as a breach of the law within the
meaning of the conditions of the policy."
"That the jury were therefore to inquire whether the death of
the insured was occasioned by the breach of the law; that this was
a question for the jury."
"That if the jury should find that Seaver was killed by the race
itself, by an ordinary accident of the race, so that the race was
the proximate cause of the death, the plaintiff could not recover;
but if the jury should find that Gilmore turned his horse
intentionally and tortiously, with the purpose of winning the race
at all hazards, whether he should crowd Seaver from the track or
not, then that the conduct of Gilmore and not the race would be the
proximate cause of the death, and the plaintiff would be entitled
to recover."
"That the plaintiff's evidence showed that Gilmore, turning in
as he did, was in violation of the rules of the race; that a man
was usually to be taken as intending the natural and necessary
consequences of his own acts. And that if the jury were of opinion
that Gilmore drove as he did tortiously and with the intention of
winning the race in any event, even though in his so doing he
should crowd Seaver from the track and upset him, and that such
driving caused the death of Seaver, then the jury should find for
the plaintiff."
"That if the death of the insured was caused by the willful
exposure of himself to an unnecessary danger or peril within the
meaning of the other clause in the policy relied on by the
defendants, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover."
"That upon this part of the case, it was to be considered,
however, that the language of this clause must be taken most
strongly against the defendant, because used in their policy, and
for the purpose of inducing parties to take policies;"
"And that it was further to be considered how ordinary people in
the part of the country where the insured reside, in view of the
state of things then existing, the frequency of such
Page 86 U. S. 535
races, and the way in which such matches are usually regulated,
would naturally understand such language, whether as precluding
such driving or not."
"That the jury should also consider the nature of the business
of the insured as set forth in the application and therefore known
to the defendant -- that of livery stable keeper -- which, of
course, embraced the management and driving of horses."
"That the question was not what construction would be given to
the language at Hartford, where the defendants' company was
located, but, in view of all the circumstances and conditions above
alluded to, whether intelligent, fair-minded people in the vicinity
of the insured where the contract was made would regard it as
excluding the driving of such a race, and, if not, that the case
would not come within the proviso of that clause in the policy, and
the plaintiff would, so far as that is concerned, be entitled to
recover."
The jury found a general verdict for the plaintiff, and found in
addition, in answer to questions specially submitted, a special
finding thus:
"That when the sulky of Seaver came into collision with the
sulky of Gilmore, Seaver jumped to the ground and was entirely
clear from the sulky, harness, and reins, upright and uninjured,
and spoke to his horse to stop, and then started forward to get
hold of the lines to stop him, and in that attempt was killed."
The company excepted to the charge of the court, and, judgment
going for the plaintiff, it brought the case here.
Page 86 U. S. 539
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The statutes of Vermont make all horse racing for any bet or
wager a misdemeanor and impose a fine not exceeding $500 for the
offense.
In regard to this branch of the defense, the court instructed
the jury that they were to regard the trotting race, in which the
insured was engaged when he jumped from the sulky and was killed,
as a breach of the law within the meaning
Page 86 U. S. 540
of the clause of the policy on that subject. As the plaintiff
below took no exception to this ruling and had a verdict, no error
can be assigned on it here, and we need not further examine the
argument of her counsel, which controverts that proposition.
The court further instructed the jury on this branch of the
subject, as follows:
"That if the jury should find that Seaver was killed by the race
itself, by an ordinary accident of the race, so that the race was
the proximate cause of the death, the plaintiff could not recover;
but if the jury should find that Gilmore turned his horse in
intentionally and tortiously, with the purpose of winning the race
at all hazards, whether he should crowd Seaver from the track or
not, then that the conduct of Gilmore and not the race would be the
proximate cause of the death, and the plaintiff would be entitled
to recover."
"That the plaintiff's evidence showed that Gilmore, turning in
as he did, was in violation of the rules of the race; that a man
was usually to be taken as intending the natural and necessary
consequences of his own acts. And that if the jury were of opinion
that Gilmore drove, as he did tortiously, and with the intention of
winning the race in any event, even though in his so doing he
should crowd Seaver from the track and upset him, and that such
driving caused the death of Seaver, then the jury should find for
the plaintiff."
In regard to this, the plaintiff in error contends that no
evidence was given tending to show that Gilmore intentionally and
tortiously turned his horse with the purpose of winning the race at
all hazards, whether he should crowd Seaver from the track or not.
All that the bill of exceptions discloses on this point is that
Seaver having the inside track, his mare broke and fell back a
little;
"that Gilmore thereupon reined in towards the inside of the
track, apparently to get the inside track, his team being then
about half its length ahead of Seaver's mare; that Seaver's mare
at
Page 86 U. S. 541
that moment regained her speed and, gaining on the other horse,
the sulkies came into collision."
We think this a very slender foundation to put to the jury the
question of Gilmore's tortious intention to drive Seaver from the
track at all hazards and to rest upon that possible secret
intention the proposition that the race was not the proximate cause
of the death, but that Gilmore's act was. It was well calculated to
mislead, and no doubt did mislead, the jury. If the legal
proposition was sound, the state of the testimony, as given in the
bill of exceptions, on which it was founded could hardly justify
it. It would have been much nearer sound principle to have said to
the jury that if Seaver saw that Gilmore was ahead of him ever so
little, his persistence in so running his horse as to bring about a
collision was willfully exposing himself to danger within the
meaning of the policy.
But we are of opinion that if the testimony raised the point,
the instruction was erroneous. The company, in protecting
themselves against accident or death caused by a violation of law,
acted upon a wise and prudent estimate of the dangers to the person
generally connected with such violations. And in the class of cases
under consideration, we have no question that the sum of money
often at stake stimulates to further acts of carelessness in the
way of violence, fraud, and a disregard of the rules of fair
racing, which increase largely the dangers always attendant on that
sport. The class of men who collect on such occasions and who often
become the leading parties in the conduct of the affair when large
sums of money are wagered have led to its denunciation by many wise
and thoughtful people, and very surely adds to the risk of personal
injury to the rider or driver. It was against this general species
of danger, attending nearly all infractions of the law, that the
company sought to protect itself by the clause of the policy in
question, and of this class was the reckless driving of Gilmore. If
his intentions were as bad as the instructions imply, they did not
take the case out of the protection of the clause.
If Seaver had died the moment he was thrown from the
Page 86 U. S. 542
sulky, his death would have been caused by a violation of the
law, though Gilmore may have disregarded the rules of the course
and may have intentionally sought to run Seaver off the track.
The jury, in response to a request to find specially on certain
points, did, in addition to a general verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, make the following special finding:
"And the jury further find that when the sulky of Seaver came
into collision with the sulky of Gilmore, Seaver jumped to the
ground and was entirely clear from the sulky, harness, and reins,
upright and uninjured, and spoke to his horse to stop, and then
started forward to get hold of the lines to stop him, and in that
attempt was killed."
It is said that this verdict is conclusive that the death of the
deceased was not caused by the violation of the law in trotting for
a wager, but by his own voluntary act when he was not trotting; and
both parties appeal to the case of
Insurance Company v.
Tweed, * where it is
said that when a new force or cause of the injury intervenes
between the original cause and the accident, the former is the
proximate cause.
But we do not think this new force or cause is sufficiently made
out by this verdict. The leap from the sulky and securing the
reins, and the subsequent fall and injury to Seaver are so close
and immediate in their relation to his racing, and all so
manifestly part of one continuous transaction, that we cannot, as
this finding presents it, say there was a new and controlling
influence to which the disaster should be attributed. If he had
been landed safely from his sulky and, after being assured of his
position, had, with full knowledge of what he was doing, gone to
catch the animal, his death in that pursuit when the race was lost
might have been too remote to bring the case within the
exception.
But as the finding presents it, we cannot say that the accident
was not caused by the race which was itself a violation of the law,
and which might still have gone on had he caught his mare in
time.
Page 86 U. S. 543
And we are to consider that both this special finding and the
general verdict were probably influenced by the erroneous
instruction we have already considered, and by that we are now
about to mention.
The jury were told that if the death of the insured was caused
by the willful exposure of himself to an unnecessary danger or
peril within the meaning of the other clause in the policy relied
on by the defendants, the plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover. The court added:
"Upon this part of the case, it was to be considered, however,
that the language of this clause must be taken most strongly
against the defendant, because used in their policy, and for the
purpose of inducing parties to take policies."
"It was also further to be considered how ordinary people in the
part of the country where the insured resided, in view of the state
of things then existing, the frequency of such races and the way in
which such matches are usually regulated, would naturally
understand such language, whether as precluding such driving or
not."
"The jury should also consider the nature of the business of the
insured, as set forth in the application, and therefore known to
the defendant, that of a livery stable keeper, which of course
embraced the management and driving of horses."
"That the question was not what construction would be given to
the language at Hartford, where the defendant's company is located,
but, in view of all the circumstances and conditions above alluded
to, whether intelligent, fair-minded people in the vicinity of the
insured where the contract was made would regard it as excluding
the driving of such a race, and if not that the case would not come
within the proviso of that clause in the policy, and the plaintiff
would, so far as that is concerned, be entitled to recover."
We are of opinion that the language of this policy is to be
construed by the court, so far as it involved matters of law, and
by the jury aided by the court when it involved law and fact, and
that in neither view of it was the opinion of ordinary people in
view of the state of things where the deceased resided, or their
understanding of its language in view of the
Page 86 U. S. 544
circumstances of the case, any sound criterion by which the
judgment of the jury should be formed, and the instruction in this
branch of the case was unwarranted and misleading.
The jury should have been left to decide for themselves, under
all the facts before them attending the death of the insured,
whether it was caused by his willful exposure to an unnecessary
danger or peril. Such light as the court as a matter of law could
give them on the subject of the willfulness of his conduct or the
presence or absence of any necessity or the character of the
necessity which would justify him might be proper, but this general
reference to what ordinary people in a particular locality might
think about it, was clearly not so.
For the errors here considered,
The judgment is reversed with direction to grant a new
trial.
4 7 Wall. 44.
